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A B S T R A C T
This is an account of European settlement and se t t le r  
plantat ion agriculture in the region of Papua New Guinea 
formerly known as B r i t ish  New Guinea (1884-1905) and 
subsequently as the Te r r i to ry  of Papua when the country 
was administered as a separate Te r r i to ry  of the 
Commonwealth of Austra l ia  un t i l  1942 under the Papua Act 
of 1905. The period of the study ends in 1942.
Part I is a consideration of the fa i lu re  of B r i t ish  New 
Guinea to a t t rac t  the se t t le rs  thought necessary i f  the 
country was to 'develop' and pay i t s  way. Part I I  examines 
the beginnings of Commonwealth respon s ib i l i ty  and the 
formation of pol icy for  a t e r r i t o r y  thought l i k e l y  to be 
of great economic value. The international plantat ion 
boom of the decade before 1914 did bring a considerable 
investment and a few hundred se t t le rs  with high expectat­
ions. Part I I I  deals with c o n f l i c t  between the administr­
ation of Judge J H P ( la te r  Sir  Hubert) Murray and the 
planters over the course of development and the place of 
the Papuan people in the colonial economy. In Part IV a 
series of crises and disappointments force se t t le rs  to 
reassess the i r  posit ion and reach a kind of accord with 
the Papuan Government in the period 1921-26. Part V i s a  
h is tory  of the subsequent d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered by the 
plantat ion industr ies. Part VI is an account of the 
culture and l i f e  of the planter community and an 
examination of re la t ions on the plantat ions between 
European management and Papuan workers. Part VII provides 
conclusions.
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Note on weights, measures and currency:
Imperial weights and measures are used throughout. A conversion 
table is provided below. Since in f la t io n  of currencies has 
obviously taken place since the beginning of the century even as 
general wealth and income have risen i t  is d i f f i c u l t  to establish 
standards of comparison by which we now can have some idea of what 
the value and purchasing power of money was then. A salary of £250 
a year provided a handsome l i v in g  fo r  a plantat ion manager in 1914 
and a meagre one in 1921. We might need to mu lt ip ly  these f igures 
by a factor  of twenty at least to give an equivalent in 1988 
Austral ian Dollars. By th is  calcu lat ion the salary of the 
Lieutenant Governor of Papua, £1,800 in 1922, would be about 
$36,000 in 1988, hardly a very large income, but the £1 m i l l ion  
invested in the Te r r i to ry  in the boom years would be equivalent to 
$20 m i l l io n ,  the investment of £200,000 by Sir  Rupert Clarke and 
R S Whiting alone worth $4 m i l l ion  today, the minimum £6 a year 
paid to indentured Papuan labourers the purchasing power of about 
$120, the minimum annual cost of a labourer to an employer in 
wages, food, and fees, $360.
Imperial Metric
1 pound (weight) =
1 hundredweight (112 pounds) = 
1 ton (2240 pounds weight)
1 mi le
1 acre =
.4536 kilogram 
50.80 kilograms 
1.016 tonnes 
1.609 ki lometres 
.405 hectare
There were twenty sh i l l in g s  in a Pound (£) whether 
Sterl ing (Stg) or Austral ian (Aust). £ 1(Stg) was exchanged for  
twenty-f ive sh i l l ing s  (Aust) over much of the period under review. 
There were twelve pence in a s h i l l i n g  and 240 pence in £1. In 
1965 each £1 (Aust) became valued at $2 (Aust).
1Introduction
Plantations
There can be perhaps l i t t l e  posthumous meeting of minds between 
the white planter of the period 1884 to 1942 and the Melanesian 
nat ional i s t .  That a s e t t l e r  should have extracted something l ike 
a 'Western' standard of l iving from the labour of Papua New 
Guineans in Papua New Guinea, regardless of the contribution of 
his capital  and effor t  and however unremunerative his investment 
in the end, may seem now the taking of an immoral advantage of a 
defenceless people. In the larger world, plantat ions stand accused 
of being mere enclaves of the economies of the occupying powers 
set up to exploi t  the resources and labour of others,  while 
contributing l i t t l e  to any improvement in thei r  comfort, and at 
the additional cost of thei r  l iber ty .  Through the unimpeded 
expatriat ion of prof i t s ,  i t  is said, the operation of these 
enclaves prevented capital  accumulation in the colonies,  stranding 
them in a s ta te  of permanent dependency or "underdevelopment" with 
the resul t  that  the "independence" that  was f ina l ly  achieved by 
former colonial states is a sham, a mask for "neo-colonialism", a 
clever device by which exploi tat ion continues through a duped and 
compromised native e l i t e .  And not only does the plantat ion system 
stand accused of being the most extreme form of predatory 
exploi tat ion undertaken by the western imperial is ts  but i t  is 
widely assumed that  during the colonial period i t  must also have 
been highly prof i table ,  whatever they say, for the planters
themselves, and that in the scale of explo iters these set t le rs  
represent an especial ly pernicious class.
I am not equipped to respond to th is  analysis, though I can 
feel i t s  power, except by way of test ing i t s  appl icat ion in one 
case. The r e a l i t y ,  in Papua at least,  was otherwise, the planters 
themselves dupes of excessive expectations and delusions they 
shared with those who had encouraged them to se t t le  there, and 
peripheral losers in the p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, and cul tu ra l  
transformations of th is  century. Without 'development' from which 
a revenue could be raised, Papua's predecessor, B r i t ish  New 
Guinea, had 'stood s t i l l ' .  Scarcely any se t t le rs  at a l l  could be 
persuaded to come to the country in the f i r s t  twenty years of 
European dominion on the coast of south east New Guinea despite 
the very generous conditions offered. The rush that fol lowed in 
1906-14 was the by-product of an in te rnational  boom in tropical  
agriculture that quite fo r tu i to u s ly  occured at the moment the new 
Austral ian Commonwealth was determining a pol icy fo r  the ' f i r s t  
grandchild of the Empire '. (1) No one in 1905 or 1914 could have 
envisaged the world of 1975 or 1988. The European intervention in 
Papua seemed then - to those wishing the Papuans well as much as 
to those who cared only fo r  p r o f i t  - f i n a l l y  unavoidable, the 
se t t le rs  indispensible, the kind of economy they brought the only
1 The phrase‘was Beatrice Grimshaw's in her Papua the
Marvellous: The country of chances, 1909. p. 5. See below 
p. 104. I t  was used in the t i t l e  of a small book, Papua:
"A Grandchild of the Empire", by Gordon Ing l is  published 
in 1912. I t  was a co l lec t ion  of a r t ic les  on Papua wr i t ten 
fo r  The Field.
3one they could have brought. I cannot assert that planters and 
plantations did not exploit Papuans in the sense described, only 
that at the time quite rational men, and not always out of 
self-interest ,  saw the situation differently. I am not sure that 
planters and plantations were then wrong to be there. That is just 
how the world was.
Undoubtedly the Papuan planters of the f i r s t  decade of this 
century, like planters everywhere, were opportunists on one front 
of the progress of a triumphant and flexible 'western' culture - a 
civilization, underpinned by unparalleled advances in empirical 
sciences, that had institutionalised the seizure and exploitation 
of economic and technical advantage. Undoubtedly the development 
of colonial plantations allowed the rapid expansion of production 
of desired commodities for European consumption at greatly 
decreased cost. Undoubtedly, also, the power that the European 
states could bring to bear, moderated only by their own 
imperfectly applied moral systems, to impose and maintain the 
conditions in the plantation colonies that were optimum for 
production was unprecedented. But so intense did the 
international competition and efficient the production of tropical 
commodities become by the 1920's that the profits of the planting 
industries rapidly declined as the prices to consumers declined. 
Consumption in the West was profligate but not insatiable. 
Excessive planting and overproduction in the rival mercantile 
empires was inevitable - this at least was vaguely expected - but 
the consequent decline in profitabi1ity exacerbated by the immense 
blow to wealth, trade and economic growth dealt the Europeans by
4the i r  se l f -des truc t ive  war of 1914-18 no one could have thought 
possible. There would be no bargaining power l e f t  fo r  coloured 
labour and l i t t l e  fo r  white capital in the colonies locked into 
the straightened international economic order of the 1920's and 
1930's.
The conditions whereby white men, whether as individual 
se t t le rs  or as employees, could come to t rop ica l  t e r r i t o r ie s  to 
work land and secure the service of indentured labourers, who were 
not white, at a cost in wages, issues, provisions and charges that 
amounted per head, as in the case of Papua in 1926, to perhaps one 
twentieth of the cost of a white overseer, a tw e n ty - f i f th  the cost 
of an employed manager, or a tenth the cost of an unski l led 
labourer in metropol itan countries, were not determined by the 
se t t le r  but by the reach of European power before 1914 and by the 
terms of trade in commodities desired by the Europeans.(2) After a 
time these conditions ensured that prices of plantat ion products 
everywhere were held close to the costs of production in those 
colonial t e r r i t o r ie s  where costs were lowest. Whether by 'good 
fortune' in being f i r s t  in a t t rac t ing  cap i ta l ,  or whether by 
reasons of cl imate, soi l  and an abundance of avai lable land and 
labour, however secured, some colonies became the pace setters in 
the production of vegetable o i l s  and f ib res ,  rubber, spices, 
sugar, tea, coffee and cacao. Ceylon and Malaya, the Phi l ippines,  
Java and Sumatra, the Gold and Ivory Coasts were among these 
jewels of empire in the la te  nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Benefi t t ing from economies of scale and in f ras t ruc tu re  
and the higher prices that obtained in the early days of greatest
2 See Chapter 11, p. 217
5advantage such producers came to dominate the markets dr iv ing 
prices down un t i l  marginal producers elsewhere in the colonial 
world could not survive without the intercession of governments 
whose revenues were dependent upon commodity exports. Colonial 
t e r r i t o r ie s  on the margins of production were the las t  to benefi t  
from rises in prices and the f i r s t  to f a l t e r  as prices f e l l  below 
costs. Such a t e r r i t o r y  was Papua.
The Planters
This thesis is an account of the planters that set t led in Papua 
between 1884 and 1942, the expectations they brought and 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  they experienced as ind iv iduals  and as a group, and 
of the plantat ion industr ies they developed. The foreigners, men 
and women, who came to B r i t ish  New Guinea and Papua as planters 
and se t t le rs  number only a few hundred and most are known and 
id e n t i f ia b le  by name. With these Austral ians, Englishmen, 
Scotsmen, Irishmen and others - planters, se t t le rs ,  men and women 
- I found i t  d i f f i c u l t ,  as I proceeded, not to have a deep 
sympathy. The intense re la t ionship  with his or her subject matter 
and a close association with a group of people (from whom he or 
she may feel i n i t i a l l y  quite al ienated by temperament and 
outlook), has probably led before to an enhancement of 
understanding in a researcher that makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  him, or 
her, to condemn easi ly . The researcher might well come to feel as 
Margery Perham f e l t  in Kenya in 1930 that
I think I now understand the 'immigrant community1. To 
own a b i t  of th is  lovely country, to make a house... to
have a share in th is  t h r i l l i n g  sunl ight;  to have cheap, 
apparently reverent ia l ,  impersonal labour; to feel the 
sense of s ing u la r i ty ,  of enhanced personal i ty that comes 
from having a white skin among dark mi 11ions. . . You feel 
there is a fu ture to be made and that your head and hands 
w i l l  count in the laying of i t s  foundations.(3)
With benefi t  of hindsight, we know what the outcomes were fo r  
these people and how th e i r  work has been eclipsed by changes in 
geo-po l i t ica l  r e a l i t y  and in social and racia l outlook. Of the 
trauma - was i t  not also a l iberat ion? - fo r  Melanesian societ ies 
that attended white settlement and the experience of ind ividual 
Papuans we can know less. For h is tory  i t s e l f  is an ar te fact of 
western culture and the records l e f t  by the Europeans are fo r  much 
of the story a l l  that we have. With the Melanesians - 
"Hanuabadans" and "Rigos", "Orokaivas" and "Mambares", "Gosiagos" 
and " I a s i - I a s i s " ,  "Goaribaris" and "Kiwais" - then remote in 
the i r  cul tu ra l  separation, yet men no less than themselves, 
Europeans can now id e n t i f y  fa r  more readi ly  than could the i r  
fathers. But the presence of Papuans here surfaces largely in 
th e i r  re la t ion  to the intruders, as servants, constables, 
labourers, as prisoners or witnesses, as fr iends only in a very 
res t r ic ted  sense, or as enemies. For the inequa l i t ies  of power, 
material cul ture and organisation between the newcomers and the 
Papuans were bound fo r  a time to create or confirm notions of 
super io r i ty  on the one side and i n f e r i o r i t y  on the other. Few i f  
any Europeans before 1914, or indeed 1945, however humanitarian,
3 Margery Perham. East African Journey (London 1976), p. 190.
could admit a confident be l ie f  in the complete equal i ty  of 
non-Europeans with themselves.
The thesis is also a study of c o n f l i c t  - between the desire of 
the metropol itan power to p r o f i t  from i t s  dependency and the 
desire to be seen by others and h is tory  to have dealt j u s t l y  with 
i t s  or ig ina l  inhabitants; between the in terests ,  as they saw them, 
of the white 'Papuan' se t t le rs ,  and the in terests of the 'na t ive ' 
Papuans and of good government as seen by the Papuan 
administrat ion. In the twenty years from 1905 un t i l  1925 contests 
to decide these issues were dramatical ly played out. Though 
perhaps only 'storms in the Papuan teacup' (4) in a wider context, 
especial ly between 1914 and 1922 what seemed at the time to the 
antagonists a t i t a n i c  struggle took place in the Papuan microcosm 
to decide an essential issue - the question of to whom the future 
of Papua would belong - the 'pioneering' se t t le rs  or the Papuans. 
In 1975 i t  would seem obvious that demographic r e a l i t y ,  long term 
p o l i t i c a l  expediency and jus t ice  could determine only one outcome 
to such an issue - and so i t  could seem at a distance at the time 
- but se t t le rs  whose outlook had been formed in the late Victorian 
years brought to Papua assumptions about th e i r  place in the world 
and the place of non-Europeans that were not easi ly  shaken, 
assumptions in c o n f l i c t  with those underpinning the 'weak and 
foo l ish '  humanitarianism of Christ ian missions and 'u n re a l is t ic '  
paternalism and legalism of ' h y p o c r i t i c a l ' governments. The
4 The expression is used by C D Rowley in his The A u s t ra l ians 
in German New Guinea (Melbourne, 1958), p. 332. He was 
describing the press agi ta t ion and the publ ic meetings of 
1920 when opposition to J H P Murray's administrat ion 
reached i t s  peak. I t  was ' t h is  storm in the Papuan teacup'
- fo r a l l  i t s  clamour no more than a side-show at a time 
when the destiny of the former German New Guinea was beinq 
decided.
bitterness of th is  struggle between the regime of Judge J H P 
Murray and the local and Austral ian c a p i ta l i s ts  he represented as 
being ' i n d i f fe re n t  to native su f fe r ing '  and wanting to debauch the 
country, had as i t s  real cause the f ru s t ra t io n  of s e t t le r  hopes 
and the fa i lu re  of the prosperity expected before 1914 to be 
realised in the fo l lowing years, but se t t le rs  saw th e i r  problems 
as the resu l t  of an unsympathetic government pursuing a generous 
'na t ive '  pol icy paid fo r  out of s e t t le r  capital and e f fo r t .  A 
col lapse of trade in 1920-22 at the very time when tree crops were 
coming into f u l l  production was profoundly ca thar t ic ,  chastening 
s e t t le r  expectations and y ie ld ing  Murray the f i e l d .  Thereafter as 
the government increasingly took the planters'  part in the real 
struggle to maintain the solvency of both commerce and the 
revenue, these se t t le rs  became reconci led to the p o l i t i c a l  and 
economic constraints that operated in Papua ju s t  as they had come 
to accept that the protect ive leg is la t ion  designed to secure the 
persons and working conditions of Papuan workers would remain 
immutable and e f fe c t iv e ly  administered.
The Setting
Papua here comprises those western Pacif ic  lands which included 
the south eastern quarter of the great island cal led by the white 
men, New Guinea, and i t s  surrounding archipelagoes. These lands 
became for  a while the Protectorate and then Possession of B r i t ish  
New Guinea (1884-1906) and subsequently the Te r r i to ry  of Papua 
under Austral ian administrat ion. They were among the very last  
regions penetrated by the Europeans in the period of the i r  
decisive p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and cu l tu ra l  expansion that brought
9the modern world order in to  being. The boundaries of the 'new' 
Protectorate in 1884, as the intruders measured them, extended 
from 141 to 155 degrees east, a distance of 920 miles, and from 5 
to 12 degrees south, a distance at i t s  maximum of 320 miles, with 
a to ta l  area of over 90,500 square miles. B r i t ish  New Guinea was 
bounded on the west by the Netherlands East Indies dependency of 
West New Guinea and on the north by German New Guinea u n t i l  1919 
and then by the Te r r i to ry  of New Guinea mandated by the League of 
Nations to Austra l ia . The surrounding islands included with in the 
boundaries of the B r i t ish  claim were the D'Entrecasteaux,
Louisiade and Trobriand Archipelagoes, Woodlark (Murua), and 
numerous smaller groups and isolated islands. The mainland 
consisted of four main regions - the very th in ly  populated and low 
lying region of the Trans-Fly and Fly River estuary in the west; a 
region of very heavy ra in fa l l  and including the deltas of the 
Bamu, K ikor i ,  Purari and Vai1 a1 a r ivers  in the centre; a region 
with the ranges running para l le l  to the p reva i l l ing  winds and 
therefore in pa r t ia l  ra in shadow along the south coast; and, to 
the north over the great unbroken chain of mountains that extend 
to the eastern t i p  of New Guinea, a region of extensive coastal 
plains with two areas of volcanic a c t i v i t y  facing the Solomon Sea.
The Melanesian population of the coastal communities was 
counted as i t  came under government control but the to ta l  fo r  the 
whole country would not be known un t i l  a f te r  1945. I t  was 
variously estimated at between 250,000 and 300,000. The high 
val leys of the central ranges did support comparatively large 
populations but these were not v is i ted un t i l  the 1930's and much 
of the malarial intermediate zone between these highlands and the
smaller coastal concentrations of people had never been sett led by 
men. During the period examined in th is  study B r i t i s h  New Guinea 
and Papua in pract ica l  terms consisted of the south east l i t t o r a l  
and the islands with an enumerated 'native.' or 'Papuan' population 
of less than 200,000 and with the numbers of Europeans that 
sett led or sojourned in the country at any time never exceeding 
1,500 un t i l  the second world war approached. These then are the 
sett ing and the scale of things fo r  what fol lows: a large 
t e r r i t o r y ,  much of i t  s t i l l  to be systematical ly explored, with a 
Papuan population of several hundred thousand divided by 
geography, language, mutual unfami 1i a r i t y  or h o s t i l i t y ;  and a few 
hundred newcomers widely dispersed and divided by status, 
occupation and motive, but well known to each other and in 
communication with the larger world.
Foundations
In 1956 J D Legge provided a s t i l l  re l ia b le  general account of 
economic development, land and labour pol icy and administration in 
Papua based on the indispensible Papuan Annual Reports and 
Austral ian Pariiamentary Papers over the whole pe r iod .(5) Like 
Dr Francis West's biography of Sir Hubert Murray (6), Professor 
Legge's book could not have been expected, wi th in the l im i ts  of 
i t s  objectives., to have considered the s e t t le r  experience in 
de ta i l .  A large body of archival material needed examination i f  a 
more confidently based account of the events and controvers ies
5 J D Legge. Austra l ian Colonial Pol icy (Sydney 1956).
6 Francis West. Hubert Murray: The Austral ian Proconsul 
(Melbourne, 1968).
over economic development in Papua was to be made. A reading of 
both Legge and West suggests that Murray's administration from 
1908 un t i l  1940 probably achieved the best that could be done in a 
period of stagnant capital ism, Austral ian ind if ference and racial 
prejudice. In general th is  remains, of course, a reasonable 
conclusion.
These were the texts that I began with together with Margriet 
Roe's early thesis on South-east Papua to 1930 (7) and Liese 
Baker's sub-thesis 'The beginning of the indentured labour system 
in Papua 1888-1908'.(8) A prel iminary study of the c o n f l i c t  that 
developed between the then 'Judge' Murray's administration and the 
B r i t ish  New Guinea Development Company in the period 1910-22, now 
reconsidered, forms the basis of Parts I I I  and I V . (9)
Of other material dealing wholly or in part with Papua before 
1942, the works of E P Wolfers (10) and Amirah Ing l is  (11) on race 
re la t ions are a l i t t l e  too ' unambivalent' in my view. While I 
believe, as I am sure they do, that the defense of the over-r id ing 
p r inc ip le  of self-determination is now - i f  we are to l ive  
together in a greatly shrunken world - a moral imperative that may
7 Margriet Roe. 'A History of South-east Papua to 1930', PhD 
thesis, ANU, 1962.
8 Liese Baker. 'The beginning of the indentured labour 
system in Papua', 1888-1908, Honours thesis, ANU, 1970.
9 DC Lewis.' 'Labour and development in Papua: The case of 
the B r i t ish  New Guinea Development Company', MA Quali fying 
thesis, ANU, 1973.
10 E P Wolfers. Race re la t ions and colonial ru le in Papua New 
Guinea, (Sydney, 1975).
11 Amirah In g l is .  Not a white woman safe (Canberra, 1974).
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urge us to judge s e t t le r  societ ies harshly, and I accept most of 
the i r  judgements, I f ind myself s t i l l  defending the 
accused. In terpret ing th e i r  world rather than judging i t  is the 
harder task. Prevai l ing opinion may have changed but the white 
se t t le rs  in Papua were not ev i l  or stupid above the norm. They 
were, as we al l  are, caught in th e i r  mil ieu, time and place. They 
saw themselves as pioneers and they were race conscious. They were 
confident that they had the r ig h t ,  and not merely the power, to be 
where they were and to do what they were doing. Why was th is  
so? Certainly,  they had not created the world in which fo r  most 
Europeans an assumption of racia l super io r i ty  had the burden of 
sel f-ev ident t ru th  or which had permitted and encouraged white 
settlement in the t rop ics .  Excepting pa r t icu la r  sins they are not 
culpable. H N Nelson's h is to ry  of the expatr iate miners in 
Papua (12) comes nearer to showing ways in which white and black 
interacted, without concealment, without easy moral judgements, 
and with an over-r id ing humanity. Perhaps the present work w i l l  
add a fu r the r  perspective.
General works of use were those by Lucy Mair (13) and Harold 
Brookfield (14). Mair brought an experienced comparative eye and 
a steady ethical posit ion to bear on development po l ic ies  under 
Australian ru le in both Papua and New Guinea, a perspective 
usefu l ly  maintained by Brookfield. Again the i r  work has been more 
broad than detai led. George Beckford's Persistent
12 Hank Nelson. Black, white and gold (Canberra, 1976).
13 Lucy Mair. Austra l ia  in New Guinea (Melbourne, 1948 and 
1970).
14 Harold Brookfield. Colonial ism, development and independ- 
ence (Cambridge, 1972).
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Poverty: Underdevelopment in the plantat ion economies of the Third 
World (15) was provocative but not, on the whole, I believe, 
relevant to Papua or my par t icular  enterprise.  I accept that  the 
vast plantat ion systems imposed upon the t ropical  world by 
European power in the las t  three centuries now comprise a t e r r ib l e  
trap from which many societ ies created in the process are hard 
pressed to escape. But Papua never became a 'pure'  plantat ion 
economy and the s e t t l e r  plantat ion episode there and in the other 
Pacific t e r r i t o r i e s  was too br ief  for the burden of blame for 
'underdevelopment' to be placed upon i t .  Certainly some s e t t l e r s  
had in thei r  minds an ideal of what a plantat ion based society 
might be l ike and tested the constraints on i t s  real izat ion.  
Certainly Hubert Murray, Lieutenant Governor 1908-1940, was soon 
determined that  such a society would not be permitted to develop 
in Papua. In ret rospect  there seems an i nevi tab i l i ty  in the Papuan 
case. Of fundamental concern to Austral ia only as a s t ra tegic  
barr ier ,  and without any decisive economic advantage, the 
Terri tory of Papua never acquired more than quite marginal 
significance as a producer of tropical  commodities. But the great 
issues of colonialism were exposed and tested there,  at least  in 
heated argument, and in a consideration of these in context,  
perhaps, l ies  the interes t  of the 'storms in the Papuan teacup' .
Azeem Amarshi, Kenneth Good and Rex Mortimer in thei r  
Development and‘Dependency: The pol i t ica l  economy of Papua New 
Guinea (16) reach some conclusions that  I find incontestable
15 George Beckford. Persistent  Poverty: Underdevelopment 
in Plantat ion Economies of the Third World (New York,
1972).
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though i t  will be obvious that  I d i f fer  with them about much. I 
cannot accept thei r  attempt to impose a scheme derived from 
Beckford and others,  and in thei r  case heavily burdened with 
ideology, upon the Papua and New Guinea data. They imply that 
there might have been another way by which the world could have 
moved forward in recent centuries,  one free of a phase of 
intervention and temporary domination by Europeans in the past and 
one free of inequity now. I do not believe,  as they seem to 
believe, that  the government of an independent Papua New Guinea is 
essent ia l ly  ' neo-co lon i a l i s t ' ,  even while I concede i t  cannot 
readily escape the constraints of the contemporary world order. 
This is jus t  how the world is.
Following the pioneering work on colonial policy in Papua by 
Legge, the biographical studies of the principal administrators by 
Joyce (17) and West, Hank Nelson's work on the miners, and the 
studies of David Wetherell and Diane Langmore of the missionaries 
in Papua (18), the present research is intended to f i l l  another 
large gap in our knowledge of Papua New Guinea history in the 
colonial period. Work remains for others in a complementary study 
of the planters of German New Guinea and the Mandated Terri tory,  
for paral lel  studies of the experience of Papuans and New Guineans 
under indenture, and for yet others in studies of the Papuan 
Resident Magistrates and the New Guinea kiaps and missionaries.
16 Azeem Amarshi, Kenneth Good and Rex Mortimer. Development 
and dependency: The pol i t ica l  economy of Papua New Guinea 
[Melbourne, 1979).
17 Roger Joyce. Sir William MacGregor (Melbourne, 1971).
18 Diane Langmore. Tamate, a kina (Melbourne, 1974), and 
Missionary Lives! Papua 1875-1914 (Hawaii,
1989).
David Wetherell. Reluctant Mission (Queensland. 1977).
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Part I Remote estuary, 1884-1905
Chapter 1 A strategic purpose obtained
A protectorate was finally established over south eastern New 
Guinea and adjacent islands in 1884 to satisfy the need of the 
s t i l l  unfederated Australian colonies for emotional and strategic 
security. Aware of the difficult ies being caused elsewhere in the 
western Pacific by the random settlement of traders, the 
depredations of labour recruiters,  and the unregulated purchase of 
land by planters in areas not as yet annexed by one of the great 
powers, the Colonial Office had included New Guinea among the 
island groups where, under the Western Pacific Order in Council, 
1877, the conduct of British subjects fell within the jurisdiction 
of British law. Further than this the British government did not 
wish to go. Indeed, the malarial coasts and the reputation of the 
inhabitants for ferocity had hitherto protected New Guinea from 
the south sea labour trade, and, apart from the small mixed 
community of copra traders and Methodist missionaries centred in 
the Duke of York islands in the north east and a few traders in 
beche-de-mer and pearl and a handful of missionaries of the London 
Missionary Society in the south east and the Torres Strait ,  most 
of the eastern l i t toral  and all of the interior of the great 
island had remained quite undisturbed by Europeans when four ships 
of the Pacific Naval Squadron appeared off the south coast in 
September.
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Po l i t ic ians  and speculators in the Austral ian colonies had fo r  
more than a decade been pressing the B r i t i s h  author i t ies with an 
extraordinary blend of im per ia l is t  rhe to r ic  and penny-pinching 
national ism to annexe the eastern ha l f  of New Guinea, the Solomon 
Islands and the New Hebrides fo r  the 'Austra l ian empire' in the 
south seas, and several attempts were made to f lo a t  enterprises to 
trade , plant or prospect in New Guinea - some expeditions 
actual ly  reaching the country - but these appeals, threats,  and 
adventures had fa i led  to move London.
Moreover, i t  was made quite clear to B r i t ish  subjects 
contemplating settlement in New Guinea that there could be 'no 
sanction, even t a c i t l y ,  to the acquis it ion of land' and that no 
such 'acquis i t ion of land made previous to a decision on th is  
matter (that of the future status of the country) can be 
recognised to the prejudice of the c rown '. (1) Though reconciled 
by 1883 to the i n e v i t a b i l i t y  of the need to proceed fu r the r ,  Lord 
Derby, Colonial Secretary in Gladstone's second min is try , disowned 
a pre-emptive annexation by the Queensland government in Apr i l  of 
that year. By November, when a Colonial Convention met in Sydney 
and pressed fo r  annexation in the face of a now palpable German 
in te rest in New Br i ta in  and the whole north east coast of the 
mainland, and offered to meet part of the costs of an ■ 
administration, action could no longer be delayed.
To bolster the arguments fo r  possession fo r  reasons of
1 George Seymour Fort.  Report on B r i t ish  New Guinea. 1886. 
Compiled from the notes of the Late Sir  Peter Scratchley,
H. M. Special Commissioner in B r i t ish  New Guinea by his 
pr ivate secretary, Appendix 13: Letter to Mr E Schubert,
13 October 1875.
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security, the Convention reiterated those of Australian economic 
self-interest.  The delegates concurred that ‘a rapid extension of 
British trade and enterprise in the Torres Straits '  was likely and 
that New Guinea would 'shortly be the resort of many adventurous 
subjects of Great Br i t a in ' . (2) Yet the proclamation of the 
Protectorate of British New Guinea in November 1884 was clearly 
not as i t  had been elsewhere made in order to assume 
responsibility where British traders and adventurers had already 
developed a significant British interest but because the 
protection of a much larger interest in the Australasian colonies 
seemed to demand i t .  In an empire sated with terr i tor ial  
responsibilities and held captive by their needs, i t  was a desire 
much more strongly fel t  in the existing colonies than at 'home' to 
balance the init iat ive of a rival imperialism that eventually 
prompted action.
As for agricultural investment by any of the 'adventurous sons 
of Great Britain'  that were expected to flock there - this, the 
very terms of the Protectorate appeared at f i r s t  to preclude. The 
proclamation of 1884 assured the Papuan 'chiefs'  gathered at 
points around the coast for a succession of ceremonies that 'your 
lands will be secured to you' and declared that 'no settlement or 
acquisition of land is to be permitted' .(3) Too l i teral  a 
construction placed upon these assurances would have made 
provision of a settled government impossible and the instructions
2 in D C Gordon. The Australian Frontier in New Guinea 1870- 
1885. (New York, 1951). p. 192.
3 in J H P Murray. Papua or British New Guinea. (London, 
1912) p. 74.
issued by the Colonial Off ice to Sir  Peter Scratchley, the Special 
Commissioner appointed to administer the country, allowed fo r  some 
land acquis it ion both fo r  publ ic and pr ivate purposes.
But i t  was enjoined upon him that should i t  'be decided to 
allow Her Majesty's subjects to purchase land, such transactions 
must in every case be conducted through you; that (the wishes of 
the native people) in these matters w i l l  be respected, and that 
the purchase money w i l l  be paid through you' . (4 )  Scratchley 
disallowed an or ig inal  purchase claim of 1878 but gave permissive 
occupancy both to Andrew Goldie, the storekeeper at Port Moresby 
who had made the appl icat ion,  and to a Chinese trader at Suau 
Island. Blocks were purchased fo r  a government bungalow at each 
of these two places and an additional large area obtained at Port 
Moresby fo r  the pr incipal settlement.
While the administrat ion needed to acquire land fo r  i t s  
headquarters and fo r  a port,  no real expectation was held of a 
sudden in f lux  of se t t le rs .  Scratchley received only a scatter of 
applicat ions fo r  land - from a f i rm  representing a German company, 
from a 'New Guinea Land and Emigration Company' of London, and 
from a th i rd  trader. The f i r s t  was referred to the imperial 
government, the second Scratchley described as 'unworkable and 
premature' and the correspondence concerning the th i rd  was never 
completed. (5) Seymour Fort,  Scratchley's secretary, noted that 
New Guinea had been ' primar i l l y  annexed fo r  a s tra teg ic  purpose'
18
4 Seymour Fort,  op. c i t .  p. 1.
5 ib id .  p. 24.
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and that ' tha t  purpose had been obtained1.(6) Nothing, he 
bel ieved, could be done 'towards systematical ly developing the 
country and developing i t s  resources un t i l  i t  is made an integral 
part of the Anglo-Austral ian p o l i t i c a l  system' but that i t  was 
'doubtful whether the country (could) ever be sel f-support ing,  
pa r t ly  on account of the cl imate and pa r t ly  owing to the a t t i tude 
and condition of the n a t i v e s ' . (7)
Scratchley's successor, John Douglas, inv ited a h o r t i c u l t u r i s t  
from Queensland, Carl Hartmann, to establ ish a government f r u i t  
garden in which a wide range of exotic f r u i t s  were planted. But 
whi le he purchased land from the v i l lage rs  on the Veimauri River 
and considerably extended the boundaries of the settlement of Port 
Moresby, Douglas f e l t  unable to proceed fu r the r  in al ienat ing 
land. To applicants he ' inva r iab ly  repl ied that (he) had no power 
to make grants or to confer immunities of th is  k i n d ' . (8) Douglas 
received appl icat ions from a London syndicate which he described 
as possessed of 'very imperfect geographic data ';  from John 
Strachan of Sydney, master mariner and explorer in the Torres 
S t ra i t ;  from H C E v e r i l l ,  leader of the Australasian Geographic 
Society's Fly River Expedition of 1885; and from Theodore Bevan, 
an explorer in the Papuan Gulf. Bevan had made three voyages to 
south-east New Guinea, the th i rd  backed by the islands trading and 
shipping f i rm  of Burns Phi lp. His appl icat ion was fo r  200,000 
acres. None of these could be considered. Alone among the 
appl icants, H 0 Forbes, a n a tu ra l is t ,  was given some kind of 
6 
7
8
ib id .  p. 27. 
ib id .
BNGAR 1888, p. 7.
permission to buy a small area of land on the Astrolabe Range 
behind Port Moresby.(9)
The explorers'  proposals fo r  huge unconditional freehold grants 
were obviously speculations on the l ike l ihood that the demands of 
future settlement might make such grants valuable and Douglas 
commented,
Experience in other countries has amply shown that the 
granting of land apart from conditions of settlement and 
a real equivalent obtained in some form of value is the 
most fa ta l  impediment to future development. I t  would be 
the same in B r i t i s h  New Guinea and though I do not think 
there are any va l id  reasons against the moderate a l ien­
ation of land where there is so much which is of no u t i l ­
i t y  whatever to the natives, care should be taken to 
secure some real equivalent in settlement and 
c i v i l i z a t i o n . (10)
Though some moderate a l ienation might be allowed in the fu ture ,  of 
the l i k e l y  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of large areas of good land fo r  extensive 
white settlement, he advised,
Now as fa r  as has been learned there are no large areas of 
f ine  land that are not required by the na t ives. . .They... 
being a race of cu l t iva to rs  plant th e i r  food crops in the
best lands sometimes at long distances from the v i l lage .
9 ib id.
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10 ib id. p. 9.
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The Government could not, without violat ing the law, d i s ­
possess these set t l ed  communities and i t  cer tainly does 
not possess the physical force that  would be required to 
do s o . (11)
The uncertainty of the Special Commissioners as to thei r  powers 
and the t ransparent ly speculative nature of most of the proposals 
for land purchase or grant made to them did not deter cr i t ic ism 
from those who through vision or s e l f - i n t e r e s t  had hoped for more 
in the way of development. Andrew Goldie, Port Moresby's only 
resident t rader  and 'not a man to mince mat ters ' ,  thought that  the 
protectorate was 'a blow to the country'  and a device inspired by 
the missionaries who wished to prevent settlement.  Theodore Bevan 
had been confronted in Port Moresby by the Deputy Commissioner, 
Hugh Hastings Romilly, with the opinion that  the widespread bel ief  
in Austral ia that  settlement would be permitted in Bri t ish New 
Guinea was 'very de lus ive ' .(12) Bevan called the protectorate 'an 
effete  and meretricious system' and 'a f a i l u r e  in every sense of 
the word', under which, as the small population of gold 
prospectors f luctuated downwards, the tenuous European foothold in 
the country appeared to be sl ipping away.(13)
In the l as t  months under this  ' system' ,  in August 1888, with 
the discovery of gold on Sudest, largest  of the Louisiades, 
hundreds of miners entered the country from Queensland and Bevan 
admitted that  'should permanent (sic) deposits of the precious
11 ibid. p. xxiii
12 Theodore Bevan. Toil ,  Travel and Discovery in Bri t ish 
New Guinea.(London, 1890). p. 11.
13 ibid.
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metal be found on a payable basis then of course w i l l  the future 
of New Guinea be assured1.(14) But raised, as he said, in 'bleak, 
rainy, foggy London' he did not id e n t i f y  himself with the 
antipodean paradigm of the laconic miner or with the mateship of 
the diggers' camp. I t  was the country i t s e l f  that held him in 
t h r a l l .  His f i r s t  glimpse of the coast from the deck of a Chinese 
junk out of Cooktown ravished him as i t  was to ravish many another 
susceptible eye, fo r ,
While sa i l ing  along the f ine  bold coast ( character!sed 
by lo f t y  headlands, interspersed with lovely l i t t l e  coves 
and deep del ic ious bays) I ,  fo r  the f i r s t  time, beheld 
r ich groves of the feathery coco-nut palm, overshadowing 
native v i l lages which nestled at the foot of grassy 
round topped swell ing h i l l s ,  and could feast my eyes on 
a wealth of t rop ica l  form and colouring never before 
imagined, not even in my most v iv id  dreams of the isles 
of the Southern Seas. A t r u l y  beauti fu l  p ic ture, with 
the sun shining on i t  there; a r igh t  f a i r  home fo r  an 
ever-vexed ra ce . (15)
Gold in su f f ic ie n t  quant i t ies might assure the future of New 
Guinea for  a period, he agreed, but 'otherwise in any case' i t  
would be plantat ion enterprise that 'must in course of time become 
the mainspring of the prosperity of th is  new B r i t ish  possession'. 
Bevan was not the f i r s t  to record the delusive att ract ions of the 
country and the nostalgia i t s  memory could evoke. Tropical
14 ib id .  p. 272.
15 ib id .  p. 8 -
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verdure, i t  seemed, played on the imagination, encouraging 
fantasies of se l f - su f f ic ien cy ,  avarice, ease or power in varying 
degrees among a l l ,  or almost a l l ,  who saw the islands. To the 
casualt ies of European societ ies, d is i l lus ioned by fa i l u re  at 
home, the tropics represented escape. To those whose ambitions 
had been merely f rus t ra ted ,  island l i f e  might mean opportunit ies 
that were closed even in the colonies of white settlement.
I n f i n i t e  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  opened before the mind. There appeared 
abundant land, a moist ' fo rc ing  house1 where anything that was 
planted grew almost v i s ib ly  in the perpetual summer, a land 
possessed of, rather than by, a race of indolent chi ldren to be 
corrected and improved and brought to the service of a manifestly 
superior c i v i l i z a t i o n .
Theodore Bevan believed as did most of his contemporaries that 
white men could not be expected to carry out manual work at sea 
level in these la t i tudes ,  but he speculated that the mountainous 
in te r io r  would surely shelter stretches of land in a cl imate that 
would allow Europeans to se t t le  and labour 'with accustomed ease'. 
The country must prove, he believed, 'one of the r ichest 
dependencies of the B r i t i s h  crown' with i t s  'noble r i v e rs '  and the 
'towering Papuan heights keeping watch and ward to the northward 
of the vast Austral ian p l a i n . . . l i k e  some mitre-shaped coronet over 
the brow of the young Austral ian dominion'.(16) Variations of 
such expectant•prose, usual ly accompanying c r i t i c is m ,  as did 
Bevan's, of each successive or preceding administrat ion, were to 
be expressed again and again by others, captivated v is i to rs  and 
hopeful se t t le rs ,  to the end of the period examined in th is  study
16 ib id .  p. 285.
and beyond.
The Possession
B r i t ish  New Guinea ceased to have the status of a protectorate 
in September 1888 when with the ar r iva l  of Dr Will iam MacGregor as 
Administrator B r i t ish  sovereignty was formal ly  proclaimed and the 
country became an annexed possession. I t  was, however, to be a 
B r i t ish  possession administered at second hand. While his 
appointment was made by the Colonial Off ice, under an agreement 
between the imperial government and the governments of the three 
eastern Austral ian colonies made in 1887, MacGregor was to be 
responsible in the f i r s t  place to the Governor of Queensland and 
not d i re c t l y  to the Colonial Secretary in London. Copies of al l  
s ign i f ican t  correspondence were to be forwarded to the 'Home' 
government where reserve powers were retained over a l l  ordinances 
that had a bearing upon the native people. An undefined power of 
intervent ion was also allowed Queensland, New South Wales and 
V ic tor ia  which between them contributed £15,000 annually towards 
the revenue.
MacGregor had served under Sir  Arthur Gordon in F i j i  as Chief 
Medical O f f icer ,  Government Secretary and at times Acting Governor 
of the Colony. Though prepared when in New Guinea to put down 
endemic raiding- and to establ ish fear of the government with 
violence i f  necessary, he shared with Gordon a respect fo r  'w i ld '  
mankind and a concern to protect native peoples from the 
destruct ive ef fects of white settlement - a necessary intrusion 
that would inev itab ly  come neither he nor Gordon could doubt. I t
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was fortunate that B r i t i s h  New Guinea represented as near as 
possible a tabula rasa in colonisation - an opportunity to 
establish a 'new' t e r r i t o r y  free of some of the problems created 
in the development of other colonies and without the incubus of an 
entrenched white community in unregulated occupation of native 
1ands.
Within months of his ar r iva l  MacGregor enacted in three 
ordinances fundamental measures to protect the native inhabitants 
of the new colony from avoidable ev i ls  that had done much harm 
elsewhere. The f i r s t  forbade dealings with the people in 
f i rearms, opium and alcohol; the second acknowledged the prima 
fac ie claim of the Papuans to ownership of a l l  lands in the 
Possession - aff i rming that the crown alone had the power to deal 
in land with the or ig ina l  owners; and the th i rd  closed the country 
to recruitment fo r  labour abroad. Not immediately concerned with 
the encouragement of white sett lement, MacGregor set about the 
urgent and congenial work of establ ishing the authori ty  of the 
government among the population and of exploring a rugged 
t e r r i t o r y  greater in extent than the United Kingdom. His success 
in pac i f ica t ion  and explorat ion was to be judged ten years la te r  
by the v is i t i n g  Queensland premier, Sir Hugh Nelson, as 'an 
achievement unprecedented in the world's h is tory ,  one worthy of 
nineteenth century c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  and one which re f lec ts  the 
highest honour' upon those by whom i t  has been accomplished'. (17)
The Land Regulation Ordinance of 1888 MacGregor was to
17 Queensland Legis lat ive Assembly, Votes and Proceedings.
1898. Notes of t r i p  to B r i t ish  New Guinea. Compiled for  
Lord Lamington and Sir  Hugh Nelson, p. 29 (p. 1085).
describe much la te r  as the 'pal ladium of Papua1 fo r  the 
unprecedented protect ion i t  gave to the interests  of a diverse, 
'p r im i t i v e '  and fragmented population without a common body of law 
or the att r ibu tes of a s ta te . (18) Under the ordinance such lands 
as the Papuans were w i l l in g  to sel l  could be purchased or leased 
by the crown only when in each case the Administrator had 
sa t is f ied  himself a fter  s u f f ic ie n t  inquiry that the owners could 
be deprived permanently of the land in question and of i t s  
resources without predictable hardship. The process of purchase 
could be lengthy and complicated. Tradi t ional  tenure was not 
uniform and r ights  to the use of land might be based on 
inheri tance through e i ther the male or female l ine ,  or merely on 
recent use by re la t ives ,  or on conquest. There could be r iva l  
claims. Even a f te r  land had been bought the crown acquired no 
indefeasible t i t l e  under the ordinance. In d e fe a s ib i l i t y  was to be 
asserted in 1899 but in other respects the protect ive provisions 
of the or ig inal  land ordinance were to remain unchanged throughout 
the colonial period. A second land ordinance in 1889 allowed the 
crown to grant to se t t le rs ,  upon payment of survey fees, the 
freehold of lands i t  had acquired. But i t  was the Crown Lands 
Ordinance of 1890 that was to provide a comprehensive framework 
for  the extensive acquis it ion and al ienat ion of crown grants that 
would permit white settlement to proceed at las t  on some 
sca le . (19) Or so, i t  was hoped, would be the resu l t .
Part I of th is  ordinance allowed fo r  consideration of the few
18 Sir Will iam MacGregor. Introduction to J H P Murray's 
Papua or B r i t ish  New Guinea. 1912.
19 Supplement to BNG Government Gazette, 23 November 1889.
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purchase claims that antedated 4 September 1888, 2,645 acres of 
which were eventual ly recognized. Part I I  empowered the 
Administrator to declare areas of land unoccupied and unclaimed by 
the Papuans to be 'waste and vacant' and at the disposal of the 
crown. Added to lands that were to be acquired by purchase these 
areas were to form a pool from which settlement blocks might be 
offered to enquirers. Part I I I  contained provisions to prevent 
i r regu la r  settlement and i l le g a l  occupation of land.
Part IV set out the payments and conditions fo r  crown grants. 
Agr icu ltura l  land was offered in fee simple at ten sh i l l in g s  an 
acre, or at two sh i l l ing s  and sixpence an acre i f  improvement 
covenants were undertaken. Land on sandy foreshores or on coral 
limestone designated expressly fo r  the planting of coconuts could 
be bought for  f i v e  sh i l l in g s  an acre, pasturage fo r  two sh i l l in g s  
an acre, and small blocks fo r  trading or f ish ing  stat ions fo r  £5 
an acre. A f i f t h  part set out the conditions fo r  crown leases. 
Agr icu ltura l  leases could be obtained at a s h i l l i n g  an acre 
without conditions or at sixpence an acre a f te r  three years with 
improvement condit ions, with a maximum term of twenty-f ive years. 
Coconut land could be leased for  up to s ix ty  years without rent 
within the f i r s t  f i ve  years in which a quarter of the land had to 
be planted up. Pasture could be leased fo r  f i f te e n  years at 
twopence an acre.
While land could be al ienated out of areas the crown might 
acquire and hold in ant ic ipat ion of demand, a prospective s e t t le r  
could also apply fo r  Papuan held land. Since so much land 
appeared to be of l i t t l e  use to the population and since the
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in te res t  shown in land by bona f ide  se t t le rs  was to remain s l ig h t ,  
a wi l l ingness on the part of the owners to sel l  seemed the only 
matter to decide and an o f f i c e r ,  under MacGregor usual ly the 
Government Surveyor, would investigate and buy the land in 
question with i t s  immediate al ienation in mind. Indeed permissive 
occupancy was often allowed to traders and sometimes to se t t le rs  
in ant ic ipat ion of a favourable conclusion to an appl icat ion,  and 
though no 'deal ing ' could take place under the law i t  was to his 
advantage i f  before he lodged his appl icat ion the s e t t le r  enquired 
among the v i l lage rs  af ter  land in which he was interested. Al l  
appl icat ions remained subject to the scrut iny of the Executive 
Council consist ing of the Administrator (a f te r  1895, the 
Lieutenant Governor), the Chief Judicial O f f ice r ,  the Government 
Secretary, and the Treasurer, with from time to time the 
Government Surveyor as a provisional member.
In 1908 the Government Secretary was to be worried about the 
consequences of o f f ice rs  purchasing land in haste and without 
s u f f ic ie n t  care in marking the boundaries with the Papuans who 
were se l l ing  i t ,  but there is no evidence that Papuan refusal to 
sel l  was ever overridden in the Council and there was then s t i l l  
no provision fo r  any compulsory purchase of native 
lands.(20) Col lusion under th is  system between a government 
o f f i c e r  purchasing land and a s e t t le r  to defraud or int imidate 
Papuan owners wh i ls t  not inconceivable was hardly possible. The 
chain of o f f i c i a l  accountabi l i ty  was formidable and precise, and 
discovery of wrongdoing would mean disgrace and punishment. The
20 See below p. 160
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small white community, l i ke  the communities from which i t  sprang, 
was deeply divided into occupational and class div is ions each with 
i t s  own loya l t ies  and code and each prepared to allege corruption 
in another. Within easy corresponding distance a free and 
sensation-mongering Australasian press stood ever ready to exp lo i t  
charges of malpractice. I t  was indeed i ro n ic a l ,  but not perhaps 
surpr is ing, that Austral ian parliaments and newspapers, the publ ic 
voices of a s e t t le r  society that had s ingular ly  fa i le d ,  and was 
f a i l i n g  s t i l l ,  to protect the Aboriginal people i t  had 
dispossessed in Austra l ia ,  would be sensi t ive to any charge of 
fa i l u re  to protect Papuans. For so they would prove.
In what had become German New Guinea Richard Parkinson had
begun clearing land fo r  the f i r s t  coconut plantat ion at Ralum on
the Gazelle Peninsula in 1882. But no planting on the generous
scale of Ralum was to begin in B r i t ish  New Guinea while i t
retained the name. MacGregor sent prisoners to Daugo (Fishermans
Island) outside Fairfax Harbour in 1890 to plant coconuts. The
work was supervised by a sandalwood getter,  Robert Hunter. The
object was to stimulate the nearby Port Moresby Papuans to extend
the i r  groves by example. In 1894 the Administrator introduced a
regulat ion fo r  the compulsory planting of coconuts throughout the
Possession - wherever enforcement was possible - in an e f f o r t  to
induce the Papuans to produce on the i r  own account fo r  ‘ i f  they
cannot greatly- increase present exports and create new ones, they
cannot ex ist long as a race1. (21) But rapid increase in the
product iv i ty  of the 'nat ive race1 could hardly have been expected
21 In R B Joyce. Sir  Wil l iam MacGregor (Melbourne, 1971). 
p. 198. MacGregor to Governor of Queensland, 15 November 
1893. (Colonial Off ice f i l e  C0422/9/7848).
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and unless a revenue base could be found that  would lead the 
colony to the stage where i t  was self-supporting the government 
could scarcely be said to have fu l f i l l ed  the expectations 
generally held about colonies - that  they both be se l f -sustaining 
and, i t  was to be hoped, prof i table  to t he i r  possessors. Only the 
' intervention of Europeans' promised these ends in the short term 
and at the same time could give the Papuans the models and 
experience of c ivi l ized industry and commerce they must imitate to 
survive, for - MacGregor was to conclude in 1898 - 'natives are 
not l ikely alone to ever add much to the exports of the 
co lony ' . (22) Yet the se t t l ing  of Europeans, possibly with 
families,  and isolated from one another on thei r  holdings, 
required an extension of law and order and a convincing guarantee 
of protection that  could not immediately be given in 1890.
MacGregor had previously demonstrated his sympathy with what 
he regarded as the legi t imate aspirat ions of white planters in 
Fi j i  where he, l ike Gordon, had himself taken up land and planted 
for his private in te res t  and prof i t .  But Fi j i  was a f i n i t e  world. 
There, pacif icat ion had meant subordinating the known hereditary 
and hierachical authori t ies  among the Fi j ians to the government 
and placing a control on a vola t i le  s e t t l e r  community whose 
presence long antedated the cession to Bri tain.  In New Guinea, 
where the Protectorate had not even raised a police force and 
where the native communities were smaller but more numerous, more 
d i s t inc t  from each other in language and custom than Fi j ians,  
constantly at war, and with ' chiefs '  - i f  that  was what they were
22 BNGAR 1897-98. p. x l i i i .
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to be called - that  could scarcely be distinguished from thei r  
fellows, MacGregor had to begin upon a more uncertain foundation. 
The process of exploration alone in Papua would not end for 
another f i f t y  years.
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Chapter 2 Neither working se t t le rs  nor 1and-grabbers
By 1892 MacGregor had begun to be anxious about the absence of
development af f i rming in a le t t e r  introducing a f i r s t  .Handbook fo r
Intending Sett le rs  in B r i t ish  New Guinea that ' the circumstances
of the Possession are such as now make i t  the duty of the
Government to a t t rac t  the working s e t t le r  possessed of some
c a p i t a l ' . (1 )  Exploration had revealed t rac ts  of country that he
thought were suitable fo r  sugar, tea, coffee, and r ice ,  and
pac i f ica t ion  had opened up areas where se t t le rs  could l i ve  in
reasonable safety and where the men of the d i s t r i c t ,  themselves
newly free from threat , would be avai lable as labour. Not only
were coconuts and native foods cul t ivated on the government
stat ions in the Mekeo, at Rigo, Samarai and at Nivani Island, but
consignments of economic plants imported from the botanic gardens
at Rockhampton in Queensland had been sent to Resident Magistrates
and Government Agents fo r  t r i a l  elsewhere. By 1894 more than
fo r t y  exotic f r u i t s ,  spices, vegetables and trees were th r iv in g
on the Rigo sta t ion including cotton in sixteen va r ie t ies .  Small
quanti t ies of seed, cut t ings and root stock could be made
avai lable. Yet the d i f f i c u l t y  appeared in f ind ing enterpris ing
se t t le rs  in a world wide open to the white man and o f fe r ing  many a
more comfortable l i f e  and less r isky  prospect. For, though i t
might ravish the eye and imagination of those who saw the country,
pract ical consideration of New Guinea untinted from afar suggested
caution to prudent men of modest means fo r  whom Austra l ia  i t s e l f
provided much greater a t t rac t ion .  Very few se t t le rs  of the yeoman
1 Handbook of Information fo r  Intending Sett lers  in B r i t ish  
New Guinea, 1892. Preface. (NLA Stan ifor th  Smith Papers,
MS 1709, Item 1459)
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kind that MacGregor had in mind were to come to the country until 
long after he had gone. Instead, in the mid-nineties, interest 
abroad seemed restricted to a few speculators who were prepared to 
gamble on some eventual boom in land when large holdings, 
minimally improved, might be disposed of at great profit.  To 'the 
speculator in land the country offers no field'  MacGregor made 
quite clear in 1892, and until 1897 he scorned all large 
proposals.(2) On leave in England in 1894 he grasped every 
opportunity offered by invitations to address learned societies to 
publicise the scientific and commercial attractions of British New 
Guinea. His speeches were published in journals and reported in 
newspapers, magnifying MacGregor's reputation - he was created a 
knight in 1895 and his position elevated from that of an 
Administrator to that of Lieutenant Governor - but without other 
result.
The f i r s t  tentative commercial plantings of export crops were 
not for the most part made by sett lers who had come for that 
purpose but by already resident traders, government officials and 
missionaries who with l i t t l e  or no capital turned to experiments 
with coconuts, coffee, rubber and other cultures from a variety of 
motives, chiefly as means of spreading the base of their incomes. 
Traders, such as Reginald Guise at Hula and Richard Ede in the 
Laughlins, planted groves of coconuts on small blocks dotted 
around the coas-t either to encourage imitation among the Papuans 
or merely to ensure a steadier supply of nuts for copra. Several 
of the f i r s t  'planters'  whose ambitions stretched to the
2 i bi d.
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establishment of plantat ions of a size that could wholly or 
substan t ia l ly  provide a l i v in g  were to come from among these 
traders. Indeed, the d is t in c t io n  in south east New Guinea as 
elsewhere in the Paci f ic between traders who aspired to become 
planters and many smaller planters who subsisted through the years 
of development on trade was blurred. After 1907 in Papua with the 
coming of plantat ion companies in number, the salaried manager, 
assistant or overseer became the more charac te r is t ic  
representat ive of the planter class than e i ther of these 
categories of 'small '  men.
The manager of the Port Moresby branch of Burns Phi lp and 
Company Limited, Walter Henry Gors, began the f i r s t  plantat ion of 
an ambitious size in B r i t i s h  New Guinea at Dedele on Cloudy Bay 
where he had acquired a crown grant of 440 acres in February 1894 
in partnership with a Norwegian trader, Thomas Anderson. Anderson 
l ived at Dedele overseeing the work of development while operating 
a store Gors supplied from Port Moresby.(3)
Gors had arrived in the country in 1891, the f i r s t  of four 
brothers to come and eventual ly take up land. He gained a 
reputat ion fo r  indefat igable work on behalf of Burns Phi lp and the 
company was for  a period loca l ly  ide n t i f ied  with him. He bought 
and sold anything that might reap a p r o f i t ,  from 'sharks' f in s  to 
pearls, massoi bark to wi ld rubber, paradise birds ' feathers to 
human s k u l l s ' ,  but p r in c ip a l l y  copra.(4) Having bought out Andrew 
Goldie, Burns Phi lp were the suppl iers of traders and the bankers
3 Anderson committed suicide in November 1899 af te r  the 
discovery that he had 'robbed' his own (and Gors's) 
store. (BNGAR 1899-1900, p. 4)
4 Papuan Courier, 22 May 1935. Obituary Walter H. Gors.
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and credi tors to the whole white community from Mullins Harbour to 
Daru, and the company issued i t s  own One Pound and Five Pound 
notes negotiable as far  south as Sydney. I t s  monopoly of both 
wholesale and r e ta i l  trade was soon challenged in Port Moresby by 
Captain C R Baldwin, a former employee, and at Samarai, where 
there was a separate branch, i t  was r ival led from the beginning by 
the firm of Whitten Brothers. Nonetheless, unti l  Dutch ships were 
at t racted to Papua in the new century, Burns Philp dominated the 
the purchase of copra and the modest export trade of both ports.
In 1897, Port Moresby employees of the company began clearing 
land for arabica coffee on the f i r s t  portion of 250 acres of a 
freehold block that  Gors had acquired as a s t a f f  'sanatorium' at 
Warirata over 2,000 fee t  above the Laloki gorge t h i r t y  miles 
inland from the port.  I t  was to be developed and maintained by 
s taf f  in rotat ion as they took local leave. As well as the coffee 
which flourished,  tea,  passion f r u i t ,  pineapples and cinnamon were 
grown, and for a period unti l  Gors l e f t  Bri t ish New Guinea in 
1902, i rregular  supplies of Warirata produce reached the town.
With the fa i lure  by 1903 of a large plantat ion venture by the 
company, promoted by Walter Gors, Burns Philps'  experiments in 
agriculture in south-east  New Guinea ended.
When the Royal Commissioners of 1906 arrived in Papua, as 
Bri t ish New Guinea had jus t  been renamed, the ‘most systematic 
attempt at cocoanut plant ing'  in the country and indeed the only 
plantat ion in production that  had been laid down by an experienced 
planter was at Panasesa, an island in the Conflict  Group 80 miles
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east of Samarai.(5) This uninhabited group of very small i s le ts ,  
under 1,800 acres in extent, had been leased with an option to 
convert to freehold by Henry Alexander Wickham in 1896. Widely 
travel led and subsequently to be given la te  recognit ion and a 
knighthood fo r  his exp lo i t  in 1876 in securing the or ig ina l  Para 
(Hevea Brasi1iens is ) rubber seeds from which the en t i re  rubber 
industry of Southeast Asia was developed, Wickham was f i f t y  years 
old when he came to New Guinea.
After a daunting experience as a planter in South America he 
had held posit ions as a d i s t r i c t  commissioner in B r i t i s h  Honduras 
and as Commissioner fo r  the Introduct ion of the Para India-rubber 
Tree and Inspector of Forests fo r  the Government of India.
Set t l ing  fo r  a time in Austra l ia  he had attempted to grow coffee 
in North Queensland, and on coming to New Guinea he interested 
himself at f i r s t  in the latex bearing trees and vines that i t s  
forests offered. What could have prompted th is  rest less man, 
comparatively la te  in l i f e ,  to commit himself to a lease of a 
remote a to l l  on which to grow coconuts? Perhaps, since he arrived 
in 1895, his had been a so l i ta ry  response to MacGregor's 
advertisement of the country in 1894. Perhaps he needed to 
provide fo r  ret irement; or perhaps his in te rest  had been 
impulsively engaged, l i ke  Theodore Bevan's, by the t ropica l  
verdure - fo r  Wickham was a talented amateur a r t i s t  i l l u s t r a t i n g  a 
book he wrote on rubber production in 1908 with his own work. He 
was remembered as ‘ every inch a pioneer, broad-shouldered and 
heavily b u i l t  with an extraordinary long and wavy moustache, his
5 CPP, Vol 15, 1907, p .137-459. B r i t ish  New Guinea. Report 
of the Royal Commission of Inquiry in to  present 
cond i t ions . . .  p. xvi (p. 152).
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physical s t reng th . . . as great as his r e s o l u t i o n (6)
His iso la t ion  in the Confl ic ts  only apparent, Henry Wickham was 
s ingu lar ly  able to draw on the wider planting world fo r  
information and assistance and upon a long personal experience of 
pract ical experiment with new materials and processes. Seeking to 
exp lo i t  the f u l l  commercial p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of his lease he employed 
Papuans to dive not only fo r  the usual she l l ,  pearls and 
beche-de-mer but also fo r  marine sponges which he was the f i r s t  to 
trea t  and export. In 1899 he brought a marine b io log is t  to the 
lagoon to tes t  whether pearls could be a r t i f i c i a l l y  cultured 
there. In the boom of 1910, regarded as an authori ty  on both 
plantat ions and the country, Wickham was to commend Papua to 
potential  rubber inves to rs . (7) He had continued to travel  but 
spending time at Panasesa un t i l  1911 when he assigned control of 
his Conf l ic t  Islands Planting Association to a new company in 
which he retained an in terest .
Despite the beginnings made by Walter Gors and Henry Wickham, 
perhaps too small at f i r s t  to notice, MacGregor had regretted in 
the Annual Report of 1895-96 that 'no European planting on a scale 
of any importance has been s ta r ted1. (8) No new grants at a l l  had 
been issued in the year, but now an e f f o r t  was mounted to rap id ly  
increase the areas of obviously good land that the crown could
6 The Times -(London), 28 September 1928. Obituary: Sir  Henry 
Wickham. An obituary in the Papuan Courier (14 December 
1928) mentions Wickham's pioneering in 'New Guinea' 
without d e ta i l .  He had been knighted in 1920.
7 ANUABL Deposit 95. B r i t ish  New Guinea Development Co.
L td . ,  London Off ice. M37, BNGD Prospectus 1910, p. 9.
8 BNGAR 1895-96. p. x x x i i i .
o f fe r .  The Government Surveyor, John Cameron, purchased 31,000 
acres of the best lands he could f ind  around the head of Milne Bay 
in the Eastern Division and at Cloudy Bay, Domara, Marshall Lagoon 
and on the Kemp Welch River in the Central Div is ion. Cameron's 
eye was a good one, fo r  these blocks were to prove among the more 
valuable lands to be la te r  disposed of to investors.
In 1894 Cameron had himself been granted freehold of an area of 
over 2,000 acres in the Kabadi d i s t r i c t  on the western side of 
Galley Reach, the estuary of the La loki ,  Vanapa and Brown Rivers 
midway between Port Moresby and Yule Island. He was the f i r s t  of 
of several government o f f ice rs  to whom MacGregor saw no reason to 
deny the p r iv i lege  of taking up land. The Chief Judic ial  Of f icer ,  
Francis Winter, was to acknowledge la te r  that in permitt ing th is  
MacGregor had departed from the s t r i c t  observance of ' the rules of 
the c i v i l  serv ice ' ,  but believed that he had done so only fo r  ' the 
benefi t  of the country ' . (9 )  Cameron did not l i ve  to develop his 
grant but in 1897 MacGregor encouraged David Bal lantine,
Treasurer, Col lector of Customs and Resident Magistrate (RM), to 
begin the planting of coffee on 100 acres he was granted at 
Sogeri, a r o l l i n g  plateau behind the Astrolabe Range of which 
Warirata was a spur. Bal lantine had only recent ly pacif ied the 
' t r i b e s '  between Sogeri and the Owen Stanley Range and his 
plantat ion may have been a device to establ ish a European presence 
near the periphery of contro l.
By 1897 too, Albert Charles English, the Government Agent 
responsible fo r  the plant nurseries at Rigo, f i f t y  miles south
9 note untraced.
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east of Port Moresby, had planted out a private es ta te  of f i f t y  
acres of native rubber. Small quant i t ies of this  rubber had been
exported since 1895 and the value of the trade exceeded £1,000 in 
1902-03. The latex was extracted from various t rees ,  principal ly 
the Ficus Rigo. or Makimaki, and was gathered usually by Papuans 
employed by sandalwood get ters .  A regulation was passed in 1895 to 
protect the t rees in what MacGregor hoped would become a 'new 
native indust ry1. A C English sent samples to London at the time 
where they were regarded as the equal in qual i ty to the best 
rubber then coming out of the Amazon. Assured by such comparisons 
he proceeded to plant Ficus Rigo on grants he had obtained in 1894 
neighbouring the government stat ion.  By 1901 he had 12,000 of 
these trees together with about f i f t y  Ficus E las t ica . A Londoner 
who had come to the country to trade in bird of paradise plumes, 
English had been appointed Government Agent at Rigo under the 
Protectorate.  He accompanied MacGregor on several journeys of 
exploration and was commended with his constabulary for 'pluck and 
gal l an t ry1 in an engagement with ' h i l l  t r ibe s '  near Dedele in 
1894. Becoming an Assistant  Resident Magistrate (ARM) af ter  
MacGregor's departure,  he was accused by Captain Baldwin before 
the Royal Commission in 1906 of neglecting his of f ic ia l  duties to 
engage in trade and his other pursuits which by then included, in 
addition to the rubber plantat ion,  Barodobo, a potent ial ly 
prof i table 'experiment'  with sisal  (agave si sal ana).(10)
Denying neglect of his dut ies,  English defended himself on the 
grounds that  as the c ivi l  service made no provision for the 
retirement of i t s  of f icers  he had been but prudent and
10 CPP, 1907, pp. 297-298. Royal Commission.. . pp. 2-5, 
31-32.
enterpris ing. Undoubtedly impressed by the ARM's undertakings and 
prepared to use them to i l l u s t r a t e  what pr ivate enterprise could 
accomplish, the Commissioners could only agree that English's 
interests and duties were in c o n f l i c t .  He resigned from the 
service in March 1907 and remained a planter at Rigo u n t i l  1942.
Af ter  the miners, the missionaries of the London Missionary 
Society (LMS), the New Guinea Anglican Mission, the Methodist 
Overseas Mission, and the Congregation of the Sacred Heart were 
the largest group of white residents. They were c lea r ly  the more 
widely d is t r ibu ted and set t led part of the community and more than 
140 grants - mostly of under f i v e  acres - had been made to the 
missions by 1898. As the mission stat ions, l i ke  those of the 
government, were expected to become largely s e l f - s u f f i c ie n t  in 
foods, exotic trees and vegetables were inev i tab ly  planted. 
MacGregor recommended that the missions also establ ish small 
plantat ions of economic trees from which the Papuans could obtain 
'seed and example'. He thought he could 'con f iden t ly  expect 
valuable assistance from Dr Ginocchi (at the head of the Cathol ic 
mission in the Mekeo d i s t r i c t )  in th is  m a t te r ' . (11) By 1895 
arabica coffee was bearing 'sp lendid ly '  on mission land near Yule 
Island. While there was to be some expansion of mission 
plantat ions, most remained more ho r t icu l tu ra l  and educational than 
commercial and were never in B r i t ish  New Guinea or Papua to 
compare in siz-e or signif icance with the mission estates, both 
Cathol ic and Lutheran, in German New Guinea.
11 BNGAR, 1893-94. p. 44.
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Keeping out the Land Grabber
In his 1ast Annual Report in 1897-98, MacGregor surveyed the 
whole decade of his administrat ion.  There was much to find 
sa t i s fac t ion with in the extension of law and order and in the 
work of exploration,  but economic development had been negligible.  
Scarcely more than 5,000 acres had been granted for agricul tural  
purposes in ten years and the s i tuat ion of the colony qua colony 
had become desperate. He wrote
The time has come when agricul tural  development should be 
pushed in the Possession with as much perseverance as has 
been employed in forcing peace on the di f ferent  host i le  
t r ibes  to prepare for i t . . . industr ial  development through 
agricul ture is now a pressing necessi ty i f  Bri t ish New 
Guinea is to be made a Bri t i sh colony in anything more 
than name. The conditions under which land has been 
offered for some years for settlement have been very easy 
but they have fai led to a t t r a c t  s e t t l e r s .  There will be 
no help for this  condition of matters except to grant 
f a c i l i t i e s  and inducements as may a t t r ac t  s e t t l e r s  of the 
kind now required. There is already undoubtedly as much 
land known and avai lable for occupation as, i f  u t i l i zed,  
would suff ice to make the colony se i f - suppor t ing. (12)
Failure to a t t r ac t  independent s e t t l e r s  and the urgent need to 
extend the revenue base now made MacGregor t rea t  with in teres t  and
12 BNGAR, 1897-98. p. 59.
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approval the proposal of a B r i t ish  New Guinea Syndicate formed in 
London early in 1897 to take up lands in New Guinea fo r  large 
scale plantat ion development. The promoters of the scheme, John 
Lowles MP, Sir Somers Vine and Sir Charles Kennedy, had sought and 
obtained the support of the then Premier of Queensland, Sir Hugh 
Nelson, and early in 1898, a f te r  MacGregor had drafted an 
agreement acceptable to Vine and Lowles, an ordinance was passed 
by the Legis lat ive Council in Port Moresby that would have allowed 
grants to ta l l i n g  up to 250,000 acres to be made progressively to 
the Syndicate over eight years a f te r  which th e i r  options would 
lapse. The Colonial Off ice had rejected an early proposal of the 
syndicators that they be given a charter. For the f i r s t  time the 
colonial governments that contributed to the revenue chose to 
exercise the i r  r igh t  of intervention to oppose allowance of the 
ordinance.
Opposition was roused by a series of a r t ic les  in the Melbourne 
Age in May 1898 wr i t ten with the assistance and insp ira t ion  of 
Theodore Bevan. From time to time since 1888 Bevan had sought to 
use his contr ibution to explorat ion as a lever to obtain large 
grants of land fo r  projects varying from plantat ions to gold 
dredging. Vague and b la tan t ly  speculat ive, these appl icat ions had 
not commanded su f f ic ie n t  capital to make them credible and they 
had been refused. Now MacGregor was accused of p a r t i a l i t y  in 
giving preference to the 'B r i t i s h 1 scheme over those of an 
'Austra l ian ' and at the same time denounced fo r  betraying the 
principles he had e a r l ie r  espoused by now being prepared to allow
a 'monopoly' in pursuit of huge concessions in to  the country.(13)
Though MacGregor's instruct ions obliged him to consult only
with the government of Queensland which had invar iab ly  borne the
f u l l  responsibi 1i t y  of representing the contr ibuting colonies, the
Age asserted that in a matter of the importance of the current
proposal the Victorian and New South Wales governments should have
been expressly consulted. Whether th is  view was j u s t i f i e d  or not,
i t s  assertion made i t  p o l i t i c a l l y  peri lous fo r  these governments
to condone the scheme, and when a new Queensland min is try  i t s e l f
withdrew i t s  support, a l l  three colonies declared the i r
opposition. MacGregor's defence of his actions was ignored in the
furore of popul ist indignation against 'speculato rs ' ,  ' land
grabbers' and the 'astute boomers' who would t i e  up the best lands
in the Possession against Austral ian enterprise. The Colonial
Off ice, i t s e l f  reserved about the good fa i t h  of the promoters, was
yet re luctant to disallow the ordinance a f te r  matters had
proceeded so fa r  and did so only a f te r  ins is t ing  that compensation
be paid to the Syndicate. A disappointed visionary and an
opportunist and sensational press had combined to successfully
manipulate governments and publ ic opinion by appealing to an
anglophobia that jos t led  with imperial sentiment in the minds of
most Austral ians. Yet there was no substance in the assumption
that Austral ian capital was eager to enter New Guinea or that any
serious Austral ian enterprise had been hindered. New Guinea, i t
seemed, was to be an Austral ian preserve and to be exploited by
Austral ians when they were ready to do so. That was a l l .
13 Queensland Legis la t ive Assembly, Votes and Proceedings,
1898, contains copies of a large correspondence over the 
BNG Syndicate. The Age (Melbourne) a r t ic le s  appeared on 
10, 11, 16, 17 and 25 May 1898.
In defending his actions over the Syndicate, the Lieutenant 
Governor referred to fa i lu re  in attempts he had made in the years 
since 1890 to in terest  large Austral ian f irms in agr icu l tu ra l  
investment in New Guinea.(14) But a year a f te r  the col lapse of 
the 'B r i t i s h '  scheme and af ter  Sir  Will iam MacGregor had l e f t  the 
Possession to become Governor of Lagos, a conference was held in 
Sydney between George Ruthven LeHunte, his successor in New 
Guinea, and the 'Prime Min is ters '  of Queensland and New South 
Wales to consider LeHunte's proposals fo r  a new land ordinance and 
the f inancing of the administrat ion as Austral ian federation 
approached. Between sessions of the conference, James Burns, 
managing d i rec tor  of Burns Phi lp and Company, asked LeHunte to 
consider the dra f t  prospectus of a company to be f loated to 
purchase and develop 100,000 acres fo r  agr icu l tu re and 100,000 fo r  
pasture in B r i t ish  New Guinea with capital of £100,000.(15) In 
reaction to what had been decided as the speculative and excessive 
nature of the B r i t ish  New Guinea Syndicate's proposals, the 
conference had only the previous day agreed that under the new 
ordinance no grants of more than ten square miles (6,400 acres) 
could be made without the consent of the contr ibuting colonies and 
that no grants exceeding 50,000 acres were to be made at a l l .  
LeHunte suggested to Burns that his company, i f  f loa ted,  might 
accept 50,000 acres in fee simple and 50,000 acres in leasehold. 
Burns found th is  unacceptable on the grounds that no investor 
could be expected to put his money into the leases, which as the 
law stood were only fo r  a twenty f i v e  year term. Obviously
14 Queensland Legis lat ive Assembly, Votes and Proceedings,
1898. MacGregor to Governor of Queensland, 31 December 
1897.
15 ib id .  Vol 4, 1899. p. 20. 'Notes of a meeting held at 
Sydney on the 15th and 16th August 1899 to discuss land 
and f inanc ia l  matters of B r i t ish  New Guinea'.
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star t led by the sudden emergence of an Austral ian in te res t ,  the 
conference, with great inconsistency, inserted a provision in the 
ordinance that allowed that the granting of areas larger than 
50,000 acres freehold could be permitted a f te r  the new law had 
been in operation fo r  six months.
In September 1900 the Hall Sound Company was registered. The 
provisional board of d i rectors included James Burns, Sir Malcolm 
McEacharn - a Melbourne shipowner, J T Walker and Sir  George Dibbs 
of Sydney, and Walter Gors, the promoter of the company and 
' local*  d i rec tor  in Port Moresby. The capital of the company was 
now to be £50,000 in £1 shares of which 30,000 were to be issued 
at a s h i l l i n g  on appl icat ion with ca l ls  of a s h i l l i n g  to be made 
at not less than monthly in te rva ls .  Gors as promoter was to 
receive 3,000 f u l l y  paid up shares 'under certain condit ions' - 
presumably that he undertook to manage the a f fa i r s  of the company 
in B r i t ish  New Guinea fo r  a specif ied pe r iod . (16)
As i t s  name indicated, the company sought to acquire land 
around Hall Sound, the sheltered anchorage between Yule Island and 
the mouth of the St Joseph or Angabunga River seventy miles north 
west of Port Moresby. Within i t s  powers under the new ordinance 
the government proceeded immediately to make an i n i t i a l  grant to 
the company of 5,000 acres near Inawaia, a v i l lage  some miles up 
the Angabunga and of a portion of Yule Island fo r  sheds, a store 
and a wharf.
16 ib id ,  1900. p 853. 'Appl icat ion of Hall Sound Company to 
take up land in B r i t i s h  New Guinea'. This contains fu r ther  
correspondence and includes the Hall Sound Company 
Prospectus.
The Hall Sound Company had the enthusiast ic support of LeHunte 
and of the Queensland government now led by Robert Phi lp, one of 
the founders of Burns Phi lp, and ' t h is  f i r s t  large bona f ide 
attempt by an Austral ian company to develop the untouched 
resources of B r i t ish  New Guinea1 was commended to the Victorian 
and New South Wales governments fo r  approval.(17) Yet, whi le they 
had been prepared to combine with Queensland to oppose the 
in trus ion of a large al ien 'B r i t i s h '  enterprise in to  an Austral ian 
preserve, the premiers in Sydney and Melbourne were by no means 
prepared now to allow even an Austral ian company in to  the f i e l d  
without scrut iny, and both asked the Queenslanders fo r  more 
information.
Burns le t  i t  be known through LeHunte that i f  d i f f i c u l t i e s  were 
put in the way of an agreement then the company was un l ike ly  to 
proceed. This may have been perceived as a ploy to induce 
compliance with the scheme, but almost cer ta in ly  i t  represented a 
d is inc l ina t ion  to pursue very fa r  a course of action essent ia l ly  
inspired by Walter Gors that to Burns involved at best some 
considerable r isk .  The prospectus had drawn attention to the 
success of the plantings at Warirata and i t  ackowledged Gors's 
unrival led qua l i f ica t ions  fo r  overseeing the work, but no 
agr icu l tu ra l  development had been undertaken in B r i t i s h  New Guinea 
that could as yet give some guide as to commercial p o s s ib i l i t i e s .  
Indeed, the prospectus betrayed th is  uncertainty where i t  spoke of 
one of the principal objects of the company being ' to  test the 
adaptab i l i ty  of the land fo r  tropical  a g r i c u l tu re ' .(18) The
17 ib id .  p. 855. (p. 3) The Chief Secretary of Queensland to 
the Prime Minister of V ic to r ia ,  28 September 1900.
18 ib id .  p. 853 (p. 2). Prospectus.
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capital was scarcely adequate fo r  the development of the lands 
Gors and Burns hoped to obtain and unless fu r the r  capita l was 
raised, and th is  probably outside Austra l ia ,  then the company 
might ce r ta in ly  be considered a speculative venture. And so the 
premiers in Sydney and Melbourne concluded.
I f  B r i t i sh  New Guinea had l i t t l e  a t t rac t ion  fo r  the small 
se t t le r  and ' i f  th is  scheme is also set aside from want of 
encouragement1, the Queensland government responded, the question 
arose as to
What of fers  which have for  th e i r  object the development, 
on an advantageous scale, of the resources of B r i t ish  New 
Guinea, are to be accepted at a l l ,  or are any beginnings 
to be made to such development except those which have no 
other recommendations than that of being so small as to 
contr ibute only in an inappreciable degree to the prospect 
of the Possession becoming a sel f -susta in ing provinee?(19)
At his f i r s t  and perhaps only 'glance1, the New South Wales 
premier, Sir  Will iam Lyne, f e l t  that the proposal was open to the 
same objections as those raised against the B r i t ish  New Guinea 
Syndicate. And that the Hall Sound Company was Austra l ian, that 
i t  asked now for  no concessions outside the recent ly amended land 
law, and that the governments of the contr ibuting colonies were 
being consulted about i t s  proposals, seemed not to sway him. He 
announced without debate in the New South Wales House of Assembly
19 ib id .  p. 856 (p. 4). Letter above, 28 September 1900.
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in November 1900 that  he firmly opposed the scheme on the grounds 
that  he did 'not think that  a lease of so large an area should be 
g r a n t e d (20) I t  was the las t  exercise of power with respect to 
New Guinea by one of the Australian colonial governments before 
responsibi 1i ty for dealings with the Possession passed to the 
newly federated Commonwealth of Austral ia in January 1901.
LeHunte was par t icular ly  disappointed and raised the question 
of the Hall Sound Company for reconsiderat  ion by the federal 
government. Lengthy debates on New Guinea in both houses of 
parliament in thei r  f i r s t  session included reference to the scheme 
but rhetorical  opposition to ' land grabbers'  in general so clouded 
the ai r  that  members could scarcely dist inguish between the 
reviled Bri t ish syndicate and the Australian company despite the 
presence in the House of Representatives of Sir Malcolm McEacharn 
and in the Senate of J T Walker.(21)
The populist  Western Australian senator,  Staniforth Smith, 
visi ted the Hall Sound Company land on his f i r s t  v i s i t  to Bri t ish 
New Guinea in 1903. Before leaving Austral ia he had heard that 
the company 'was composed of men who were genuine investors 
desirous of putting thei r  money in the development of valuable 
i ndus t r i es ' .  He had gone ' a t  considerable t r oub l e . . . inland to 
inspect thei r  property and found ten acres planted with ch i l l i e s  
which pract ical ly  grow wild. The whole s t af f  consisted of a
20 New South Wales, Pariiamentary Record, November 1900.
21 Commonwealth of Austral ia.  Pariiamentary Debates. 
(Representatives),  p. 7451, 19 November 1901; (Senate), 
pp. 7467, 7479-81, 7486, 20 November 1901.
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Samoan and two Papuans1.(22) He was to ld that the promoters were 
s t i l l  hoping to obtain a much larger freehold grant before 
f loa t ing  a company in London with enough capital to develop the 
lands acquired. In a report Smith denounced the venture as 
another speculative fraud. He was not ser iously challenged.
The larger grant was never obtained, James Burns was never to 
be induced to invest fu r the r  in Papuan lands and the Hall Sound 
Company died. Despite the promising beginnings made by Walter 
Gors, Burns Phi lp cautiously avoided d i rec t  in te rest  in 
plantat ions in south-east New Guinea un t i l  the late t h i r t i e s  when 
a few largely planted-up estates could be bought fo r  less than the 
costs of th e i r  development. On many occasions in the intervening 
years planters ref lected resen t fu l ly  that the fa i lu re  of the 
company to undertake the r isks of planting while l i v in g  o f f  those 
who did demonstrated a farsightedness on the part of ' the octopus 
of the P a c i f i c 1 that they wished they had themselves possessed.
22 NLA, Deposit 1709, Staniforth Smith Papers, Item 1461, 
'B r i t i s h  New Guinea with a preface on Aus t ra l ia 's  pol icy 
in the P a c i f i c . '  by Senator S tan ifor th  Smith. 21 July 
1903. Portions taken from ar t ic le s  in the Dai 1y Telegraph 
(Sydney). Morning Herald (Perth), and the Kalqoorl ie 
Mi_n£r.
50
Chapter 3 The Interregnum
MacGregor had framed the terms and fees payable for land under 
the 1890 ordinance when he could not have anticipated the 
d i f f i cu l t i e s  in obtaining s e t t l e r s  and when i t  was hoped that  land 
sales would come for a period to make a considerable contribution 
to the revenue. If the original cost to the government of the 
lands i t  had acquired had averaged, as he estimated, at about a 
shi l l ing an acre, then the extent to which the revenue might have 
benefi t ted i f  demand for land had been greater can be appreciated. 
But in 1899 LeHunte thought that  the charges were excessive and 
had been a posit ive discouragement to settlement.  Francis Winter, 
the Chief Judicial  Officer,  in a memorandum accompanying a 
proposal for changes LeHunte wished to make in the law, pointed 
out that  both the annual rents of pastoral leases,  equivalent to 
five pounds three shi l l ings  a square mile, and thei r  term of 
f i f teen years would seem to compare very unfavourably with what 
selectors or graziers could obtain in Aus t r a l i a . (1) In addition to 
the new conditions i t  contained requiring the Lieutenant Governor 
to gain the approval of the governments of the contributing 
colonies before making any large grant,  the Lands Ordinance of 
1899 considerably lowered the charges for crown lands. The 
government could now sell  freehold agricul tural  blocks for one 
shi l l ing an acre. Annual rent on pastoral leases were reduced to 
a penny an acre and the term extended to twenty-five years.
Letters Patent t ransferr ing the government of Bri t ish New
1 Queensland Legislat ive Assembly, Votes and Proceedings. 
Vol 4, 1899. p. 944.
Guinea to the new Commonwealth of Austra l ia  were f i n a l l y  issued on 
18 March 1902 and Sir George LeHunte l e f t  the country in the March 
of the fo l lowing year. Due ch ie f ly  to the e f fo r ts  in the federal 
parliament of a strong temperance lobby which sought, in the 
interests of the native people, to impose complete p roh ib i t ion  on 
the import of alcohol into New Guinea, including any fo r  white 
consumption, and to the f i l i b u s t e r in g  pressure of a few members 
influenced by the pr inc ip les of Social Credit who wanted to end 
the pract ice of granting land in freehold, there occurred a delay 
of over four years before a new const i tu t ion fo r  the country now 
to be cal led the Te r r i to ry  of Papua was brought into operation in 
September 1906. This long period of uncertainty about the 
pol ic ies that would be fol lowed under d i rec t  Austral ian ru le was 
prolonged s t i l l  fu r the r  by the need to await the outcome of a 
Royal Commission brought on by dissension in the government 
service and a delay in the appointment of the f i r s t  Austral ian 
Lieutenant Governor un t i l  1908.
Between 1898 and the end of the interregnum in 1906, serious 
in terest in taking up land holdings of a size that could be 
considered by the government in Port Moresby without the need to 
refer appl icat ions to Austra l ia  remained, as i t  had been since 
1890, almost wholly confined to a few residents who had come to 
the country fo r  some purpose other than to plant. In 1899 ten 
square miles of .unoccupied land on the Musa River in the Northern 
Division were selected by the Government Medical O f f icer  (GM0) at 
Samarai, Dr Cecil Vaughan, fo r  a rubber p lantat ion.  Granted 
permissive occupancy, Vaughan f loated a small company in Austra l ia  
to develop the block. Though i t  had been agreed that the land
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should not be more than twenty miles from the coast i t  was soon 
found that the area chosen was subject to seasonal f looding and a 
second select ion had to be made a fu r the r  twenty miles inland. 
LeHunte used the example of Vaughan's or ig ina l  selection to show 
that even when land could be inspected by a prospective s e t t le r  in 
person i t s  nature could be unknown.(2) Since he doubted that very 
large t racts  of good land were avai lable in any one place, a 
thorough inspection by a buyer was imperative both in his own 
in te rest and that of the reputat ion of the country. In fac t ,  very 
large stretches of low-lying coastl ine from the Dutch border 
almost to Hall Sound in the south and from the German border to 
Cape Vogel in the north, accessible and seemingly f e r t i l e ,  i f  
the i r  vegetation was any guide, were vulnerable to f looding. In 
the same year a large block was taken up on the Oriomo River 
opposite Daru in the Western Divis ion.  Again country fo r  which 
the Papuans had l i t t l e  use, i t s  f e r t i l i t y  an i l l u s io n ,  th is  land 
could also be inundated by both t ide  and f lood.  Vaughan commenced 
clearing the Musa block but neither of these propert ies was 
developed.
More successful were plantat ions begun on a less ambitious 
scale. In the Eastern Divis ion the f i r s t  plantings since Henry 
Wickham's were on three small blocks developed af te r  1898 around 
the shores of Milne Bay. Bubuleta, the oldest, was the f i r s t  
experiment in planting of the Samarai merchant, Will iam Whitten.
A Londoner who had arrived in B r i t ish  New Guinea during the 
protectora te, he was joined in 1892 by his brother Robert and the 
f i rm of Whitten Brothers grew into  a prosperous agency and trading
2 ib id .  p. 938.
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business with several modest plantat ions,  a Port Moresby branch 
and stores on the goldfields.  Advancing credi t  with some 
generosity to the miners and smaller t raders of the Eastern, South 
Eastern, and Northern Divisions,  the i r  posit ion in the east  
paral leled that  of Walter Gors and Burns Philp and Company in the 
western divisions.  William Whitten bought the original Dedele 
Plantat ion from Walter Gors af ter  Gors l e f t  for Austral ia in 1902.
Kil ler ton,  the second plantat ion in Milne Bay, covered a small 
island and was the f i r s t  of a st r ing of plantings on the Bay and 
near Samarai developed for income and example by Charles Abel, a 
prominent LMS missionary and a pioneer in the technical education 
of the Papuans. The third plantat ion,  Ramaga, on the south side 
of the Bay, was not begun unti l  1902. I t  was developed slowly by 
John Clunn, a Cooktown man who had arrived or iginal ly as a miner 
but became proprietor of a Samarai hotel .  Another miner, William 
Shedden, in partnership with John Gusth Nelsson, a Swede and 
trader to the miners on the Murua (Woodlark) goldfield,  and 
Charles Arbouin, Burns Phi 1ps1 f i r s t  agent at Samarai, began 
development of a plantat ion on Doini or Blanchard Island to the 
south and in sight of Samarai in 1903.
In the South Eastern Division the f i r s t  grant f or . a  coconut 
plantat ion was not made before 1903 when 200 acres on the eastern 
end of Rossel ‘(Vela) Island were acquired by the i s l and ' s  only 
resident white t rader ,  Frank Osborne. At the other end of the 
country in teres t  was similarly s l ight .  Apart from the Oriomo River 
lands and a small experiment recorded as having been made with 
peanuts on Gebaro Island in 1899 by Charles 'Peanut Char l ie1
Gill ingham, there was no fu r the r  development before 1905, when 
Mibu Island, at the mouth of the Fly River, was leased to the 
Western B r i t ish  New Guinea Trading Company, an ambitiously named 
venture of a Daru trader and re c ru i te r  Captain Will iam L u f f . (3)
The lease was fo r fe i te d  undeveloped in 1908. Mibu was found to 
comprise mostly t ida l  f l a t s  and the only area on the island 
suitable fo r  coconuts was eventually planted in 1914 by John 
Cowling, a Thursday Island trader and pearl buyer who had had a 
stat ion at the mouth of the Pahoturi River since 1899.
In the Central Division a th i rd  plantat ion was begun in the 
Sogeri D is t r i c t .  In 1902 the Chief Clerk and Registrar of the 
Central Court, Charles Grant Garrioch, went into partnership with 
Henry Lesueur Greene to plant coffee on a block not fa r  from 
David Bai 1 ant ine1s. Both men had come to New Guinea from 
Maurit ius. Both were acquainted with plantat ions rather than 
experienced in them. Greene, who managed the property fo r  the 
partnership, was a former bank c lerk ,  aged twenty-four. He had 
come to the country, he said, fo r  his health and had found Sogeri 
favourable; more probably Garrioch had invited him to come and 
t ry  his luck in obtaining a government ' b i l l e t '  fo r  which Greene 
was to make several approaches. In addition to coffea arabica, 
Garrioch and Greene planted the f i r s t  Para rubber in the country 
at Sagoro Tano, about eight acres in December 1903.
In October 1903 a small grant of land was made to Edward Robert 
Anderson at Hisiu beach, a long sweep of coast on Redscar Bay to 
the west of Galley Reach. Here he planted the f i r s t  commercial
3 BNGAR 1898-99. p. xxv i i .
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palms in a d i s t r i c t  that was to a t t rac t  others. In 1905 he was 
joined as neighbour by Alearce Savery Anthony, yet another se t t le r  
from Maurit ius, who had managed fo r  David Bal lantine at So.geri. 
Described as a 'coloured' man, Anthony may have come to New 
Guinea as a personal servant of the Government Secretary, Anthony 
Musgrave, but became a co l lec to r  of specimens both natural and 
cul tura l  fo r  European museums. At Hisiu he obtained a lease of 
640 acres.
In the Eastern Division a na tu ra l is t  and major co l lec to r  for  
Lord Rothschi ld's Tring Museum, Albert  Meek, was granted 300 acres 
on Goodenough in the D'Entrecasteaux in 1896 in partnership with a 
Woodlark miner, James Thompson.(4) The land was reported the 
fol lowing year to be largely planted up but seems to have been 
soon abandoned.(5) By 1899 Meek had cleared land fo r  a coconut 
plantat ion and 'farm' on Sariba Island on the China S t ra i t  near 
Samarai.(6) He imported a herd of ca t t le  from 'south' to keep the 
ground clear under the palms and to supply the nearby township 
with milk. But by 1906 Meek had exhausted his experiment with 
planter l i f e  and resumed co l lec t ing  in the Solomons.
Cows were also used in la te r  years to maintain clear ground 
under coconuts at Loani a plantat ion on the mainland opposite 
Samarai. This property of 500 acres had been par t ly  cleared and
4 Miriam Rothschild. Dear Lord RothschiId (Baltimore, 1983). 
Over 500 of Meek's le t te rs  are held in the Rothschild 
Archive.
5 BNGAR 1896-97. p. 49.
6 AS Meek. A Natura l is t  in Cannibal Land (London, 1913).
p. 100.
planted by a brother of the LMS missionary Fred Walker and taken 
up in the brothers'  j o i n t  names in 1897. I t  passed in 1909 to 
Elias Solomon, possibly another s e t t le r  from Maurit ius, who had 
overseen the government nursery at Wagawaga on Milne Bay in 1907.
While these modest developments were a l l  that stood out in 
commercial plantat ion agr icu l tu re in the interregnum, the 
in te rs t ices of opportunity had continued to f i l l  with even smaller 
undertakings. In 1894 an 'energetic s e t t l e r ' ,  Richard Edward 
Weaver, had begun cu l t iva t io n  of a market garden on the Laloki 
River near Sapphire Creek, demonstrating a f te r  a l l ,  Francis Winter 
observed, ' tha t  a European can do manual labour1 on the coastal 
lowlands.(7) Weaver was representat ive of a class of perhaps f i f t y  
se t t le rs  who could make l i t t l e  claim to being either traders or 
planters in the conventional sense. They included a handful of 
'Mani l la '  men, several Chinese and Lascars, a var ie ty  of South Sea 
islanders - castaways and absconding crew, two Malay servants l e f t  
behind by the I ta l ia n  na tu ra l is t  Luigi D 'A lbert is  in 1876, runaway 
convicts from the French penal settlement at Noumea, and English 
and Austral ian 'knockabouts'. They gathered sandalwood, pearls, 
trochus and trepang, or d r i f te d  in and out of prospecting. They 
subsisted as best they could on small holdings and what the 
country could o f fe r ,  intermarrying with the Papuans and heavi ly 
dependent on th e i r  goodwil l . Some l i ke  Robert Hunter, sandalwood 
and wild rubber co l lec to r ,  were re la t i v e ly  prosperous. Most never 
were. Hunter planted cotton at Obu on Hisiu Beach in 1898 and 
was, with his brother George, employed fo r  a time by the 
government.
7 BNGAR 1894-95. p. xxv i i .
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Mission grants continued to increase in number - to 340 in 1900 
- and whether sett led by European missionary, South Sea island 
pastor or Papuan teacher, these stat ions l ike  those of traders 
were invariably planted with some exotic foods and economic trees. 
The European population was s t i l l  very small, r is ing  to 573 in 
1904. With concentrations only on the go ldf ie lds and at Samarai 
and Port Moresby, th is  community was widely d is t r ibu ted in ones 
and twos along the coasts. Possessed as they were of ar tefacts of 
great novelty, and pursuing th e i r  mysterious ends often with a 
display of swagger, b lu f f  and exaggerated idiosyncrasy what would 
hardly have been tolerated at 'home1, th e i r  very scarc ity  enhanced 
the notorie ty  of these strangers among the Papuans. Among these 
Europeans and the i r  Papuan employees a mental map of B r i t ish  New 
Guinea was already being formed upon which the isolated stat ions 
and settlements connected by ketch and lugger or the government 
yacht, the Merrie Engl and, appeared a formidable and reassuring 
network, the distances between points seemed less than they were, 
and two or three whites together might be f e l t  almost to comprise 
a town.
In the interregnum land acquired by the crown fa r  exceeded the 
land actual ly  alienated fo r  settlement or development. In 1899 
over 326,000 acres of the Laloki ,  Brown and Goldie r i ve r  lands 
between Port Moresby and the Astrolabe Range were declared waste 
and vacant. Th-is area, the largest so declared, had been the 
hunting grounds of the coastal Motu and Koitapu peoples and a 
buffer  t e r r i t o r y  between them and the Koiaris of the range. In 
the same year 12,500 acres were purchased from the Koiaris between 
Warirata and Sogeri. A f te r  LeHunte had asked the Queensland
government for  help, the s ta f f  of surveyors increased temporarily 
to six with a draughtsman and two assistants in November 1900. In 
the fo l lowing year there were seventy appl ications fo r  land. 
Sixteen were made by Christ ian missions, f i f t e e n  of which were 
granted. Of the remainder, nine were withdrawn, six refused, and 
twenty three remained under consideration at the end of the year. 
The to ta l  area granted amounted to only 1,115 acres, nearly half  
of which went to the missions. The to ta l  area applied fo r  had 
been 202,529 acres, including a resubmitted appl icat ion of the 
Hall Sound Company and another fo r  a block of over 100,000 acres 
at Mullens Harbour that LeHunte favoured but was unable to 
consider - presumably because the appl icant who made i t  could not 
command su f f ic ie n t  cap i ta l .  This was the Hon. Richard deMoleyns, 
the son of an I r ish  peer and probably l i v in g  on a remittance. He 
had entered the government service b r ie f l y  in 1900 and la te r  
worked as an assistant on various plantat ions.  The anthropologist 
Malinowski was to know 'D i r ty  Dick1 in Samarai during the war as 
'a thoroughbred noble f igu re .  Drunk as a sponge, so long as there 
is whiskey about. . .A f te r  sobering up . . .w i th  s t r i k in g ly  good 
manners.. . 1 i t t l e  in te l le c tua l  c u l tu re 1. (8) DeMoleyns committed 
suicide at Samarai hospital in 1916 and his family repudiated his 
debts. I f  he was exceptional in his or ig ins and manners, there 
were others who shared his sty le of l i f e  on the fr inges of the 
white community.
By 1904 purchases of land from the Papuans amounted to 353,614 
acres, and waste and vacant lands to ta l led  338,988 acres, while
8 Bronislaw Malinowski. A Diary in the S t r i c t  Sense of the 
Term (London, 1967). p. 39.
the area actual ly al ienated to se t t le rs  was 22,099 acres or 19,576 
acres i f  mission grants were excepted. Christopher Robinson, 
Winter 's successor as CJO and Acting Administrator in 1903, 
submitted fu r the r  recommendations fo r  changes in the land law. He 
advocated that the crown should at las t  assume the radical t i t l e  
to a l l  lands whether presently occupied or claimed under customary 
tenure or not, but that fu ture al ienation should only be allowed 
under lease. A questionnaire c i rcu la ted among the white residents 
had brought answers overwhelmingly favouring the continuance of 
the freehold grant system but even so, as Robinson noted, the 
demand fo r  land had been 'very s l i g h t ' . (9) A system of land 
al ienation based on leasing, he pointed out, protected planters 
from cred i tors ,  fo r  the lessee was saved a large i n i t i a l  outlay 
that could instead be turned to development. Rents could be scaled 
according to the increasing capacity of an enterprise to pay and 
would provide the government with a continuing and d i rec t  source 
of income to augment and perhaps exceed import duties as the 
principal generator of local revenue. I f  despite the prejudice in 
i t s  favour, the o f fe r  of land in freehold had fa i le d  to a t t rac t  
settlement, then long leases with th e i r  advantages well 
advertised might yet do so.
By 1906, gold exports amounted to over £58,000 in .value, or 
three quarters of the exports. The value of copra, s t i l l  coming 
mostly from v i l lage  groves had increased to more than £9,000. I t  
remained the pr incipal item of trade with the Papuans but i t s  
value did not exceed that of the combined export of pearls, beche
9 Despatch No 35, 12 August 1903, Robinson to Governor of 
Queensland.
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de mer, trochus and sandalwood decl in ing as these small industr ies 
were. Coffee exports of about f i f t e e n  tons were valued at £915.
Of the 700,000 acres of crown lands and the grants and leases made 
from them, barely 1,500 acres had been, in fac t ,  developed a f te r  
more than twenty years of European presence on the coast . (10)
Devoid general ly of both capital and experience, the few planters, 
even when beginning to see some success, remained mostly amateurs 
working on a small scale and depending upon some other l ive l ihood 
or a partnership to supplement th e i r  income or provide development 
funds.
The Land Ordinance of 1906 was to end the granting of freehold 
r igh ts  in Papua. I t  did not assert the crown's claim to radical 
t i t l e  but preserved MacGregor's presumption of the Papuans' 
customary ownership of a l l  land unless otherwise determined. The 
ordinance, nonetheless, provided very generous leasing conditions 
that un t i l  1909 waived survey charges, levied no rents fo r  the 
f i r s t  ten years, and exacted only threepence an acre per annum 
thereafter . Improvement conditions alone applied a check on 
excessive ambition. But these too seemed l ig h t .  A f i f t h  of any 
agr icu l tu ra l  lease taken up was to be planted with an 'approved' 
crop within f ive  years, or, in the case of pastoral leases, the 
lessee was given f ive  years in which to stock each square mile 
with ten head of ca t t le .  Within twenty years three quarters of a 
plantat ion lease had to be planted up.
In a f l u r r y  of a c t i v i t y  outstanding freehold grants were issued 
to the remaining provisional grantees and published in the last
10 PAR 1906-07. p. 132; PAR 1912-13 p. 23 sets out increase 
in planted areas since 1907.
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Brit ish New Guinea Government Gazette in September 1906. Since 
1890 465 grants had been made, the l as t  to be f inal ised being 
Henry Wickham's. Because the Conflict  Islands,  s t i l l  unsurveyed, 
did not contain more than a third of the area stated in the deed 
of grant, Wickham had disputed the charges levied and the freehold 
t i t l e  was not issued until  1920.(11)
Commenting in 1912, Sir William MacGregor saw the argument over 
the form of tenure to be given alienated land to have been 
i rrelevant  to the development of the country since a boom in 
tropical  commodities in the interim had succeeded in at t ract ing 
capital  to leasehold land in Papua when offers of cheap freehold 
in Bri t ish New Guinea had previously fai led to excite in teres t .  
What was meritorious about the land legi s la t ion of Bri t ish New 
Guinea and Papua, he thought, was i t s  guarantee of Papuan 
r i g h t s . (12) A more recent historian has concluded that  i t  was ' to 
the credi t  of Papua's rulers  that  they were never dominated by the 
determination to make lands available at all c o s t s ' . (13) To the 
extent that  large speculative land bids were discouraged before 
1906 this  is obviously true.  But short of being offered absolutely 
free and without conditions,  land had been made amply available.  
The government had already acquired far  more crown land than i t  
was ever able to dispose of, and had heavy demands developed, far
11 CRS Al 22/9540 A Bill was introduced in 1906 in the 
Federal Parliament to permit the grant but was withdrawn.
The Papua Ac-t was amended in 1920 to overcome the 
impasse.
12 Sir William MacGregor in the Foreword to J H P Murray's 
Papua or Bri t ish New Guinea (London, 1912).
13 L P Mair. Austral ia in New Guinea (Melbourne, 1970). 
p . 135.
greater areas could have been obtained without a l te ra t ion  in the 
law. In B r i t ish  New Guinea, i t  seems, the reach of imperial ism 
had, at least temporari ly, exceeded i t s  grasp and that the 
goodwill of the new gavamani towards the Papuans would never 
rea l ly  be brought to the tes t .  Among the remoter estuaries of 
empire, the country had remained barely touched by the high t ide 
of the Anglo-Saxon sea, possessed of a well intentioned land law 
designed to protect the native inhabitants from a f low of white 
se t t le rs  that could not be induced to come. With the end of the 
interregnum coinciding with an international plantat ion boom i t  
appeared that at last  the f low might begin.
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Chapter 4 The greatest freedom of contract
The question of exp lo i ta t ion  of the labour of the 'nat ives'  of 
New Guinea had arisen even before the establishment of the 
Protectorate. A report of a Committee of Inquiry  in to  the workings 
of the Western Paci f ic  Orders in Council was presented to the 
Colonial Secretary in October 1883. With the unrecognized attempt 
to annex the whole of eastern New Guinea by the Queensland 
government the previous Apr i l  s t i l l  a recent memory and with the 
Convention of the Australasian Colonies in session and pressing 
again for  an assertion of B r i t ish  sovereignty, the Committee 
opposed the creation of a protectorate on any terms other than 
those which reserved to the imperial au thor i t ies  the appointment 
of o f f i c i a l s  in any government to be establ ished. S ir  Arthur 
Gordon, the f i r s t  High Commissioner and pr incipal  author of 
the Report, was anxious to avoid any step that might lead to 
d i rec t  ru le in New Guinea by Austral ians accountable to 
representative white colonial leg is la tures on grounds s imi lar  to 
those which had e a r l ie r  led him in 1878 to support annexation - 
the need to protect the islanders from the violence and anarchy 
that he believed would attend white settlement. But whereas in 
1878 he had been disturbed at the thought of the treatment native 
peoples were l i k e l y  to receive from miners entering the country, 
in 1883 he was apprehensive about the capacity of Austral ian 
governments, in pa r t icu la r  Queensland's, to withstand pressure 
from sugar interests to allow large scale use of cheap labour 
drawn from th is  new, large and populous source by the Queensland 
sugar industry. I t  was ' to  place the destinies of many mi l l ions of
men entirely in the hands of those whose interests are always 
alien, and too often antagonistic to their own'.(l)
The Colonial Office took a different view from that of the 
Committee and could see l i t t l e  reason to bear the burden of 
establishing a protectorate in New Guinea except in response to 
Australian pressures and upon the understanding that the burden 
must eventually pass to the Australians. But in consideration of 
the scruples of many who shared Gordon's apprehensions the Letters 
Patent establishing the protectorate over the south east coast in 
September 1884 explicitly forbade the removal of labour from the 
country. As if to confirm Gordon's worst predictions, the f i r s t  
recruiting vessels to visi t  the coasts began calling at the 
Louisiades in April 1883 - the captain and Queensland government 
agent on the very f i r s t  ship, the Stanley, being subsequently 
convicted of offences under the Kidnapping Act (Q1d.).  In the 
succeeding year repeated violations of the Queensland law 
regarding recruitment and the desertions of 'New Guinea natives' 
from sugar plantations led to the appointment of a Royal 
Commission in December 1884, the Report of which gave so much 
evidence of misunderstanding, deception and violence in a t raff ic 
barely eighteen months old that the government in Brisbane ordered 
the repatriation of all New Guinea labourers. Of a total of 648 
'recruited'  in the Louisiades, 404 were returned in 1885, f i f ty  
saw out their contracts in Queensland for another year or two, and 
the balance of 150 remain unaccounted for and might have died of 
disease or starvation in service or after absconding from i t .  To
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1 Derryck Scarr. Fragments of Empire (Canberra, 1967) 
p. 131.
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those Austral ians now sensi t ive to th e i r  countrymen's treatment of 
coloured people i t  seemed that a calamity had barely been avoided.
The Protectorate was recognised by the European powers as an 
assertion of a claim to a future consolidation of B r i t ish  
interests in the region but otherwise by d e f in i t io n  i t  meant the 
provision of no more than a protect ive shield under which s t i l l  
sovereign native p o l i t i c a l  structures and community l i f e  could 
continue to work without outside interference. As with land 
pol icy, so with the question of whether or how the labour of the 
native people might be exploited, the period 1884-1888 was one of 
s tandst i11.
The discovery of payable quant i t ies of gold on Sudest in August 
1888 preceded the assumption of B r i t ish  sovereignty by a month. In 
his th i rd  enactment as Administrator Dr MacGregor proclaimed an 
interim labour ordinance aimed at the miners that placed an 
immediate re s t ra in t  on the use of 'aborig inal natives' of B r i t ish  
New Guinea as labourers outside defined d i s t r i c t s  or otherwise 
beyond ten miles from th e i r  homes unless fo r  government service or 
engagement under agreement sanctioned by a Resident Magistrate to 
work on coastal boats. No agreement could be fo r  more than six 
months and the consent of the ' t r i b e '  or family needed to be 
secured. In other respects the conditions of service, b r ie f l y  set 
out in th is  ordinance, were to remain those upon which a l l  future 
contract or indentured labour law was to be based.(2) These 
conditions were that the determination of the wil l ingness of New
2 Natives Removal Prohib it ion Ordinance, 1888. Supplement 
to BNG Government Gazette. 17 September 1888.
Guinea men to engage and of th e i r  understanding of what they were 
committing themselves to, and of the employers' preparedness to 
o f fe r  a f ixed remuneration, ra t ions, f a i r  treatment and a passage 
home af ter  a f ixed term of service, should from the beginning be 
the responsibi 1i t y  of the magisterial s ta f f .  Employers were 
required ei ther to deposit wages in advance or to supply a 
guarantee to cover default .  The Resident Magistrates (RMs) while 
remaining accountable to the Government Secretary could cancel 
agreements at any time without being obliged to give reasons.
That the labourers recruited in the Louisiades fo r  service in 
Queensland in the b r ie f  labour trade of 1883-1885 had proved less 
sat is fac tory  than workers drawn from elsewhere in western 
Melanesia led no one to suppose that the largest of a l l  Pacif ic  
islands could not y ie ld  more than su f f ic ie n t  labour fo r  i t s  own 
economic development i f  a properly regulated internal system of 
contract labour was ins t i tu ted .  I t  was unthinkable in the 1890's 
that i t  might ever be thought desirable to import labour into New 
Guinea to work mines and plantat ions - fo r  i f  most white 
Austral ians were uneasy about the use of Kanakas by Queensland 
sugar planters and would soon proceed to end the trade in island 
labour into Austra l ia  then they were not l i k e l y  to consent to the 
importation of cool ies in to  a t e r r i t o r y  so close to th e i r  northern 
coasts and which they already considered th e i r  own.
A comprehensive Native Labour Ordinance in 1892 permitted 
casual employment of the 'natives of B r i t ish  New Guinea' wi thin 
twenty- f ive miles of th e i r  v i l lages fo r  periods up to a month and 
contracts of service entered in to  before an RM now allowed labour
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to be removed from one Division to another for periods up to a 
year. Employers in the Torres S t r a i t  pearl f i sher ies  who 
maintained assets in the Possession and provided securi ty could 
take Papuans outside the boundaries of the country as far  south as 
Cooktown - a privi lege extended also to the missions, effect ively 
the Sacred Heart Mission, which wanted to send pupils from the 
Mekeo to Thursday Island. Either party to a contract  could now 
apply to have agreements al tered or cancelled though in any case 
the employer was obliged to bear the cost of returning labourers 
home. Only the death of a labourer or a posi t ive refusal to return 
to his vi l lage could rel ieve the employer of this  ob i iga t i on . (3)
The law as yet contained no sanctions - except loss of pay - 
that  could be applied to labourers who 'without reasonable cause' 
deserted the i r  employers or who refused to work, and since all 
wages due were normally paid at the termination of the contract  in 
the presence of an RM, the employer was compelled to regi s te r  
desertions or other complaints promptly or remain l iable  for the 
full  wages agreed to at the outset  and other costs s t ipulated by 
1 aw.
To MacGregor the Ordinance had been 'framed to permit the 
greatest  freedom of contract  between the employer and.the native 
that  is compatible with reasonable protection of the l a t t e r  in his 
present condit ion' . (4)  To the few se t t l e r s ,  as matters stood in 
1892, i t  might reasonably have seemed that  the men of Bri t ish New
3 Native Labour Ordinance, 1892. Supplement to BNG Govern­
ment Gazette, 4 June 1892.
4 BNGAR 1891-91, p. 12.
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Guinea had very l i t t l e  to lose in breaking the i r  contracts whereas 
employers took a considerable r isk  in employing them at a l l .  While 
the chief inducement to engage fo r  service with the white man must 
always have been the goods purchased with the wages labourers 
expected to receive at the end of the i r  indenture, and while 
coastal communities were quickly made dependent on the metal 
goods, cloth and tobacco which indentured service allowed them to 
buy, in an essential sense the capacity of the people to subsist 
without work fo r  money was not greatly  diminished by the European 
in trus ion. The conventional wage paid to 'na t ive ' labour 
throughout the t ropica l  world since the end of negro slavery had 
never been a l i v in g  wage, and while MacGregor included a clause in 
the new Ordinance to the ef fec t  that an RM sanctioning an 
agreement must be sa t is f ied  that the dependants of a labourer 
would be adequately maintained i t  was not expected that they would 
be maintained by the absent labourer.(5) I t  is true that employers 
had to accommodate, feed and minimally clothe th e i r  workers and 
that the costs of these provisions together with those of 
recruitment and repa tr ia t ion  might amount to three or more times 
the average wage of between f ive  sh i l l in g s  and £1 a month, but in 
B r i t ish  New Guinea, as elsewhere in the tropics where labour was 
secured by contract, the dependants of indentured labourers were 
expected to f ind the i r  subsistence at home or on land made 
available by the employers.
But v i l lage rs  could not be compelled to work fo r  Europeans, and 
indentured labourers possessed, unl ike th e i r  employers, no movable 
"'wealth that could be claimed in redress of a breach of contract -
5 NLO 1892, XIV (3).
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i t  being agreed that th e i r  lands could not so be used. There 
seemed then no means by which Papuan workers could be forced to 
honour an agreement with an employer other than by withholding 
the i r  wages - unless, that is , penalties properly belonging to the 
criminal law were applied in cases of default  by native employees 
in c i v i l  contracts of service. This was lega l ly  anomalous but 
p ra c t ica l ly  necessary and in 1893, in an amending Ordinance, 
MacGregor imposed such a penalty in the form of a month's 
imprisonment fo r  un jus t i f ied  desertion or refusal to begin 
contracted service. A fu r the r  amendment in 1897, waiving 
imprisonment, allowed fo r  the arrest and return to th e i r  employers 
of deserters, but another in 1900 imposed a f o r tn ig h t ' s  gaol fo r  
fa i lu re  to carry out reasonable orders. Thus the inequa l i t ies  of 
the s i tua t ion were resolved in the employer's favour with the 
power of the magistrates and the threat of gaol standing behind a 
taubada' s order. The extent to which employers could exp lo i t  th is  
advantage would be tested in the coming years.
A fu r the r  Ordinance consol idating the labour law and amendments 
as they then stood was proclaimed by MacGregor's successor,
G R LeHunte, in January 1900.(6) This required recru i te rs  of 
Papuan labour to be licensed and to lodge guarantees covered by a 
bond of £50 with a l icensing o f f ic e r .  The re c ru i te r 's  
respons ib i l i t ies  towards men he had recruited, l i ke  those 
subsequently of the employer, became a charge against his estate 
in the case of his death and the RMs were to be allowed the same 
unobstructed access to rec ru i te rs '  boats that they had to labour
6 Native Labour Ordinance, 1900. Supplement to BNG Govern­
ment Gazette, 10 February 1900.
l ines on mines and plantat ions.  By making i t  an offence to use 
fa lse pretences to induce a v i l la g e r  to leave his home to travel 
to a government stat ion to be engaged as a labourer, the law 
placed upon the re c ru i te r  the f i r s t  responsibi 1i t y  of making sure 
that recru i ts  understood enough of the purpose, durat ion, 
destination and conditions of service they were being offered well 
before they appeared before an RM who could witness th e i r  
contract. In e f fec t  recru i te rs  needed to know from employers 
placing orders fo r  labour what the conditions and type of work 
would be so that labourers could be recruited to spec i f ic  order. 
There were to be no labour exchanges or pools.
Labourers could now have th e i r  contracts endorsed to permit 
re-engagement fo r  a second year and contracts could be signed 
before any RM along large parts of the coast soon to be declared 
Settled Labour D is t r i c t s .  The penal sanctions for  refusal to 
work, desertion or neglect of duty could include both imprisonment 
and loss of wages though the costs of carrying out a warrant fo r  
the arrest of deserters were s t i l l  to be borne by the employer.
The relaxation fo r  a time of the requirement that labourers be 
signed on at the government stat ion nearest th e i r  homes came under 
c r i t i c ism  and in 1912 the more str ingent requirement was restored. 
Thus, unless the employer was a licensed rec ru i te r  himself,  the 
burden of seeing that the conditions at the outset of engagement 
were f u l f i l l e d  was to rest with recru i te rs  and government o f f ice rs  
in the div is ions where labour was obtained. Though RMs were 
frequently moved the o f f ices  on stat ions soon acquired systematic 
records of labour movements that allowed recruitment and
repat r ia t ion to be policed with an apparently complete 
effect iveness.
The s t ructure of the system of indentured labour in Bri t ish New 
Guinea and inheri ted by the Terr i tory of Papua under the 
Commonwealth was therefore substant ial ly assembled and in place 
well before 1906. The actual numbers of the 'Papuan natives of 
Bri t ish New Guinea1 who were affected by the consolidated Labour 
Ordinance of 1900 were r e la t ive ly  small with most employed in gold 
mining in the South Eastern and Northern Divisions or the Torres 
S t r a i t  pearl f i sher i es .  In 1902-03, the Eastern Division was 
providing most labourers with 2,114 engaging there in the year,
1,122 for work in other d iv i s i ons . (7)
Both employers and governments thought that  employment did no 
more than soak up the idle labour made available by the 
suppression of t r ibal  warfare, indeed that  service for the white 
man was a healthy subst i tute  for feuding and that  the absence of 
the young men placed l i t t l e  added burden upon communities where 
the labour of subsistence had always fal len unequally upon the 
women. In effect  engagement was to be largely confined to young 
unmarried men whose labour may have been or had become ' surp lus ' ,  
yet the continued existence of the paral lel  subsistence economy 
whence the labourers came was s t i l l  vi tal  to the plantat ion or 
mining economy -that Europeans sort  to establ ish,  the more so in 
dependencies l ike Bri t ish New Guinea and i t s  successor ent i ty ,  the 
Terri tory of Papua, where labour was to be exclusively drawn from 
within the country. If i t  was to be the dis tant  consumers of
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tropical  commodities and not often the white se t t le rs  in the 
tropics who were to benef i t  most from the near perfect competition 
that existed between the plantat ion colonies in the production of 
these commodities, those consumers might also have been the 
beneficiaries of an e f fec t ive  subsidy to production provided by 
the enduring capacity of subjected peoples to subsist 
independently of the wage system.
I t  was a par t icu la r  v i r tue  of the administrations of B r i t ish  
New Guinea and Papua that in ta c i t  recognit ion of the 
i n t r a c t a b i l i t y  of the international terms of trade that determined 
'nat ive ' wages, the Papuans would never be permitted to become a 
landless and permanently wage dependent p ro le ta r ia t .  The coro l lary  
of th is ,  i t  seemed, was that they were ever to remain 'boys' and 
the i r  wages in the nature of pocket money fo r  the purchase of 
imported luxuries.  The s e n s i t i v i t y  to the moral issues 
surrounding the acquis it ion of new colonial respon s ib i l i t ies  that 
characterised the best in late nineteenth century B r i t ish  
imperialism could secure a s i tua t ion  no better than th is .
A new Native Labour Ordinance drafted in 1906 while Captain 
F R Barton was Administrator by J H P Murray CJO was given assent 
in Apr i l  1907.(8) I t  permitted terms of indenture of up to three 
years, or consecutive shorter terms of indenture amounting to 
three years, before labourers were to be repatr iated. The 
Ordinance consolidated the previous leg is la t ion  placing the f u l l  
responsibi 1i t y  fo r  the care, safety and safe return to the i r
8 Native Labour Ordinance, 1907. Supplement to Te r r i to ry  of 
Papua Government Gazette, 23 Apri l  1907.
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villages of indentured labourers clearly in the hands of the 
Europeans recruiting or employing them. In the case of an employer 
his obligations commenced from the day on which a contract was 
signed until the labourer's return home. As before, Contracts of 
Service were to be signed before an RM or ARM in the labourer's 
home division, the kind of labour to be undertaken and the place 
of work to be limited to those 'agreed' to in the contract. Wages 
were to be lodged at monthly intervals with the RM in the division 
in which the worker was employed and paid out in full in the 
presence of an officer at the end of the term of indenture. The 
wages of deceased labourers were sent on to their relatives. A 
further Ordinance in 1911 which continued in force with amendments 
until 1941, permitted signing on for a fourth year provided at 
least a year separated the completion of the prolonged period of 
indenture and the commencement of another. Employers were required 
to place an amount equivalent to three months' wages in advance 
with an RM or provide a surety who had agreed to guarantee the 
employer's l iabi l i t ies .  In later years larger employers might have 
this requirement waived.
The administration was reluctant to allow the payment of 
'advances' - payments to labourers during the term of indenture - 
on account of the advantage such payments would give the planter 
as storekeeper. But from 1919 amounts totalling no more than a 
sixth of the wages due at the end of the contract could be 
'advanced' out of the deposits held by the RM, and spent locally, 
usually at the plantation store. Native Affairs officers regularly 
checked prices charged in such stores as plantations were
74
inspected. (9)
The techniques of cu l t iva t io n  and preparation fo r  export of 
tropical tree crops did not greatly change throughout the period 
under review. Much of the work on plantat ions was essent ia l ly  
h o r t i c u l tu ra l ,  i f  on a large scale, and continued to require a 
very large input of manual labour by comparison with the 
increasingly mechanised agriculture of the temperate lands . (10)
The standards fo r  the export of trop ica l  products were set and the 
technology developed usual ly in the main producing countries.
These requirements were quickly passed on through trade and 
agr icu l tu ra l  bu l le t ins  and the signals given by the market to the 
growers in the smaller producing countries l i ke  Papua who could 
not afford to f a l l  fa r  behind. L i t t l e  or none of the value 
of increased e f f ic iency  or product iv i ty  achieved over the years 
was retained by the producers in these t e r r i t o r ie s  - th is  
was quickly absorbed by the metropol itan manufacturers and 
consumers who could as a consequence buy more cheaply.
9 By the t h i r t i e s  advances of up to a th i rd  of accumulated 
wages were permitted. (PAR 1935-36, p. 7)
10 Temperate tree crops required pickers and packers in large 
numbers only at harvest time and markets in th e i r  produce 
remained accustomed to accepting prices determined by 
competition among European producers employing white 
1abour.
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Part II F i r s t  grandchild of the Empire, 1901-1914
Chapter 5 A natural dependency of Austral ia
With the approach of federation in Austral ia,  the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, sought to establ ish 
that the full  responsibi 1i ty for the future government and expense 
of Bri t ish New Guinea should be with the new Commonwealth. In 
June 1898 he reminded the colonial governments that  part icipated 
in supporting the administration that  the possession was a 
'natural dependency' of Austral ia,  that  i t  was l ikely to be 
developed almost ent i re ly  by Australian enterprise,  and that  i t  
had been annexed solely in response to an overwhelming colonial 
demand. From the end of 1900 the Bri t ish government declined to 
make further  contributions to the revenue of Bri t ish New Guinea, 
the expenditure in 1901 being mostly met out of a small reserve 
bui l t  up by MacGregor. With the establishment of the 
Commonwealth, the former contributing colonies also withdrew thei r  
financial  support pending federal i n i t i a t i ve  in a matter that  had 
ceased to be a States responsibi l i ty  under the Federal 
Constitution.  By late  1901 LeHunte was forced to approach the 
Queensland government for guarantees to cover his d e f i c i t . (1)
Pressed thus to consider the acceptance of Bri t ish New Guinea 
as a t e r r i t o ry  of the Commonwealth before, in the opinion of some 
members, the new nation was ready to undertake such a 
responsibi1i ty,  both houses of the federal parliament debated the
1 CRS A2 03/2538 Letter  LeHunte to Sir  Samuel Gr i f f i th ,  
1 October 1901.
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issues in November 1901. The debates are ins t ruc t ive  fo r  in them 
were raised the fundamental contradict ions that existed between 
Austral ian s e l f - in te re s t  and an expansionist pol icy by white 
Austra l ia in the south Paci f ic .  In view of the threat im p l i c i t  in 
the stand of the imperial au thor i t ies - that the possession might 
otherwise be abandoned - the government of Sir  Edmund Barton moved
1
that B r i t ish  New Guinea be accepted as a 'T e r r i to ry '  of the 
Commonwealth and that £20,000 a year be voted fo r  f i v e  years as an 
interim measure to meet the costs of admin is t ra t ion .(2)
In the end a majori ty of the federal members were to be readi ly  
persuaded that an increased responsibi 1i t y  in New Guinea was 
j u s t l y  commensurate with Aus t ra l ia 's  new status and imperative i f  
host i le  powers were to continue to be denied use of numerous 
harbours from which an attack upon Austra l ia  might in fu ture be 
launched. But a minori ty  f e l t  that the acquis it ion of common 
borders between unambiguously Austral ian t e r r i t o r y  and 
t e r r i t o r ie s  of the German and Dutch empires might lead d i re c t ly  to 
those very entanglements and confrontat ions that possession was 
supposed to prevent and which continuation of the former 
arrangement might avoid. The symmetry of an island continent 
inhabited by one race and nation, so recently establ ished, was to 
be immediately los t  and the pol icy of white racia l exclusivism 
compromised from the s ta r t .
The member fo r  New England and a wealthy grazier, Will iam Bowie
2 Commonwealth Pariiamentary Debates, Vol VI, 1901. p. 7092. 
(Representatives) 12 November 1901. The debate was resumed 
on 19 November, p. 7396. The debates of 20 November in the 
Senate includes the text of Chamberlain's despatch of 8 
June 1898, p. 7470.
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Stuart Sawers fa i le d  to see any advantage fo r  Austra l ia  in 
accepting the f u l l  burden of a l im i t less  expenditure in New Guinea 
where the experience of the 'home' government with many another 
unprofi table colonial possession was l i k e l y  to be repeated.(3)
Or, he asked, were industr ies such as sugar production to be 
encouraged there and given assistance that would be ' to  the 
detriment of our own workers with in our own proper Austral ian 
t e r r i t o r y '?(4) He hoped that i f  the Commonwealth could f ind  part 
of the costs of government, the Colonial Off ice would continue to 
administer B r i t ish  New Guinea and that some rearrangement of the 
spheres of influence of European powers in the Paci f ic  might be 
made to remove the danger of c o n f l i c t  fu r the r  from Austral ian 
shores, fo r  'the pol icy of mopping up the islands is a sort of 
Jingoism which I hope Austra l ia  w i l l  re f ra in  f r o m ' . (5)
The Attorney General, Alfred Deakin, eloquently advanced those 
arguments for  the government that were calculated to disarm 
opposition through an appeal to humanitarianism. I f  the a t t i tude 
of the 'home au tho r i t ies '  was f i rm and unalterable in refusing 
fu r the r  to take responsibi 1i t y ,  and since B r i t ish  New Guinea had 
indeed been ' v i r t u a l l y  annexed' at the behest of the Austral ian 
colonies ' f o r  many years past ' ,  the Commonwealth had very l i t t l e  
choice in the matter. Nor could i t  be admitted that 'separated by 
half the earth 's  c i r c u i t ,  a Government in Downing Street would be 
l i k e l y  to administer (New Guinea's) a f fa i rs  more e f f i c i e n t l y  in 
the in terests of the Empire as a whole than would the Government
3 ib id .  p. 7406.
4 ib id.
5 ib id .  p. 7407.
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of the Commonwealth with i t s  much greater p ro x im i ty ' .(6) As fo r  
the threat to A us t ra l ia 's  securi ty  posed by the common borders 
acquired, i t  was un l ike ly ,  Deakin thought, that the se t t le rs  of 
the respective Austra l ian, German and Dutch t e r r i t o r ie s  would f ind 
themselves face to face for  many years.
Ult imate ly , he argued, i t  was essential that the Commonwealth 
acquire f u l l  control over the t e r r i t o r y  in the in terests of the 
native people fo r  the protect ion of the i r  lands and labour from ' 
i rresponsible men who are a law unto themselves' (7) and who would 
inev i tab ly  be drawn there, as
The only guarantee, or the most e f f i c ie n t  we can have, 
that the settlement of New Guinea shal l form an exception 
in the h is tory  of the development of a tropical  country 
inhabited by native races - that the settlement shal l 
take place on the l ines of peace, order, and good govern­
ment, so that great land monopolies and in jus t ice  to the 
natives may be prevented - is that when we pay th is  
£20,000 a year, the Commonwealth Parliament shall be able 
to impose i t s  own conditions, and see to the adminis­
t ra t ion  i t s e l f .(8)
There was, i t  seemed, no a l te rna t ive  to an acceptance of th is  
responsibi1i t y  -just as ' there can be no pause in New Guinea t i l l  
i t s  resources are s u f f i c ie n t l y  developed to y ie ld  a revenue to
6 ib id .  p. 7410.
7 ib id .  p. 7412.
8 ib id .
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provide fo r  i t s  e f f i c ie n t  admin is t ra t ion1.(9)
Among the speakers in the debate in the upper house on the 
fo l lowing day was a senator from Western Austra l ia ,  Miles 
Stanifor th Cater Smith. He regretted that 'we have to accept the 
government of any t e r r i t o r y  outside of Austra l ia  fo r  the next 
f i f t y  or hundred years' when Austral ians had such a vast land of 
the i r  own to develop.(10) He was immediately intr igued, 
nonetheless, by the alternatives open to Austra l ia  in the 
development of the t e r r i t o r y  and by the d i f f i c u l t i e s  presented by 
the incorporation in some manner of 350,000 ' a l ie n s , . . .  equal in 
number to the population of two states of the Commonwealth'. In 
pa r t icu la r  and in d i rec t  reference to both the Hall Sound Company 
and the 'Somers Vine Syndicate' he condemned ' endeavours.. . to 
monopolise huge t racts  of country' in New Guinea and hoped that i f  
Austra l ia  was to be obliged to take over the t e r r i t o r y  that a 
s t ipu la t ion  should be that no al ienat ion of land in fee simple be 
permitted.(11) I t  was declamation of a kind that was repeated and 
which made i t  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  Senator Walker, the Hall Sound 
d i rec tor ,  to do more than seem to apologise for  his company with 
suggestions that i t  would accept long leases instead of freehold 
land. Austral ian populism whether expressed on the l e f t  or the 
r igh t  of representat ive leg is la tures could f ind easy game and 
electoral p r o f i t  in inveighing against any step by c a p i ta l i s ts  
that i t  suited p o l i t i c ia n s  to represent as excessive. A low 
p ro f i le  and an ega l i ta r ian  manner were even then desirable
att r ibutes in antipodean entrepreneurs.
9 ib id .  p. 7411.
10 ib id .  (Senate) p. 7477.
11 ib id .  p. 7479.
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St ani forth Smith's in te res t  in B r i t ish  New Guinea was to 
increase. He was born in V ic to r ia  in 1869. Having gone as a 
telegraph linesman to the Western Austral ian go ldf ie lds he had 
become Reuters' correspondent and a highly successful and popular 
mayor of Kalgoorl ie at t h i r t y .  He establ ished the town markets 
undercutting middlemen by p ro f i tab ly  r a i l i n g  fresh f r u i t  and 
vegetables to the town at municipal expense. He gave Kalgoorl ie 
chi ldren holidays by the sea. In the elect ions fo r  the f i r s t  
Senate he achieved the most votes of any Western Austral ian 
candidate. After March 1902 he 'adopted' B r i t ish  New Guinea as a 
cause becoming an undisputed pari iamentary authori ty  on the 
t e r r i t o r y  and in 1903 on an investigatory tour that that also 
included German New Guinea and the B r i t ish  Solomon Islands, he 
v is i ted  the country.
Senator Smith returned greatly impressed by the luxuriance of 
tropical  vegetation and the f e r t i l i t y  th is  might suggest to anyone 
who had spent years on the arid Western Austral ian diggings. Of 
Austra l ia 's  'new' t e r r i t o r y  he concluded,
B r i t ish  New Guinea is l ike  a large and valuable estate 
which, up to the present lying id le ,  only requires money 
jud ic ious ly  spent in cu l t iva t ion  to make i t  capable of 
y ie ld ing a large revenue. The present revenue is s u f f i ­
cient to maintain the status quo and unless the Common­
wealth is prepared to i n i t i a t e  a more l ibera l  pol icy New 
Guinea w i l l  remain undeveloped, and always be a f inancia l  
burden.(12)
12 NLA Deposit 1709, Staniforth Smith Papers, Item 1461.
'B r i t i s h  New Guinea' by Senator Stan ifor th Smith, 21 July
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Yet, he repeated, the country must not be given over to 
speculators,  syndicators or promoters l ike the Hall Sound Company 
'who desire to obtain the freehold of huge areas, not to 
cul t ivate ,  but to hold unti l  white s e t t l e r s  arrive,  when they will 
be in a posit ion to demand a share of the wealth they 
produce' .(13) For Staniforth Smith i t  was to development by the 
same enterprising white smal1-hoider-planter  for whom MacGregor 
had waited in vain that  the country was to be opened up. In the
ful l  flush of federat ion,  Austral ia now seemed possessed of
immensely increased power to carry out the work of development 
and, indeed, must find the power or f o r fe i t  the r ight  to hold such 
a valuable t e r r i t ory .  Point was again given to the threat  posed 
by other powers in the region in October 1904 when the Melbourne 
Age reported that  an a r t i c l e  in the St Petersburg paper Novoe 
Vremya had urged the establishment of a Russian naval refuel l ing 
stat ion in the vic ini ty  of New Guinea for the Baltic f l e e t  then 
embarking for the f a r - e a s t . (14) The Prime Minister consulted 
Senator Smith, recently returned from New Guinea, about conditions 
in the Dutch t e r r i to ry .  The Senator understood these to be chaotic
and urged opposition to any Russian move. No member of
parliament, i t  seemed, now knew more of the region than Staniforth 
Smith and in the debates late in 1905 over the form of a new 
const i tut ion for Bri t ish New Guinea to be embodied in the Papua 
Act, his advantage, unfai l ingly demonstrated, might well have 
i r r i t a t ed  some .of his colleagues.
1903, portions taken from Daily Telegraph (Sydney), Morning
Herald (Perth),  and Kalgoorl i e Miner. p. 17.
13 ibid.
14 NLA Deposit 1709, Staniforth Smith Papers, Items 930-936.
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At the end of the year in a l e t t e r  to Deakin, now Prime 
Minister,  Smith suggested that  he be enabled to v i s i t  Java, the 
St ra i t s  Settlements and the Federated Malay States in order to see 
al ternat ives that  might be applied in the development of the 'new' 
Terri tory of Papua and to make recommendations. The permanent 
head of the Department of External Affairs ,  Atlee Hunt, responded 
that
Mr Deakin wishes to say that  he much appreciates the 
public sp i r i t  you display,  and will be pleased indeed 
to receive a report  on the l ines indicated by you. Your 
knowledge of the Terr i tory of Papua will place you in a 
posit ion enjoyed by very few others of making your report  
of such a nature that  i t  will have practical  value in 
assis t ing the development of the Possession.(15)
The Report was tabled as a Parliamentary Paper in June 1906. I t  
was clearly the work of an energetic mind, voracious for 
administrative and agricul tural  minutiae, unfettered by doubt. 
Smith concluded ' conf ident ly . . . that  any economic plant growing 
successfully in Java could be grown equally successfully in Papua' 
which was, af ter  a l l ,  at ' the same lat i tude and in the same 
isotherm' as ' the Garden of the E a s t ' . (16) Only the lack of ski l l  
and experience among the Papuans could prevent the commercial 
development of many of the agricul tural  products that  might be 
grown and in time this  condition could be amended. Meanwhile he
15 ibid. Item 938. Atlee Hunt to Staniforth Smith, 3 January 
1906.
16 CPP, 1906, Vol 2, Report on the Federated Malay States and 
Java. Senator Staniforth Smith, p. 53.
could recommend the development of rubber and copra industries 
certain that they would succeed.
Nonetheless, 'exceptionally easy terms' must be offered if 
sett lers were to be attracted to New Guinea when huge areas of 
tropic lands appeared to be available elsewhere. While leasehold 
t i t l e  was preferable to alienation of land in freehold, Smith 
continued to believe, lessees who fulfi l led the conditions of 
their leases should be allowed the virtual equivalent of freehold 
- the leases should be perpetual and the rental kept to a 
'peppercorn' rate for the f i r s t  ten or fifteen years. Much 
impressed by the support given to the planters of Java by the 
Netherlands East Indies Government through the research 
establishments at Buitenzorg, he recommended that the Papuan 
Government quickly develop coastal and hill experimental stations 
with nurseries from which planters could obtain seed at cost. The 
government should also establish i ts own commercial plantations of 
rubber and coconuts in conjunction with these stations and smaller 
experimental plots should be maintained by the RMs with prison 
labour at all Divisional headquarters. Finally, there was a need 
for an agriculture department administered by a 'thoroughly 
practical expert in tropical plantation work'. It must operate as 
an ' Intelligence Department' constantly in touch with developments 
abroad, for, being 'the last of the nations to take upon our 
shoulders the burden of a tropical dependency' Australia could 
begin its work-in Papua 'lightened by the fact that almost every 
important problem of subordinate government in the tropics, and 
almost every difficulty regarding economic development, has either 
been solved or has been the subject of prolonged investigation' .(17)
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17 ibid. p. 64.
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Of the Papuans, thei r  ' t rue welfare ' ,  Staniforth Smith thought, 
would more probably be served by Australian imitat ion of the 
methods used by the Dutch in compelling the native Javanese to 
become an e f f i c ient  and prosperous workforce - rather than by 
following the Bri t ish policy of importing more ' v i r i l e '  races 
under an indenture system. The t ransfer  of labour from India and 
China to Malaya had injured the Malays, accentuating thei r  
l i s t l essness '  and 'destroying thei r  d i s t inc t ive  race 
char ac t e r i s t i e s ' . (18) If doubts were held about the 
industriousness of the Papuans i t  was to be remembered that  they 
were an agricultural  people, that  thousands of them were already 
under voluntary indenture within the t e r r i t o ry  and that  similar 
people from the South Sea Islands had worked well in Queensland. 
Taxation, he thought, should not therefore be used, for the 
present at least ,  to force the people into wage labour and they 
were to have thei r  possession of the lands they occupied once more 
confirmed.
Hesitant as he may have been in 1901 about Aus t ra l ia ' s  capacity 
to undertake responsibi l i ty  for Bri t ish New Guinea when so much 
remained to be done at home, by 1906 Staniforth Smith had come to 
see the country as an invit ing national and personal opportunity. 
For by 1906 also, developments in Papua had set in t ra in  steps 
that would lead to a Royal Commission into the administrat ion,  and 
the Senator could see that  in considering his own future he might 
reasonably aspire to a greater and more di rect  influence on the 
government of the Terr i tory i f  and when the Administrator,  Captain 
Francis Rickman Barton, r et i red .  I t  was an a t t rac t ive  option but
18 ibid.  p. 67.
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not the only one open to him. In June 1906 he sought nomination 
from non-Labor groups in Western Austral ia for the House of 
Representatives seat of Fremantle believing that  the Senate was 
too elevated a base for an active and continuing pol i t ical  career 
in Austral ia.  I t  seems l ikely that  the Senator would have 
received that  nomination for he remained a popular f igure,  the 
‘very image of a plain-speaking and pract ical  pol i t i c ian  whose 
views seemed to re f l ec t  public opinion. But on the 4th of 
September Deakin offered Staniforth Smith the post of Director of 
Agriculture,  Mines and Public Works together with the off ice of 
Commissioner of Lands and Surveys in the Government of Papua with 
an invi tat ion to carry out those policies he had advocated for the 
development of the T e r r i t o ry . (19) So broad and encompassing did 
this mandate seem that  Smith can only have thought that  he was 
being prepared for the highest off ice in the administration when 
i t  became vacant. Accepting the appointment the following day he 
set out his hopes in an ef for t  to bind Deakin to the i r  fulfi lment  
adding that
I shall t rus t  ent i re ly  to you when the of f ic ia l  offer 
is made to so amplify my posit ion that  I shall not be 
cramped in carrying out a strenuous development policy, 
and at the same time enable me to succeed Captain Barton 
whenever his term may expire,  as the f i r s t  Australian 
Lieutenant Governor.(20)
19 NLA, Deposit 1709, Staniforth Smith Papers, Item 969, 
Deakin to Staniforth Smith, 4 September 1906.
20 ibid.  Staniforth Smith to Deakin, 5 September 
1906.
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Yet the Prime Minister had been t ry ing  to arrange the return of 
Sir Wil l iam MacGregor to serve a fu r the r  term in New Guinea and to 
smooth the passage of new pol ic ies that the Commonwealth might 
undertake there. Such an appointment would not necessar i l ly  have 
barred the way fo r  Stan ifor th Smith fo r  long and Deakin went so 
fa r  as to say in reply that ' I  have no knowledge of any Austral ian 
with qua l i f ica t ions  fo r  the post of Lieutenant Governor equal to 
your own. After  you have had local experience I do not suppose 
that you could be passed over but I cannot o f f i c i a l l y  guarantee 
i t ' . (21) But as an uno f f ic ia l  guarantee th is  was enough. Senator 
Smith telegrammed his p o l i t i c a l  brokers his intention to r e t i r e  
from p o l i t i c s  to take up ' farming1.(22)
To secure an opinion upon which Commonwealth pol icy might be 
based the permanent secretary of the federal department 
responsible fo r  the T e r r i to ry  had e a r l ie r  been sent to Port 
Moresby in July 1905. This was Arthur Atlee Hunt. Born in 1864, 
Atlee Hunt had been private secretary to the f i r s t  Prime Minister,  
Edmund Barton, and as head of External A f fa i rs  (1901-1917), and 
subsequently of Home and Te r r i to r ies  (1917-1921), he was to remain 
the Commonwealth o f f i c e r  reponsible fo r  re la t ions with the 
administrat ion in Papua through many changes of federal min is try  
and years of hope, c o n f l i c t  and disappointment. His Report was 
barely tabled before the Papua Act was passed in November 1905.
Couched in terms more circumspect than Smith's, Hunt had not 
seen New Guinea as a country where white men could be encouraged
21 ib id .  Item 968. Deakin to S tan ifor th  Smith, 5 September 
1906.
22 ib id .  Item 955.
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to se t t le  in large numbers both on account of the cl imate and 
because such se t t le rs  'are the very k in d . . .o f  whom Austra l ia  
stands in need h e rs e l f1.(23) But since a pol icy of mere 
possession and pac i f ica t ion  could only lead to the degeneration of 
the Papuans through sloth , and might hardly be said to be making 
' the f u l l e s t  use of the goodly heri tage' i t  had become Aus tra l ia 's  
'p r iv i lege  to possess', the country must be developed. And while 
'extravagant optimism' was not warranted and the time and 
investment required in the progress of development should not be 
underestimated, a combination of imported cap i ta l ,  white d irect ion 
and native labour would lead eventual ly, he suggested, to 'a sol id 
and substantial  p rosper i ty ' . (24)
Cautious, prudent, yet suggesting the p o s s ib i l i t y  of real gain, 
th is  was well calculated not to escape the eye of ' jud ic ious '  
investors and Hunt went on to hold out the hope that in time the 
country, r i g h t l y  administered, might indeed be another Java and 
repay i t s  possessors 'most handsomely', for  ' the management of a 
colony is . . .m ere ly  the conduct of a commercial undertaking' and 
Austra l ia 's  pr inc ipal consideration must be 'where. .. the capital 
( is )  to be found which is to run th is  mercanti le enterprise that 
we have taken on our hands'. (25) Using the example of the publ ic 
loans that had financed the development programmes of the 
Austral ian colonies he went so fa r  as to propose that the 
Commonwealth invest a f ixed amount, a minimum of £300,000 in the 
government of B r i t ish  New Guinea in annual payments of £15,000
23 CPP, 1905, Vol 2. B r i t ish  New Guinea Report. At lee Hunt.
p. 6.
24 ib id .  pp. 19 and 28.
25 ib id .  p. 28.
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upon which an interest of 3% or 3.5% might be levied.
Hunt was prepared to concede that the savage practices of the 
inhabitants were 'inhuman' perhaps only 'to our minds' and he was 
surprised and impressed by the variety and settled quality of 
Papuan community l i f e .  Yet he accepted as axiomatic that iron 
tools and peace would debi l i tate the people and rob them of 
opportunity for struggle without which, as every reasonable man 
would grant, health and vigour could not be maintained whether by 
races or individuals. He proposed that taxation should be used to 
compel the vil lagers into work either for themselves or for 
others. If,  as he thought l ikely,  the lot of raising economic 
crops and therefore the tax in the vi l lages should fal l  mainly 
upon the women who traditionally bore a disproportionate burden in 
the garden labour, then a levy 'of young men for plantation 
service to be performed as a national duty' could be imposed upon 
each community from the wages of whom the tax could be 
deducted.(26)
It was a confident age for Europeans, their col lective hubris 
as yet to face i ts most terrible challenges. Staniforth Smith's 
and Atlee Hunt' s Reports were written in the last decade of what 
had been an extraordinary century of expansion in white settlement 
overseas. And everywhere Europeans had settled 'native' peoples 
seemed to be ijn retreat,  their numbers diminishing inexorably 
towards extinction, the Australian Aborigines the most conspicuous 
amongst them. Java was an exception. There it  appeared the Dutch 
had solved the problem of population decline with a policy that
26 ibid. p. 24.
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compelled the Javanese to work. The concern expressed by Hunt and 
Smith to 'save' the Papuans by gett ing them l ikewise to work might
seem now mere casuistry, an attempt to make a pol icy of 
exp lo i ta t ion seem morally j u s t i f i e d .  But these men, l i k e  many of 
the i r  contemporaries elsewhere, were responding to facts  that 
seemed indisputable. The 'conservative' function of work in human 
societ ies seemed obvious. Getting the Papuans to work was an 
urgent necessity i f  they were to survive as a people.(27)
27 There was a s im i la r  presumption that the adoption of 
European c loth ing by 'na t ive '  peoples was also a 
contr ibutor to the i r  ' a n n ih i la t io n ' .
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Chapter 6 The late Crown Colony t radi t ions
Atlee Hunt had stayed in Port Moresby as a guest of Captain 
Barton, the Administrator, and his report  gave a favourable 
impression of both the administration and i t s  of f icers ;  the 
' s t a nd s t i l l '  in development he at t r ibuted wholly to the 
uncertainty that  prevailed as to what Australian policy would be. 
But a case arose while Hunt was in the country that  was to raise  
doubts in Deakin's mind that  Hunt's high opinion of Barton's 
administration was j u s t i f i ed .  The Administrator had suspended the 
Chief Government Surveyor, John Richmond, when Richmond refused to 
withdraw a charge that  Barton had al tered of f ic ia l  papers 
connected with the for fe i ture  and t ransfer  of an urban lease and 
had destroyed an of f ic ia l  minute paper. The case fur ther  divided 
two fact ions that  had formed among the f i f t y  off icers  that  
comprised the government service - those who were loyal to the 
Administrator and those sympathising with Richmond and aggrieved 
in other ways who were grouped around the doyen of the service and 
Government Secretary, Anthony Musgrave.
The case was examined by a board of enquiry in Austral ia and 
Barton exonerated. But now aware of the division among the 
of f i c i a l s  in Port Moresby and unwilling to act publicly in view of 
the support Hunt's report  together with the outcome of the enquiry 
gave to the Admini s t ra to r ,  Deakin wrote privately in March 1906 to 
the Chief Judicial  Officer (CJO) in Papua, John Hubert Plunkett 
Murray, requesting a confidential  ' c r i t i c i sm of the circumstances 
in New Guinea' and the ' f u l l e s t  and frankest  judgement you can
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favour me with upon our of f i cers ,  methods and a ims ' . (1) The moves 
that  led to the eventual appointment of Hubert Murray as 
Lieutenant Governor have been recounted by his and Deakin's 
biographers but since the choice of Murray was due in part  to a 
view of development for Papua that  he held at this  time and that  
he was to express before a Royal Commission in November 1906 they 
must be discussed here.
Murray, always standing at a distance from events in which he 
was engaged, and as se l f - su f f ic i en t  and reserved as Staniforth 
Smith was gregarious and garrulous, was an intimidating and 
enigmatic personal i ty.  Physically imposing, a graduate with f i r s t s  
at Oxford, l ieutenant colonel of the New South Wales Mounted 
Infantry in the South African War and in every way an apparent 
anglophile in manner, he ident i f ied himself as an Australian 
nat ional i s t ,  a Roman Catholic and a sympathiser with both Boer and 
Fenian. After an undistinguished career as a c i rcui t  court judge 
in New South Wales, he was for ty- three  in 1904 when appointed CJO 
in Bri t ish New Guinea following the suicide of his predecessor. A 
profound boredom can account at least  in part  for his going there.
In 1900 Murray had seen quarrels between English and Australian 
off icers in South Africa as ' i nev i t ab le ' .  He had then stood in no 
doubt that  his loyal t ies  were with the f i t t e r ,  and he thought 
bet ter  led, colonials.  In his long l e t t e r  of 26 March 1906 in 
reply to Deakin he revealed with what cold and legal eye but 
partisan heart he had s i l en t ly  contemplated the cavalier  vestige
1 J A LaNauze. Alfred Deakin (Melbourne. 1965). Vol 2. 
p. 459. ~
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that remained of LeHunte's 'Engl ish' administrat ion. In short 
there was in Papua, he wrote, a 'Colonial O f f ice '  party led by the 
Administrator that had no in te rest  in the development of the 
country and 'imbued with horror, doubtless sincere, of Austral ian 
democracy, would inwardly re jo ice i f  al l  white se t t le rs  - 
especial ly miners - could be removed from the country, and who 
consider, apparently, that the destiny of B.N.G. would be 
f u l f i l l e d  i f  i t  never came to anything more than a sort of 
curiosity-shop and an extensive and very expensive ethnological 
museum'.(2) Opposed was an 'Austra l ian ' party 'anxious fo r  the 
development of the country, and sincere in th e i r  d is l ike  of a 
pol icy which, in the i r  opinion, had retarded the progress of the 
Possession' . (3 )  I f  the s ince r i ty  of each party with regard to the 
development of the country could not be doubted there was much in 
the behaviour of the Administrator and his fr iends that could be 
represented as scandalous. Murray affirmed that i t  was his 
private view that Richmond's claims had been correct and that 
Captain Barton was indeed a 'man of weak character and indolent 
d ispos i t ion ' ,  thoroughly dominated by the 'unscrupulous' Treasurer 
and drunkard, David Bai 1 antine. (4) There was much else besides.
I t  needed hardly to be added, as Murray said, where his sympathies
1 ay.
These were revelat ions that the Prime Minister having so l ic i ted  
them, could hardly ignore. Yet neither , on account of the way in
2 Francis West. Selected Letters of Hubert Murray (Melbourne
1971). p. 37. Letter No. 32. Murray to Deakin, 26 March
1906.
3 ib id .
4 ib id .  p.40.
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which they were obtained, could he discuss them with his off icer  
responsible for Papua, Atlee Hunt, with whom Barton carried on a 
f r iendly correspondence. Having been informed by an i r r i t a t ed  
Hunt that  Deakin had received 'adverse c r i t i c i sm1 about af fa i r s  in 
Papua, Barton, ' as tonished1, called for a ful l  enquiry.(5) In the 
circumstances Deakin found i t  very convenient to grant the 
request.
Three members of a Royal Commission were appointed in August 
1906 and were taking evidence in Port Moresby in September. The 
terms of reference went well beyond an enquiry into 'present  
conditions'  to allow the Commissioners to make general 
recommendations about the government and development of the 
Terri tory.
Murray's evidence before the Commission in November - 
essent ia l ly  an expanded version of what he had written in 
confidence to Deakin in March and relying as i t  did both upon a 
cri t ique of Barton's 'pol icy'  of opposition to white settlement 
and upon cri t icism of the personal conduct of the Administrator 
and his adherents - was bound to provoke deep bi t terness  among the 
condemned. While he could plausibly claim that  there was 
considerable and culpable carelessness in the recent work of the 
administration in the processing of land applications and in the 
accounting of money and stores,  Murray's central contention that  
the ' scantiness of white set t lement '  could be at t r ibuted to 
' interminable delay'  and obstruction by Captain Barton's and
5 NLA, Deposit 52. Atlee Hunt Papers. Item 52/41. Captain 
F R Barton to Hunt, 5 July 1906.
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previous administrations in the making of land available rested 
ultimately on subjective impressions - the few applications with 
which the administrations had dithered were not, as he implied, 
the tip of some submerged iceberg of demand for land, but all that 
there were.
Yet if it  was conceded that there was a prima facie case that
the administration had been dilatory over land applications - and
Captain Barton was to challenge that there was a single case of
unnecessary delay - then the cause could be found, Murray claimed,
in the Administrator1s own attitude of deep hosti l i ty to white
settlement. In private and unguarded conversation with him Barton
had expressed his distaste for the miners as a class and his wish
that gold had never been discovered in British New Guinea. In
another instance the Administrator had denied protection sought by
a set t ler  who believed himself exposed to attack by Papuan
raiders. This lat ter  case made a profound impression upon the
Commissioners and concerned a request for a police patrol made by
Henry Greene at Sagoro Tano after a rumour had spread among the
Koiari that the 1Hagari' were about to descend upon his plantation
and murder the two Europeans there. (6) A force of the Armed
Constabulary was, in fact,  already in the Sogeri area but Greene
was never told. Instead the f i le  of correspondence i.n the matter
had annotations made by Barton or his officers that referred to
Greene's 'funk1 and a copy of a let ter  to Greene from the
Administrator1s private secretary that suggested that he leave the
6 CPP Vol 15, 1907. pp. 137-459, British New Guinea. Report 
of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into present 
conditions.. . ,  pp. xciv-xcvii (pp. 214-233) contain the 
Commissioners' comments on the case; pp. 25-31 (pp. 291- 
297) contain a record of the hearings in the matter.
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country i f  he f e l t  so easi ly  threatened, fo r  the sake of 'the 
prestige of the white man'.(7) This prestige had not been so 
great as recently as Apr i l  1906, Murray had elsewhere reminded the 
Commissioners, as to discourage the murderers of old Weaver, the 
market gardener on the La loki ,  whose property was with in ten miles 
of Port Moresby.
For Barton's h o s t i l i t y  to settlement Murray could also f ind a 
cause in an excessive sympathy fo r  the Papuans - the placing of 
the natives 'on a pedestal fo r  too l o n g ' . (8) In evidence the 
Administrator defended his refusal to press Papuans who were 
unwil l ing to sel l  land fo r  sett lement, and his adherence to the 
guarantees proclaimed by Commodore Erskine in 1884. I t  is true 
that Barton had a gentlemanly but serious in terest  in ethnography 
contr ibuting to C G Seligman's great work, The Melanesians of 
B r i t ish  New Guinea.(9) Yet beyond th is  his 'sympathy' might have 
been s l ig h t .  He was quick to make la te  proposals to tax the 
Papuans through forced labour on v i l lage  plantat ions, when in 
November 1906, he saw how events were turning. Meant to vindicate 
his decisiveness th is  gesture might well have suggested that i t  
had been in e r t ia  rather than concern fo r  Papuan welfare that had 
been more characte r is t ic  of his ' p o l i c y ' .  Certainly the 
unnecessary violence employed by several RMs, Barton's fr iends, 
and brought as evidence against them by Murray, seems hardly 
congruent with the view that a sensi t ive appreciation of Papuan
7 ib id .  p. xcvi.  copy of le t t e r  Arthur Jewell to Greene,
22 January 1906.
8 ib id .  Murray's evidence, p. 85. 8 November 1906.
9 CG Seligman. The Melanesians of B r i t ish  New Guinea 
(Cambridge, 1910).
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interests was the uppermost concern with the Admin is t rato r ' s 
cl ique.
There is no doubt that Judge Murray believed in the substantial  
tru th  of his own testimony fo r  i t  was consistent with views 
expressed in le t te rs  to his family since 1904. Nor need we doubt 
that he was quite sincere in recommending to Deakin in March that
i t  would be best i f  a complete stranger were chosen to succeed
Barton - the argument at the time and afterwards that his 
'd i s lo y a l ty '  to the Administrator had been prompted by ambition 
has no sure basis. Indeed Murray had l i t t l e  choice but to 
re i te ra te  before the Commission the opinions he had pr iva te ly  
expressed to the Prime Min ister and to do so as fo rc e fu l l y  as 
possible. The div is ions within the service were real enough and 
the Adminis t ra tor ' s inadequacies now appeared obvious. Yet the 
fact ional ism had derived fa r  more from personal antipathies than 
from the fundamental dif ferences over pol icy that Murray thought 
he could descry, and Barton, though an Englishman, had been
appointed as interim Administrator not by the Colonial Off ice but
by Deakin himself.
Whether correct in point of deta i l  or not - and the 
Commissioners could f ind error in several of his charges - the 
CJO's evidence represented a formidable synthesis of argument the 
general c r e d ib i l i t y  of which could withstand re fu ta t ion in i t s  
parts. The over-r id ing impression Murray gave that the 
administration of B r i t ish  New Guinea had fa l len  in to  the hands of 
amateurs was deeply compatible with what the Commissioners wanted 
to f ind .  A scapegoat fo r  stagnation had been ide n t i f ied  not in the
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physical and economic circumstances of the country nor in the lack 
of an Austral ian pol icy, indeed any pol icy, in the years un t i l  
1906, but in a del iberate and reactionary 'po l icy  of re tard ' 
allegedly pursued by an ef fe te  and misguided coterie of o f f i c i a l s  
that had f e l t  no re spon s ib i l i t y  towards Austra l ia  or Austral ian 
interests.
I f  the ' la te  Crown Colony t ra d i t io n s '  could be set aside, the 
Commissioners were convinced, the country might be turned ' in to  an 
agr icu l tu ra l  and pastoral asset of great value to the 
Commonwealth' . (10) The land they had observed to be ' r i c h ,  
v i rg in ,  and easi ly  worked while i t s  i n f i n i t e  var ie ty  makes the 
successful cu l t iva t ion  of almost a l l  trop ica l  products 
poss ib le1.(11) The Papuan, on the other hand, had been plunged by 
government protect ion ' i n to  a condition of peaceful s lo th ' ,  a 
' lo tus-ea ters '  dream' from which i t  was 'an imperative and 
immediate necessity' to awaken him i f  he was ' to  be saved from the 
fate of most aboriginal ra c e s ' . (12) The fa te projected fo r  the 
Papuans by Atlee Hunt and Stan iforth Smith only a year e a r l ie r ,  i f  
work could not be found fo r  them, i t  now seemed had become 
immanent.
The Royal Commission Recommendations
Their recommendations were to betray the extent to which the 
Commissioners, having placed blame in an acceptable quarter,
10 Report of the Royal Commission, op. c i t .  p. x c v i i i .
11 ib id .  p. x.
12 ib id .  p. x i i i .
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conceded that a vigorous development pol icy required much more of 
Austra l ia  than i t  had h i ther to  provided. Every part of the 
administrat ion, i t  seemed, required reform or decisive new 
in i t i a t i v e s  with the purpose of opening up the country at last to 
permanent and p ro f i tab le  white settlement and to i t s  eventual 
incorporation into the Commonwealth as a state. The white 
community were to be provided with schools, better communications, 
higher government salaries,  t r i a l  by ju ry ,  and a h i l l  s tat ion for  
local recuperation. The development of roads and ports were to be 
financed through an in te res t  free loan and an Austral ian t a r i f f  
protection given to t e r r i t o r i a l  produce. Al l  lands unclaimed by 
the Papuans were to be declared the property of the crown and a l l  
lands 'which the natives are w i l l i n g  to sel l  should at once be 
purchased1.(13) The power of compulsory purchase of lands fo r  
purposes that might extend beyond publ ic use was to be acquired, 
the crown's r igh t  to a l l  minerals found on native lands 
unequivocally asserted and a geological survey of the country 
carried out.
In return for the benefi ts of securi ty and c i v i l i z a t i o n  they 
now enjoyed and to arrest the 'present indolent, apathetic state 
into which Government protect ion (was) sinking a race capable of a 
more useful and worthy des t iny ' ,  the Papuans were to be taxed, 
compelled to attend schools at which English was to be taught, and 
systematically recrui ted fo r  employment through a government 
agency. Easy optimism over the prospects fo r  economic development 
were thus matched by a s im i la r  cer ta in ty  about the place to be 
accorded 'native ' peoples in a future dominated by Europeans. For
13 ib id .  Recommendations, p. cxxiv.
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Europeans everywhere, however some of them might deplore the 
rapaciousness of th e i r  fe l lows, the evidence of th e i r  eyes in 1906 
could as yet suggest no other p o s s ib i l i t y  than that there was a 
scale of humanity, b io lo g ica l ly  determined i t  seemed, fo r  the 
races of men as fo r  ind iv iduals ,  and a correspond!ng scale of 
c i v i l i z a t i o n  only to be ascended with much time and labour. In few 
publ ic documents can these assumptions have been more casual ly and 
innocently recorded than in the Report of the Royal Commission of 
1906; there could be no insuperable c o n f l i c t  between essential 
native interests and those of development in such a view of the 
world.
Yet beyond the swif t  execution of i t s  recommendations 
concerning o f f i c i a l s  who were to be re t i re d ,  or in the case of the 
Commandant of the Armed Constabulary to have his posit ion 
abolished, the Report was to be largely disregarded as a plan for  
immediate action. The areas of land already held by the crown and 
avai lable fo r settlement made fu r the r  acquis it ion hardly an urgent 
matter. The proclamation of the Papua Act short ly  a f te r  the 
Commissioners' ar r iva l  had ended a l l  al ienat ion to se t t le rs  in 
freehold and the passage of the Lands Ordinance 1906 in the same 
month, drafted as i t  was by Murray but incorporating Captain 
Barton's strong concern to preserve the assurances given the 
Papuans in 1884 and embodied since in the intervening Land 
Ordinances, e f fe c t ive ly  fo res ta l led  any recommendation that the 
crown assume the radical t i t l e  to al l  lands - a step that Murray 
had advocated before the Commission and one with which in the i r  
questioning of Barton the Commissioners had implied they 
sympathised. The adoption of 'development' recommendations
conceived in an expansive mood depended on a f inanc ia l  settlement 
that was not to be nearly as generous as the Commissioners had 
expected.
But as a clarion cal l  to investors and as encouragement to 
settlement the Report1s influence was immediate and considerable 
i f  s t i l l  not nearly to the extent envisaged by i t s  authors. They 
had recommended that the country be advertised to overcome the 
ignorance or the unfortunate prejudices that prevai l led about 
conditions in Papua. The country they could aff irm was not only 
po ten t ia l ly  r ich but beaut i fu l ,  r e la t i v e ly  safe and healthy, facts 
that should be brought together, with s ta t i s t i c s  and information 
about the a v a i la b i l i t y  of lands fo r  sett lement, in the 
Commonwealth Year Book. Copies of th is  mater ia l,  separately bound 
might also be d is t r ibu ted 'through those countries whose people 
would be most l i k e l y  to be attracted by the information 
given1.(14)
Neither the signif icance of the Commissioners' endorsement of 
the substance of his testimony nor an awareness of the impression 
of self-assurance, high pr inc ip les and in te l l igence he had 
succeeded in giving in the presentation of his evidence could have 
escaped Hubert Murray. Private ly he could now dare to hope that 
by an unexpected turn of fortune he might be given an opportunity 
to test and employ ta lents he had long resigned to wither. With 
the tab l ing of the Commission's Report in February 1907, Captain 
Barton began a face-saving leave of absence fo r  one year. Deakin, 
in some haste to be away to London but with the advice of the
100
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Commission's chairman, Colonel Mackay, and af ter  a f i r s t  meeting 
with Murray himself, appointed the CJO as Acting Administrator.
The s i tua t ion could scarcely have been more d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the 
appointee. He was na tura l ly  to be regarded as a t r a i t o r  by the 
members of Barton's party, several of whom i t  seemed were to 
remain in Papua acquiring a l l i e s  to dog Murray's steps un t i l  by 
longevity and prolonged service in o f f ice  he was to outlast or 
convert them.
In November 1907, Beatrice Grimshaw, an Anglo-I r ish jo u rn a l is t  
then becoming well known, v is i ted  the 'new' Te r r i to ry  of Papua and 
quickly found a rapport with Judge Murray. His views expressed 
before the Royal Commission had placed the acting Administrator in 
a posit ion where he was expected vigorously to promote development 
of the country at the very moment when, in a sense, an e f f o r t  was 
no longer required. But Grimshaw at t r ibuted the great changes 
taking place, af ter  decades of evident in e r t ia ,  to Murray's 
i n i t i a t i v e  while recognising his detached concern fo r  Papuan 
welfare, her perceptions seasoned by f ind ing her opinions in 
agreement with his over a wide range of issues re l ig ious and 
p o l i t i c a l .  As 'an unprejudiced observer' in the fo l lowing January 
she began a correspondence with Deakin that gave an analysis of 
the s i tua t ion in Papua highly favourable to Murray and c r i t i c a l  of 
the remaining Bartonites who, she could report ,  whi le they were 
completely outnumbered in the white community, had continued to 
i n t r ig u e . (15) In her le t te rs  and at two meetings with the Prime 
Minister she undoubtedly gave support to the impression developing 
in his mind that Judge Murray could not be passed over without 'an
15 LaNauze, Deakin. op. c i t .  p. 471.
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in jus t ice  to Papua, and to a deserving public servant1 in the 
permanent appointment of an Austral ian Lieutenant Governor.(16) 
Beatrice Grimshaw was to l ive  fo r  extended periods in Papua over 
the next twenty-six years i n i t i a l l y  as a p u b l ic is t  on contract to 
the government and subsequently as a d i le t ta n te  planter supporting
herself  with her journalism, travel books and novels.
Off icers leaving the government service in 1907 included two 
senior RMs, Henry Moreton and CAW Monckton, the la t t e r  at least 
unwil l ing to work under Murray, and the eminence gr is behind 
Barton, the Treasurer David Bal lantine.  Moreton and Monckton l e f t  
the country but Bal lantine stayed. A Scot, he had served fo r  
eighteen years without a break under MacGregor, Le Hunte,
Robinson and Barton. He re t i red  to his plantat ion at Sogeri, 
there to die of alcoholism in 1909 aged fo r t y  one. One of the few 
legends preserved by a se t t le r  Papua which otherwise found native 
supers t i t ion r id icu lous - and one kept a l ive ,  no doubt, by those 
who saw Ballantine as i l l -used  - related how his ghost r id ing  the 
grey horse he had ridden in l i f e  was repeatedly seen by plantat ion 
labourers in the Sogeri area in the fo l lowing years.
As a device to r id  the service of the impetuous Commandant of 
the Armed Constabulary, Will iam Cunningham Bruce, the 
Commissioners had recommended the abo l i t ion  of his o f f ice .  Born 
in India, a veteran of the Boer War, a good cr icketer  and shot, 
Bruce epitomised the swagger and i r responsibi 1i t y  of the Barton 
regime that Murray could deplore. He had barely survived 
unscathed an e a r l ie r  Royal Commission in to  the 'a f f ra y '  at
16 ib id .  p. 473.
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Goaribari in 1904 when, in the belated attempt to arrest  the 
murderers of the missionary James Chalmers, Bruce had been at 
f i r s t  unable or unwilling to res t ra in  the f i r e  of panicking Papuan 
po l ic e . (17) In 1906 the record of his having used obscene 
language in front  of women on several occasions and his abuse of a 
missionary were considered. The evidence l e f t  l i t t l e  doubt that 
Barton had shielded Bruce from the consequences of his behaviour 
in allowing him to plead in each case that  he had been drinking.
The hurt to his pride now dealt  him by the Commission prompted by
/
what he saw as Murray's sanctimonious dupl ici ty was to rankle and 
fes t er  in Bruce's mind to the point where some believed i t  had 
become unhinged. Though he might have l e f t  the country he chose 
to stay on, to l ive by his wits and to hope, i t  can be presumed, 
to bring Murray down. He became for a period a planting contractor 
to companies entering the country af ter  1907. He prospected for 
gold, obtained planting blocks at Sogeri and near Galley Reach, 
and milled timber cleared from the estates in the Galley Reach and 
Hisiu areas at a sawmill he and a partner established at Manu 
Manu. As editor of the Ter r i to ry ' s  f i r s t  newspaper from 1911 until  
1917 he pursued Murray with constant obloquy and denunciation. His 
bi t terness  was never assuaged. After the deaths of two of his 
children from dysentery, and a br ief  period of l iving beyond his 
means in grand style on Touaguba Hill in Port Moresby he was to 
die, his health broken and in poverty, in a cottage at Sapphire 
Creek in 1924.-
Of other off icers ,  A C English, ARM at Rigo, re t i red to his
17 Report of the Royal Commission, op. c i t .  pp. lxxv-lxxvii ,  
and pp. 182-186.
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neighbouring sisal  and f icus rubber plantat ion;  Arthur Jewell,  
Barton's private secretary and one of those whom Murray was 
eventually to reconcile,  resigned to work as a contractor on 
Fairfax Harbour sisal  estates  subsequently becoming manager of a 
plantat ion company floated by Henry Wickham; and Guy Manning, ARM, 
contracted to develop land at Marshall Lagoon. Henry Lysaght 
Griffin,  RM for the Northern Division, was permitted to resign 
honourably the following year when discovered shooting birds of 
paradise in ' ant i c ipat ion '  of a change he expected in the law 
forbidding the ki l l ing of the birds.  Griffin also went to work 
developing a plantat ion at Galley Reach for a Melbourne syndicate. 
In 1908 he floated a company in which Arthur Jewell had an 
interes t  to plant sisal  at Tavai near Gaire, 30 miles south east  
of Port Moresby. This company subsequently bought Bal lant ine' s  
Sogeri plantat ion af ter  the former Treasurer ' s  death in 1909. 
Capital soon exhausted the propert ies were sold, Bal lant ine' s  
block together with Henry Greene's at Sagoro Tano becoming the 
foundation of the Itikinumu Estate of the Bri t ish New Guinea 
Development Company in 1910. Anthony Musgrave, the i rascible  
leader of the anti-Barton fact ion and Government Secretary since 
1888, re t i red  in June 1908 to be succeeded by Alexander 
Malcolm Campbell, formerly the senior RM in the eastern divisions.
In 1909 the Commonwealth published Papua the Marvelous, the 
Country of Chances, a racy and provocative booklet advert ising 
Papua prepared by Beatrice Grimshaw for dis t r ibut ion in 
England.(18) I t  was of a kind with an abundance of promotional
18 Papua the Marvellous: The Country of Chances (Victorian 
Government Pr inter ,  1909).
105
matter being printed and dis t r ibuted at the time in books, 
journals and brochures by empire enthusiasts ,  colonial governments 
and cap i ta l i s t s  urging others to s e t t l e  in this  colony or that ,  or 
to invest in par t icular  t ropical  industr ies.  The author began by 
confronting misconceptions actually or supposedly held about 
Papua's pol i t ical  s tatus ,  i t s  climate,  native population and 
agricul tural  opportunit ies,  and the health of Europeans in the 
country, proceeding to refute these notions with 'astonishing'  
facts .  Where MacGregor had straightforwardly sought and fai led to 
a t t rac t  yeoman farmers of suf f ic ient  means, Grimshaw, perhaps more 
r ea l i s t i c a l l y  but also more class consciously, aimed her appeal at 
younger sons of 'county famil ies '  possessed of at least  £2,000 and 
daring enough to tackle ' the country of the rough and ready' ,  
knowing, i t  is l ikely,  that  rather  less dist inguished people 
impressed by such- a pitch might the more readi ly be at t racted.  For 
while Papua, l ike Bri t ish New Guinea before i t ,  may have acquired 
a sprinkling of remittance men, there seems scarcely one 
ident i f iable  'younger son' among the generation of s e t t l e r s  that  
came to the country af ter  1910.
Alexander Campbell thought the exaggerations and inaccuracies 
in this  propaganda amounted to deceit  and he protested to 
Hunt.(19) Murray wrote that  because 'no one can speak from 
experience. . . no useful purpose (would) be served by keeping back 
( i t s  publ i cat-ion). . .  The object of Miss Grimshaw's pamphlet is 
primarily to stimulate inquiry, and t he re for e . . . the sooner i t
19 Atlee Hunt Papers, Item 231. Campbell to Hunt, n.d. ( l909).
Grimshaw had shown Campbell an a r t i c l e  for Chambers'
Journal with 'statements that  have no foundation in f a c t ' .
appears the b e t t e r 1. (20) In the following year Beatrice Grimshaw 
produced The New New Guinea, a book of 320 pages of anecdote and
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further  'astonishing'  revelat ions about Papua, with photographs by 
William Whitten, for which she apparently received some payment 
from the Papuan government and edi tor ia l  assistance from the 
Lieutenant Governor.
20 ibid.  Item 292. Murray to Hunt, 28 September 1909.
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Chapter 7 The country of chances
If for Judge Murray the arrival of Beatrice Grimshaw and her 
promotion of his cause was singularly opportune, the employment of 
her pen to puff Papua among investors and l ikely s e t t l e r s  was 
la ter  to rebound on his administration as were his own easy 
cer ta in t ies  expressed before the Royal Commissioners and recorded 
in i t s  Report. Disappointed planters one day were to claim that  
through Grimshaw1s pamphlets the government had great ly 
exaggerated the opportunit ies the country offered and had 
understated the d i f f i c u l t i e s  of development. In th is  view the 
s e t t l e r s  and investors had been the victims of a confidence t r ick.
Effective though Miss Grimshaw's hyperbole might have been, the 
charge of del iberate  misrepresentation was unfair .  Influences far 
more substantial  were at work in the larger world of investment in 
tropical  commodities in the seven years before 1914 to induce an 
interes t  in Papua l ike that  being shown in almost all t ropical  
t e r r i t o r i e s .  I t  now seemed merely to need i t s  geographic 
existence drawn to the at tent ion of the investing public to at tain 
a share of this  in te res t  and i f  time was to prove investors dupes 
then Beatrice Grimshaw, Murray and Staniforth Smith had also been 
deceived.
The f i r s t  public intimations of the immense boom to come in the 
development of rubber plantat ions in South East Asia were f e l t  in 
1906. Plantat ions of all kinds were a t t rac t ing capital  and i t  
seemed, as Beatrice Grimshaw could write in 1909, ' t ha t  everybody 
knows somebody who knows somebody who has made a fortune in a
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surpr is ing ly  short time, tea planting in Ceylon, growing rubber in 
the Malay States, or ra is ing cotton in West A f r i c a . . . th e  
surpassing f e r t i l i t y  of t rop ica l  so i ls  is a true goldmine, fo r  
those who can f ind the capital to work i t ' . ( l )  In Austra l ia  
rhetor ica l  assertions of confidence in the future of New Guinea 
seemed at las t  to be matched by large and avai lable resources of 
capital and by the resolut ion of the Federal and Papuan 
governments to carry out a vigorous pol icy of development.
As recently as 1900 most of the copra in in ternational  trade 
was s t i l l  derived from the trade with native producers of e i ther 
fresh or dried kernel carr ied on by beach traders and v i s i t i n g  
ships. From the early 1880's, when the f i r s t  commercial coconut 
plantat ions in South-east Asia and the Paci f ic  islands were being 
planted, coconut o i l  was becoming an important ingredient in 
competition with whale o i l  and ta l low in the manufacture of soaps, 
especial ly of the f in e r  kinds, and increasingly used as a cooking 
o i l .  By 1906 the demand fo r  the o i l  fo r  use in the preparation of 
margarine had arisen to such an extent that a c r i s i s  of supply had 
arisen, the average price doubling from the £14 a ton that had 
prevailed in the decade to 1903, to £28 a ton in 1914. In 1912,
Sir Will iam ( la te r  Lord) Lever would wr i te  in an introduction to 
Coconuts, Consols of the East, a book promoting copra production, 
that he knew of
no f i e l d  of Tropical Agricu lture that is so promising at
the present moment as coco-nut planting, and I do not
1 Papua the Marvellous: The Country of Chances (Victorian
Government Pr in te r ,  1909). p. 7.
think in the whole world there is the promise of so 
lucra t ive an investment of time and money as in th is  
industry. The world is only ju s t  awakening to the value 
of coco-nut o i l  in the manufacture of a r t i f i c i a l  butter 
of the highest qua l i ty ,  and of the by-product, coprah 
cake, as a food fo r  c a t t l e . . . (2)
As la te  as 1914, in another 'coconut' book. Al l  about Coconuts, 
the authors believed that
we are only on the f r inge of gigantic developments 
in the ind us t ry . . . that i t  was only a question of time 
before butter made from vegetable fa t  w i l l  e n t i re ly  
supersede the butter made from animal fa t . . . (a n d )  that 
over-product ion, the bugbear of most industr ies, is 
p ra c t ica l ly  impossible.(3)
I t  was the same with rubber. In 1907 Henry Ford introduced the 
assembly l ine  into the manufacture of motor cars and sales of 
vehicles in the United States rose from 44,000 in that year to
65.000 in 1908, 127,000 in 1909 and 187,000 in 1910.(4) In the 
la t t e r  year rubber production throughout the world was s t i l l  under
100.000 tons, 80% of which came from the f i n i t e  resources of wi ld 
rubber trees. By 1909-10 the rate of investment in plantat ion
2 H Hamel Smith and F A G Pape. Coconuts, Consols of the
East (London, 1912). p. v. * "
3 R B e l fo r tand  A Hoyer. Al l  about Coconuts (London, 1914). 
pp. v i i i - i x .  Papua had 'very promising prospects'
on p. 44.
4 John Drabble. Rubber in Malaya 1876-1922 (Kuala Lumour
1973). p. 62. “
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rubber f lo ta t io n s  exceeded 'any previous boom known in our 
generation, ecl ips ing the K a f f i r  boom and...coming per i lous ly  near 
the South Sea Bubble1. (5) In Apri l  1910 the price rose above 
twelve sh i l l in g s  a pound. I t  was being 'estimated by experts that 
when rubber f i r s t  f a l l s  as low as 3s. a pound, i t  w i l l  become 
avai lable fo r  use in street  paving, and the demand w i l l  then be 
1im i t le s s 1.(6) Both extraordinary fo res ight  and good luck had 
prepared investors in Malayan estates fo r  th is  opportunity a 
decade before and the enormous dividends that the pioneer 
companies were already paying out could only heighten 
undiscriminating investment in rubber wherever i t  might be grown.
In Papua the passage of the Land Ordinance of 1906 had f i n a l l y  
sett led the question of the form of tenure to be permitted over 
alienated land. Although the sale of crown lands in freehold was 
discontinued, the conditions offered to prospective buyers of 
leases were such as to j u s t i f y  S tan ifor th  Smith's assertion that 
they were 'the most l ibe ra l  in the t r o p i c s ' (7) - a 99 year lease 
could now be obtained on the payment of a nominal deposit of up to 
£10 a thousand acres, free of rent fo r  a generous period, and with 
the costs of survey being met by the government. These were terms 
that could only encourage many an incautious appl icat ion fo r  land 
once a boom had begun and when the eventual f u l f i lm e n t  of the 
development conditions t ied to the leases seemed to be 
underwritten by an insatiab le world market in p lantat ion products
5 ib id .  p. 63.
6 Grimshaw. op. c i t .  p. 27; Stan ifor th Smith gave deta i ls  
of an experiment with rubber paving in his 1906 Report.
7 Staniforth Smith. Handbook of the Te r r i to ry  of Papua 
(Canberra, 1927) p. 62.
I l l
stretching fa r  in to  the fu ture .
The appointment in May 1907 of S tan ifor th  Smith, a well known 
federal senator with a reputation fo r  'ge t t ing  things done', to 
the new posit ion of Director of Agricu lture  with a responsibi 1i t y  
over a l l  the 'development departments' of government in Papua 
undoubtedly increased confidence in the T e r r i t o ry 's  ag r icu l tu ra l  
p o s s ib i l i t i e s  and of i t s e l f  did much to create a sense of 
impending prosperity  fo r  the country. Atlee Hunt wrote to Smith in 
November, and not only to pander to the new D irec to r 's  vanity , 
that he was ' the backbone of everything, the fee l ing is now "Oh, 
Stan iforth Smith's there, i t  w i l l  be a l l  r i g h t ' " . (8) Nor did Smith 
disappoint by want of achievement in those f i r s t  years. With 
apparently t i re le ss  industry, and tormented a l l  the while by the 
hope of greater preferment, he applied himself day and night 
'making strenuous e f fo r ts  to antic ipate every d i f f i c u l t y  that the 
planters w i l l  experience in th is  new country ' . (9)
A year e a r l ie r  in March 1906, whi le on his tour of Java and 
Malaya, Senator Smith had arranged fo r  the purchase of 100,000 
selected rubber seeds through the Director of Agr icu lture in the 
Federated Malay States. In the fo l lowing May he had supplied 
careful instruct ions to enable Captain Barton to have a nursery 
prepared fo r  th e i r  reception in October - rubber seeds having 
b r ie f  f e r t i l i t y .  The nursery on the Laioki River had been 
established by the end of 1906 and on taking up his duties as
8 NLA Deposit 1709 Staniforth Smith Papers. Item 1024. Hunt 
to Stan ifor th Smith, 2 November 1907.
9 ib id .  Item 659. S tan ifor th  Smith to Hunt, 28 July 1907.
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Papuan Director of Agriculture,  Smith could feel that  his 
foresight  had gained a valuable year in the development of the 
rubber industry.
By July 1907, Staniforth Smith could already announce in the 
Government Gazette that  the s tat ion plantat ion at Rigo had sisal  
suckers available.  By October the f i r s t  7,000 hevea rubber 
seedlings were ready for sale at Laloki. In the same month an 
Economic Museum and Laboratory was opened and residents were asked 
to send in specimens of any useful plant or mineral that  they 
might come across for ident i f i cat ion and exhibi t ion.  A year l a ter  
rubber plants were available from a second nursery on the Kemp 
Welch River, f i f t y  miles to the south east  of Port Moresby beyond 
Rigo. Anticipating the early exhaustion of stock, orders were 
being taken for seed from a fur ther  one million ordered from 
Mai aya.
Before the end of 1907 the Director of Agriculture and 
Commissioner for Lands had published his f i r s t  Handbook of the 
Terri tory of Papua, of 108 pages. I t  gave a br ief  descript ion of 
the government, physical features and l iving conditions in the 
Terri tory and the opportunit ies,  i f  yet untested,  for plantat ion 
development - the matter of fact  presentation all the more 
reassuring af ter  the enthusiasm of the Royal Commission Report. 
Subsequent and great ly expanded edit ions of the Handbook in 1909, 
1912 and 1927 were to be regarded abroad as valuable compendia of 
information about tropical  agricul ture and hea l t h . (10)
10 Hamel Smith and Pape. op. c i t .  pp. 75-82. Staniforth Smith 
is commended as an authori ty.
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Through much of 1908 and in view of his aspirat ion to be the 
f i r s t  Australian appointed Lieutenant Governor, Smith saw no 
virtue in excessive modesty and he continued to communicate with 
his former colleagues in the Federal Parliament - in opt imist ic 
l e t t e r s  that  have an unmistakeable hint of naivete - to keep 
everyone well informed of his exhausting schedule. Responding 
appropriately to one l e t t e r ,  Senator Pearce wrote that  Smith's 
' l a s t  very interes t ing l e t t e r 1 had been received and had 'gone the 
rounds pret ty well in both Houses and.. .caused very favourable 
comment among those members to whom I have shown i t ' .  (11)
Indeed so industrious was Staniforth Smith in this  period that  
fears were held that  he would collapse from overwork. Hunt warned 
him not to 'knock himself out'  and on another occasion to ' t ry  and 
remember you are a valuable person and t h a t . . . a  few score hours of 
overtime will not be compensated for by some months forced 
ret i rement1.(12).  H H Lewis, Chief Clerk of External Affairs 
confided in Smith that  Deakin intending bringing him to Melbourne 
early in 1908 ' to  save you from a breakdown' as much as ' to afford 
Ministers an opportunity of discussing with you the policy to be 
followed in the f u t u r e ' . (13) Ignorant of the Prime Minister ' s  
intentions with regard to the Lieutenant Governorship unti l  the 
las t  moment, Atlee Hunt continued to give encouragement to Smith's 
hopes. When Hubert Murray's appointment was f ina l ly  announced in 
November 1908, knowing his man and no doubt despairing of finding 
a replacement nearly so competent, Hunt played upon Smith's
11 Staniforth Smith Papers, op. c i t .  Pearce to Smith,
12 ibid.  Item 1032. Hunt to Staniforth Smith, 21 October 
1907.
13 ibid. H H Lewis to Staniforth Smith.
s u sce p t ib i l i t y  to f l a t t e r y  to get him to stay on as Director of 
A g r ic u l tu re . (14) He was successful.
Staniforth Smith remained Director of Agr icu lture and 
Commissioner fo r  Lands in Papua fo r  most of the years u n t i l  he 
re t i red ,  aged sixty-one, in 1930. His period in o f f ic e  was 
interrupted by war service from 1915 u n t i l  1919 and by an 
appointment as acting Administrator of the Northern T e r r i to ry  in 
1919-21. He was from time to time also Administrator of Papua, a 
confusingly named posi t ion held whenever the Lieutenant Governor 
was absent by the o f f i c e r  administering the Te r r i to ry .  Smith was 
believed by the leading planters to be more easi ly  influenced than 
was Hubert Murray, and at several points they proposed that he 
replace Murray. Certain ly Smith saw a more active and expensive 
development pol icy by Austra l ia  as desirable in Papua and his 
dra f t  of the 1909-10 Annual Report, prepared in Murray's absence, 
met with disapproval in Melbourne because in i t  Smith wrote that 
he 'could see no reason why the white residents should not elect 
the uno f f ic ia l  members' of the Legis la t ive Council 'on a one 
adult,  one vote b a s i s ' . (15)
I f  fo r  Atlee Hunt, Stan iforth Smith seemed fo r  a time the 
'backbone of everything' in Papua, Hunt was himself an 
indefat igable propagandist for  investment in the T e r r i to ry ,  the 
'backbone' of Austral ian government in te rest  through a rapid 
succession of federal m in is t r ies .  Shrewd and conventional in much
14 Atlee Hunt Papers, op. c i t .  Item 492. Hunt to Stan ifor th  
Smith, 30 November 1908.
15 The rejected d ra f t  Admin is t rator ' s Report 1909-10 is in 
Staniforth Smith Papers, Item 1120.
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of his administrat ion he conducted a most unconventional pr ivate 
correspondence simultaneously with A M Campbell, Murray and Smith, 
seeming to speak to each with a disarming and exclusive candour.
I t  was fo r  Hunt a form of conversation at a distance that allowed 
him in his iso la t ion  to sound out opinion among the senior 
o f f i c i a l s  in the Te r r i to ry  but one which could hardly be 
considered f a i r  to his correspondents. He ca re fu l ly  recorded every 
small f l u r r y  of in te rest  in Papuan investment being always at home 
to prospective investors and furnishing any who wished to v i s i t  
the Te r r i to ry  with le t te rs  of introduction to Smith or Murray. In 
September 1909, w r i t ing  to Smith, he noted that he was s t i l l  
'continuing to give lectures to a l l  and sundry, which your 
s i i des.. .make of in te res t .  In Bal larat on Monday (there was a) 
good audience'. (16)
In July 1907 Fred W Kitchen of the Melbourne soap making f i rm 
of J. Kitchen and Sons, an appl icant fo r  a large lease at the head 
of Milne Bay and armed with a l e t t e r  of int roduction from Hunt, 
met Stan iforth Smith in Port Moresby. Subsequently a subsidiary of 
Kitchen and Sons, the Commonmwealth Copra Company was formed to 
develop some 5,000 acres at G i l i g i l i ,  fo r  a time the largest 
single copra estate in the South Pacif ic  islands. In 1916 th is  
property was acquired by Lever Brothers in th e i r  purchase of
I
Kitchens becoming the only Papuan plantat ion of the great 
'Combine'. G iV ig i l i  and i t s  neighbours Hagita and Waigani were 
established on land that proved to lack elements necessary fo r  
healthy palm growth. Al l  were to be re la t i v e ly  poor producers.
16 Atlee Hunt Papers, op. c i t .  Item 501. Hunt to Stan iforth 
Smith, 22 September 1909.
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In October 1908 Kitchens complained to Hunt about the 'great 
deal of trouble' they had had with a consignment of labourers 
recruited in the Purari Delta. Since it  was upon his own 
' representations' that the company had gone to Papua rather than 
to the Solomons, Hunt could claim in a let ter  to Murray enquiring 
into the matter that he took 'a very special interest in their 
success'.(17) It  was a claim that in the same let ter  he could also 
make with respect to the largest Australian investments in 
commercial plantation agriculture in Papua before 1942 - those of 
Sir Rupert Clarke (Bart) and Robert Selmon Whiting that together 
were to exceed £200,000 by 1922.(18)
It was through a friendly acquaintance of Hunt's, Arthur 
Stoughton Bloomfield, that the attentions of Clarke and Whiting 
were f i r s t  drawn to Papua. Bloomfield and Whiting were neighbours 
and friends at their country houses at Mount Macedon near 
Melbourne with business interests that touched in the city - 
Whiting a rich and successful solicitor and Bloomfield a 
prosperous chartered accountant and company secretary. Persuaded 
that a large return might be obtained by those who were the f i r s t  
with the courage to go into Papuan plantations on a large scale, 
the 'voluble' Bloomfield was to do more than any other man to 
attract and commit Victorian investors to 'take a punt' on the 
'new' country. R S Whiting was a partner with Sir Rupert Clarke 
in the ownership of the Isis Downs sheep station in Queensland.
17 Atlee Hunt Papers, op. ci t .  Item 275. Hunt to Murray,
23 October 1908.
18 CRS Al 25/16087. 'Loans to Kemp Welch and New Guinea 
Rubber Estates. Papua' 1921-1925. Bloomfield to Minister,
29 July 1921.
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Clarke, grandson of the most successful of the successful graziers 
of the Western D is t r i c t  of V ic to r ia ,  was probably the r ichest man 
in Austra l ia ,  flamboyant in character and a taker of r isks  - in
1914 in search of the reefs from which he and others thought the
a l luv ia l  gold of Papua must have come, he was to finance and lead
an expedition up the Fly River, a venture which to the great
‘ r e l i e f  of the Papuan Government ended without major inc ident.  Two 
years la te r  having enl is ted fo r  active service in the war he was 
inval ided home from Salonika aged f i f t y -o n e .
In 1907 Clarke was prepared to invest very large sums by 
Austral ian standards in the proposals presented to him by 
Bloomfield. Without the example of Sir  Rupert Clarke at the time, 
the Papuan 'boom' might have amounted to l i t t l e  and indeed, even 
he, with a l l  his wealth, was la te r  to regret his judgement with 
respect to Papua, so costly  had i t  proved.
As early as July 1906 Bloomfield had met and talked with 
Alexander Campbell and the Government Surveyor, Ralph Drummond, 
about the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of land and with Burns Philp as his agents 
he took out one of the f i r s t  leases under the new Ordinance, 1,000 
acres at Galley Reach. To develop th is  property he f loa ted a 
company in Melbourne which with the addition of a fu r the r  lease of 
1,280 acres acquired in his wife Ada's name became in 1908 the 
Galley Reach Rubber Estates Limited. Having v is i ted  the Federated 
Malay States early in 1907 to see the technical side of rubber 
planting fo r  himself he returned to Papua in July to begin the 
work at Galley Reach and to make fu r the r  appl ications fo r  leases 
for  companies yet to be formed. Writ ing to Atlee Hunt in
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September, Judge Murray reported that Bloomfield had 'succeeded in 
gett ing a l l  the land he required. His people have, I th ink,
15,000 rubber stumps in the ground already - 80% of them growing - 
and have ordered a m i l l ion  seeds; so they are evident ly in 
earnest1.(19)
The leases he obtained on the Kemp Welch River t o t a l l i n g  2,000 
acres were soon assigned to two Melbourne companies promoted by 
Bloomfield in 1908 - Kemp Welch River Rubber Estates Limited in 
which Atlee Hunt himself took up 500 £1 shares, and New Guinea 
Rubber Estates Limited where a con tro l l ing  in terest  was held by Dr 
Geoffrey Syme, l i t e r a r y  ed i to r and subsequently managing d irec tor  
of the Melbourne Age. A lease of 1,000 acres at Marshall Lagoon 
Bloomfield disposed of to a Laka River Rubber Company. Par t ly 
developed th is  property was to be sold in 1910 to the B r i t ish  New 
Guinea Development Company.
In February 1907 Sir  Rupert Clarke and R S Whiting had
registered a company in V ic to r ia  to be known as The Papua Rubber
Plantations Proprietary, Limited, with Bloomfield as secretary. By
July 5,000 acres on the eastern and northern sides of Galley Reach
had been leased in Clarke's name and a fu r the r  3,800 acres on the
Veimauri River entering Galley Reach from the north east in
Whit ing's. The P R P Proprietary developed two plantat ions on
Clarke's lease, Kanosia and Rorona, fo r  rubber and copra
respectively with Veimauri maintained as a separate rubber
plantat ion and concern. Thus while Bloomfield acted as publ ic
o f f ic e r  of Clarke's and Whit ing's companies in Austra l ia  u n t i l
19 Atlee Hunt Papers, op. c i t .  Item 263. Murray to Hunt,
18 September 1907.
119
1916, their general manager at Kanosia could superintend 
Bloomfield's nearby Galley Reach interests.  Lit t le expense was 
withheld in the establishment of the Clarke and Whiting 
properties. An experienced Ceylon planter was employed to develop 
the estates and the rubber stumps for Kanosia were shipped to 
Papua from Malaya in Wardian cases.(20)
In 1909 after a trader living at Porebada, John Exton, had 
shown that sisal grew well in the surrounding savannah Clarke and 
Whiting extended their interests further by obtaining a lease of 
10,000 acres between the western extremity of Fairfax Harbour and 
the sea at Boera to grow the plant from which a fibre used in rope 
manufacture was extracted. Two further companies, Fairfax Harbour 
Plantations and North Fairfax Harbour Plantations were set up to 
develop this land.
A S Bloomfield was indeed as Staniforth Smith wrote to Hunt 
'the most valuable man in the investment line we have had' for he 
had demonstrated more than the glib confidence of the promoter. He 
had put hard money into the country and his 'Galley Reach 
plantation (was) already a show place ' . (21) By 1909 considered 
and considering himself another authority on the development of 
commercial plantations Bloomfield published a well produced 
promotional brochure called Tropical Agriculture in Papua. (22)
This incidentally showed that in four of the companies in which he 
had an interest,  and which he used as examples to i l lustrate his
20 See below p. 134
21 Atlee Hunt Papers, op. ci t .  Item 444. Staniforth Smith to 
Hunt, 9 February 1908.
22 AS Bloomfield. Tropical Agriculture in Papua (Melbourne, 
1909).
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argument, some £53,000 out of an issued capital  of £68,000 had 
already been contributed and, i t  can be presumed, largely spent in 
developing a total  of 927 acres on leases to ta l l i ng  13,980 
acres. That the balance of the issued capital  available for 
further  cal ls  amounted to only £15,000 when so large an acreage 
remained undeveloped and when the plantat ions were barely two 
‘ years old might have been thought ominous in less bouyant times.
The reserves of the nominal capital  of the companies remaining for 
issue amounted to l i t t l e  more than a fur ther  £15,000.
The Papuan contagion had nonetheless already proved widely 
infectious in Austral ia and among Australian connections in Great 
Bri tain.  Of other Australian speculators one of the ea r l i e s t  was 
a well known wri ter  and mining engineer who had vis i ted Bri t ish 
New Guinea in 1905 and denounced i t s  government, Randolph 
Bedford.(23) In 1907 Bedford applied for two leases t o ta l l i ng  
4,950 acres on Eworogo Creek at Sogeri in the d i s t r i c t  between 
Burns Phi 1ps ' old Warirata property and the plantat ions of David 
Balantyne and of Garrioch and Greene, and a lease of 10,000 acres 
on the Maiwara River at the head of Milne Bay in the Eastern 
Division. The Sogeri lease was refused when the Papuan owners 
declined to sell  but that  at Milne Bay was t ransferred in 1910 to 
James Robert Osborne, a former Wesleyan missionary and managing 
director  of a Milne Bay Rubber Company, formed in Victoria in which 
the large re t a i l  grocery firm of Moran and Cato had an 
i n t e r e s t . (24) Belying the company's name, i t s  plantat ion,  Hagita, 
was to be largely turned over to coconuts after  rubber proved
23 The Age, Melbourne, 17 November 1905.
24 Atlee Hunt Papers, op. c i t .  Item 552. Staniforth Smith to 
Hunt, 1 October 1912.
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unsuited to the area.
Other land at Sogeri was taken up in 1907 by a Papua Para 
Rubber Company at the junction of Eworogo Creek and the Laloki 
River. This was a company in which several government o f f ice rs  
had shares. Soon fo r fe i te d  without development th is  area was 
< eventual ly to pass to a syndicate of old plantat ion managers 
employed by the B r i t i s h  New Guinea Development Company in the la te 
t h i r t i e s  to provide ret irement securi ty that the company i t s e l f  
could not afford. A neighbouring lease of 1,500 acres planted 
with 115 acres of hevea rubber in 1908-09 by A 0 Wallace was 
exchanged in 1910 fo r  20,000 £1 shares in Sogeri Para Rubber 
Plantations Limited of Sydney. This property, known as 
Koitakinumu or Koi tak i ,  became the nucleus of a much larger estate 
and the best known of Papuan plantat ions under the continuous 
management from 1913 u n t i l  1953 of T L (Tom) Sefton. Nearby at 
Bisiatabu, the Austral ian Conference Association of the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church leased land in 1917 and proceeded to plant 
rubber in a small way, twenty acres by 1940.
Other Sydney based companies were the Papuan Rubber and Trading 
Company that developed a lease in the Sagarai Val ley, an isolated, 
fever ridden and f lood prone d i s t r i c t  at the eastern end of 
Mullens Harbour in the Eastern Div is ion,  and Angabunga River 
Plantations Limited which took up the old Hall Sound Company lands 
in’ the Mekeo d i s t r i c t  beyond Galley Reach. The chairman of 
Angabunga was Sir Joseph Carruthers, onetime Premier of New South
Wales.
A second es tate  in the Sagarai Valley was that  of Mullens 
Harbour Plantat ions Limited, known as Sagarai Plantat ion and 
managed by Charles Boxhall. Boxhall was also a di rector  of a 
Papua Rubber and Copra Company of Christchurch, New Zealand, which 
obtained leases in the Elai Valley awkwardly separated from a well 
protected anchorage at Port Glasgow by a range of h i l l s .  Renamed 
Papuan Products Limited, this  company engaged the Samarai merchant 
Willi am Whitten as i t s  ' loca l '  di rector .  The plantat ion,  Mamai, 
was to prove a heavy drain on the capital  of i t s  proprietors and 
was to pass ful ly  developed to the Steamships Trading Company in 
1934 for a t r i f l e . (25)
An Adelaide enterpr ise,  Papuan Plantat ions Limited, applied for 
5,500 acres on both sides of the Laioki River at '12 Mile' 
and a fur ther  1,500 acres at '7 Mile' on the track from Port 
Moresby to Sapphire Creek and the Sogeri d i s t r i c t .  The country 
about was savannah similar to the Fairfax Harbour lands being 
developed by Clarke and Whiting and thought sui table for sisal  
hemp. Under the management of Raymond Dubois, whose recent 
experience had been as a vigneron in South Austral ia,  some 500 
acres were planted with sisal  by 1914 and the company was the 
f i r s t  in Papua ever to pay a dividend - a mistaken gesture that  
was quickly followed by l iquidation and purchase of i t s  propert ies 
and assets by the Bri t ish New Guinea Development Company jus t  
before the outbreak of the European war. A second Adelaide 
syndicate , Adelaide Papuan Rubber, held a brief  lease on lands at 
Galley Reach that  passed to Clarke's Kanosia estate.
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Elsewhere on the coast between Port Moresby and Samarai 
development began in 1908 on two estates on the Domara River, one 
on a lease of 2,000 acres the property of Domara River Plantat ions 
Limited of Melbourne and known as Keuru or Domara, and the other 
on a lease of 900 acres held by the Port Moresby publican, Thomas 
McCrann, and called Baia. Further east  on Amazon Bay a partnership 
between G A Loudon, then managing the trading operations of the 
Bri t ish New Guinea Development Company (BNGD), and Campbell 
Cowley, son of a BNGD di rec tor ,  began the development of a 
plantat ion at Mogubo in 1914. Cowley went off to the war, 
returning in bad health.  He died in 1920 and G A Loudon became 
sole owner of the property.
In the Western Division new enterpr ise came from a di f ferent  
quarter.  In 1905 the Reverend F W Walker resigned from the London 
Missionary Society to manage a mission supported commercial and 
industrial  t raining undertaking, The Papuan Industr ies Limited, 
based at Badu in the Torres S t r a i t s .  In 1908 Papuan Industries 
obtained plantat ion leases at Dirimu on the Binaturi River that  
enters the sea twelve miles to the west of Daru, and at Madiri at 
the head of the Fly River estuary.  Madiri became thus the most 
isolated plantat ion in Papua and were i t  not that  labour 
recrui ters  in the west found i t  convenient or a matter of honour 
to call there i t  might have been the lonel ies t .  Dirimu though 
small is of in teres t  as the only Papuan plantat ion laid down in a 
cartwheel pattern.  These two estates  together with the plantat ion 
developed by John and Janet Cowling on Mibu Island were to remain 
the only ones in the vastness of the Western Division. If the 
Government Plantat ion at the Kikori Station and the Kikori
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Plantation Company estate subsequently developed at Ogamobu in the 
Delta Division are added, there were to be only five plantations 
of any size in the entire western half of the country.
The Kikori Plantation Company was formed in Adelaide in 1914 to 
plant coconuts four miles above the government station on the 
! Kikori River. Issued capital was £7,500. The principals of the 
company included J S Burston of Adelaide, J M McComas of Collins 
Street, Melbourne, and the Commonwealth Electoral Officer at 
Broken Hill, Percy Robinson, who, on a voyage to the Northern 
Territory of Australia, had paused at Kikori and been captivated 
by its overwhelming verdure. It  was Robinson who had instigated 
the enterprise. In 1918, aged forty-five, he settled at Ogamobu 
taking over direct management of the plantation from his inept 
brother-in-1aw while meeting the costs of development from returns 
on the recruitment of Western and Delta labourers for the 
plantations of the Central Division.
It was soon obvious that coconuts did not grow well in the 
Kikori area, a region with some of the heaviest rainfall on earth, 
and from 1919 Robinson began the conversion of the plantation to 
rubber as clearing progressed. His very detailed let ters to his 
wife until she joined him at Ogamobu in 1921, and Irene Robinson's 
letters to her mother and sisters until 1929 form the most 
extensive private correspondence from a planter source that we 
have from any part of the colonial period in Papua, a unique and 
invaluable record of plantation development and l i fe ,  reassuringly 
humane, and, saving Percy and Irene's personal reticences, 
remarkably unguarded. The Robinson let ters are extensively used in
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later  chapters.(26) The Kikori Plantat ion Company was succeeded in 
1918 by Kikori Plantat ions Limited with i t s  off ice in Melbourne.
In 1924 the second company was l iquidated and ownership of Ogamobu 
was t ransferred to Ogamobu Plantat ion Limited in which Percy 
Robinson held a third of the shares with the other two thirds 
being held by G A Loudon, by then general manager of the BNGD 
Company, and by the Port Moresby hotel keeper, T D Ryan, 
respect ively.  In 1929 with the collapse of the market the 
plantat ion was sold to BNGD and the Robinsons l e f t  the country.
For Percy Robinson, the defeat would gnaw at the heart .
In addition to the government nurseries establ ished in 1907 at 
Laloki, on Hombrom's Bluff,  and on the Kemp Welch River in the 
Central Division, at Kokoda in the Northern Division, and at Nari 
Island and Wagawaga in the Eastern Division, among the most 
important of Staniforth Smith's projects ,  as he saw them, was the 
development beginning in 1911 of two large government plantat ions 
to be operated both for revenue and example. The f i r s t ,
Gobaregere, on the Kemp Welch, was planted up with rubber, and the 
second, Baibara, on Orangerie Bay, with coconuts. Baibara became a 
showplace under the continuous management for t h i r t y  years of 
Harry Catt ,  previously a Burns Philp employee in the Solomons - he 
was 'a drinker,  now reformed and a good worker' Smith wrote to 
Atlee Hunt at the o u t s e t . (27) Established with a special 
Commonwealth loan of £25,000, both government plantat ions were run
26 The Robinson Letters together with the Prospectus of 
Kikori Plantat ions Ltd. are in the possession of Mrs 
Penelope Hope of Canberra.
27 Atlee Hunt Papers, op. c i t .  Item 444. Staniforth Smith to 
Hunt, 9 February 1908.
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on economic l ines,  but gained an advantage from savings in f reight  
and government levies that  made comparisons with private 
undertakings occasionally invidious and a l i t t l e  smug. Staniforth 
Smith became very proud of his own 'commercial'  success with these 
ventures, the Commonwealth's loan being repaid in ful l  by 1927 
' en t i re ly  out of p r o f i t s ' . (28)
Overseas
Henry Alexander Wickham reminded the world of the place he had 
taken in the early development of the rubber industry with the 
publication in 1908 of his second book and the patenting in the 
same year of a rubber smoking process he had developed.(29) His 
simultaneous emergence into the l ight  of day in London af ter  a 
long obscurity in the South Seas to promote a company to take over 
his in teres ts  in Papua was bound to exci te some in te res t .  The 
company was Mombiri Rubber Plantat ions Limited and f loated with 
the backing of J H Houldsworth, Sir George Manners and H M de 
Courcy Hamilton, gentlemen. I t  received in addition to the 
freehold of the Confl icts,  the t ransfer  of a lease (Mombiri) that  
Wickham had acquired at Collingwood Bay on the north coast in 
1907. Further leases were obtained in the Kanosia d i s t r i c t  and on 
the Giriwu River near Buna. Management was to be shared between 
Wickham and R Tweed Baird, but in 1911, on his returning to 
England again, Henry Wickham was feted at an International  Rubber
28 PAR 1927-28, p. 1.
29 H A Wickham. On the plantat ion,  cul t ivat ion and curing 
of Para Indian Rubber (London, 1908). The book contains 
several drawings Wickham made in Papua.
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Banquet, presented with 1,000 Guineas, and given an annuity fo r  
l i f e  by the Rubber Growers Associat ion and the Planters 
Associat ions of Ceylon and Malaya. He did not re tu rn  to Papua.
Mombiri was then managed u n t i l  1913 by George Whybrow who resigned 
to begin a t imber m i l l i n g  venture with Wil l iam Bruce at Manu Manu. 
The company was reconstructed tha t  year and became the P a c i f i c  and 
Papua Produce Company managed from 1913 u n t i l  1942 by Arthur 
Jewel l .  The Collingwood Bay lands were never developed though 
there was in te re s t  in the area in l a t e r  years when i t  was thought 
paper could be cheaply made from the kurukuru (kunai or lalang) 
grass which was abundant t h e r e . (30) The company's p lan ta t ion  near 
Kanosia, Lolorua, became a major rubber estate.
In May 1909 a second London based company, the Papua Trading 
and Plant ing Syndicate Limited was reg is tered under the 
chairmanship of Admiral E H M Davis who had raised the B r i t i s h  
f l a g  in the G i lbe r t  Is lands in 1892. He had v i s i t e d  Papua in 1906. 
The company acquired 2,600 acres at Patakalana on the Kemp Welch 
River and 10,000 acres on the Im i la  River at Marshall Lagoon from 
a prospector and speculator ,  A lber t  Hayes.(31) As i t s  name might 
suggest the company sought to es tab l ish  i t s e l f  as a trader  at 
f i r s t  and as p lante r  second and a hotel s i te  in Port Moresby and 
trad ing s ta t ions  at Hula and Kalo on the south centra l  coast were
30 See below p. 362
31 NAPNG & CRS G179, Item 7/2 'Return shewing Europeans 
charged with Criminal Offences in the T e r r i t o r y  of Papua 
since 1st January 1910', 1921. A lber t  Hayes f a i l e d  to 
appear in the Central Court in Port Moresby on a charge of 
' s te a l in g '  in January 1910. I t  can be assumed he was no 
longer in Papua.
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also obtained. When the prospectus of the Bri t ish New Guinea 
Development Company appeared in January 1910, i t  contained a 
comment that  disparaged the Patakalana property of the syndicate 
in comparison with those to be acquired by the company and an 
action was commenced against Bri t ish New Guinea Development for 
slander of t i t l e .  In April 1911 the p l a in t i f f  had become a 
^considerable debtor of the defendent company, now establ ished as a 
large t rader  in ' Po r t ' ,  and was ruined when BNGD won the case on 
appeal. In 1914 the unfortunate di rectors  were sued under the 
Director ' s  L iabi l i ty  Act (U K) for more than £5,000 subscribed for 
shares in the syndicate by a Danish gentlewoman, Sophy von 
Holstein Rathlou. The equally unfortunate Mme von Holstein Rathlou 
had been f i r s t  interested in the investment by Bert Hayes himself 
when she joined the P and 0 ship at Alexandria in 1908 that  took 
him to London to promote the enterprise.  Her two sons had 
subsequently visi ted Papua where the Rigo planter Albert English 
had commended Patakalana. She lost  her c a se . (32)
Speculating on the boom a Queensland Papua Syndicate had been 
formed late  in 1908 by a Brisbane commission agent Claude Musson 
to acquire lands in the Terr i tory for disposal to plantat ion 
companies that  might be formed. Among the members of the 
syndicate was the Chief Just ice of Queensland, Sir Pope Cooper.
In May 1909 a company, Papuan Lands Limited, newly registered in 
London, accepted the syndicate' s options and proceeded to obtain 
further  leases prior to seeking support in a buoyant capital  
market for an undertaking that  might develop the propert ies.  The
32 Financial Times (London), 13, 14, 15, 16 February 1914.
The Court ruled that  the c i rcular  advert ising the venture 
was not a prospectus.
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promoters of Papuan Lands Limited were John Greeley Jenkins, 
American born, former premier of South Austral ia and the then 
South Australian Agent General in London, and a speculator Duncan 
El l io t  Alves. Musson retained an in te res t  in the new company and 
became i t s  Australian ' loca l '  agent.
Capital for the purchase of the lands was subscribed by an 
impressive l i s t  of public figures who then as vendors were 
prepared to guarantee subscription of over half of the i n i t i a l  
issue of shares in the proposed plantat ion venture. These 
guarantors included the Earl of Ranfurly, a former Governor of New 
Zealand; Viscount Esher, an intimate of King Edward; the Hon. 
Geoffrey Howard, Liberal whip in the House of Commons; and a 
number of prominent company di rectors in England and Austral ia.  
Among the Australians l is ted  was W L Beaulieu of Melbourne, an 
important Victorian investor,  though one whose connection with 
this  new company appears to have been br ief .  Late in 1909 Jenkins 
together with Charles Alfred Darling, a South Australian 
representing a family business in London, went out to Port Moresby 
to arrange the t ransfers  and fur ther  purchases in subscribers '  
names of lands amounting to 112,000 acres dis t r ibuted for the most 
part  in large leases along the coast in both the 'wet'  and 'dry'  
belts of Papua. Charles Darling was to remain in Port Moresby as 
general manager. In preparation for the prospectus for the 
planting f lo ta t ion  the best expert opinion avai lable was engaged 
to appraise these leases together with several other propert ies 
that  unconnected speculators hoped to sell  to the company. Among 
the experts who reported to Papuan Lands were Henry Wickham,
Arthur Bloomfield, and Major A J Boyd of the Queensland Department
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of Agriculture and Stock. (33)
In January 1910 the prospectus of the Bri t i sh New Guinea 
Development Company Limited (BNGD) was issued with considerable 
publ ici ty.  This company was to become the largest  planting 
enterpr ise to establ ish i t s e l f  in Papua, large even by comparison 
with plantat ion companies set t ing up in Malaya and Sumatra at the 
time. The nominal capital  was to be £1,500,000 in 500,000 
ordinary shares of £1 each, of which 275,000 shares and £68,000 in 
cash were t ransferred in settlement to the vendors, Papuan Lands; 
and 1,000,000 £l part icipat ing preference shares,  of which 500,000 
were to be issued to provide the working capital  for the company.
Though not without i t s  detractors among f inancial  observers who 
thought that  the Papuan Lands syndicate had done rather  too well 
out of the sale of unimproved lands for which i t s  members had paid 
pract ical ly  nothing, BNGD appeared an impressive new enterpr ise,  
in name, scale and programme resembling a chartered company. And 
so at least  some in the press regarded i t ,  the correspondent of 
the Bri t ish Australasian of 17 February 1910 noting that
One of the most important projects of Imperial develop­
ment which have been brought before the Bri t i sh public 
since the Chartered Company was introduced by Mr Cecil 
Rhodes is that  of the Bri t ish New Guinea Development 
Company...an enterprise of vast pos s ib i l i t i e s ;  and the 
fact  that  i t  is backed by such well known names (to men-
33 ANUABL Deposit 95, M37. Prospectus of the Bri t i sh New 
Guinea Development Company Limited, 1910.
t ion but a few) as Viscount Esher. . . gives some indication 
of how the project  is regarded in high Imperial and 
financial  c i r c l e s . (34)
In 1921 Judge Murray was to a t t r ibute  all the d i f f i c u l t i e s  he 
had had with BNGD in the intervening years to i t s  'chartered 
! company' pretensions,  but although the company did develop large 
plantat ion and trading i nte res t s ,  provided a coastal shipping 
service,  d r i l l ed  for o i l ,  manufactured tobacco, and had looked 
around in 1910 for prospective tenant s e t t l e r s ,  there is no 
evidence in the correspondence of the company's off icers  that  they 
pretended to a 'chartered company' role.  There was, nonetheless,  a 
consciousness among i t s  principals in London and Port Moresby that  
by virtue of the size of i t s  investment, BNGD should be accorded a 
certain respect ,  and i t s  in teres ts  given a certain consideration.  
Murray would be contemptuous of such expectations in the years 
ahead when he and the company clashed over policy as i t  tested the 
constraints under which i t  laboured in Papua.(35)
In addition to J G Jenkins and Lord Ranfurly, who became 
chairman, the Board of Directors of BNGD comprised Sir Westby 
Brook Percival,  Tasmanian born, New Zealand educated and a 
di rector  of the Union Bank of Austral ia;  Ferdinand Charles 
Stanley, a brother of Lord Derby, l a t er  Brigadier General and a 
di rector  of the Santa Fe Land Company; William Austin Horn, a 
director  of the Bank of Adelaide, born in New South Wales, a 
onetime boundary r ider  and a sponsor of Northern Terr i tory
34 The Bri t ish Australasian (London), 17 February 1910. p. 16
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exploration whose in teres t s  extended from Malaya to the Argentine; 
Sir Alfred Sandlings Cowley, sugar magnate and former Minister for 
Lands in Queensland and Speaker of the Queensland Legislat ive 
Assembly; and Duncan Alves. Cowley was to be the ' l oca l '  di rector  
of the company.
The BNGD plantat ions laid down in 1910-14 were Aroa near Hisiu 
on Redscar Bay, Bomana and Katea on the dry savannah lowlands of 
the Laloki Valley, Itikinumu on a t r ibutary of the upper Laloki on 
the Sogeri plateau,  Jawarere on the Musgrave River beyond 
Itikinumu, Otomata at Cape Rodney, Baubauguina near Abau, Gadaisu 
on Orangerie Bay, and Waigani at the head of Milne Bay near 
Gi l ig i l i  and Hagita. Paili  or Pai le,  on Marshall Lagoon, was 
bought from the Laka River Rubber speculators.  To these were added 
Obu near Aroa bought in 1914 from Robert Hunter, Jaropa near Buna 
on the north coast establ ished in 1917 part ly as a recrui t ing 
stat ion for Mambare labour, and Doa, si tuated between Clarke's 
Kanosia property and Mombiri's Lolorua at Galley Reach acquired in 
the same year in settlement of debts to the company of William 
Bruce. A very large lease of 40,000 acres on the Brown River was 
never developed and relinquished in 1921. While these propert ies 
taken together immediately established BNGD as by far  the largest  
plantat ion in teres t  in Papua, the company through i t s  subsidiary 
Bri t ish New Guinea Trading Company also became for a time a major 
trader with large wholesale and re t a i l  stores in both Port Moresby 
and Samarai.
The BNGD plantat ion leases,  excepting the Brown River lands, 
amounted to over 70,000 acres and plantings by 1919 exceeded
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12,000 acres. In addition,  W A Horn, chairman of the company from 
1913 to 1922 and the major shareholder in the Kuala Selangor 
Rubber Company of Malaya, decided to take a fur ther  risk in 1915 
by developing a separate estate  at Robinson River near Abau 
planted and managed by BNGD unti l  1926. Of these propert ies,  Aroa, 
Baubauguina, Obu, Otomata, Gadaisu, Paili  and Waigani were planted 
j with coconuts, Itikinumu and Jawarere with rubber, Bomana with 
sisal  and Katea with tobacco. Sea Island cotton was also grown 
for a period on Baubauguina, Gadaisu and Katea. Robinson River 
produced copra.
As well as requiring the employment of dozens of new managers 
and overseers of varying experience or none, the f lur ry  of 
clearing and planting provided work for many of the old Papua 
hands who, i t  was presumed, 'knew the natives '  and the country and 
who now contracted to clear scrub, prepare nurseries,  recrui t  
labour and lay down es tates .  As mentioned in a previous chapter,  
the r e t i r ing  government o f f i c i a l s  of the Barton fact ion,  William 
Bruce, Guy Manning, Henry Griff in and Arthur Jewell,  all  became 
contractors to the new companies - in the case of Bruce and 
Griffin at l eas t ,  in order to provide a l iving while they bui l t  up 
propert ies of thei r  own. Bruce and Griffin both worked on 
Bloomfield's es tates  at Galley Reach, Manning cleared Pail i  for 
the Laka River company, and Jewell cleared the Fairfax Harbour 
leases of Clarke and Whiting to produce sisal  hemp. These men 
otherwise all speculated in land, might have carried out al luvial  
mining in spel ls of inac t iv i ty  or even have shot birds of paradise 
i l l ega l ly .  They were prepared to turn thei r  hands to anything that  
could help them re-es tabl i sh the style of l i f e  to which thei r
A
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former off ice and education had led them to feel en t i t l ed .  In 
openly class and race conscious times and not wishing to descend 
to the level of the older resident  knockabouts who openly 
consorted with the Papuans they must have found the i r  predicament 
very t rying.
Other contractors - Daniel Horan, Alec Clunas, James Driver,
1 Charles Arbouin, Ernest Wythes, Robert Hunter, Elias Solomon, the 
Evenetts,  the Auerbachs, and the Gors brothers were drawn from 
among the miners, r ec rui te r s ,  t raders ,  small planters and jus t  
plain d r i f t e r s  of whom the Terr i tory seemed never to be short .  To 
the management of estates  though, were at t racted a few men of 
experience from the larger plantat ion world. Clarke and Whiting's 
f i r s t  manager at Kanosia, Wallace Westland, had managed an estate 
at Matale in Ceylon, a country to which he returned in 1912. 
William ' G i l i g i l i ' Wright, Kitchen and Levers'  manager at Milne 
Bay unti l  1929 and subsequently the partner with Arthur Bunting 
and ' Gus' Nelsson in a dessicated coconut factory at Ahioma, had 
also worked in Ceylon. Bloomfield's manager at Kemp Welch, William 
Jefferson may have worked in the Cocos Islands prior to coming to 
Papua, and George Archibald Loudon, to be met with hereinaf ter  as 
the strong willed general manager of BNGD from 1915 until  1926, 
had spent four years on a cotton es ta te  on the Zambezi, two years 
in the Argentine and three years in Nigeria as an invest igator  for 
Bri t i sh estancia and plantat ion investors.  Henry Gri f f in,  William 
Jefferson,  and Henry Greene of Sagoro Tano all went on to obtain 
posi t ions on Malayan estates  on the basis of thei r  Papuan 
experience.
Australian-born s e t t l e r s  probably comprised no more than half
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of the private white planters in Papua and fewer than half of the 
managers on the company owned estates. Many of these were 
Englishmen, Scotsmen or Irishmen. Names like George Bernesconi, 
Richard Thorvald Jensen, Helge Holm and Kurt Hacke, suggest other 
backgrounds. Plantation assistants were more likely to be 
Australians. Of the 1 Brit ishers1, most, like William Bruce, were 
quick to demand the ' rights'  of Australians, as they 
understood them, and prepared at times to use Australian 
precedents to just ify demands they made on the government. Most of 
the officials under Murray were Australians. Certainly most 
Australians strongly supported the imperial t ie in the period 
under review and clearly sett lers were divided by social class and 
employment status. Yet other divisions could also exist, and the 
effect of the country of birth, as indeed of religious loyalties, 
might have been more significant in influencing the attitudes 
towards each other of groups within the white community than the 
records show.(36)
36 W C Bruce was deeply anti-Catholic in his opinions and 
Captain Fitch's allegation in April 1920 that Judge 
Murray had given the Catholic Mission favourable treatment 
over customs dues - tried to suggest sectarian bias in 
Murray and may suggest the same in Fitch.
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Chapter 8 Small men, o f f i c i a l s ,  c ap i t a l i s t s  
Settlement by the 'small man' in the boom years
With the boom dozens of white miners, t raders ,  and recru i te r s ,  
many ' b a t t l e r s '  and a few remittance men, long or newly resident 
in Papua, applied for leases in large and small parcels in many 
parts of the Eastern and South Eastern Divisions. Principal among 
these was Arthur Bunting a former Burns Phi Ip employee and Samarai 
storekeeper since 1903 who had brought out from England his 
brothers Fred and Bob to help in his business. Together the 
Bunting brothers were to separately hold or share with each other 
or others in teres ts  in more than twenty planting leases and to 
supersede Whittens as the major private planters in the eastern 
divisions.
On the mainland between Bentley Bay and East Cape were now 
developed a number of small coconut plantat ions whose owners 
depended for a l iving primaril ly on trade and on recrui t ing the 
'Gosiagos' of the D'Entrecasteaux Archipelago and ' I a s i - I a s i s 1 of 
East Cape who came to be the preferred labour on the rubber 
estates of the Central Division. These small t rader-planters  and 
recrui ters  included John Gray of Annie Inle t ,  Landen'Erri ngstone 
Forrester  of Polotana, and Fred 'Brassy'  Evenett of Moununa. 
Brassy Evenett 'also leased Deirina Island south west of Samarai. 
With his brother,  Arthur, he contracted for a time and worked 
beche-de-mer boats in the eastern divisions.  This group was 
joined in the twenties by the Talbot brothers,  Charlie and Dick, 
at Punipuni. Across Goodenough Bay Hobart Spi l ler  of Menapi also
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combined planting with trade and r ec r u i t i n g . (1)
On the southern shore of Milne Bay in 1915 Fred Kruger, a miner 
r e t i r ing  from the Waria gold-f ield,  planted 'Dodo' or Gamododo, 
where his trade store became a well known stopping place for 
coastal boats and canoes for the next twenty-seven years. On the 
opposite coast in the same year Hanorah and John Leetch 
established Hihila - another modest plantat ion dependent on i t s  
store to survive. Across from Samarai, Loani, planted with palms 
by the Walker brothers,  was now managed and part ly owned by Elias 
Solomon who proceeded to plant rubber and experiment with vanil la 
and cocoa. He supplied milk to Samarai from a herd of c a t t l e  that  
came with the property. Nearby on Sariba Island was Borebore or 
Boliboli ,  the plantat ion of George Eichorn, son of a na tura l i s t  
who had accompanied Donald Mackay's expedition up the Purari River 
in 1908.(2) There too was the Belesana slipway operated by James 
Ballantyne who, in 1907, also leased a planting block of 300 acres 
on the mainland opposite. In 1910 he assigned this  property to his 
wife, Meta Ballantyne, who developed i t .
On the islands to the east  of Samarai the scale of plantat ions 
was small though thei r  number was large. Here most planters were 
primaril ly t raders who might have made no pretense to the t i t l e  
' p lanter '  at all as i t  became increasingly a name appropriated by
1 Hobart Spill  e r ' s  partner for a time was William Maxwell 
Middleton la ter  a prominent planter in the Mandated 
Terri tory.  Max Middleton had come to Papua as a bank 
off icer  at Samarai in 1913. In 1914 he was an applicant 
for a lease in the Torlesse Group. He went off to the war 
and lost  an eye in France. He became an assessor for the 
Board of Expropriated (German) Propert ies in New Guinea 
and acquired several estates on Karkar Island,  Madang.
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the managers and espec ia l ly  the owner-managers of the larger  
estates on the mainland. Several of the is land t rade r -p lan te rs  
accumulated small coconut p lan ta t ions  and became r e la t i v e l y  
substant ial  f igu res  in the 'eas t '  and in i t s  centre of Samarai. 
El izabeth and John Mahony, traders to the miners on Sudest and 
Misima now developed small p lan ta t ions  at Madaua on Sudest, on 
Motorina in the Calvados chain, at Dunvara on Rossel and at 
Bonagai on Woodlark. Hanorah Leetch of H ih i la  in Mi lne Bay was 
t h e i r  daughter. In periods spent in Samarai between 1914 and 1918 
the anthropolog is t  Bronislaw Malinowski came to know Mrs Mahony 
well and was impressed by ' t h i s  63 year old woman, t a l l ,  strong, 
with an u l t ra -e n e rg e t ic  Anglo-Saxon face, constant ly  using profane 
language (damn, blooming) ' who intervened in Papuan v i l l a g e r s '  
rows and who completely overshadowed her wayward and ine f fec tua l  
husband in the management of t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s . (3) She was one 
s e t t l e r  in the 'eas t '  who was l a t e r  able to r e t i r e  'south '  in some 
comfort leaving a son in charge of the fam i ly  company, Tagula 
PIantat ions.
The Swede, John Gusth Nelsson, remained another of the more 
successful of these South Eastern and Eastern D iv is ion  p lante rs. A 
trader at Woodlark and already j o i n t  owner with the miner Wil l iam 
Sheddon of a p lan ta t ion  lease over Doini Is land near Samarai since 
1903 he now obtained fu r th e r  land at Kwaiapan Bay on Woodlark fo r  
a p lan ta t ion  — 5,000 acres in 1909. Nelsson was a Member of the 
Le g is la t ive  Council from 1914 u n t i l  his death in 1940. In the
2 B o l ib o l i  may have been prev ious ly  A E Meek's place on 
Sariba. See above p. 55
3 Bronislaw Malinowski. A Diary in the S t r i c t  Sense of the
Term (London. 1967). p. 263.
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extreme east  of the Terr i tory,  the Osborne brothers,  t raders on 
Rossel, had also been planting there at Abu 1eti since 1903. Their 
neighbours to the north, Richard Ede, with his son Isadore, 
traders in the Laughlin Group and, were i t  not for thei r  lugger, 
perhaps the most isolated Europeans in all Papua, now developed a 
small plantat ion on Woodlark at Guasopa.
In the D'Entrecasteaux John Olsen, another miner, planted a 
small property at Sebulagomwa on the southern promontory of 
Fergusson Island opposite the Methodist Mission head stat ion on 
Dobu. Nearby at Kedidia a lease was taken out by George Harrison. 
When Olsen died in 1915, Sebulagomwa was leased by Harrison's 
brother Ernest.  Ernest Harrison had been a Methodist missionary on 
Woodlark, a notably unfrui tful  f i e ld  in the evangelization of 
Papua. He le f t  the mission af ter  marrying a fellow missionary who 
then fe l l  so i l l  that  she was forced to leave the country.
Perhaps embittered, Ernest Harrison , l ike many of his new friends 
on plantat ions,  became a heavy drinker.  By 1920 Arthur Bunting in 
partnership with Burns Philps'  manager at Samarai, George 
Aumuller, and others held planting leases at Sewataitai on 
Normanby Island,  and at Sanaroa Island in the group.
In the Trobriand Islands the brothers Samuel and Raphael Brudo 
held a small lease,  Kavataria, on Kiriwina where they traded in 
pearls,  and a plantat ion of 180 acres on Bomapau Island nearby 
where they cult ivated coconuts. Malinowski said of Raphael that  he 
was the only man in the islands he could meet with who could bring
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him into touch with c i v i l i a t i o n .  He was to stay with the Brudos on 
a v i s i t  to P a r is . (4)
Ten miles across the lagoon from Kavataria to the south Edward 
'Ted' Auerback and his brother George traded at Sinaketa and 
planted coconuts on nearby Muwo Island which they leased af te r  
Nelsson and Sheddon had fo r fe i te d  i t  in 1909. Ted recrui ted in 
the D'Entrecasteaux and was a contractor fo r  BNGD on Waigani 
estate in Milne Bay. He was red-headed and a phi landerer of note 
among Papuan women.
Off the east coast of Kir iw ina, Cyri l  'King' Cameron leased 
land on Kitava Island. I t  was said that he had fo r fe i te d  a claim 
to chie fta insh ip of the Clan Cameron on account of his Papuan 
chi ldren. He presided over his small domain fo r  t h i r t y  years among 
a people the most beaut i ful  and sexual ly free in Melanesia 
resenting v is i to rs  who might in te r fe re  with 'h i s '  women and in the 
t h i r t i e s  developing a passion fo r  ra d io . (5)
On the numerous smaller islands between Samarai and Sudest were 
t h i r t y  or so plantings including several of those of the Mahoneys 
mentioned. The Buntings planted on Imbert, on Panamau, on 
Quessant, on M i l i g i l i ,  200 acres on Panawina, and 44 acres on 
Meila i.  John 'Jack' Anderson, one of the f i r s t  prospectors in the 
Sudest goldrush of 1888, set up as a planter on Panamoti in 1907.
He was s ix ty - fou r .  In the Conf l ic ts ,  the plantat ion on Panasesa 
developed a decade e a r l ie r  by Henry Wickham was managed a f te r  his
4 ib id . p. 214.
5 Informant Fred Craig, Alotau, May 1975.
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departure by his onetime partner Captain Herbert Holton until  
Holton's death in 1910 and then by Holton's wife until  1912. 
Thereafter until  the t h i r t i e s  i t  was managed for the Mombiri 
Company and i t s  successor Pacific and Papua Produce Company by 
Alphonse and Helene Bernier, an eccentric French couple who were 
notorious for requiring thei r  labourers to wash dai ly with soap.
* The Berniers planted a small es tate  of thei r  own on Misima that  
fai led to f lourish and where Bernier went out of his mind. Another 
Frenchman, Prosper Charpentier, similarly regarded as an odd i f  
charming ' charac t er ' ,  held a planting lease on Woodlark. 'Charpy' 
had a penchant for writ ing highly idiosynchratic l e t t e r s  to 
newspapers and the government that  made him occasionally a thorn 
in the side of those he attacked. In the twenties Charpentier 
se t t led on a smal1-holding, Nauru, on the Laloki outside Port 
Moresby.
On Nivani, a very small island in the Torlesse Group to the 
south west of Misima, a small government coconut plantat ion had 
been laid down in 1893 using prison labour when Nivani was br ief ly  
headquarters of the South Eastern Division. In 1908 i t  was 
offered for lease and Elizabeth Mahony applied. She refused to 
pay the £300 the Lands Department asked for the palms and the 
lease was awarded to George Munt in 1909. Munt went on to acquire 
further  leases on Misima but fai led to gain a greater holding he 
sought in the Torlesse Group under a policy whereby the government 
disallowed any fur ther  applications for al ienat ion of small 
uninhabited islands that  might have been stopping places for 
Papuan canoes or vis i ted by thei r  fishermen.
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East of Amazon Bay on the south coast planters ,  miners, 
t raders,  missionaries,  and perhaps increasingly also some Papuans, 
looked towards Samarai as thei r  centre.  This small town occupying 
nearly all of the f i f ty- two acres of an island in the China S t ra i t  
at the very easternmost point of the New Guinea mainland and 
surrounded by other palm-fringed islands at t racted the kind of 
sentimental regard in Papua shown elsewhere in the Pacific for 
Levuka, Tulagi,  Apia and Pape'ete.  There were s e t t l e r s  in the 
eastern divisions who had never seen the parched s t ree t s  and 
glaring roofs of Port Moresby and who took pride in saying so. In 
1937 George Munt of Misima going on holiday could s t i l l  claim that  
he was one of those white residents of eastern Papua who had 
'never been to Por t ' . (6)
In the Northern, Central,  and Gulf Divisions plantat ions 
developed by individual s e t t l e r s  in the period 1907-14 were fewer 
i f  sometimes larger than those of the east .  At Buna on the north 
coast,  Ernest 'Ernie'  Oates planted coconuts between recrui t ing 
sor t ies  with his partner Les 'Jumbo' Joubert among the Orokaivas.
A few miles away the goldfield trading partners Alexander 'Alec'  
Clunas and Mort Clark leased land on the Yodda road at the Giriwu 
River on which they grew cotton. Clark also leased 10,000 acres on 
Oro Bay but he died in 1912 and the land was passed.in.  I t  may 
have been the same land taken up by Oro Bay Plantat ions Limited in 
1915 and called Wiresota, a property that  would be owned by one of 
the Bunting partnerships by 1930. Government s ta t ions were 
established at Kokoda in 1904 and at Ioma to cover the ac t iv i t i e s  
of miners on the Yodda goldfields.  Small plantat ions of hevea
6 Papuan Courier. 25 March 1937.
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rubber were established at both using prisoners to clear and plant 
the stumps. In la ter  years the Kokoda area was to a t t r ac t  in te res t  
and Mamba Estate was established by the Kienzle brothers in 
1938.(7)
After 1910 there was l i t t l e  fur ther  planting by individual 
s e t t l e r s  in the Central Division where the larger companies had 
come to dominate commercial agricul ture.  On Redscar Bay, on the 
coast known as Hisiu Beach, the brothers of Walter Gors - Leo,
Otto and Arthur - established several small plantat ions alongside 
BNGD's Obu and Aroa, and the propert ies of A S Anthony and Dr 
Simson.(8) 'The Palms' , another small Hisiu plantat ion,  was 
developed by Allan MacGregor Sinclai r  and his wife. Sinclai r  was 
one of those who assigned leases they had acquired speculatively 
to BNGD in return for shares in 1910. He was occasionally a r e l i e f  
manager on BNGD estates .  Coconuts were planted fur ther  west at Ou 
Ou Creek near Delena by Louis Clunn, a son of the Milne Bay 
planter John Clunn. The BNGD general manager, G A Loudon, l a ter  
became a partner in the property with Clunn and then sole owner.
In the east  of the Division at Cape Rodney a lease of 500 acres 
had been taken up in 1907 by Frank Horn. He died in tes t a t e  in 1916 
and the Papuan Times organised an appeal for his des t i t u t e  family, 
the plantat ion being sold the following year to Domara River 
Plantat ions.  Nearby at Baramata in the early twenties a Papuan 
Government Soldier Settlement lease was granted to a G Harden and 
Partner but relinquished soon af ter .  I t  was then leased to Arturo 
Carlo P i l o t t i ,  an apparently trouble-prone Sici l ian some supposed
7 See below p. 338
8 The Gors plantat ions were consolidated as ' I k i - i k in a ' .
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wanted for rape in Austral ia who married a Papuan only to be 
stabbed by her f a t h e r . (9) He was s t i l l  alive there in 1939 when he 
sold the property ful ly  developed. Further east  s t i l l ,  on Baxter 
Bay near the Mogubo property of G A Loudon and Campbell Cowley, 
Alfred Greenaway, an Englishman 'from Ramsgate or Margate1 planted 
coconuts. Malinowski recorded that  Alf was 'married to a native 
woman and feels  miserable in respectable company, par t icular ly  
feminine. (He) Has not the s l ightes t  wish to leave New 
Guinea ' . (10) There were a dozen others l ike Greenaway along the 
coast.
Over 200 miles to the west, in the Gulf Division, coconuts were 
planted by the t raders Ernest McGowan at Moveave; Donald McDonald 
at Vaiviri ;  Robert Mawson, father  of the Antarctic explorer,  at 
Orokolo (11); Braham and Pope at Kukipi; Mrs Ashton at Huiva on Ie 
Inlet ;  F W Clark at Koaru; and W 'Scotty'  Curry at Oiapu. Of these 
plantat ions,  McGowan's, begun in 1908, was the ea r l i e s t ,  and 
McDonald's by far  the largest  - 350 acres by 1937. Like the 
t rader-planters  of the north east  coast who recrui ted Gosiagos and 
I as i - I a s i s ,  these men probably did some recrui t ing for the larger 
estates as labourers from the neighbouring Delta Division, 
col lect ively called 'Goaribaris '  and from the Gulf, the 
'Orokolos' ,  were in demand at various times. A much larger
9 Pi lo t t i  shot himself in the knee in January 1930. NAPNG 
& CRS Series G91, Abau Station Journal,  18, 19 January 
1930. Report by Leo Fl in t  ARM, 9 February.
10 Malinowski, op. c i t .  p. 39.
11 Robert El l i s  Mawson's lease at Kavauvau, Orokolo, was 
issued in 1906. He may already have been there for some 
time. He obtained leases to ta l l i ng  2,500 acres on the
Vai1 a1 a in 1909 which he might have t ransferred to Lewis 
Lett .  He died at Orokolo in 1913.
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plantat ion begun before the war was Maira, 12 miles up the Vai lala 
River above V a iv i r i .  The planter was Lewis Le t t ,  f i r s t  engineer on 
the Bentinck, the tramp steamer that had brought out the supplies 
fo r  the establishment of BNGD in 1910. Lett was the co-discoverer 
of an o i l  show on the Vai la la  in 1911 and much la te r  a w r i te r  and 
biographer of J H P Murray. His house at Maira with a t i l e d  roof 
and ornamental garden was the f in e s t  on the coast in 1918.(12) 
A f ter  the war cotton was grown in commercial quant i t ies fo r  a 
period by Frank Mahony, son of El izabeth and John Mahony of 
Sudest and a returned so ld ie r ,  and by Robert Shaw-Moody, a former 
plantat ion overseer, at Keuru near Mrs Ashton's place halfway 
between the Vai lala and Kerema.(13)
There was no fu r the r  plantat ion development in the Western 
Division a f te r  the work undertaken by Papuan Industr ies Limited 
and the Cowlings. Unt i l  1931 the Papuan Industr ies propert ies were 
managed from Madiri on the Fly by James Freshwater and fo r  periods 
by a Daru rec ru i te r ,  Hugh 'Percy' Beach. Ownership was then 
transferred to the Unevangelised Field Mission which leased out 
Madiri to Janet Cowling and Dirimu to Leonard Lu f f ,  the principal  
Daru trader. The only 'town' in the west, Daru, with a white 
population of perhaps twenty, lay on a low mangrove ringed island 
that barely escaped inundation by the t ides. Depending on the 
trading houses of Port Moresby fo r  supplies i t  remained 
essentia l ly  a - recru i t ing  stat ion fo r  Papuans indentured in the 
pearl ing industry in Queensland waters and on plantat ions in the 
Central Division and a place where the returning ' Kiwai ' labourers
12 Percy Robinson. Letters. 14 December 1918.
13 See below p. 350
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could spend accumulated wages.(14)
With the managers and assistants brought to Papua by the 
investment boom these people made up that 'second' generation of 
pioneers who from 1907 availed themselves of ' the most liberal 
land laws in the tropics ' .  Leasehold tenure had indeed provided 
v opportunities for settlement in Papua by white men and women of 
small means who might never have afforded the purchase price of a 
freehold grant. Despite their hopes, and like their predecessors 
in the interregnum and before, most of these men and women never 
became planters independent of trading. Planting carried prestige 
but trade was to provide a surer living whether the enterprise was 
large or small throughout the history of colonial Papua. Like 
many of the nameless assistants on the larger company owned 
estates perhaps a majority of these sett lers died in Papua, a 
memory for a time among their peers, labourers and servants and in 
not a few cases among Papuan descendants. In 1909 there were 
forty-five planters, twenty-eight traders and fifteen recruiters 
in the Territory among an adult white population of 489. By 1917, 
when the adult white male population reached 701, there were 139 
planters, managers and assistants, twenty-three traders and 
nineteen recruiters.  A further dozen sett lers like the Whittens 
and the Buntings, while they were classified as ' storekeepers' in 
the Annual Reports, were also significant pi anters . (15) It  is
14 For the peoples of the Western Division, most of which was 
low-lying and relatively infer t i le,  indentured service 
remained the only channel open for satisfaction of the new 
needs European intrusion had brought. Often tall  and strong 
above the average in Papua, workers from this region were 
regarded as especially valuable, along with the Motu of the 
Central Division, on coastal boats.
15 PAR 1908-09, p. 25; and 1916-17, p. 12.
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doubtful that the number of those engaged d i re c t ly  in planting in 
Papua was ever much greater than in 1917. A f ter  1930 there were 
fewer than a hundred planters.
O f f i c ia ls  interested in land
Government o f f i c i a l s  were as quick now to see advantage in 
obtaining an in te res t  in land as were the 'u n o f f i c i a l '
(n o n -o f f i c ia l )  population, and u n t i l  an Executive Council meeting 
of 24th December 1907 decided that o f f ice rs  of the Lands 
Department could no longer apply fo r  or hold leases there were no 
re s t r i c t io n s  whatever placed upon appl ications for  Crown Lands by 
o f f ice rs  of the Papuan Government. The service as yet provided no 
pension scheme fo r  r e t i r i n g  o f f ice rs  and though A C English had 
been accused before the Royal Commission of a c o n f l i c t  of in te rest 
between his o f f i c i a l  respons ib i l i t ies  and his plantat ion and 
obliged to resign, his fe l low o f f ice rs  had continued to acquire 
lands in the i r  own names.
Up un t i l  June 1908 these interests included those of 
H L G r i f f i n ,  RM fo r  the Northern Div is ion,  who had applied fo r  and 
been granted 640 acres on the Varna Creek at Galley Reach and who 
proposed to take leave in 1908 to f l o a t  a company to develop the 
lease, and Charles Garrioch, Clerk of the Executive Council, who 
retained his half  share with Henry Greene in Sagoro Tano.
Garrioch along with John Bensted, Clerk of Government Stores,
Cyr i l  Havil land and Albert Ard l ie ,  f i e l d  assistants to the 
Government Surveyor, each held £100 shares in the soon to be 
aborted Papua Para Rubber Company. This venture had apparently
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succeeded where Randolph Bedford fai led in obtaining a lease 
between the Laloki and Koitaki at Sogeri. The master of the 
government yacht,  Merrie Engl and , Captain Archibald A H Hunter, 
held 600 acres near Garrioch's and Ballantyne's blocks and was one 
of the syndicators in the BNGD f lo ta t i on ,  his land being 
transferred to the new company as part of Itikinumu Estate in 
:i return for shares. The gaolers John MacDonald and Horace Hides 
each held a 500 acre lease on the lower Laloki, the Government 
Medical Officer at Samarai, Dr R F Jones, held a sixth share in 
Henry Wickham's Conflict  Island Planting Association, and the only 
Papuan appointed to the regular service,  Teina Materua, a clerk in 
the Treasury, held a lease of 100 acres at Hisiu. The ARM at 
Samarai, Charles Owen-Turner, held an interes t  in 125 acres on 
Milne Bay acquired in the name of his wife who indeed worked the 
property. Many of f icers ,  natural ly enough, had purchased town 
allotments in 'Port '  or Samarai on which to build houses.
That r es t r i c t i ons  should be placed upon the nature and extent 
of the interes ts  of o f f i c i a l s  in land became obvious at the end of 
1907 when i t  appeared that  members of the Lands Department might 
have acted improperly in manipulating applications and in seeking 
subsequently to evade an Executive Council Order that  prohibited 
them speci f ica l ly  from having any direct  in te res t  in l and . (16)
In October, Archie MacAlpine, assis tant  manager on Clarke and
Whiting new estates at Kanosia, had begun looking at land nearby
for possible development by a syndicate comprising himself, the
16 'Correspondence re la t ing to dealings in land by o f f ic i a l s  
was tabled in Parliament and printed in CPP, 1907-08, 
pp. 1575-1588. Other correspondence is in CRS Al 14/5145, 
'Dealings in Shares and Land by Papuan Officials ' ,  1908-1914.*
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Chief Clerk of the Treasury, Herbert Champion, Champion's junior 
clerk,  J C Watt, and the acting Chief Government Surveyor,
Ralph Drummond, and his ass i s tants ,  Charles Pinney and 
Albert Ardlie.  Drummond had been an off icer  reprimanded by the 
Royal Commissioners for insubordination towards Anthony Musgrave 
in going past the Government Secretary to seek Captain Barton's 
support in a matter where Musgrave had opposed him. In 
J H P Murray's confidential  account of a f fa i rs  that  led the Prime 
Minister to establ ish the Commission, Drummond was described as a 
'young man of very limited education, and his conversation, 
general demeanour, and general principles are such that  he could 
never hope to command the respect of the off icers  of the 
Department' . (17) He survived in his acting posit ion under Murray 
but was known to be of the Barton fact ion that  chafed under the 
judge's administration.
I t  happened that  early in December, Henry Mola, acting both on 
his own behalf and as agent for Bloomfield's Dundee River Rubber 
Company saw Drummond about leases Mola wanted to obtain at Galley 
Reach. On the 13th, the day af ter  he had lodged his formal 
application for the land Mola was handed a sketch map showing that  
two 250 acre portions of the land he had chosen had already been 
applied for by Drummond and Pinney - the actual dates on Pinney's 
application being the 11th and on Drummond's, the 13th, - facts 
not communicated to Mola. At the Executive Council meeting held 
on Christmas Eve Drummond's and Pinney's applications were 
rejected on grounds that  off icers  of the Lands Department were not
17 Francis West. Selected Letters of Hubert Murray (Melbourne, 
1971). Let ter  fto. 32, p. 43.
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to have the p r iv i lege  thenceforth of acquiring lands in the i r  own 
names though the i r  in te res t  in a registered company that obtained 
lands might not be deemed improper.(18)
Over the Christmas period Champion and Drummond were both house 
guests of Wallace Westland, general manager at Kanosia, while 
.Pinney and Ard l ie  were staying nearby at MacAlpine's house at 
Rorona. In the course of a week said to have been spent hunting 
magani and goura pigeons much of the area that included the 
portions refused to Drummond and Pinney was traversed and, no 
doubt, ca re fu l ly  examined by the hol idaying part ies. On the 
re-opening of the Lands Off ice on 2nd January 1908 appl ications 
were lodged by MacAlpine and J C Watt fo r  land that included the 
blocks previously applied fo r  - ju s t  two hours before Henry Mola 
resubmitted his appl ications fo r  the same area.
As a member of the Land Board that made recommendations fo r  
the Executive Counci l 's approval, Drummond met his immediate 
superior, Stan iforth Smith, to consti tu te  a meeting of the Board, 
the quorum of which was two, and, as with the previous 
appl icat ions by Drummond and Pinney, the appl ications with 
apparent p r io r i t y  - those of MacAlpine and Watt - were 
recommended. Drummond to ld Smith of his intention to take up an 
in te rest in any subsequent undertaking to develop the land and 
Smith understood th is  to be acceptable wi th in the meaning of the 
Order of 24th December. H A Mola, now thwarted twice, appealed to
18 CPP, 1907-08. 'Correspondence re la t ing  to dealings in land 
by o f f i c i a l s .  Precis of events etc.* p. 1575. Stan iforth 
Smith had suggested Mola look at Galley Reach lands as 
the Dundee (or Waipara) River lands at Hood Lagoon were 
unsu i tab le . ( ib id .  p. 1585).
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the Executive Council accusing MacAlpine and Watt of being in a 
syndicate with Drummond and Pinney and effect ively the i r  
instruments in an attempt to evade the Council 's Order. At the 
February meeting of the Council, R M Drummond and C R Pinney were 
asked to answer this  charge together with charges of attempting to 
obtain pr ior i ty  for ' t h e i r '  application over that  of a member of 
vthe public and of f a i lu r e  to render Mol a proper assistance.  The 
Council comprising Murray, Musgrave, Campbell, Staniforth Smith 
and Champion were divided, the f i r s t  three finding Drummond and 
Pinney gui l ty on the f i r s t  count at least .  Drummond was suspended 
short ly to resign and Pinney's salary reduced. Staniforth Smith 
continued to affirm his bel ief  in Drummond's good f a i th  and 
privately believed the whole a f fa i r  part  of a conspiracy by 
Murray's party to damage his own c red ib i l i ty  in the matter of the 
Lieutenant Governorship - damage that  was indeed done since the 
propriety of Smith in twice permitting Drummond to s i t  with him as 
the Land Board to consider applications in which the acting CGS 
had an interes t  was brought into question. Smith wrote
I can see the whole vi le conspiracy now. Drummond was to 
be sacri f iced although innocent in order to d iscredi t  the 
Lands Department of which I am the head. I have been the 
real prey and others merely the stalking h o r se s . . . ( I t  was) 
a careful ly and maliciously organised plot to destroy my 
reputation and good name.(19)
Murray could indeed permit himself to say in a l e t t e r  tabled in 
the Commonwealth Parliament that  Smith 'should have real ized how
19 NLA Deposit 52. Atlee Hunt Papers. Item 469. Staniforth 
Smith to Hunt, 28 April 1908.
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absolutely i t  was opposed to all rules ,  not only of j us t ice  but of 
common sense, that  Drummond should s i t  in consideration of his own 
appl icat ion ' ,  but that  i t  might be urged in Smith's defence ' tha t  
his total  want of experience in departmental procedure and 
administrat ion'  was at f a u l t . (20)
To t ry to ret r ieve the s i tuat ion,  Staniforth Smith offered 
Deakin his resignat ion.  In a l e t t e r ,  also tabled,  the former 
senator admitted his error of judgement finding i t  necessary now 
to defend himself against wild assert ions in the Parliament that  
he had in teres ts  in land himself. His private humiliation seemed 
complete when towards the end of June A S Bloomfield revealed to 
Smith that  Drummond had all the while held 1,000 shares in 
Clarke's Papua Rubber Proprietary and that  this  in te res t  had 
ent i t led him indirect ly to 250 shares in the subsidiary Fairfax 
Harbour Plantat ions that  were taken up in his wife' s  name. The 
Director of Agriculture and Commissioner for Lands was deeply 
shocked. He had ' impl ic i t ly  bel ieved1 Drummond's assurances given 
'time and aga in . . . tha t  he had no interes ts  in any land 
t ransac t ions1.(21) He ordered the surveyor out of his off ice  and 
was la ter  to learn that  both Champion and Campbell had known from 
the beginning of Drummond's involvement in shares in l and . (22) 
Judge Murray could stand back almost benevolently and watch the 
sel f-dest ruct ion of his r ival .
20 CCP, 1907-08. op. c i t .  Letter J H P Murray to Minister for 
External Affairs ,  1 March 1908. p. 1577.
21 NLA Deposit 52. Atlee Hunt Papers. Item 478. Staniforth 
Smith to Hunt, 25 June 1908.
22 ibid.  Item 484 (no date).  Staniforth Smith to Hunt.
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The outcome of the Drummond a f fa i r  was the inclusion of a 
regulation under Section XVI of the Land Ordinance, drafted by 
Atlee Hunt on Deakin's ins t ruct ions,  that  permitted serving 
off icers other than members of the Lands Department to acquire a 
whole or part in teres t  in lands other than for a place of 
residence only in those d i s t r i c t s  in which they were not employed, 
where they did not personally manage the property and where t he i r  
off icial  duties were not compromised. Shares could be held in 
public companies in the Terr i tory provided off icers  took no part 
in the conduct of the enterpr ise and held no control l ing in te res t .  
The regulation did not apply ret rospect ively although all  exist ing 
interes ts  were to be revealed to the Lieutenant Governor. By 1914 
off icers of the Lands Department were once more allowed to acquire 
land subject to an extended waiting period in which applications 
by others would be given pr ior i ty .  In the years ahead off icers  of 
the Papuan service continued to acquire plantat ion and other 
leases subject to these conditions loosely applied where the need 
to t ransfer  off icers from Division to Division sometimes placed 
them near propert ies in which they were interested.
Government Medical Officers in part icular  were at t racted to 
plantat ion enterprise.  Dr Cecil Vaughan who had unsuccessfully 
sought to develop a block on the Musa River in 1899 and Dr Jones's 
shares in the Conflict Islands Association have been mentioned. In 
1906 Dr Colin Coape Simson resigned on taking up 500 acres at 
Hisiu adjoining A S Anthony's property. He continued in private 
practice in Port Moresby for a time before 1914, his plantat ion 
managed by Fred Weekley - an old prospector and a nominated Member 
of the Legislat ive Council. Dr Simson became a major shareholder
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in the Laloki Copper Mine and in 1915 was deputed by a meeting of 
c i t izens in Port to publ ic ise the d issa t is fac t ions  of the white 
community of Papua in Austra l ia .
Living in Austra l ia  a f te r  1918 Simson continued to make an 
annual v i s i t  to Hisiu u n t i l  1941. Other GMO's to take up land were 
Dr Jul ius Street, Chief Medical O f f icer  in 1910, who was a partner 
with Will iam Whitten in the purchase of leases in the Elai Val ley 
at Port Glasgow developed by the Papua Rubber Company of 
Christchurch, New Zealand; Dr Walter Harse, a shareholder in the 
Milne Bay Rubber Company who in 1917 bought Tomanau, the 
plantat ion in the Sagarai val ley of the Papuan Planting and 
Trading Company; Dr F Goldsmith who obtained a lease in 1910 of 
5000 acres on the Vanapa River in partnership with an 'o ld - t im e r ' ,
S F H Thoresby (23); Dr W E Gibl in who developed Nonowai 
Plantation opposite Samarai from 1920; and much la te r ,  Dr 
G H Vernon, GMO at Daru, ' real ised his ambition' by beginning a 
p lanter 's  l i f e  at Oni-Oni at Port Glasgow in 1938.(24)
Of other o f f ice rs  taking up land a f te r  1914, Lionel Percy 
Barton Armit ARM, the son of an o f f i c e r  who served under 
MacGregor, and Alfred Edward Pratt ,  the then CGS, took up 
neighbouring blocks at Sogeri where Armit 's  widowed mother and Mrs 
Pratt planted rubber. Both propert ies were eventual ly sold and 
incorporated Into Koi tak i .
23 Goldsmith and Thoresby's lease was not developed.
24 Papuan Courier, 8 Apr i l  1938. Dr Walter Strong, CMO 1915-37, 
planted an 'experimental garden' on his pr ivate lease at 
Sapphire Creek in the t h i r t i e s .  The Annual Report,
1934-35, p. 7, noted that he was test ing tobacco.
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Capital i s ts
Sir Rupert Clarke and Geoffrey Syme were eminent men in 
Australian public l i f e  whose substant ial  investment might be 
expected to have stimulated i nte res t  in Papua among others of 
thei r  class and wealth. Yet apart from the concentration of 
‘investment that  derived from the Bloomfield and Clarke connection 
and the coming together of Australians and Englishmen with 
antipodean experience to promote the formation of the Bri t ish New 
Guinea Development Company in 1910, capital  entering Papua in the 
boom years from 1907 to 1914 came from diverse and widely 
dispersed sources. Australasian investment proved more typical ly 
to come from small syndicates of middle-class business and 
professional men who, perhaps reassured by the r i sks  taken by 
Clarke and Whiting, and prompted by an exceptionally favourable 
international  investment climate for tropical  agricul ture,  thought 
Papua now a safe place into which to put thei r  money close at 
hand.
The l i s t s  of shareholders in two of A S Bloomfield's promotions
have survived. (25) In Kemp Welch River Rubber Estates Limited
there were seventy seven shareholders in 1921, most of whom had
taken up thei r  shares at the outset .  Of 19,710 £1 shares the
largest  parcel was one of only 1,273 held by Major General E Tivey
of Queen Street ,  Melbourne. Atlee Hunt held 500 shares,  Geoffrey
Syme of the Age, 333, and Bloomfield himself,  401. Most
shareholders held fewer shares. About half were in the hands of
25 CRS A1 25/16087 Loans to Kemp Welch & N. G. Rubber Estates 
Ltd. Papua. 1921-1925. Lists of shareholders,  30 August,
1921.
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Melbourne 'ci ty'  men who might have been clients of Bloomfield, 
the balance being held by smaller investors, widows and retired 
people. Several shareholders were members of the Melbourne Club 
or connected with Collins House, two of the principal gathering 
places of Australian capital ists but they constituted no 
dominating group. Other noteworthy investors in the company were 
iA C English of Rigo with 200 shares, Otto Gors of Hisiu with 150, 
Ernest Glass of the Barnet Glass Rubber Company with 174 shares,
J W McComas of Collins Street and a director from 1914 of Kikori
Plantations Limited with twenty-five shares, and one E Griffin - 
perhaps the wife of H L Griffin - of 'Galley Reach Park', Fish 
Creek, South Gippsland, also with twenty-five shares.
The company that developed the neighbouring plantation on the 
Kemp Welch, New Guinea Rubber Estates, had an issued capital of 
£25,888. It was in this company that Dr Syme held 10,500 shares 
and where he was by far the largest shareholder. His fellow 
investors were similar to and in a few cases the same people who 
had financed Kemp Welch River Rubber and included again, 0 C Gors, 
A C English and E Griff in. (26)
The interests of Sir Rupert Clarke and R S Whiting were in 
enterprises almost wholly their own. In 1922, at a time when he 
had severed his connections with Clarke in rather acrimonious 
circumstances and had no reason to exaggerate, A S Bloomfield 
estimated that Clarke and Whiting's personal investment in their 
Papuan plantations amounted to £220,000.(27) Bloomfield's own
26 ibid.
27 ibid. Arthur Bloomfield to Minister, 29 July 1921.
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investment in Galley Reach and the Kemp Welch plantat ions together 
might have exceeded £20,000. Galley Reach was sold to Clarke and 
Whiting in 1922 in settlement of accounts af ter  the f a i lu r e  with a 
considerable loss of Bloomfield's managing agency, the Moresby 
Trading and Agency Company in 1921.
Of the 'Br i t i sh '  companies, the principal shareholders in BNGD 
were the English di rectors  themselves and the Australian members 
of the Papuan Lands Syhdicate who had promoted the development 
company. In 1923 Staniforth Smith agreed that  the investment of 
the BNGD shareholders amounted to £620,000, no dividend at the 
time having yet been pa id . (28) Others in England interested in 
Papuan plantat ions were l ike those in Austral ia a dispersed group. 
The directors and shareholders of the Pacific and Papua Produce 
Company ( l a t er  Anglo-Papuan Plantat ions Ltd),  successors to 
Mombiri, were probably old friends or associates of Henry Wickham 
and whose only connection with BNGD or Admiral Davis's company was 
thei r  common interes t  in Papua. One di rector  of Pacific and 
Papua Produce at l eas t ,  H M de Courcy Hamilton, was among the 
audience with Lord Ranfurly of BNGD and Sir Pope Cooper of the 
late Papuan Lands Syndicate at a lecture on commercial 
opportunit ies in Papua given by John Greeley Jenkins before the 
Royal Colonial I n s t i tu t e  in 1911. The occasion was chaired by 
J H P Murray himself on leave in London.(29)
Undoubtedly many of the new white 'Papuans' or ' Anglo-Papuans' ,
28 NAPNG, G69 23/5/1. Staniforth Smith to Minister,  14 May
1923.
29 Morning Post (London), 24 January 1911. Jenkins'  paper was 
ent i t led  'Papua and the Papuans' .
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thei r  number reaching 700 in 1909 and over 900 in 1914, shared the 
optimism in the years 1907-14 about the new Terr i tory of Papua, a 
country which in the i r  minds they had appropriated as thei r  own. 
There was a prospect ahead of unlimited expansion, a confidence 
that  they were present at the beginning of great undertakings. The 
infusion of new capital  exceeded £1 million in this  period and 
provided work di rec t ly  and indi rect ly for several hundred white 
employees and suppliers of services,  and for numbers of Papuan 
labourers increasing by 1910 to 5,000 annually.
With the outbreak of the European war in August 1914 the boom 
ended. While plantat ions might change hands thereaf ter ,  the 
planted areas expanded on the exist ing leases,  and there were to 
be short f lu r r i e s  of in te res t  and investment in the years af ter  
1922 in cotton, s i sa l ,  and sugar, there was no substant ial  
expansion again in plantat ion agricul ture until  the late t h i r t i e s  
when the threat  of a second war rekindled Australian in teres t  in 
securing supplies of rubber near at hand. The area under 
cul t ivat ion on land owned or leased by Europeans had risen from 
1,500 acres in 1906 to 44,447 acres in 1914-15.(30) The total  area 
under lease for agricul tural  purposes in the l a t t e r  year was over 
200,000 acres but no plantat ions had completed thei r  development. 
Forfei tures of lands speculatively leased and for which 
development capital  could not be found had amounted to 174,355 
acres since 1910. Of the planted areas, 32,722 acres were given to 
coconuts, 6,203 to rubber and 4,244 to s i s a l . (31)
30 PAR 1914-15. p. 132.
31 ibid.
By 1920 the cultivated areas amounted to 62,162 acres or about 
one hundred square miles in the 95,000 square miles of Papua. The
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number of plantations rose from seventy-six in 1908 with an 
average area of s ix ty-f ive  acres much of i t  jus t  being cleared, to 
259 in 1922 and an average area of 232 acres under cult ivat ion.  
Many of these plantations were very much smaller than the average 
and more than half of them had no resident planter. Rubber would 
be planted on fewer than th i r ty  properties all  to ld ,  and of these, 
only Itikinumu, Koitaki, Lolorua and Kanosia would exceed 1,000 
planted acres. Of the 200 coconut plantations only th i r ty  would 
reach a size where they produced more than 100 tons a year, and of 
these only four would be producing more than 500 tons in 1940.(32)
The total  of the planted areas on the plantations declined to 
61,122 acres in 1931-32 and to 58,241 acres in 1933-34. The 
expansion in rubber planting towards the end of the 1930's was 
masked by the reduction in the areas under other cultures and in 
1940-41 only 63,609 acres were being cult ivated.  Rubber now 
accounted for over 18,000 acres, nearly 8,000 acres of i t  planted 
since 1936, with coconut plantations having declined in area from 
48,000 acres in 1934 to 45,500 acres and the area cult ivated with 
all other crops now less than 800 ac res . (33)
32 For the copra tonnages 1940, NAPNG & CRS G69, Item 25/20. 
Treasurer to Acting Administrator, 21 November 1940; for  
de ta i ls  of the number and size of rubber estates 1940,
CRS A518 Item P812/1/5 Part 4. 'Papuan Commerce. Rubber 
Industry ' .  1938-1940. Return of Rubber Plantations 15 May 
1940. For copra and rubber exports see below, p. 461.
33 PAR 1920-21, p. 89; 1931-32, p. 26; 1933-34, p. 32;
1940-41, p. 26. See Appendices, Tables 1 and 2, pp. 456-459
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Part III Testing the constraints, 1908-1921
Chapter 9 Acting Administrator and Lieutenant Governor
In his f i r s t  Annual Report as Acting Administrator, Judge 
Murray found i t  'gratifying to be able to state that during the 
whole of the year, although land applied for had in most cases to 
be bought from the native owners, there is not a single case in 
which i t  has been alleged that the interests of the natives have 
been in any way disregarded1 23. He noted that 'the efforts of a 
conscientious and hardworking staff have shown that the white 
sett lers may be placed upon the land without the slightest 
suspicion of injustice to the native owners' .(1)
Mindful of the Drummond affair Murray knew that he could 
suspect several officers of 'land fraud' - at least to the extent 
of attempting to evade an Executive Council order.(2) And others 
were not quite sure that present justice had been everywhere dealt 
the Papuans in land purchases - or that an injustice to them might 
in future be thought to have been avoided. In July 1907, Alexander 
Campbell, then RM at Samarai, wrote to Atlee Hunt that great care 
was being taken in the Eastern Division to see that the boundaries 
of acquired land were marked and that villagers were 'quite 
willing to sell i t ,  as anything like a breach of faith with regard 
to lands will be attended with grave danger' . (3) In August he
1 PAR 1906-07. p. 20.
2 Francis West. Selected Letters of Hubert Murray (Melbourne, 
1971). No. 36, to Gilbert Murray, 19 January 1908.
3 NLA, Deposit 52, Atlee Hunt Papers, Item 174. A M Campbell 
to Hunt, 8 July 1907.
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wrote that  'we are not having the least  trouble in acquiring land 
from the nat ives ' ,  and submitted a scheme for compulsory 
acquisi t ion for settlement where land seemed so abundant and 
Papuan claims to tenure dubious. In October Hunt responded that  
since there was no present necessi ty for such a measure there was 
no need ' to arouse the storm that  would undoubtedly burst i f  we 
placed upon the sta tute  book a provision contrary to promises made 
to the na t i ve1. (4) He enquired
One point occurs to me...Do the natives get anything l ike 
a f a i r  return for thei r  land? The prices paid to them 
seem ridiculously small in comparison to the area 
acquired. I suppose they are sa t i s f ied  but a child might 
be sa t i s f ied  i f  you took from i t  a gold watch and gave i t  
a penn'orth of sweets and a yard of blue r ibbon. (5)
In the same month a Samoan mission teacher from the Rev.
Charles Abel 's Kwato mission had begun spreading 'wild reports '  
around Milne Bay that  the dimdims intended taking all  the land 
from the Papuans. Abel proceeded quickly to calm the man Judge 
Murray a l i t t l e  cruel ly l a t er  referred to as a 'mad mullah' and by 
January the ' scare '  in Milne Bay was apparently ove r . (6)
Campbell may have been embarassed by this  quite unexpected 
manifestation of Papuan anxiety in his Division and in the 
following month he drew Hunt's at tent ion to ' t rouble at Port
4 ibid.  52/185, Hunt to Campbell, 1 October 1907.
5 ibid.
6 ibid. 52/265. Murray to Hunt, 4 November 1907.
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Moresby in land matters,  and candidly speaking I do not at all 
l ike the manner in which land has been acquired from natives in 
the Central Division. In one instance an off icer  purchased some 
21,000 ac r e s . . . i n  the space of two h o u r s ' . (7) In 1907 vi l lagers  at 
Saroa near Rigo regret ted that  in sel l ing land along the Kemp 
Welch River they had sold gardens s t i l l  in use. This might suggest 
that  they had been pressured into the sale and cer tainly indicates 
that  the purchase was too hast i ly concluded. The Executive Council 
granted them a year ' s  access but the purchase was not rescinded.
A M Campbell was appointed Government Secretary to succeed 
Anthony Musgrave in July 1908. The posit ion at the time entai led 
responsibi 1i ty  through the Resident Magistrates not only for 
judicial  and administrat ive services in the nine divis ions,  but 
also for 'Native Affairs '  - the supervision of the indentured 
labour system. In the rather  tense atmosphere in Port Moresby 
where the remaining Bartonites and those who were prepared to work 
with Judge Murray could hardly be f r iends,  Campbell generally 
sided with the new regime, keeping Atlee Hunt informed about 
developments. He now ' inst ructed the Land Buyers to interview the 
late owners of all land bought in the Central Division during the 
past two or three years and ascertain whether they are sa t i s f ied  
with the payment they received' . (8)  If  Papuan se l le r s  had been 
paid too l i t t l e  he undertook to authorise a fur ther  payment. He 
noted that  thi r ty-nine square miles of Woodlark had been declared 
waste and vacant, and ' a l l  I can say is that  the population must 
have died out very rapidly since I was t he r e ' .  Two years l a t er  he
7 ibid.  52/190. Campbell to Hunt, 18 February 1908. The 
off icer  involved appears to have been Henry Griff in.
8 ibid.  52/221. Campbell to Hunt, 12 October 1908.
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reported that  he had made additional payments in all cases where 
he was sa t i s f ied  the Papuans had been underpaid. !9) Scrupulous, 
sel f-r ighteous and pedantic, Campbell could confidently assert  
that  'I have never yet to my knowledge broken my word with a 
na t ive1. (10) There is no reason to disbelieve him. But outside the 
Central Division and despite the Government Secretary' s  commitment 
i to fai rness in land dealings,  some cases of in jus t ice  - or at 
least  serious misunderstanding - might yet have escaped his eye.
C B Higginson RM, on patrol in the Eastern Division in 1911, could 
s t i l l  report  that  labourers employed by George Auerback, 
contractor on Hagita es ta te  at Milne Bay, were threatened by local 
vi l lagers  who claimed they had never been paid for some of the 
land being cleared.  They said that  they had refused an ear l i e r  
offer of payment on inst ruct ion from a Kwato mission 'boy1. (11)
As long as his posit ion was unconfirmed Murray remained very 
vulnerable in his dealings with both Melbourne and the new 
investors entering the country. He was expected to do everything 
necessary to ensure easy access to land and labour for the 
planters.  To have begun to scruple publicly over the detai l  of 
land transactions at this  point would have fueled opposition from 
the groups who were l ikely at the time to extend him thei r  
support, and to have allowed the Bartonites an unexpected 
advantage. But in 1908 as Acting Administrator,  he seemed s t i l l  to 
share the s e t t l e r  assumptions about the future and there is ample 
evidence that  he as yet saw no essent ial  confl ict  between thei r
9 ibid. 52/242. Campbell to Hunt, 11 February 1910.
10 ibid.  52/236. Campbell to Hunt, 28 February 1909.
11 NAPNG & CRS G91. Patrol Reports Eastern Division, Report 
of 1 October 1911.
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in teres t s  and those of the Papuans. In March 1908, Fred Weekley 
and William L i t t le ,  the ' unof f i c i a l '  members of the Legislat ive 
Council representing the planting and mining in te res t s ,  signed a 
pet i t ion supporting his candidature for the Lieutenant 
Governorship.
I t  was also imperative for Murray to gain the confidence of the 
' hardworking' s t a f f ,  some of whom could be expected to feel that  
Captain Barton had been badly t reated,  by demonstrating his 
confidence in them. Among off icers  remaining in the depleted 
service who gained promotion was Herbert Champion, 'a most 
cautious and almost pessimistic person'  who in 1914 succeeded 
Campbell as Government Secretary.  He responded to Murray's t rus t  
with many years of exceptional industry in maintaining order in 
the administration.  (12) Another was Bertram Bramell, a Bartonite 
who Murray chose to consult on 'nat ive '  matters when his own 
understanding was s t i l l  rudimentary. Bramell was soon won over 
and in 1910 appointed Commissioner for Native Affairs and Control, 
a posit ion newly separated from that  of the Government Secretary, 
and given the responsibi 1i ty  of policing the indentured labour 
system. Unpopular with planters,  off icers  of the Native Affairs 
Department consist ing of the Commissioner and two or three 
Inspectors were ent i t l ed  to enter all places of employment of 
Papuans and to prosecute employers in breach of the Labour 
Ordinance.
With his appointment as Lieutenant Governor, Judge Murray's
12 Francis West. op. c i t .  Letter No. 57, 30 December 1913,
Murray to Hunt.
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views of the government's respons ibi l i t i e s  towards the Papuans 
began to a l t er .  He was no longer sure that  they were being too 
well t reated under white rule.  While land resources were 
suf f ic ient  for any foreseeable requirements of European settlement 
the Papuan population was small and i t s  capacity to provide an 
adequate supply of labour appeared to place a l imit  on 
i development. There was s t i l l  the poss ib i l i ty  that  Papuan numbers 
were declining as a resul t  of European intrusion.  Not only were 
epidemic diseases more severe in the i r  effect  on peoples until  
recently isolated but the increased leisure time made available 
with the introduction of metal tools and the suppression of 
warfare was supposed to create an indolence and despair that  would 
lead to a decline in the bir th rate .  The problem - perceived much 
in these terms ear l i e r  by both Atlee Hunt and Staniforth Smith in 
1905-06 in thei r  reports to the Commonwealth Parliament - was to 
find meaningful work for the Papuans to do. Since i t  seemed 
unlikely that  they would begin to produce commodities for export 
on thei r  own behalf for many years,  labour, educative and 
res torat ive ,  on European owned plantat ions and in mining seemed 
the only remedy to hand, for,  as Murray repeated, ' i f  the natives 
won't work i t  appears to me that  they are doomed; idleness does 
not do them any more good than i t  does to white men' . (13)
To overcome Papuan indolence and to prevent i t s  supposed 
consequences, as Acting Administrator Murray had been will ing to 
go so far  as to press Papuans into service for the government 
through a forced labour scheme proposed by Alexander Campbell.
13 ibid.  Let ter  No. 38, 14 November 1908, to Gilbert  Murray.
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In September 1907, Campbell sent a d ra f t  of a proposal to 
' tax '  the Papuans to Atlee Hunt. Conceived not as a revenue 
measure but as a device to pressure into 'habits of 
ind us t ry . . . those indolent and l icent ious young natives who now 
spend most of th e i r  time hanging about the v i l lages,  l i v in g  upon 
the i r  more energetic fel lows and in te r fe r ing  with the wives and
I
daughters of those who may be absent from th e i r  homes'(14), i t  
provided that men between the ages of sixteen and t h i r t y  undertake 
compulsory unpaid labour and carry fo r  the government fo r  a month 
a year. I t  was a tax in the form of labour since a tax in cash 
might not necessarily compel the lazy to work and the wages of 
those already under indenture might be stretched to cover the 
obl igations of those who were not. Indentured labourers under the 
proposed scheme were to be exempt from i t s  requirements since they 
already contributed substan t ia l ly  to the revenue through the i r  
purchase of goods upon which duty had been paid. A rebate of the 
compulsory service might also be given labourers whose indenture 
had ended and to growers of cash crops.
Atlee Hunt had himself recommended in 1905 the imposition of a 
tax on the wages of a compulsory levy of workers to be drawn from 
each v i l lage  for labour on plantat ions.  Campbell's scheme he now 
thought 'quite  the best' he had seen and ' perfect ly. 
pract icab le ' . (15) He responded p r iva te ly  that i t  would receive 
his support i f  i t  was brought forward o f f i c i a l l y .
14 NLA, Atlee Hunt Papers, 52/183. A M Campbell to Hunt, 
September 1907.
15 ib id .
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On 29th May 1908 the Legislat ive Council passed, subject to the 
assent of the Commonwealth Government, an ordinance embodying 
Campbell's proposals ' to  encourage the natives of Papua in habits 
of indust ry ' .  The Encouragement of Industry Ordinance had the 
support of Judge Murray, who drafted i t ,  and of the Treasurer,  
Herbert Champion, and of the three 'unof f ic ia l '  (nominated) 
members of the Council, Fred Weekley, William Whitten and Bill 
L i t t l e .  I t  was opposed by Staniforth Smith and the r e t i r ing  
Government Secretary, Anthony Musgrave. Smith was indignant that  
he had not been consulted in the draft ing of the bi l l  which 
touched substant ia l ly,  he thought, on agricultural  development, 
nor had he seen a copy of the draf t  before Whitten had - the 
integr i ty of his stand perhaps a l i t t l e  compromised by an 
opposition to Murray's handling of the administration that  had 
become predictable.  Musgrave, Smith reported to Hunt, regarded 
the ordinance as 'an abandonment of all  the principles that  have 
made the Empire g r e a t ' . (16)
Though Atlee Hunt had indicated his sympathy with Campbell's 
scheme, he was caught at a disadvantage when attacks on the 
provisions of the l egi s la t ion passed in Port Moresby began 
appearing in the Australian papers even before a copy of the 
ordinance had been received by his department. Obviously primed 
by persons in Papua opposed to the scheme ei ther  out of pr inciple,  
or, as is more l ikely with a few, out of a desire to discredi t  
Murray, the Sydney Daily Telegraph edi tor ia l  of 17th June labelled 
the ordinance a ' s lavery'  b i l l .  The measure was disal lowed.(17)
16 ibid.  52/473. Staniforth Smith to Hunt,
31 May 1908.
17 Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 17 June 1908. In the Atlee Hunt
Employers wanted a guarantee of a continuous stream of labour 
and to secure for themselves the benefi t  of the ‘education.1 they 
were providing the Papuan through the offer  of employment. For 
some the indenture of women alongside t he i r  husbands seemed to 
offer greater securi ty of supply.
In August 1908, Wallace Westland, general manager for Clarke
and Whiting's Papua Rubber Plantat ions Proprietary at Kanosia,
wrote to his di rectors  drawing t he i r  a t tent ion to a prospective
shortage of labour that  made i t  d i f f i c u l t  for him to j u s t i f y
'asking you to spend more money in fresh extensions for next
y e a r ' . (18) Coming to Papua with an experience of planting in
Ceylon, Westland was alarmed at the comparative cost of Papuan
labour and recruitment.  He thought the short term of indenture
unsat isfactory because the t raining of a labour force was 'a
gradual and expensive process'  but that  this  d i f f i cu l t y  could be
overcome i f  women and children could be engaged. In the meantime
he could 'not accept the responsibi 1ty of asking you to increase
your stake in the country'  and submitted his r es i gna t ion . (19) A
month l a ter  in a private l e t t e r  to R S Whiting he noted that  with
the opening of the Astrolabe copper mines the competition for
available labour would increase.  If  the ' v i l l age '  system could be
established on the estates  then plantat ions would survive as the
'Native will always prefer agricul ture to mining and will sooner
Papers, 52/208, is a l e t t e r  Hunt wrote to Campbell on 7 
August recording opposition in the Bri t ish and continental 
press.
18 NLA Deposit 52, Atlee Hunt Papers, Item 277. Westland to 
the directors of Papua Rubber Plantat ions (Clarke and 
Whiting), 15 August 1908.
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go where he can have his women fo lks  around him than to the 
barracks of a Mine but we must have complete Vi l lages and we must 
keep down the rates of p a y ' . (20)
In May Westland had submitted a scheme to the Government 
Secretary fo r  the settlement of married Papuans on the Clarke and 
Whiting estates, the ' re s u l t  of much earnest thought and some 
practical  experience'. (21) He set out the social benefi ts he 
thought would accrue - the tendency labourers would have to enter 
successive terms of indenture with th e i r  fami l ies about them - and 
he l is ted  the addit ional measures that would need to be taken, at 
some considerable expense to the planters, to accomodate women and 
chi ldren. He did not mention the economic advantage that planters 
would sooner or la te r  acquire as a resu l t  of having a dependent 
labour force l i v in g  permanently on the estates, an advantage he 
well knew had greatly  benefi t ted 'Eastern' producers. Judge Murray 
forwarded the proposals on to the Min ister of External A f fa i rs  
'e n t i re ly  in favour of the proposal which, in my opinion, w i l l  
remove any d i f f i c u l t i e s  that may be f e l t  in connexion with the 
present system'. (22) Twenty three residents including 
missionaries, planters, merchants and o f f i c i a l s ,  were asked fo r  
the i r  opinions about the indenture of married women under the 
scheme in a ' p l e b i s c i t e ' .(23) A majori ty , th i r teen ,  including 
three missionaries were in favour. Those against included the
20 ib id .  Itfem 276. Westland to R S Whiting, 15 September 1908.
21 CRS A518 S800/1/5 'Indenture of Native Women' 1907-1925. 
Westland to Campbell, 12 May 1908.
22 ib id .  Murray to Minister,  1 June 1908.
23 ib id .  Schedule of repl ies to the Government Secretary's 
Circu lar No. 08/1625.
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planters A C English and Guy Manning, and six missionaries. A 
tenth missionary, C F Rich, was prepared to support the scheme i f  
labourers were obtained from the d i s t r i c t  in which the plantat ion 
was situated. As with his support of the Encouragement of Industry 
Ordinance considered by the Legis la t ive Council in May, Murray's 
ready endorsement of Westland's proposals gave no h in t  of the 
transformation in his att i tudes to come.
Private ly  the Acting Administrator confessed that the 
accusations of ' j u d ic ia l  cor rup t ion ' ,  pre ferent ia l  treatment of 
f r iends,  and o f f i c i a l  dishonesty being level led at him at the time 
by those opposed to the confirmation of his appointment seemed 'so 
strange that I sometimes doubt my own i d e n t i t y ' . (24) And i f  his 
enemies had misjudged th e i r  man, Murray was s t i l l  coming to terms 
with both his new ro le and the l imi ted outlook of those on whose 
support he had been re ly ing .  In la te r  years in le t te rs  to his 
brother Murray would r id ic u le  Atlee Hunt as 'a safe man fo r  the 
c a p i t a l i s t s '(25),  but in 1908 i t  was Atlee Hunt and not Hubert 
Murray who hesitated to r isk  publ ic opposition to schemes Murray's 
enemies at the time could readi ly  attack as damaging to the 
interests of the Papuans. By 1913 when the question of the 
indenture of women was again raised and considered by the 
Legis lat ive Council, Murray, now f i rm in o f f ic e  and. opinion, was 
en t i re ly  opposed to the idea.
The unpredictabi1i t y  of supply and the burden of continuously
24 Francis West. op. c i t .  Letter No. 37, 2 October 1908, to 
Gi lbert  Murray.
25 ib id. No. 76, 27 May 1921, to Lady Mary Murray.
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inducting into the routines of plantat ion l i f e  batches of 'raw 
re c ru i ts '  from the bush, most of them in 1908 on one year 
contracts, when few of th e i r  white overseers themselves knew how 
to proceed, placed a very great pressure on managers developing 
company owned estates, pressure that could only lead them to 
consider and propose a l te rna t ive  schemes that might better sa t is fy  
th e i r  need fo r  labour.
In July 1910 three planters managing fo r  planting companies, 
Guy Manning of Laka River Rubber Estates, Wallace Westland of 
Clarke and Whit ing's Papua Rubber Plantat ions Proprietary, and 
Raymond Dubois of Papua Plantat ions Limited, complained that they 
were f ind ing d i f f i c u l t y  in gett ing labour . (26) One of the 
companies had had a schooner looking fo r  recru i ts  along the south 
coast between Kapakapa and Samarai fo r  six weeks and had obtained 
seven men, f ive  of whom replaced members of the crew leaving only 
two fo r  plantat ion service. Staniforth Smith, Administrator in 
Judge Murray's absence was challenged to support the claims 
published a year before in the second ed i t ion of his Handbook, 
that there was 'apparently no d i f f i c u l t y . . .experienced in 
obtaining a l l  labour required '. (27)  A second l e t t e r  bearing the 
signatures of the missionary Charles Abel and the BNGD general 
manager, Charles Darl ing together with those of eight prominent 
plantat ion managers and d irectors including Westland and Dubois, 
requested the sett ing up of a Commission to inquire in to  labour 
resources.
Staniforth Smith forwarded the le t te rs  on to the Minister in
26 CPP, 1910, Vol 3, pp. 151-154. Papua: Native Labour Supply.
27 ib id .  p. 3 (p. 153).
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Melbourne where they were tabled in Parliament together with an 
explanatory l e t t e r  of his own. He was able to point out that of 
the 140 plantat ions of a l l  sizes in the Te r r i to ry ,  sixty-one of 
them in the Central Div is ion, the managers of only f i v e  had 
complained of a labour shortage.(28) He at t r ibuted the current 
d i f f i c u l t y  to the many deaths from dysentery on the Lakekamu 
go ld f ie ld  that lay in the west of the Central Division. Men from 
d i s t r i c t s  east of Port Moresby did not currently  want to work to 
the west. There appeared no dearth of labour in the western and 
eastern d iv is ions.  In November Stan iforth Smith forwarded a 
lengthy despatch, also tabled in Parliament, in which he set out, 
with a cha rac te r is t ic  show of industry and care, project ions of 
labour requirements and supply fo r  the fo l lowing twenty years.(29) 
His f igures,  including the l im i t  of the recommended supply to 10% 
of the population at any one time, were to be those used by 
Murray whenever the question came up in subsequent years. No 
Commission was appointed.
Meanwhile Judge Murray was in London and in September he was 
entertained to dinner by the directors of the new BNGD Company.
The company's secretary, Samuel Thompson, in a l e t t e r  to the 
general manager noted that 'He (Murray) does not appear to think 
well of labour prospects in Papua'.(30) Thompson cautioned Darl ing 
not to arrange fu r th e r  contracts fo r  the laying down of
28 CPP, 1910, Vol 3, pp. 155-159. Papua: Despatch from Admin­
is t ra to r  of Papua re la t ing  to Native Labour.
29 ib id .  pp. 4-5 (pp. 158-159).
30 ANUABL Deposit 95/1, B r i t ish  New Guinea Development 
Company Limited Letterbooks, Vol 1. S L Thompson
to Lewis Cowley, September, 1910. Cited below as BNGD 
Letterbooks.
173
plantat ions unti l  i t  was known i f  labour would be avai lable in 
suff icient  numbers to proceed. He asked to be kept fu l ly  informed 
about f luctuat ions in the supply. The Lieutenant Governor was 
quoted in the London Morning Post in January 1911 as of the 
opinion ' that  some gentle compulsion to labour is necessary for 
the Papuan' . (31) Beatrice Grimshaw, writ ing in 'a Colonial 
.newspaper' in 1910 wrote that  ' i t  was extremely improbable'  that  
there would be suf f ic ient  labour in future secured on the exist ing 
voluntary basis.  The choice was 'compulsory labour'  or ' foreign 
labour'  and she suggested that  taxation be used to induce Papuans 
to enter employment.(32)
Planters on the 1 arger company owned es ta tes ,  relying on 
licensed recrui ters  to secure labour of unpredictable qual i ty in 
dis tant  d i s t r i c t s ,  remained unreconciled to the s i tuat ion.  I t  was 
not that  they thought that  there was not suf f ic ient  potential  
labour available - i t  seemed to them that  they were surrounded by 
a large population of Papuans who, for the most part ,  appeared not 
to work at all - but that  the voluntary principle was too insecure 
a basis upon which to procede with plantat ion development. In 
1912, again finding labour hard to get for his sisal  plantat ion on 
the Laloki, Raymond Dubois proposed that  the government undertake 
the di rect  responsibi 1i ty  of providing a steady supply of labour 
for private employers by employing government off icers  as 
recrui ters  jus t  as i t  did in supplying i t s  own needs. (33)
31 ANUABL Deposit 95/3, BNGD, Volume of newspaper cutt ings.  
Morning Post (London), 28 January 1911.
32 ibid. Which newspaper is unknown.
33 CRS A1 Item 13/71. 'Recruiting of native labour, Papua'. 
1912-1913. Dubois to Murray, 15 May 1912. Murray' comments 
and O'Malley's response to the Government Secretary' s  
Circular No. 56/1912 are on this  f i l e .
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J T O'Malley, RM in the Central Division, found that  other 
plantat ions in the Division had suf f ic ient  labour and suggested 
that  because coastal Papuans would not work inland, planters l ike 
Dubois with estates  si tuated away from the coast should t ry to 
obtain the i r  workers from up-country. Murray had no wish to 
compromise the government and i t s  off icers  by having them recrui t  
on behalf of the companies and Dubois' proposal was gently 
rejected.
As to the introduction of ' foreign labour ' ,  J K Samuel, the 
secretary in Adelaide of Dubois' company, had writ ten to the 
Minister in February 1911 asking i f  Papua Plantat ions Limited 
could bring in 'one or two' Javanese to teach Papuans how to work 
decort icat ing machinery.(34) On a similar applicat ion by Dubois 
himself, Staniforth Smith, acting for Murray in June, allowed the 
request under a clause in the Papuan Immigration Restr ict ion Act 
that  permitted the admission of a few ski l led al iens.  Similar 
applications were submitted on behalf of the Clark and Whiting 
companies by A S Bloomfield in September and October.(35) Probably 
prompted by one of these in teres ts  a wri ter  in the Sydney Daily 
Telegraph raised the question 'Do we propose to l e t  Papua be 
undeveloped for an indef ini te  period, or to accept the al ternat ive  
which is the importation of coloured l abour? ' (36) But if  1 arger 
companies were interested in exploring the po s s ib i l i t i e s ,  the
34 CRS A1 12/19567. 'Papua Admission of Javanese Labourers'  
1911-12. J K Samuel to Atlee Hunt, 9 February 1911;
Staniforth Smith to Minister,  5 June 1911; Bloomfield to 
Murray, 31 October 1911.
35 ibid. Bloomfield to Murray, 31 October 1911.
36 Noted in Papuan Times, 22 November 1911.
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white community were c lear ly not united on what was, for any 
Austral ian,  a momentous issue,  and one of several pet i t ions  
submitted in September to the v i s i t ing  Minister,  E L Batchelor, 
contained the names of ninety-three residents of the Eastern 
Division who were opposed to the admission of 'Asiat ic 
1abourers1. (37) In January 1912 before any Javanese had actually 
been admitted, Murray reported that  his Executive Council had 
recommended that  up to 10% of the labourers on rubber estates and 
6% on sisal  estates could be brought in from Java. They were in 
every case to be accompanied by thei r  wives, be subject to s t r i c t  
medical checks, and be allowed to stay for a period no longer than 
three years.  These conditions could only have been seen as placing 
a prohibit ively high cost on such a scheme - as Murray may well 
have intended - though the numbers he seemed prepared to admit 
greatly exceeded those being requested. (38)
In July at a public meeting of planters from around Port 
Moresby resolut ions were passed urging the government to encourage 
longer terms of indenture and to admit Javanese 1in s t ruc to r s1 for 
the rubber i ndus t ry . (39) Perhaps Murray knew that  no Australian 
ministry would ever allow as much as 10% of a labour force to be 
imported - he could now be po l i t i ca l l y  devious - and in September 
he wrote to the planters to say that  the Minister had refused to 
sanction the admission of Javanese while approving the
37 CRS A1 11/16363. 'Pet i t ions of residents of the eastern
division of Papua.. .1911' .  11 September 1911.
38 CRS A1 12/19567. op. c i t .  Murray to Minister,  13 January 
1912.
39 Papuan Courier, 31 July 1912, gave a detai led account.
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encouragement of three year contracts fo r  Papuans.(40) A year 
la te r  he to ld Lewis Cowley that he might consider the admission of 
a few 'Manil la men' but no planter pursued the m a t te r . (41) The 
question of whether 'coo l ies '  might be allowed in to  Papua was 
raised again in other years but would never be ser iously 
considered.
By 1912, in spite of a widespread epidemic of dysentery in that 
year, Judge Murray could bel ieve that there was no considerable 
population decl ine. In December he wrote to the new Minister, 
Patrick McMahon Glynn, giving a general ou t l ine of the pol icy he 
thought the Commonwealth had endorsed, one 'combining the 
development of the resources of the Te r r i to ry  with the gradual 
elevation of the natives to such a standard of c i v i l i s a t i o n  as 
they may prove themselves capable of a t ta in in g 1.(42) In the 
elevation of the Papuans, the pac i f ica t ion  of the remainder of the 
Te r r i to ry  s t i l l  remained the most important object ive of the 
government. Subsequent employment would teach them ' ind us t r ia l  
habits '  and eventual ly they might be taxed in the i r  own in te res t .  
As for  'Development', th is  should be l e f t  to 'the s k i l l  and
40 NAPNG & CRS G128 Item 2. Murray to Cowley et a l . 21 Sept­
ember, 1912. Much e a r l ie r  in June 1907, Murray had wr i t ten 
to the Minister that the admission of Japanese and other 
imported labour 'would cause the ruin of the Papuan 
na t ive ' .  (CRS Al 25/18522. 'Deportation of undesirables'.  
1907-1925.) I t  is l i k e l y  that th is  was his real opinion and 
that in 1912 he was being forced to appear an 'honest 
broker' between the planters and the Commonwealth. Hunt had 
p r iva te ly  assured Stan iforth Smith, acting fo r  Murray in 
1910, that whi le 'o f  course, we recognize here that you are 
up against a very big problem.. .There w i l l  be no assent by 
our Parliament to the introduction of coloured labour1.
Atlee Hunt Papers, 52/528, 12 August 1910.
41 ib id .  Murray to Cowley, 4 August 1913.
42 CRS Al 14/5413, 'Papua. Taxation and Education of 
natives' 1913-14. Murray to Min iste r,  9 December 1912.
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judgement of the se t t le rs  themselves'. (43) Apart from being 
provided with government services and s u f f ic ie n t  labour, they 
required, he advised, no other ' d i r e c t '  assistance.
In his f i r s t  book, Papua or B r i t i s h  New Guinea, published in 
that year, he again affirmed the value fo r  the Papuans of an 
'< experience of working fo r  Europeans. Indeed by accepting
employment v i l lage rs  were already making a contr ibution to the 
development of the country. Murray wrote
Papua must be developed: can i t  be developed without 
evi l  resu lts to the Papuan? Personally I think i t  can, 
not only without ev i l  resul ts  but with the best possible 
. . .  An o f f i c i a l  who expresses these opinions, who thinks 
that (altogether apart from the in te rests  of the se t t le rs )  
i t  is to the advantage of the Papuan to learn to work, 
and that the best avai lable schools are the plantat ion 
and the mining f i e l d  runs the r isk  of being looked upon 
as a hypocri te who seeks to curry favour with the 
employer while posing as a fr iend of the n a t iv e . (44)
But he added that i t  was
no part of our pol icy to convert them (the Papuans) from 
what they are now, peasant producers, in to  a landless 
p r o le t a r i a t . (45)
43 ib id .
44 J H P Murray. Papua or B r i t ish  New Guinea (London, 1912).
p. 361. *
45 ib id. p. 350.
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The emphasis of pol icy had shi f ted since 1908. Having already 
provided the minimum conditions necessary fo r  Europeans to 
undertake the work of development - s u f f ic ie n t  land and s u f f ic ie n t  
labour, the duty of the government now lay in contro l ,  in po l ic ing 
the l im i ts  of reasonable change in order that Papuan society could 
transform i t s e l f .  The impl icat ion,  not yet spelt  out, was that i f  
work fo r  the white man was a school where Papuans could obtain a 
present income, and acquire the s k i l l s  and habits of t h r i f t  and 
industry, the education they received might at a fu ture time lead 
to th e i r  d i rec t  pa r t ic ipa t ion  in the production of exports on 
the i r  own account. I f  Papuan v i l lage  society was not to be 
overwhelmed then the maximum number of labourers that could be 
engaged under contracts of service in any one period was that 
estimated by Stan iforth Smith in 1910 - 10% of the population 
calculated as two out of f i v e  of the 25% of the population 
regarded as 'able-bodied' males, or 25,000.(46) In the end the 
needs of employers were never to provide a demand fo r  even as many 
as 25,000 workers before 1942.
In other respects also, Murray had changed his mind. In 1906 as 
the 'Austra l ian ' champion of development he had attracted the 
suspicion of the missionaries and the admiration of the miners - 
and in accord with his stance in favour of Austral ian democracy he 
had suggested to the Royal Commissioners that the time had arrived 
for  the system of nominating representatives of the white 
community to the Legis lat ive Council to be replaced by elected 
representation. But the experience of o f f ic e  suggested caution.
46 CPP, 1910. Despatch from Administrator of Papua re la t ing  
to native Labour in the Te r r i to ry ,  p. 159.
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How could the in te res t s  of the Papuans be protected once the 
movement towards elected representat ion by a f ierce ly  part isan 
white community was begun? His f a i lu r e  in the following years to 
proceed with the enfranchisement of the s e t t l e r s  together with his 
change of mind about so much else he had averred before the Royal 
Commission, while i t  perplexed some, could only have confirmed the 
opinion of others l ike William Bruce, that  Murray had been an 
ambitious l i a r .
In 1908 Murray had seen Exeter Hall as an enemy, the influence 
of the missionaries in Austral ia as 1 appal 1ing1.(47) Yet here too 
he was to reverse is opinions. By 1912 the members of the London 
Missionary Society, the Methodist Mission and the New Guinea 
Anglican Mission, apprehensive in 1908 about a Catholic Governor 
and seeing themselves as the only party di s in teres tedly concerned 
about Papuan welfare, had come to see Murray in a d i f ferent  l ight .  
His adherence to legal principle and resistance to s e t t l e r  
pressures at t racted t he i r  support. Here, a f t er  a l l ,  was an 
administrator to be t rusted to consider the Papuan i n te r es t ,  his 
pol icies corresponding closely with t he i r  own benevolent and 
authori tar i  an outlook. In the years ahead Murray had good reason 
to value thei r  fr iendship.
For even as his book was being praised by reviewers Murray was 
privately doubtful that  s e t t l e r s  were e i ther  wil l ing or able to 
deal j us t ly  with the Papuans. The in teres ts  of ' c a p i t a l i s t s '  and 
'nat ives '  were not, as he had said again and again, conveniently 
concurrent, but were in fact  - without a very strong control being
47 Francis West. op. c i t .  Let ters Nos. 35, 16 December 1907,
36, 29 January 1908; and 38, 14 November 1908.
exercised by government - in profound opposition. In January 1913 
he wrote to his brother, G i lber t  Murray, Regius professor of Greek 
at Oxford, that he was 'coming to the conclusion that any white 
community l e f t  with absolute power over 'nat ives ' would resort  to 
slavery with in three generations - I can feel the tendency 
m y s e l f ' . (48) In November he could 'see danger ahead with regard to 
,the natives of the T e r r i to ry '  where ' the general sense of honour 
among the community is very l o w ' . (49) And time was to in tens i fy  a 
convict ion growing in his mind that the experience of employment 
by Europeans was of i t s e l f  of l im i ted benefi t  to the Papuans. By 
1925 in his second book, Papua of Today, Murray would wr i te  of the 
plantat ion worker that
He has learned to chop, scrub and pick weeds but i t  is 
quite possible that he may have learned l i t t l e  e lse . . .
And i f  we are going to keep him t i l l  the end of time 
as an unski l led labourer working fo r  the white man at
a wage of two and six a week...he w i l l  (not) have much 
to thank us f o r . (50)
I f  fo r  the se t t le rs  the logic of th e i r  posit ion in the years 
ahead would d ic ta te  with an almost Marxian degree of 
p re d ic ta b i l i t y  th e i r  stance in re la t ion  to the government's dual 
pol icy - that i t  was weighted against them and in favour of the 
undeserving Papuans - so also did the log ic  of his posit ion form 
Murray's views. He alone bore the task of balancing the
48 ib id .  Letter No. 52. Murray to Gi lbert  Murray, 19 January 
1913.
49 ib id .  Letter  No. 56. 3 November 1913.
50 J H P Murray. Papua of Today (London, 1925). p. 271.
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co n f l ic t in g  demands of development and protect ion. He alone could 
see the whole predicament that he faced, both moral and prac t ica l ,  
increasingly accused of the same indif ference to settlement that 
had brought Captain Barton, with Murray's help, in to  disgrace.
Perhaps also, Hubert Murray, in a deep sense, was discovering 
his t ruer se l f .  Though Austral ian born, he belonged to a class and 
generation of Austral ians, usual ly with a landed background, that 
moved f re e ly  between colonial society and that of the Home 
Counties. His l a t t e r  education had been in England and might have 
been that of many a la te  Victorian Anglo-Irishman of moderately 
pr iv i leged background. Like the Anglo-I r ish he could distance 
himself from the English, his Australianness and his residual 
Irishness showing in the extent he was always to eschew empty 
ceremony and the 'dressing up' that some thought an essential 
accompaniment to the ro le  of colonial governor.(51) But at Oxford 
in the heyday of late l ibera l ism he could not have remained 
uninfluenced by the ideals of honour, duty, and publ ic service 
held by a ru l ing  class s t i l l  confident that B r i ta in  was the 
'Tutelary Angel of the Human Race'.(52)
I t  was a preparation that had la id in store fo r  the opportunity 
and re spons ib i l i t ies  he now faced, a grounding in a.code of ethics
51 J F Horn a d i rec tor  of Robinson River Plantat ion v is i t i n g  
Papua in 1932 thought that Murray 'should ginger things 
up, s ta r t ing  with himself. Sentries on G. H., Guard etc. 
R.M's to wear some sort of uniform e tc ' .  In J F Horn. 
(Diary of) 'T r ip  from Sydney to Robinson River to inspect 
property ' ,  in the possession of Commander J F Horn, Sydney 
1975.
52 In Peter Sparta l is . The Diplomatic Battles of B i l l y  
Hughes (Sydney,1983). p. 77. Lord Esher to S ir  Maurice 
Hankey, 29 August 1918.
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and behaviour profoundly in opposition to the 'pet i t -bourgeois '  
values (he would have called them ' c a p i t a l i s t '  a t t i tudes)  of the 
middle class s e t t l e r s  who came to Papua with the boom. His own 
assumption of superiori ty was e f for t l es s  and much of the time 
quite unconscious. His a t t i tude  to the Papuans had much about i t  
of noblesse oblige, the duty and consideration a gentleman owed to 
less fortunate classes and races.  His apparent empathy with the 
rough white miners in Papua too might at bottom have been no more 
than t his .  Spartan in his personal l i f e  he cer tainly was, but in 
manners and outlook he had much more in common than he could admit 
with his contemporaries among the Oxford and Cambridge educated 
civi l  servants who went out to administer India and the Bri t ish 
Crown Colonies than he had with any of his Australian compatriots.
As an Australian in England and South Africa Hubert Murray had 
thought himself alienated by the condescension shown towards 
colonials by insensi t ive Englishmen even as he clear ly shared the 
education, ethical  outlook and accent of other Englishmen. His 
Irishness and his Catholicism might indeed be construed as the 
provisional loyal t ies ,  even eccen t r ic i t i e s ,  of an isolated man, 
his Labor Party sympathies an attachment of a patr ician to the 
only Australian party that  by reason of i t s  white working class 
exclusivism was opposed to ' exploi ta t ion '  of coloured people. And 
in the end he did not t r u s t  the white democracy that  he had 
espoused so convincingly in 1906. Beatrice Grimshaw, shallow as 
her judgements mostly were, had been r ight  in her appraisal of 
Murray to Deakin. He could, she said, have f i t t e d  easi ly as an 
administrator into the larger world of the Crown Colonies or an
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Indian Presidency.(53) In several periods Murray himself would 
privately hope for an imperial appointment - though in such a post 
and constrained by the career considerations and frequent 
transfers of the larger service i t  is possible that his merits 
might have seemed but average. He came indeed to measure his 
administration in the light of the imperial standard and towards 
the end of his l ife in his 1937-38 Annual Report, the one-time 
sympathiser with Britain's enemies in Ireland and South Africa 
could write, without a trace of irony, that 'after al l ,  however 
far we may be from the important centres of civilization, we are 
s t i l l  an integral part of the greatest empire the world has 
known'.(54)
Murray's private let ters reveal the out of time out of place 
reality of his position as the governor of an Australian 
dependency, the ennui, the reluctant response to a sense of 
unavoidable duty that drove him on. Australians were increasingly 
impressed by so rare a plant sprung from their soil while Murray 
became rapidly aware of how l i t t l e  he could trust his countrymen, 
their politicians, their press or their entrepreneurs. Publicly he 
affirmed again and again his confidence in the good sense of 
Australian governments and gratitude for the Australian subsidy 
while privately expecting betrayal. Certainly no one remotely like 
him was appointed to be Administrator of the Mandated Territory of 
New Guinea after 1919. Had such a one been sought he could not 
have been found.
53 In J A La Nauze. Alfred Deakin. Vol 1. p. 470. Beatrice 
Grimshaw to Deakin, 21 March 1908.
54 PAR 1937-38, p. 1.
Among sett lers i t  was soon to become commonplace to regard 
Murray as loft i ly indifferent to the needs of business, industry 
and commerce preferring to despise those whose work and 
risk-taking maintained the administration. One long-serving 
officer, certainly, took the view that the Lieutenant Governor was 
quite unbusinesslike himself. J T Bensted, the Papuan Government 
Agent in Sydney from 1913 until 1922 and subsequently Director of 
Public Works, later recalled that 'Sir Hubert Murray understood 
l i t t l e  of financial principles or business methods and was quite 
hostile to any claim that system should enter into anything... He 
was not systematic himself and was impatient with others who 
were1. (55) He had chided Bensted for running his department ' like 
a business concern' and Bensted commented, 'I accepted i t  as a 
compliment but he meant i t  as a reprimand1.(56) If this assessment 
of Murray was accurate - and Bensted may have mistaken an attitude 
that Murray merely affected for something more substantial - then 
the Lieutenant Governor was well served by officers who were 
systematic. These included his Official Secretary and nephew, 
Leonard Murray, the Government Secretary Herbert Champion, the 
Treasurers William Kendrick and Edward Harris, Staniforth Smith 
certainly and Bensted possibly, who maintained careful records and 
an effective control over expenditure. The thoroughness of the 
Territory's bureaucracy is indeed impressive. Murray's legal 
drafting, let ters,  reports, and occasional writings all 
demonstrate a high degree of internal organization and indicate a 
systematic mind. His court notes are more casual but suggest that
55 NLA, Bensted Papers, MS 2057, Series 1. Bensted was
commenting on Lewis Lett 's biography of Murray published 
in 1949.
184
56 ibid.
he could reconstruct  a f u l l e r  account from memory. He may have 
casually derided business pract ices because he did not care for 
people who were obsessed with them.
In January 1911, the Papuan Times began publication as a weekly 
newspaper with a di s t r ibut ion of about 300 copies. I t  was a 
; valuable amenity for the growing white population and quickly 
at t racted advertisements and a readership of almost the whole 
community. I t s  owners were Edward Baker, a pr inter  formerly 
working for the government, William Bruce, and Charles Baldwin the 
Port merchant. Baker became Government Pr inter  within a year and 
relinquished his share in the paper to Charles Elston, another 
pr inter .  Bruce was the edi tor  and author of much of the copy 
f i t t i n g  the work into his overfull  schedule as planter ,  planting 
contractor and timber merchant. From the beginning the paper 
became a vehicle for every host i le  cr i t ic ism of the government as 
well as a means by which Bruce could pursue his personal vendetta 
against Murray. 'Ent i rely independent'  and 'run in the national 
i n t e r e s t s ' (57),  the Papuan Times derided as ' su ic ida l '  the policy 
that  was placing the in teres ts  of 'brown brother '  above those of 
the 'law abiding sturdy white pioneers . . . the revenue 
producers' . (58) In one of a series of open l e t t e r s  Bruce assured 
the Minister for External Ter r i tor ies  that
There are not many whites in the whole country who 
would not give the native an honest go! The Australian 
who crosses over to Papua does not lose his ident i ty
57 Papuan Times, 3 June 1914.
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and become a di f ferent  c rea tu r e . . .  He is exactly the 
same as on his native soi l!  but, he won't play second 
f iddle to the Papuan native not for all the tea in 
China, or, for all the pol i t i c ians  in Austral ia.  Nor 
will his enfranchised brother permit such a t h ing . . .  
there is no doubt in thei r  mind as to the i n f e r i or i t y  
of the brown person.(59)
James Fowler - much l a t er  a government off icer  himself,  but 
br ief ly  a s e t t l e r  on the Vai1 a1 a in 1909 and a manager on various 
estates in the following decade - was among others who submitted 
verse for publication in the Papuan Times. His 'Wake up Papua', 
appeared in the paper in June 1911. In a pastiche of Kipling i t  
caught the mood and sense of the extreme s e t t l e r  ethos.
Wake Up Papua - The White Race Will Win Through
Haul up the white man's standard, f a l l  in the l i t t l e  band 
Of plucky Europeans who suffer in this  land.
We can' t  be taxed for Papuans, (who) neither t oi l  nor spin; 
The Papuans can' t  be " l i l l i e s " ,  or be preserved in t in.
The f i t t e s t  must "gang forward", the weakest lag behind, 
Despite the ranting bigots and people of that  kind,
The coloured races ere this  have for the white made room, 
And so i t  ever must be until  the crack of doom.(60)
59 ibid.
60 ibid,  21 June 1911; James Fowler, born 1871, was 
appointed ARM in August 1918 (PAR 1925-26). He married 
a s i s t e r  of Archie MacAlpine.
In pa r t icu la r  Bruce denounced again and again the 'pernicious 
nominee system1 by which Murray chose the ' u n o f f i c i a l '  members of 
the Legis lat ive Council. He saw, and probably cor rec t ly ,  that 
elected representation was the key to gaining a better hearing fo r  
the Papuan pioneer in te rest  in Austra l ia .  Sett lers  were not 
seeking responsible government - even Bruce could see that such a 
1 claim would not yet be credible - but to obtain the bargaining 
power of the franchise was imperative i f  the 'ch ie f  wowser' who 
ran the country was to be side-stepped or replaced.(61) Without 
the vote the pioneers would remain 'Unwept! Unhonoured! and 
Unknown!' . (62) He was confident that though
Cranks may scream in opposition, interested part ies may 
bellow th e i r  disapproval. . . i t  must come al l  the same.
The most democratic Parliament in the wor(l)d cannot 
afford such a b lo t  on i t s  escutcheon fo r  very long.
Ministers may endeavour to shelve the question and local 
potentates struggle to fog the issue, but in spi te of a l l  
i t  must come.(63)
Charac te r is t ica l ly  Bruce's, th is  kind of emotional w r i t ing  
repeated week af te r  week, i f  i t  amused a few, set the agenda fo r  
conversation and did much to polarise the community, p a r t i c u la r ly  
in Port Moresby, into two camps. On the one hand were the derided 
o f f i c i a l s ,  wi.th th e i r  safe incomes at least pa r t ly  squeezed out of
61 Papuan Times, E d i to r ia l ,  3 June 1914. The 'wowser' epithet 
had appeared in the paper of 31 January 1912.
62 ib id .  31 January 1912; 9 October 1911.
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the sweat of the private se t t le rs .  With th e i r  missionary a l l ie s  
many of these government o f f ice rs  were strong defenders of both 
the Lieutenant Governor and his po l ic ies .  On the other hand there 
were the embattled se t t le rs ,  perhaps l i k e  Bruce with a family to 
support, u n fa i r l y  taxed and badgered, they thought, precariously 
c l inging to a job or developing a land-holding where p r o f i t a b i1i t y  
lay years ahead. Most of them came from the same social class as 
the o f f i c i a l s  and there continued to be movement across the 
divide.  But the means of l ive l ihood determined a t t i tude ,  and 
interests seemed u t t e r l y  opposed. Two contending moral i t ies were 
at war in Papua among a white population that numbered less than 
that of a good crowd at a country race meeting in V ic tor ia .
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Chapter 10 Contending Moralit ies
By early 1914 the atmosphere had become uncomfortable and 
Hubert Murray was privately anxious about his posi t ion.  Others 
more inf luent ial  than Bruce had begun to make unfavourable, highly 
part ial  and generally inaccurate comments in Austral ia about the 
Papuan administration.  In April ,  in connection with cr i t icisms 
levelled at his pol icies by Sir Rupert Clarke in Melbourne, Murray 
wrote to his brother in England that  there was 'a gang of 
c ap i t a l i s t s  interested in Papua who want to get rid of me in order 
to have a free hand with the n a t i v e s ' . (1) This suggested a 
conspiracy. Nothing so tangible existed but undoubtedly the 1 arger 
investors in Papuan plantat ions had concerns that  were common and 
were coming to view Murray as pursuing a 'nat ive '  policy at the 
expense of white capi ta l .  Sir Rupert Clarke was only an occasional 
c r i t i c ,  and Arthur Bloomfield, the secretary and a director  of the 
Clarke and Whiting companies remained on good terms with the 
Lieutenant Governor. A much greater  threat  to the government came 
with the appointment in Port of a new and resourceful general 
manager in the largest  of the plantat ion companies, the Bri t ish 
New Guinea Development Company.
Matters came to a head in May when while he was 'in Austral ia
Murray was approached by T J Craig, a former employee of BNGD, who
had worked for five months on Baubauguina estate.  Craig alleged
that  the manager, George Bernesconi, had seriously i l l - t r e a t e d  the
workers and had, among other things,  attempted to hang a labourer
1 Francis West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray,
(Melbourne 1971), No. 58, 22 April 1914, Murray to Gilbert  
Murray.
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for de se r t i on . (2) Bernesconi had been previously convicted and 
fined late in 1913 for neglecting to t r ea t  a sick labourer who had 
died. Murray instructed Staniforth Smith, Administrator in his 
absence, to arrange a ful l  inquiry at Baubauguina into the new 
charges before C E Herbert, the DCJO, and Craig was asked to 
return to Port Moresby. At the hearing in June, Bernesconi was 
acquitted of one charge of hanging a labourer to a bell post. As 
the labourer that  Craig had referred to had l e f t  the plantat ion,  
the par t icular  'hanging'  charge that  he had made was not 
immediately pursued. Bernesconi and an ass i s tant ,  R H P  Marsham, 
were, however, convicted and fined on nine out of twelve lesser 
charges. The manager was subsequently convicted of yet two more 
charges of assaul t  and in October, the labourer of Craig's 
al legat ion,  Lauboiboio, having been found, the principal charge of 
causing grievous bodily harm was heard before Murray himself . (3)
Lauboiboio alleged that  at some date e a r l i e r  than August 1913 
he had been caught desert ing the plantat ion and taken to 
Bernesconi who had bound his hands and hanged him by the neck from 
a r a f t e r ,  clear of the ground, from 6 am. until  11 am.
Three Papuan witnesses corroborated this  testimony though they 
differed in de ta i l s .  The Chief Medical Officer,  Dr Buchanan, 
declared i t  to be incredible as death would have resul ted from 
such treatment within half an hour, and L P B Armit, the RM at 
Abau, t e s t i f i ed  that  he had dismissed a similar al legat ion after  
questioning Lauboiboio about i t  in August and September 1913. The
2 NAPNG & CRS G126/3. Murray to Staniforth Smith, 21 May 
1914.
3 The t r i a l  was reported in detai l  in the Papuan Times of 
4 November 1914. Murray's notes are in NAPNG & CRS 
Series G179.
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man had been prosecuted fo r  desertion three times and Armit 
regarded him as not sane. Bernesconi defended himself by saying 
that desertions were re la t i v e ly  frequent at Baubauguina not 
because of i l l - t re a tm e n t  but because 'boys' preferred plantat ions 
closer to the coast. He admitted to having had Lauboiboio t ied up 
on two occasions though not by the neck. The Criminal Code of 
Queensland adopted in Papua made i t  an offence with up to three 
years gaol to i l l e g a l l y  confine a person. The manager was found 
g u i l t y  on th is  count on October 30th and sentenced to twelve 
months imprisonment.
Bruce in the Papuan Times, appalled by the outcome of the case, 
wrote that
Not everyone may be a judge of a nat ive 's  evidence but 
everyone has a r ig h t  to his be l ie f  whether th is  was a 
cock and bul l  story invented by a few cunning natives 
to get even with a master who had made them work hard 
or whether i t  r ings l ike  a true s tory .(4)
An appeal to the High Court in Melbourne was lodged immediately 
and the paper ran a publ ic appeal fo r  funds to support Bernesconi. 
Ed i to r ia ls  and a r t ic le s  throughout 1914 attacked the government's 
po l ic ies in Bruce's most intemperate s ty le .  With al lusions to the 
Bernesconi t r i a l  and to other prosecutions and inquir ies under way 
that must have been obvious to everyone, the paper declared the 
Papuans to be chi ldren and often in need of chastisement. At the 
same time they were also 'crude savages' and 'minor .assaults must
4 Papuan Times. 4 November 1914.
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occur on p i anta t ions1.(5) The ' lying propensi t ies '  of the Papuan 
were proverbial and 'native evidence alone should never convict a 
white man - unless there is very strong circumstantial  evidence to 
corroborate the case ' .  The government by giving credence to every 
t r iv ia l  or fabricated claim made by labourers wanting to desert  
and by applying punishments that  were too lenient  to Papuan 
offenders was contributing to a loss of respect for the white man 
and a breakdown of order. Bruce prophesied that  'The time will 
come - and before very long - when the white man will have to walk 
in the road whilst  the buck nigger occupies the footpath i f  things 
are not a l t e r ed ' . (6)
Set t le rs  could indeed be shocked by the government's evenhanded 
policy in accepting 'nat ive '  evidence before a court.  Most would 
have accorded the law nominal acceptance but they had not expected 
that  they would be held to account for the many petty and not so 
petty breaches of the NLO and the Criminal Code that  occured in 
the extremity of the moment in the i solat ion of the estates or the 
privacy of the kitchen. As Murray had suggested in his remark 
about the tendency of s e t t l e r s ,  i f  unchecked, to reduce 'nat ives '  
to slavery,  white men in the predicament of s e t t l e r s  could readi ly 
see the laws as basical ly having application between ' c i v i l i s ed '  
men whose societ ies had developed them. Otherwise as in Papua, 
they thought, laws should exist  primari l ly to protect  the white 
residents.  Only in time - and cer tainly not yet - i t  could seem, 
should Papuans be allowed something approaching equali ty before 
the law. Set t le rs  in similar circumstances in many parts of the
5 ibid,  4 November 1914, 15 July 1914, 30 September 1914.
6 ibid, 21 October 1914.
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world throughout the nineteenth century had l i teral ly 'got away 
with murder' as they were s t i l l  to do in the Northern Territory of 
Australia i tself  for years to come where the same Federal 
Government that was so sensitive in i ts administration of Papua 
turned a blind eye. Settlers could not admit that their behaviour 
was cruel or unjust - so deeply had the popular version of 
Darwin's theory of the survival of the f i t t e s t  penetrated; they 
were merely instruments of an i r resist ible historical and 
biological movement. Even the 'protection'  of the Papuans as 
undertaken by Australia could be seen in this view as a voluntary 
act of restraint made entirely for reasons of humanity and in the 
face of the historical processes. Those planters with relatively 
humane attitudes who believed that the laws ought to be applied 
impartially were just as annoyed as those with a cruder outlook at 
interference in their affairs by officials who did not, in their 
view, have either experience or an actual responsibility for the 
management of Papuan labour or the running of an estate. Until the 
twenties planters generally believed the visi ts of Native Affairs 
officers to be unwarranted intrusions and gave their peers the 
benefit of the doubt if they were charged with an offence.
Bernesconi's appeal, heard in the High Court in March 1915, was 
dismissed after long digressions into whether Commonwealth Law 
applied in Papua and into whether a jury system was desirable in 
Papuan circumstances in which the Court deferred in every respect 
to Murray's opinion. (7) Lewis Cowley, general manager of BNGD 
since 1911 and a member of the Legislative Council (MLC), chose
7 George Bernesconi served his sentence in Badili Gaol.
He is believed to have later become a newsagent at Elwood,
Victoria. ( Mrs H. Champion 21 October 1973)
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December 1914 as the moment to resign.  A sociable man who had 
sided with the government against the other two 'unof f i c i a l '  
members in the Legislat ive Council over the indenture of women in 
August 1913, Cowley had lost  one of his children in the dysentery 
epidemic of 1912. He now claimed i l l  health as the reason for 
l eaving. (8) He may have found his posit ion untenable as both 
general manager of BNGD and an MLC on good terms with the 
Lieutenant Governor when i t  was revealed he had known of 
T J Craig's al legat ions against Bernesconi since late  1913 and had 
fai led to act upon them. A di rector  of the company, Evelyn 
Metcalfe, was in Port Moresby having been sent out to Papua to 
find ways to check the alarming rate at which the development of 
i t s  propert ies was drawing on BNGD' s c a p i t a l . (9) He immediately 
appointed the company's commercial manager in Port,  G A Loudon, to 
the senior posit ion.  George Archibald Loudon, born in 1882, had 
been commercial manager since 1913 and was of a temperament very 
di f ferent  from Cowley's. Handsome, capable and energet ic,  a taker 
of r i sks ,  he had come to Papua with a considerable experience of 
the plantat ion world. He was determined to 'bring the company to a 
dividend paying ba s i s ' ,  to press for every advantage and oppose 
every r es t r i c t i on  placed before his objective.  Bertram Bramell 
advised Murray that  the new general manager would 'need watching' .  
He was, Murray feared,  'a bi t  of a n i p p e r ' . (10)
8 Atlee Hunt Papers, NLA Deposit 52/349, Murray to Hunt
13 December 1914. Murray thought Cowley might be suf fer ­
ing from tropical  sprue.
9 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol 1, 10 October 1913. Capital for 
development of the BNGD propert ies was being drawn upon 
at the rate of £5,000 a month while receipts coming in 
from BNG Trading were less than half of this .
10 Atlee Hunt Papers, op. c i t .  Murray to Hunt, 13 December 
1914.
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At the same time as the Bernesconi a f f a i r  was simmering, a 
rec ru i t ing  scandal involving a Resident Magistrate came to l ig h t  
in which BNGD was to suf fer  considerable losses as an innocent 
th i rd  party. At an inquiry  in camera ending in August 
1914, Alexander Campbell, the Government Secretary since re t i red ,  
had cancelled the contracts of th i r teen  Eroro labourers on the 
‘ grounds that there had been col lus ion between the RM in the Kumusi 
(Northern) Div is ion, A E Oelr ichs, and the recru i te rs  Les Joubert 
and Ernie Oates to pressure men in to  signing on. Apparently 
Oelrichs had threatened to burn down v i l lages and k i l l  pigs i f  men 
did not agree to engagement.(11) As the labourers so pressed in to  
service were among a large consignment fo r  BNGD, the company 
sett led i t s  account with Joubert and Oates fo r  the remainder, 550 
in a l l ,  a f te r  Campbell's decision was known. Campbell gave Loudon 
a verbal assurance that there would be no fu r the r  action taken in 
the case. In July the government announced that new disclosures 
necessitated the re-opening of the inquiry  and by February 1915 
the contracts of a fu r the r  130 Orokaivas had been cancelled. BNGD 
submitted that the government should bear the cost of these 
cancel lat ions,  including the expenses in repa t r ia t ing  the 
labourers, since a qua l i f ied  o f f i c e r ,  i f  in i l le g a l  circumstances, 
had witnessed the con t rac ts . (12) Loudon at f i r s t  seemed to f lo u t  
the law by keeping the Orokaivas at work a f te r  the decision of the 
court was made known. This led Murray to bel ieve that BNGD was 
attempting a t r i a l  of strength with the government and that whi ls t  
the company may have been an innocent party in the rec ru i t ing
11 CRS Al 13/19589 and 16/15122 contain the correspondence 
dealing with the Oelrichs case.
12 NAPNG & CRS G126/3. Loudon to Murray, 23 June 1,914.
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scandal, i t  was now apparently prepared to challenge the law over 
i t s  obligation to r epa t r ia te  the labourers in ques t ion. (13) Native 
Affairs demanded that  the company immediately release the 
Orokaivas from service and return them home without delay or face 
an action that  would deprive BNGD of the r ight  to have labour 
signed on.
Murray's at tent ion was also drawn to a recent report  of the CNA 
that  referred to an incident at BNGD' s Katea estate  where the 
manager, Jim Matley, had apparently sent a horse and r ider  to 
bring back an absconding labourer making his way to Port Moresby 
to lodge a complaint. Fortunately the labourer had evaded the 
pursuit  which, Murray concluded, amounted to an attempt ' to 
t e r ro r i se '  the man, and conduct on the part of the manager that  
could hardly be regarded as the ' f a i r  t reatment '  to which RMs were 
expected to assign Papuans entering contracts of service.  He asked 
that  these deta i l s  be sent to Loudon.(14)
On January 2nd an interview with Evelyn Metcalfe in which he 
was highly c r i t i c a l  of af fa i rs  in Papua was published in the 
Melbourne Argus.(15) He accused the Murray administration of 
'harassing (his) company out of exis tence ' .  Murray was prompted to 
ask the general manager why Metcalfe should have formed such 
opinions, and Loudon - no doubt with the d i r ec to r ' s  advice - set
13 CRS A1 Item 17/10895. Murray to Minister,  23 February 
1915.
14 ibid.
15 Melbourne Argus, 2 January 1915. On 4 January the paper 
published a reply by the Minister,  Hugh Mahon, and on
5 January, the leader a r t i c l e  covered the controversy.
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out a long statement of grievances.(16) In addition to the claim 
for the costs of the Orokaiva cancellations BNGD complained that 
the government had, without warning, reduced the permitted 
passenger complement of the company's coastal steamer, the 
Wakefield, from 106 to thirty-four at the very moment when i t  was 
obliging the company to return the large number of Orokaivas home. 
It was on the day that the restrictions were l if ted that the 
company was advised that i ts rights to engage labour might be 
cancelled. Loudon went on to complain of inconsistent treatment by 
the Customs Department, and of an excise tax being contemplated 
for locally grown tobacco while the industry was s t i l l  in the 
experimental stage and certainly before i t  had become profitable. 
He objected that the Native Affairs Inspectors did not seem to 
accept the truth of plantation returns with regard to ration 
issues and that the Commissioner did not allow the payment of 
advances on wages to labourers on the estates, a measure that if 
permitted, Loudon suggested, would go far to making the period of 
indenture more tolerable. Implying that the administration was 
prejudiced against business in general, he referred to yet another 
hearing that had taken place since Bernesconi's in which the word 
of a native was used to convict the manager of Clarke and 
Whiting's Fairfax Harbour plantation, J A R  Wilkes, against the 
sworn testimony of three reputable European witnesses.
Murray responded in a rather distant vein to these charges 
through the Official Secretary. Loudon was, His Excellency had 
suggested, 'over sensitive'  in the 'misunderstanding' over the 
Wakefield, and in the matter of the Fairfax inquiry the Lieutenant
16 NAPNG Series G126, Item 3, G A Loudon to Murray, 25 
February 1915.
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Governor observed that  ' i t  is impossible to say whether the 
decision was right  or wrong, - so much depends, sometimes, upon 
the demeanour of witnesses and the manner in which they give thei r  
evidence' . (17) True as this  may have been of the processes of law 
in Austral ia or England, i t  was an extraordinary remark for Murray 
to make and could only have been understood by Loudon to mean that  
the Lieutenant Governor believed i t  was more incumbent on the 
government to make the law appear impartial than that  j us t ice  
should be done. Murray added that  i t  was ' c lear ly  impossible to 
lay down a rule that  a magistrate should always decide according 
to number and colour'  which Loudon was hardly l ikely to see as 
more than cant.
Indeed, Murray was to break off his private correspondence with 
Atlee Hunt in June 1915 over the Wilkes case when, af ter  
Arthur Bloomfield had protested to him, Hunt was inclined to agree 
that  the judgement in the Port Moresby RM's Court was 
quest ionable. (18) Wilkes had been fined for f a i lu r e  to provide 
good and suff icient  food for six Bamu River labourers who had been 
admitted to hospital in February 1915 in a feeble condition. The 
defence had claimed that  the 'boys'  in question had been 'weedy' 
and ' th in '  on arrival  at the plantat ion having passed a government 
inspection and that  200 others on Fairfax Harbour had not 
complained of a shortage of food. The f ines imposed on the manager 
were small and the costs involved inconsiderable in comparison 
with those incurred by the employer in the BNGD cases. An appeal
17 NAPNG Series G128, Item 3, Lieutenant Governor to 
G A Loudon,5 March 1915,
18 Francis West, op. c i t .  Letter No 64, 16 June 1915. Murray 
to Hunt.
was made against Wilkes's conviction and dismissed. Of this  case 
Bruce indignantly noted in the Papuan Times of 19 May that  'some 
evil minded crank (had) sent to a southern paper a photograph of 
diseased and emaciated boys who were the cause of a recent 
prosecution'  and had described (them) as 'Victims to Capitalism in 
Papua' .(19)
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A subsequent l e t t e r  informed Loudon that  nothing on the 
Government Secretary' s  f i l e s  could be found to show that  Campbell 
had given BNGD any assurances af ter  the f i r s t  Oelrichs inquiry.
Yet in this  Loudon had not l ied - Campbell l a t er  admitted in 
l e t t e r  that  he had indeed given the verbal assurances Loudon 
cl aimed.(20) In correspondence with the Minister,  Murray argued 
strongly that  as the law stood the government was not l iable  for 
the costs which BNGD, even as an innocent party,  was now obliged 
to meet.
Murray also clashed with Evelyn Metcalfe more di rec t ly .  A 
director  experienced in Australian condit ions,  Metcalfe had 
managed a pastoral property in Queensland, and was prepared to 
play the rougher game thought by the other members of the board of 
BNGD to be necessary in dealing with Aus t ra l i ans . (21) In an 
interview with the Papuan Treasurer,  William Kendrick, he had 
referred to the Lieutenant Governor as 'a bloody l i a r ' .  Kendrick
19 Papuan Times. 19 May 1915, p.2.
20 CRS A1 17/10895, Campbell to Hunt, 14 August 1915.
21 Evelyn Metcalfe had ear l i e r  been the member of the BNGD 
Board sent out in 1911 to st raighten out the company's 
a f fa i rs .  He had been selected as 'a strong man to go out 
and see what was the matter and to deal with the s i tuat ion 
with no gloved hand' .  BNGD Annual General Meeting, 1911. 
ANUABL, Deposit No, 95, Microfilm M37.
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reported this  to Murray who wrote declining any fur ther  
con tac t . (22) Receiving the l e t t e r  back in England, Metcalfe 
rejected the charge of using bad language - a t t r ibut ing i t  to the 
factional ism in Port Moresby that  made misrepresentation always 
possible.  He responded in a l e t t e r  that  his cr i t icisms of the 
Australian and Papuan governments' pol icies were not personally 
‘aimed, but went on to add with charac ter i s t i c  assurance that ,
I go to Papua seldom, and when there rarely find you at 
home...I have j us t  heard on my r e t u r n . . . that  things are 
i f  anything worse than when I was there.  I t r u s t  therefore 
that  you will give fur ther  a t t en t i o n . . . and endeavour to 
prevent a serious calamity. My Company is at all times 
wil l ing to ass i s t  the Government in every way but some 
actions of your Government leave us powerless to even 
carry out the inst ruct ions of the Government.(23)
In the Melbourne Age in May 1914 inflated reporting of the 
Bernesconi and Oelrichs cases had led to al legat ions that  there 
was ' s lavery'  in Papua.(24) Papers in England took up the story.  
The Melbourne correspondent of the London Daily Chronicle of July 
1st reported that  there was 'no doubt that  slavery has been 
f lourishing in the Terr i tory of Papua for years ' .  The Papuan Times 
did 'not believe for one moment' that  there was the remotest cause
22 NAPNG Series G128 Item 3, 3 February 1915. Murray to 
Metcalfe.
23 NAPNG Series G126 Item 4, 29 March 1915. Metcalfe to 
Murray.
24 CRS A1 17/4904 'Slavery in Papua. Protection of Native 
Races' .  The Age (Melbourne) a r t i c l e  appeared.in May, that  
in the Daily Chronicle (London) on 1 July 1914.
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for anxiety and that ,  on the contrary, the Murray administration 
was ' incl ined to err in the milk and water manner' in the opposite 
direct ion by coddling the natives.  Murray too f e l t  the need to 
deny the reports and in the Annual Report noted that  only 
s ixty-f ive  of 120 Orokaiva labourers whose contracts had been 
recently cancelled had chosen to return home. This spoke well,  he 
suggested, for the general conditions of employment. And clearly 
to mollify Loudon's sense of injury,  he now publicly acknowledged 
that
the employer cer tainly was rather  badly t reated.  There 
was nothing in the very voluminous evidence which even 
suggested that  he had done anything wrong - all he had 
got out of the a f f a i r  was a lot  of annoyance and the loss 
of 120 boys - and i t  did seem rather  hard that  on top of 
all t h i s ,  he should be denounced as a siave-owner.(25)
Elsewhere in the Report he noted that  the 'haunting t e r ro r '  of 
labour scarci ty seemed to have disappeared and that  this  was due 
to the f a i r  treatment Papuans could expect ' in the great majority 
of cases'  when they engaged. He went on to add with an eye to his 
readers in Papua as much as to his wider audience that
Doubtless there have been, even in Papua, employers of 
violent  .and even brutal temper, as well as employers who 
regard the question of thei r  employee's welfare with 
callous indifference;  but so far  as I know there has never 
been anything l ike systematic i l l  treatment of labourers 
25 PAR, 1914-15, p. 7.
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either by miners or p ia n te rs . (26)
In London the directors of BNGD on hearing of the dismissal of 
Bernesconi and Marsham instructed the secretary, Samuel Thompson, 
to inform the general manager ' tha t  i l l - t re a tm e n t  of natives is 
against the po l icy of the Board and they regret to hear of th is  
: occurring. They think that every precaution should be taken to 
prevent such an occurrence in the f u t u r e ' . (27) In connection with 
the cancel lat ion of the Orokaivas' contracts the d irectors noted 
approvingly that G A Loudon had sought the help of Sir  Rupert 
Clarke in an attempt to quash the second enquiry, but when th is  
could not be done they re luc tan t ly  supported the claim fo r  costs 
lodged by the Port Moresby o f f ic e  against the government.(28) The 
company's claim fo r  over £2,000 was to be eventually met with a 
payment of £409 in compensation in May 1917.
At the annual general meeting of BNGD in London in July 1914, W 
A Horn, who had succeeded Lord Ranfurly as chairman, had drawn 
attention to the d i f f i c u l t i e s  the company experienced in obtaining 
suitable white employees. A 'new' country, i t  seemed, tended to 
a t t rac t  wasters and adventurers from the ' o l d ' . (29) This may have 
been an early a l lusion to Bernesconi but BNGD and other planting 
companies were to claim on many occasions that the .government
26 ib id ,  p. 6.
27 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol 1, 25 September 1914, Thompson to 
Loudon.
28 ib id ,  25 October 1914, Thompson to Loudon. Also 
correspondence over the claim in CRS A1 17/10895.
29 Financial Times (London), 18 July 1914. ANUABL Deposit 95,
M37.
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could show sympathy to the larger employers in circumstances where 
i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to pol ice the conduct of subordinate personnel.
On 11 March 1914 Archibald 'Archie'  MacAlpine, Wallace Westland's 
successor as general manager of the Clarke and Whiting companies 
at Kanosia, wrote to Edgar Col l ins ,  his superintendent at Rorona, 
about fo r ty -e ig h t  Mambare (Orokaiva) deserters from Rorona estate, 
among those recruited by Joubert and Oates in the Oelrichs 
scandal, who had gone o f f  to Port Moresby with complaints about 
th e i r  overseers. The Mambares, he conceded, were a ' p a r t icu la r ly  
troublesome lo t  ever since they learned that the Govt might be 
taking steps to enquire in to  the way they were re c ru i te d '. (30) His 
concern to recoup any costs to do with the cancel lat ion of the 
contracts was uppermost in MacAlpine's mind but a lack of 
confidence in the r e l i a b i l i t y  of his white s ta f f  is apparent. He 
believed that there was 'o f  course, probably nothing' in the 
Orokaivas' complaint 'but i t  has occurred to me as being strange 
that i t  is always from Rorona that boys desert and i t  might be 
well fo r  you to consider your methods of handling labor 
( s i c ) ' . (31) Rorona was only a few miles from Kanosia and 
unpopular among Papuans because i t  was not on the beach. How much 
more d i f f i c u l t  might i t  have been fo r  a general manager of much 
more widely separated estates to superintend his superintendents. 
Indeed, dishonesty and want of care among white employees might 
general ly have been a much greater cause of anxiety fo r  managers 
responsible to d irectors and shareholders than the proverbial res 
inert iae of the Papuan.
30 Kanosia Letterbooks, 11 March 1914. See below Chapter 11, 
note 4, p. 214.
31 A charge of assault made against Col l ins by other labour­
ers was dismissed in June 1915. Papuan Times, 16 June 
1915.
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Yet i t  is clear that the Lieutenant Governor p r iva te ly  believed 
that the BNGD Company in pa r t icu la r ,  in the persons of i t s  agents 
G A Loudon and Evelyn Metcalfe, represented a real and powerful 
threat to the government. On 9th March 1915 Murray wrote to his 
brother that
I have been doing ba t t le  with the B r i t ish  New Guinea 
Company, or rather they have been doing ba t t le  with me.
This is the Company of which Geoffrey Howard was a share­
holder - I hope he has sold out, fo r  they are the weirdest 
lo t  of people I have met. We had to refuse to sign on any 
more labour to them u n t i l  they complied with the law about 
sending th e i r  labourers home. They have a notion that 
being a strong company we must be afra id of them, and are 
absolutely aghast when asked to obey the ordinary law.
However I think they are f a i r l y  quiet now, though they 
require much watching.(32)
The Papuan Times continued i t s  unrelenting attack on his 
administration throughout 1915. On March 3rd an e d i to r ia l  appeared 
that marked the high point of Bruce's incendiary journalism 
comparing the government to a 'Muscovite autocracy' and the 
se t t le rs  to the miners at Eureka who in 1854 had taken up arms to 
res is t  a rb i t ra ry  government in V ic to r ia .  The 'people were 'being 
"bled white"... . f ind ing  the money to pay th e ’ salaries of servants 
whose chief aim is to penalise and torment th e i r  masters'. The
32 Francis West, op. c i t .  Letter No. 62, Murray to Gi lbert 
Murray, 9 March 1915. Geoffrey Howard, younger son of the 
Earl of Car l is le ,  was Gi lbert Murray's brother-in-1aw.
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'breaking point ' ,  Bruce declared, had been reached.(33)
It is difficul t  to believe that in a community as small as that 
of white Port Moresby such extreme statements could have been 
taken seriously, but on paper, at least,  here was the suggestion 
that sett lers might actually rebel. There is no evidence at all 
i that civil disturbance was being remotely considered, but here was 
seditious language meant to provoke a reaction and perhaps a 
crisis that Bruce, and no doubt others, hoped Melbourne could not 
ignore. Murray was determined not to magnify the significance of 
such desperate and dangerous press agitation by appearing to give 
i t  the slightest attention.
A 'Citizens' Meeting' to consider the community's grievances 
was called for 22nd April and in the Papuan Times Bruce t i l led the 
soil of righteous indignation in the preceding weeks with long 
editorials attacking the ' hypocritical Australian press' ,  the 
'breach of fai th'  by the Commonwealth in not proceeding with a 
previously approved railway line to Sapphire Creek, and the 
failure of the government to prevent the recent murder of a white 
man at Jawarere.(34) On April 7th, noting figures given in the 
1913-14 Annual Report the editorial bit ter ly reflected that while 
the ' terr i tor ial  revenue provided by the white trash who are 
pioneering the Territory'  amounted to some £54,000 or £6,000 more 
than the previous year, for every £1 being spent on development on
33 Papuan Times. 3 March 1915.
34 ibid. 'The hypocritical Australian press. . . always poses as 
the champions of the poor blacks'. 10 February 1915. 
Editorials on the projected railway to Sapphire
Creek: 9 December 1914, 17 February 1915, and 10 March 
1915 when the failure to proceed was 'A Breach of Faith' .
The report of Harry Ballot 's murder appeared on 10 March.
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roads and services for the white community, £20 was being spent on 
'nat ive '  adminis t rat ion. (35) On April 14th the editor questioned 
the capacity of any of f ic ia l  s t i l l  in the government service to 
work Papuan labour and attacked the prying inspectors who, i f  they 
badgered labourers long enough, were bound to find something 
'wrong' - the whole l ibe ra l ly  sprinkled with references to ' the 
* lazy brutes '  and ' the infer ior  r a ce1 and ' the present policy of 
the Government ( that) b e l i t t l e s  the white man' . (36)
The Cit izens'  Meeting was well attended and addressed by Arthur 
Jewell,  William Bruce, Dr Colin Simson and G A Loudon. In his 
speech Loudon claimed that  labour could only be recrui ted on the 
verges of control because Papuans within the pacified areas 
quickly became slothful  and dependent on government assistance.  An 
i r r e s i s t i b l e  conclusion to be drawn was that  there was a 'want of 
sympathy on the part  of the Government in regard to the industr ial  
development of the country' . (37) And so i t  could seem.
Resolutions demanding electoral  representat ion and 'democratic'  
r ights were passed and sent to Murray, and Dr Simson was deputed 
to publicise the d i ssa t i s fac t ions  of the white community of Papua 
in Austral ia.  Aware of the importance of keeping public opinion in 
Sydney and Melbourne well informed of his side in any controversy, 
Murray instructed the Papuan Agent in Sydney, John Bensted, to 
spread information contradict ing Dr Simson's assert ions.  Despite 
his view that  J A R  Wilkes had been unfair ly t reated in the
35 ibid.  7 Apri1 1915.
36 ibid.  14 April 1915.
37 ibid. 28 April 1915
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Fairfax Harbour case, Arthur Bloomfield was now also prepared to 
defend the government against i t s  c r i t i c s  in a l e t t e r  to the 
papers . (38) Bruce cast igated him in the Papuan Times for believing
' i t  wise to keep in with the government at any p r i c e ' . (39) Murray 
was lampooned through the year as readers of the local paper were 
invited to regard the Lieutenant Governor as ' t h i s  dreamer'(40) 
i and as 'a crusty incapable old Tory ' (41), his policy as 
' s u i c ida l '(42) and ' c lap t r ap ' (43),  his administration as 'a r e l i c  
of feudal t imes ' . (44)
In London, the BNGD directors  had accepted Evelyn Metcalfe's 
account of the hos t i l i t y  of the Papuan government towards the 
planters.  At the annual general meeting in August 1915, W A Horn 
accused Austral ians of inconsistency. They had dispossessed the i r  
'own' natives of thei r  land and were allowing the remnants to 
slowly die of starvat ion and disease.  No one, he suggested, wanted 
this  to be repeated in Papua. Yet, i f  Papuans retained the 
ownership of the i r  land and were permitted under control to sel l  
i t  ' there is l i t t l e  advantage in that  unless the purchasers are
38 NAPNG & CRS G128/4, Murray to Bensted, 15 August 1915.
He forwarded a copy of a speech by Bloomfield praising the 
government for publication in the Sydney Morning Herald, 
in which in an a r t i c l e  Simson had named Bloomfield's 
companies as among those 'persecuted'  by Native Affairs.
39 Papuan Times, 21 July 1915, p. 4.
40 ibid 2 June 1915
41 ibid,  6 January 1915
42 ibid,  24 March 1915
43 ibid,  23 June 1915
ibid. 21 July 1915, 1 March 1916.44
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assisted in the development1.(45)
But Loudon had been wrong in his claims about the pattern of 
labour recruitment made at the Ci t izens ' meeting in A p r i l ,  and 
Murray in an obvious response in the 1915-16 Annual Report would 
draw at tention to the fac t  that most labour s t i l l  came from ' the 
old rec ru i t ing  grounds' and not from newly opened up areas.(46) 
This he put down to the dependence on imported goods among coastal 
Papuans and the confidence that experience of indentured labour 
had given them. And qua l i f ied  as Murray's view had become about 
the developers he could not admit that his commitment to the 
development of Papua by se t t le rs  was less than i t  had been - nor, 
indeed once he had mastered them, would he prove less than a 
persistent and eloquent advocate fo r  the planters and th e i r  
interests in straightened times. But there was much to be set t led 
in the years ahead before th is  would become clear.
45 Financial Times (London), 5 August 1915, p. 3. ANUABL 
Deposit 95, M37.
46 PAR 1914-15, p. 6.
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Chapter 11 Papuans and progress
The Bernesconi and Oelrichs a f fa i r s  had bruised both Murray and 
the management of the largest of the plantat ion companies. A 
mutual d is t rus t  had emerged that would be re- inforced by other 
i r r i t a t i o n s  and fu r the r  prosecutions in the next seven years in 
which both the government and BNGD - and neither perhaps without 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  - could assume h o s t i l i t y  and bad f a i t h  in the other. 
I f  Murray now had l i t t l e  confidence in the good in tentions of 
plantat ion companies even as he depended on the revenue they 
generated, planters had no confidence in his government's capacity 
or desire to work to secure remunerative conditions fo r  commercial 
agricul tu re. The larger employers assumed that economic 
ra t io n a l i t y  would obl ige the Papuan administrat ion to cheapen the 
cost of labour whi ls t  ensuring the maintenance of the supply, 
lower charges and duties, make allowances over the supervision of 
white employees, and in consideration of th e i r  economic 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  press fo r  and secure from the Commonwealth 
preferentia l  t a r i f f s ,  bounties, development loans and increased 
subsidies - su f f ic ie n t  t a r i f f s  and greater bounties, or higher 
subsidies, cheaper labour and lower taxation as the exigencies of 
the times dictated. But Austral ian wil l ingness to underwrite the 
development of Papua proved too s l ig h t  and the margin that Murray 
was determined to maintain fo r  the Papuan labourer too slender fo r  
there to be much room fo r  manoeuvre.
Public ly  accused of ind if ference to the d i f f i c u l t i e s  
encountered by se t t le rs  - an accusation he could deny claiming 
that his government was determined to maintain a balance between
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the interests of white and brown - privately Murray might well 
have come to the conclusion that given the strength of set t ler  
hosti l i ty his position and reputation did indeed rest finally on 
his defence of his 'native'  policy. He could now consider only 
minor changes in the NLO provided these did not diminish the 
broader safeguards for Papuan workers that he had inherited and 
! since strengthened. These safeguards were, he tried to remind 
settlers again and again, in their own best interest if the 
continuation of the labour supply was to be assured. He also saw 
danger in proceeding with any development that could outstrip this 
supply and open up demands by employers for a compulsory labour 
system. Large enterprises, once admitted, constituted a particular 
threat not only because of their greater capacity to lobby members 
of parliament and receive press coverage but because, as 
contributors to the revenue, their very existence could hold an 
administration to ransom. In January 1917 the Lieutenant Governor 
gave Atlee Hunt his reasons why he did not want a policy allowing 
oil prospecting by private interests in Papua. If such a policy 
were permitted and large oil deposits discovered there could 
develop
what most of those concerned with the Government of 
tropical dependencies will, I think, agree is a very 
common and sometimes dangerous feature of administration.
This is the presence of some powerful company, financially 
perhaps stronger than the Government, and determined if 
possible to 'capture' the Government and make the Govern­
ment's policy subordinate to the company's interests.  The 
result is a continual conflict (the nature of which is of
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course misrepresented outside the dependency), in which 
the Government is sometimes successful,  and sometimes,
I am told,  is n o t . . .  (1)
It  is impossible not to think that  Murray had BNGD speci f ical ly  
in mind as the chief contender in Papua for the part  of a 
'powerful company f inancia l ly  perhaps stronger than the 
Government1 2, and such an a t t i tude  could hardly be construed as 
favourable even to what might be regarded as the legi t imate 
ac t iv i t i e s  of a large company wishing to expand i t s  business in 
the country. BNGD had a strong i nte res t  in securing oil 
concessions in the Gulf Division where i t  had been the f i r s t  to 
seriously carry out exploration in 1912 when at considerable 
expense the company had sent out a German geologist  and dr i l l ing  
plant.  By 1917 the company's planting and trading in teres t s  were 
rela t ive ly  extensive, the developed area of i t s  es tates  amounting 
to 12,000 acres or nearly a quarter of the total  for the 
Terri tory.  I t s  propert ies were widely dis t r ibuted.  The BNGD store 
in Port was as large as Burns Phi lp ' s  and there was a large branch 
at Samarai. The company ran the principal coastal steamer, a 
tobacco twist  factory,  a joinery,  and an engineering workshop. 
Employing eighty Europeans and 2,000 Papuans i t  was indeed only 
rivaled by the government in the size of i t s  opera t ions . (2)
I t  is also d i f f i c u l t  to believe that  the Lieutenant Governor 
did not now find that  the l imits he and Staniforth Smith - and by
1 NAPNG Series G128, Item 4, Murray to Hunt, 3 January 
1917.
2 CRS A1 18/1463, Loudon to Minister,  20 December 1917.
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i t s  continued acquiescence the Commonwealth too - had set  on the 
labour supply in Papua formed a convenient r es t ra i n t  on fur ther  
large scale development. In the Report made of a v i s i t  to the 
Bri t ish Solomon Islands Protectorate in 1916 Murray had defined a 
principle of his administration that  he now re-affirmed in his 
l e t t e r  opposing private o i l - d r i l l i ng ,  - ' t ha t  the progress of 
development shall bear some proportion to the labour 
avai1able* 1.(3) An o i l - f i e l d  requiring large numbers of labourers,  
Murray proposed, should remain under firm government control so 
that  the demand for additional labour 'should come not suddenly 
but by degrees'  and excessive pressure on the supply under the 
existing constraints could be avoided. If  there was to be no 
compulsion for Papuans to work for Europeans, and i f  no ' foreign'  
labour was to be imported into the country, then, within the 10% 
of the population avai lable,  the willingness of the Papuans to 
enter contracts would continue to depend on the sufficiency of the 
inducements in wages, conditions and excitement that  indentured 
service offered. And t h i s ,  he thought, was quite enough.
With other costs out of the i r  control ,  the pressures on 
planters to make savings in labour costs,  i f  these in any way 
could be achieved, were considerable.  Several of the more 
note-worthy contests in the courts in the years ahead, l ike the 
Wilkes case before them, would be over the supply of 'good and 
suf f ic ient '  food to indentured labourers.  The NLO Regulations set
3 NAPNG, Series G128, Item.4, 3 January 1917, Murray to_
Hunt. Murray's Report on the Bri t ish Solomon Islands is in 
Public Records Office, London, C0225/148, 29 April 1916.
I am indebted to Peter Corris for sight of th i s .  The 
same words are used in CRS Al 17/1418, Address by Murray 
in Melbourne: Native Labour in Papua, May 1917.
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down the minimum to be issued, and some employers, par t icular ly  
the companies, t r ied to maintain only the minimum, the managers 
being under a general inst ruct ion to be e f f i c ient  and not 
wasteful.  Where overseers could be neglectful in supervising food 
dis t r ibut ion and some labourers could intimidate others,  the 
supply of food to the labour l ines at the minimum rate  could only 
lead to inequit ies and, in e f fec t ,  the starvat ion of some workers. 
The desert ions that  could resul t  might appear to plantat ion 
managers and company o f f i c i a l s  as quite unjust i f ied.  In t e s t  cases 
in 1918 and 1921 examined below, both fought out with BNGD, the 
government sought to establ ish in the minds of employers thei r  
over-riding responsibi 1i ty  for the proper feeding of all  thei r  
Papuan workers, and by the 1920's few planters would r e s t r i c t  the 
food available to the i r  labourers to the amounts prescribed in the 
regulations.
And there were the pressures imposed on the size of a work 
force by the way the indentured labour system operated in Papua. 
Since, where labour was recrui ted at a distance,  to have numbers 
of workers on a plantat ion that  were greater than necessary was a 
very heavy cost,  prudent managers preferred to have too few rather  
than too many labourers on thei r  estates and Papuan plantat ions 
generally employed fewer workers, i f  more European overseers,  than 
did estates of a corresponding size in the East. The larger 
employers were constantly anxious about f luctuat ions in the 
numbers of Papuans offering for work j us t  as individual plantat ion 
managers were sensi t ive to quite small variat ions in the numbers 
of 'boys' on an estate.  The Kanosia plantat ion let ter-books,  
surviving for the years 1914-15, contain what seems at f i r s t  a
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surprising amount of attention to the health, reception, and 
whereabouts of in d iv id ua l ly  named labourers punctuating the 
general correspondence over shipping, plantat ion development and 
the ar r iva l  and breakdown of machinery. I t  was an imperative fo r  
managers to maximise the return from the service of every labourer 
fo r  whom recru i t ing  fees of £3 a year had been paid, and, at least 
at Kanosia, i t  was an urgent matter to keep abreast of labour 
health and d is a f fe c t io n . (4) Bazel Wharton-Kirke, manager fo r  a time 
at Jawarere, was delegated by the Returned Soldiers League in 1920 
to investigate the opportunit ies ex is t ing fo r  members in Late 
German New Guinea. In a report that made b i t in g  comparisons 
between Papua and i t s  northern neighbour he concluded that 'a t  the 
present moment there is  not a plantat ion in the whole of Papua 
that has an adequate labour force to develop i t  to i t s  f u l l  
extent. This is a serious statement I know1. (5) In 1918 George 
Wiseman of Glenealy Estate, Perak (FMS), was brought to Papua by 
BNGD, Paci f ic  and Papua Produce (formerly Mombiri), and Clarke and 
Whiting to advise on th e i r  rubber plantat ions.  In a report to the 
BNGD directors he remarked that an estate in Malaya the size of 
It ikinumu would require 350 'coo l ies '  whereas Itikinumu had 150.(6) 
Figures supplied to Murray by the governors of the FMS and B r i t ish  
North Borneo suggested that th is  was only a small exaggeration. (7)
4 Kanosia Letterbooks, 3 March 1914 - 2 May 1915. Nearly a l l  
le t te rs  were wr i t ten  by Archie MacAlpine, Clarke and 
Whit ing's general manager 1912-16. While MacAlpine was 
away accompanying S ir  Rupert Clarke on his expedition up 
the Fly River in June and July 1914, Richard Walshe - then 
the company's accountant - acted in MacAlpine's place.
5 Papuan Courier, 13 March 1920.
6 CRS A1 Item 18/12377. A copy of Wiseman's report was sent 
by G A Loudon to Atlee Hunt. The report was dated 25 May 
1918.
7 NAPNG Series G126, Item 9, pp. 1178, 1179. Figures
215
In the rubber industry there, about 35 workers were employed fo r  
every 100 acres. Thus in 1919, It ikinumu with 907 acres and 198 
labourers, might have 'required'  over 300.
Af ter  1916 when most of the plantat ions la id down in the boom 
years were coming into production, the labour required on estates 
5 depended par t ly  on the p ro f i tab le  sale of the commodities 
produced. In 1919 there would be a surplus of Papuans of fe r ing  fo r  
work, in 1920 a dearth, and in 1921-22 an urgent need to reduce 
the numbers of labourers to maintenance levels as the markets fo r  
the T e r r i to ry 's  products collapsed. The NL0 permitted no standing 
down of labour and employers were s t i l l  bound to bear the costs of 
provisioning and repa tr ia t ing  labourers whose contracts were 
abruptly cancelled fo r  want of a return on production. Conversely, 
once the labour force was reduced, no immediate advantage could be 
taken of rapid increases in prices u n t i l  the number of workers 
could be restored to an operating level.
The time taken in recruitment, signing-on, transport,  and 
t ra in ing  had led planters to press fo r  three year contracts in 
1912 as they could get no more than nine months' labour from a 
'one year boy' who at the expiry of his contract was promptly los t  
to them - only to be replaced by yet another inexperienced 
re c ru i t .  The three year contracts that then became normal on 
larger estates allowed employers the longer benefi t  of trained 
workers and some staggering of labour turnover. But by the 1920's,
supplied by the Government of Ceylon were obviously based 
on the very large numbers of workers required seasonally 
fo r  tea picking and Murray suppressed them in a copy of 
the report sent to the Planters Association. (Ceylon 
le t te r ,  20 July 1920)
the government was to t r y  to encourage a return to one year terms 
because i t  was thought that there were by then many sk i l le d  former 
labourers in the v i l lages who might wish to work but who baulked 
at signing on fo r  three years. Murray then thought that ' f re e '  
labour could be encouraged and the system of indenture gradually 
allowed to wither. Yet, i f  planters could not have a surplus of 
; dependent labour in plantat ion kampongs as in the East always 
avai lable to respond to market var ia t ions,  they ce r ta in ly  did not 
want free labour in a scarce labour market able to desert estates 
at any time on account of any grievance, real or imagined, or 
asking fo r  t ime-of f  to attend local feasts.  Murray had to observe 
in 1930 that the Papuans too seemed to prefer the system that 
bound employers to known condit ions, and that i t  would be many 
years before indenture could be dispensed w i t h . (8) While some of 
the smaller planters in exceptional circumstances did come to re ly  
on local casual labour, most others preferred under the exist ing 
dispensation to secure th e i r  workers from more d is tant d i s t r i c t s  
ju s t  as Papuans had come to look on indentured labour in some part 
of the country other than th e i r  own as a r i t e  of passage, an 
indispensible experience, an adventure.
The higher ra t io  of white assistants and overseers to Papuans 
workers, and the higher salaries these Europeans commanded in 
comparison with those paid to Chinese overseers and Tamil 
kanganies in the East, may also account in part fo r  the less than 
optimum numbers of Papuan labourers that could be afforded.
Indeed, to th is  ra t io  would be at t r ibuted at least part of the 
chronic cost disadvantage Papuan commodities were to bear
216
8 PAR 1930-31, p. 6.
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throughout the co lon ia l  p e r io d . (9)
J F Horn, a son of W A Horn, chairman of BNGD 1913-1922, and a 
d i re c to r  of Robinson River P lanta t ion  v i s i t i n g  Papua in 1932, 
recorded the ' a l l - i n '  average cost to the company of an indentured 
labourer as t h i r t y - tw o  s h i l l i n g s  a month.(10) This cost can hardly 
i have changed much in the whole period 1910-1940, and since the 
information was fo r  the eyes of the other d i rec to rs  only,  i t  is 
l i k e l y  to be re l i a b le .  Papuans, i t  seems, could be employed fo r  as 
l i t t l e  as a s h i l l i n g  a day. I f  the sa la r ies  paid to government 
o f f i c e r s  are a guide, the incomes of employed Europeans on the 
other hand increased by over 70% in the period 1906-1925. The war 
had brought i n f l a t i o n  and the col lapse of the gold standard. The 
purchasing power of Papuan wages had c e r ta in l y  diminished. And 
perhaps the real incomes of whites had not r isen ,  the £370 paid to 
an ARM in 1925 purchasing no more than the £225 of 1906.(11) The 
Papuan Annual Report 1912-13 shows the sa la r ies  of the managers of 
the government p lan ta t ions  at Baibara and Kemp Welch River to be 
£250 and that of an ass is tant  £200. By 1925-26 these had r isen at 
Kemp Welch to between £420 and £510 fo r  the manager, and between 
£328 and £400 fo r  the ass is tan t .  Pr ivate employees genera l ly  were 
paid less, though Percy Robinson of Ogamobu recorded tha t  Tom 
Sefton of Koi tak i  had a income of £800 a year in 1919 - probably 
the highest salary paid to any employed manager in Papua and equal 
to that of the Papuan T reasu re r . (12) Robinson was drawing under
9 See below p. 340
10 J F Horn. (Diary o f)  'T r ip  from Sydney to  Robinson River 
to  inspect property ,  1932'. in the possession of Commander 
J F Horn, Sydney, 1975.
11 PAR 1912-13, p. 25; PAR 1925-26, p. 33.
12 Robinson L e t te rs ,  13 August 1919.
half th is  amount. Many smaller planters might have subsisted fo r  
long periods on a quarter or less of Sefton1s income, and on th e i r  
f ish ing ,  chickens, eggs and f r u i t .
And Papuan workers were not e n t i re ly  without bargaining power. 
They could respond in the 'market' fo r  th e i r  labour i f  the value 
:i of wages or conditions f e l l  too quickly below those to which they 
had become accustomed by refusing to 'sign on'.  This they did in 
1920 en masse as prices fo r  trade goods rose rap id ly  and r ice  
became unavai lable as food on many estates. At other times, 
knowing th e i r  worth with a pa r t icu la r  employer, Papuans with 
experience and s k i l l s  did not hesitate to ask fo r  more than the 
ten s h i l l in g s  a month that even before 1914 had become the minimum 
recognised as ' f a i r  remuneration' by RMs witnessing the signing of 
contracts. Wages of t h i r t y  sh i l l in g s  a month or more were commonly 
paid to valued boats crew and boss boys, in some cases bringing 
the i r  to ta l  earnings in cash and keep to above a ha l f  of what a
loca l ly  employed white overseer might cost an employer. In January 
1919 Percy Robinson of Ogamobu was forced to increase the monthly 
wage of Heagi, skipper of his rec ru i t ing  boat, the Varoe, from £7 
to £8, because Whittens' re c ru i te r  Butterworth had offered the 
Hanuabadan as much as £10.(13) Such Papuans earning sixteen times 
the minimum wage were receiving considerably more than sk i l led  
Asian art isans and clerks on plantat ions in the 'East ' .  The NLO 
and Native Labour Regulations la id down no scale of wages for  
private employers to observe, but ten sh i l l in g s  a month was the 
minimum paid to crown servants - so sett ing an actual standard. In 
the i r  ninth year of service Papuan clerks working fo r  the
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government could be paid £8 a month and retain the i r  entit lement 
to rat ions and a clothing i s su e . (14) By comparison many unskilled 
Australian workers could not earn as much as £4 a week or £16 a 
month in 1938.
The campaign of public opposition to the government throughout 
1915 had been without resul t  and Murray's posit ion remained quite 
secure where Australians were pre-occupied by a far  greater 
confl ict  fur ther  af ield.  In 1916 there was a l u l l .  In March and 
April there had been Judge Murray's v i s i t  to the Bri t ish Solomon 
Islands Protectorate.  In May he asked the businessmen of Port 
Moresby to prepare proposals for discussions ' re la t ing  to the 
welfare of the Ter r i t o ry1. Bruce could write in the paper of 17th 
May that  there was 'no doubt that  since the big public meeting 
held in the Ins t i tu t e  twelve months ago the policy of the 
Administration has changed for the bet ter . . .now the tension is 
over, matters which in the past have been used as st icks to beat 
the Administration with, can be discussed in an amicable way and 
adjusted' .(15) I t  was the nearest  he was ever to come to a 
conci l iatory word, the a r t i c l e  elsewhere bearing his unmistakeable 
stamp. At a meeting held on 25th May attended by three principal 
merchants, F 0 Greenwood of Burns Phi Ip, Charles Baldwin, and 
Robert Whitten, J C Smith of the Bank of New South Wales,
G A Loudon - as both principal planter and merchant, and the 
planters Arthur Jewell of Lolorua and Tom Sefton of Koitaki,  quite 
innocuous proposals were prepared for Murray's consideration.
14 Laws of the Terr i tory of Papua 1888-1945, Vol 4, Notices 
relat ing to Government Employees, Notice of 25 November 
1925, p 3416.
15 Papuan Times, 17 May 1916.
220
Coastal beacons, the Sapphire Creek road, Asians as domestic 
servants, an agr icu l tu ra l  expert! Nothing related to the demands 
of 1915 fo r  elected representat ion, t r i a l  by ju ry ,  or pol ic ies 
more 'sympathetic' to those engaged in the ' ind us t r ia l  development 
of the country1 were included, except perhaps the suggestion that 
the Papuans be taxed at l a s t . (16) In September, in response to a 
■■protest from the Samarai Chamber of Commerce, Loudon defended the 
increase in duty on imported American tw is t  tobacco that the 
government had found i t  convenient to impose to protect the new 
local 'Bung' tw is t  produced by BNGD. (17) The d irectors in London 
congratulated the general manager on the apparently 'be t te r  
re la t ions '  prevai l ing with the adm in is t ra t ion . (18) For eighteen 
months the government stores were a major purchaser of the 
company's tobacco grown and manufactured at Katea before the 
1917-18 crop was wiped out by disease.
With the tree crops planted in the boom years coming in to  
bearing the value of the agr icu l tu ra l  exports of the Te r r i to ry  
exceeded that of gold fo r  the f i r s t  time in 1915-16. True, 
proceeds of gold production had dropped from nearly £70,000 in 
1910-11 to under £40,000, but the value of Papuan rubber had risen 
from only £1500 to £14,846 in twelve months. In the fo l lowing 
year, 1916-17, the value of copra alone, £40,000, exceeded that of 
gold, and rubber proceeds approached £30,000. By 1919-20 copra 
exports would be valued at £124,000, rubber at £41,542 and sisal
16 ib id .  2 August 1916.
17 ib id .  13 September 1916.
18 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol 2, 16 January 1916, Thompson to 
Loudon.
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hemp at over £12,000.(19) Yet the returns were deeply 
disappointing in terms of outlay,  costs and expectations.  With 
shipping scarce on account of the war, f reight  costs were 
increasing, inf la t ion rapidly rais ing the costs of the imported 
r ice,  cal ico and blankets supplied on issue to indentured 
labourers jus t  as i t  lowered the real value of receipts ,  white 
sa lar ies  and native wages. In 1913-14, 929 vessels had entered and 
were cleared from Papuan ports with a combined displacement of 
358,506 tons,  some sixty-six of these clearances being for 
' foreign'  - mostly Dutch - ships.  The figures included coastal 
shipping but the tonnage was very large indeed for two ports the 
size of Port Moresby and Samarai with no week passing, i t  seems, 
without an overseas vessel in one or both ports.  From 1918 until  
1923, no foreign ships at all cal led,  the number of vessels 
cleared fa l l ing to eighty-six all told in 1919-20 with a combined 
tonnage of only 59,189 t o n s . (20) And for much of the produce only 
the Australian market was accessible.  Southern buyers were great ly 
advantaged. Sisal hemp could not be sold in Sydney for as much as 
£30 a ton when i t  was fetching £60 in London and more in New 
York.(21) Able to sell  all i t s  rubber in Austral ia Koitaki was 
alone in being able to pay a dividend of five-pence a share in 
1917 (22), but for anyone producing copra and unable to find 
shipping to the European markets a return on investment in Papua 
seemed unlikely for years.
19 PAR 1919-20. pp. 77-78.
20 PAR 1921-22. p. 108.
21 See below p. 346
22 Papuan Courier, 9 November 1917.
222
The prudent general manager since 1912 of the Clarke and 
Whiting propert ies at Kanosia and Fa i r fax  Harbour, Archie 
MacAlpine, resigned in 1916. A red-hai red Scot, Archie had been in 
Papua since 1908. He now l e f t  the country f o r  two years to return 
again in 1918 as p lan ta t ion  inspector fo r  BNGD. In 1916 out of 
necessity or oppor tun i ty  Ar thur  Bloomfie ld,  as secretary of Clarke 
and Whit ings'  companies, and p r inc ipa l  in the two Kemp Welch River 
ventures and the Gal ley Reach P lan ta t ion ,  now establ ished the 
Moresby Trading and Agency Company to manage a l l  these in te re s ts .  
Though a frequent v i s i t o r  to Papua staying fo r  months at a t ime, 
the 'magni f icen t '  Bloomfield remained based in Melbourne employing 
a manager and accountant in Port . The Moresby Trading and Agency 
Company would be a casualty of the collapse of trade in 1921, the 
ro le  tha t  i t  pioneered as a small 'agency house' being taken up in 
1922 by G A Loudon and Co and subsequently the B r i t i s h  New Guinea 
Trading Company, both wholely owned subs id iar ies  of BNGD, and 
managing agents f o r  the p lan ta t ions  of BNGD and Clarke and Whiting 
u n t i l  1934 when BNGD resumed the d i re c t  control  of i t s  estates and 
agencies.
In 1916-17 p lanters genera l ly  were pre-occupied with the change 
in p lan ta t ion  management and rout ines brought on by the t r a n s i t i o n  
from 'development' to product ion. Opposit ion to Murray's 
admin is tra t ion  from the e d i to r  of the Papuan Times also lo s t  some 
of i t s  i n t e n s i t y  as Wi l l iam Bruce's other business in te res ts  
de te r io ra te d . His indebtedness to  BNG Trading, the BNGD commercial 
subsid iary , reached an alarming amount as the company had been 
prepared to al low him extended c re d i t  - apparent ly on account of
/
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' the business he could bring the company's way ' . (23) I t  is perhaps 
more l i k e l y  that i t  was fo r  his e d i to r ia ls  in the local paper that 
he was shown quite unusual forbearance. But in Apr i l  1917 on 
instruct ions from London the company sought to recover £600 out of 
over £1,300 owed in a court action and to meet the debt Bruce was 
forced to transfe r to BNGD the proceeds of the sale to Houlder 
Brothers Ltd of his timber l icences and of his half  share in the 
Manu Manu saw-mill enterprise, The Papua Company.(24) Short ly 
afterwards he also sold Doa, his rubber plantat ion at Galley 
Reach, to BNGD so that he could se t t le  other accounts. He could no 
longer maintain his in te rest  in the Papuan Times. Under a changed 
name, The Papuan Courier, the paper limped through the year 
appealing fo r  readers to buy rather than borrow copies and in 
February 1918 a company, the Papuan Courier Ltd. was formed, with 
G A Loudon a substantial  shareholder. Bruce continued to l i ve  on 
Touaguba h i l l  in Port in increasingly desperate s t r a i t s .  In 1918 
year he was forced to pay f ines in a case brought by the Col lector  
of Customs. In 1920 his house was burnt down in circumstances 
where arson was suspected.(25)
G A Loudon might himself have been the author of some of the
ed i to r ia ls  in the Papuan Courier of the next two years as the
23 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol 2, 24 February 1916, Thompson to 
Loudon.
24 ib id .  Bruce's debts amounted to £1353, Richard deMoleyn's 
to £731, -and those of Captain Archibald Hunter's family to 
£3,353. The action against Bruce was reported in the 
Papuan Courier, 18 Apri l  1917.
25 Bruce died and was buried at Sapphire Creek on 30 May 
1924. Mrs Bruce had only recent ly returned from hospital 
in Port with blackwater fever. After her departure fo r  
Austra l ia  the Executive Council agreed to wr i te  o f f  her 
hospital b i l l s .
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f rus t ra t ions  of the disappoint ing market in Papuan commodities and 
the shipping shortages were prolonged in to  the post-war period - 
confounding the hope that peace would bring prosper ity, and 
bringing tensions to the surface again in several court actions 
where the paper seemed to speak exclusively as the voice of BN6D. 
With the fa i lu re  of i t s  tobacco manufacturing industry the company 
was no longer obliged to tread ca re fu l ly  in i t s  dealings with the 
government. While Murray could not be blamed fo r  a tobacco 
disease, somehow his administrat ion could s t i l l  seem responsible 
fo r  the general malaise. I t  jus t  did not appear to have t r ie d  hard 
enough to secure fo r  the planters the conditions that would assure 
them p ro f i t s .
Indeed, from the planters'  point of view, the Lieutenant 
Governor now appeared to be taking a new d irec t ion  in development 
in which they had no part at a l l .  In 1918, perhaps disappointed at 
the progress of s e t t le r  based agr icu l tu re and affected by planter 
h o s t i l i t y ,  but ce r ta in ly  becoming aware of the l imi ted value of 
plantat ion work experience fo r  the Papuans, Murray prepared two 
measures to st imulate cash crop production in the v i l lages.  In 
January 1919 the Native Taxes Ordinance came into operation. I t  
levied a tax of ten s h i l l in g s  a year on indentured labourers and 
£1 (twenty sh i l l ing s )  a year on 'natives other than native 
labourers' in areas to be declared tax d i s t r i c t s .  The la t t e r  
could, however-, remit th e i r  tax in the form of a given amount of 
produce or labour. The tax in kind or labour could be paid through 
work on 'Native Plantat ions' which were to be establ ished in many 
d i s t r i c t s  under a separate ordinance. The proceeds of the tax on 
wages and the sale of tax in kind together with approximately a
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half of the value of the production of the native plantat ions 
reserved as the government's share, were to be placed in a Native 
Education Fund.(26)
This was a ca re fu l ly  planned attempt to encourage Papuans to 
part ic ipa te in production on th e i r  own behalf and at the same time 
contr ibute towards the costs of th e i r  'e leva t ion ' .  But by making 
i t  appear that v i l lage rs  were being taxed more than indentured 
labourers while al lowing the former to pay in kind, i t  seemed to 
planters that the new taxation scheme was another of Murray's 
t r i c ks  and l i k e l y  to prove pre jud ic ia l  to recruitment. I f  
plantat ion agricu l tu re  was not f lou r ish ing ,  should not the tax 
have been in cash alone to encourage indenture rather than to 
discourage i t?  The Lieutenant Governor admitted that the object of 
the ordinance was not to increase recruitment. He thought i t s  
ef fects would be quite neutral and pointed to a large increase in 
the labour avai lable in the year immediately fo l lowing the 
introduction of the tax. In the meantime, in 1918, there had been a 
fu r the r  major confrontat ion with BNGD over the treatment of Papuan 
workers by employees of the company.
26 NAPNG & CRS G128, Item 8, 11 June 1920.
The government's Native Plantat ions scheme never f u l f i l l e d  
the sanguine hopes held out fo r  i t  at the outset. Basic­
a l l y  th is  was because, l ike  the planters, v i l lage rs  were 
to be disappointed by the low returns they obtained - 
returns even fu r the r  reduced af ter  the government's ' tax '  
share was taken out of the proceeds of sale. While fo r  
many years v i l lage rs  had been at times compelled to plant 
coconut palms and other useful trees under the Native 
Regulations there was also the hin t of compulsion in the 
way RMs put pressure on communities to plant the new 
Native Plantat ions that were to be ' jo in t ly-owned' by 
v i l lage rs  and the government. I t  was 'u p -h i l l  work' ,
Murray noted in the 1926-27 Annual Report (p. 10) where i t  
was calculated that the to ta l  area of commercial crops 
cu l t ivated by v i l lage rs  - under both the Native Regulat­
ions and the Native Plantat ion Ordinance - had reached
7,000 acres. But by 1932-33, a year when i t  might very • 
well have been ' d i f f i c u l t  to keep the natives interested 
in copra',  only sixty-seven tons with a return of £671 was 
produced under the Native Plantations scheme fo r  the whole 
Terri tory.(PAR, 1932-33, p. 15) In the fo l lowing year 
v i l lage rs  of the South Eastern Div is ion, the main 
producers, received only £176. Even Papuan grown coffee 
did better in 1933-34 with 55,552 pounds produced in 
v i l lages of the Northern Division being sold fo r  £1,541, 
the Papuans' share be ing £762.(PAR,1933-34, p. 29)
The subst i tu t ion of loca l ly  grown r ice fo r  imported r ice 
was also promoted a f te r  1920. Yet r ice cu l t iva t ion  in the 
Mekeo under the guidance of the Cathol ic Mission remained 
'desul tory '  when the e f f o r t  required to produce ninety 
tons of paddy that was reduced to f i f ty -seven  tons of 
mil led r ice  brought only £389 in 1932-33 to a community 
probably expecting much more. Papuans were not starv ing, 
and short of a miracle - to which some indeed might have 
looked to remedy the inequi t ies of the i r  predicament 
v is -a -v is  whites - they were not prepared to work very 
much harder fo r  l i t t l e  fu r ther  reward. In the end i t  is 
l i k e l y  that the cash in hand return from the sale of copra 
to the white traders was greater than from sale through 
the government's scheme. While the quant i ty of copra 
bought by the traders could not be measured, i t  was 
estimated in the 1938-39 Annual Report to be between 2,500 
and 3,000 tons - an amount which, i f  nearly correct, might 
have returned as much as £25,000 to the traders and the i r  
v i l lage  suppl iers and a sum cer ta in ly  much larger than the 
proceeds of the Native Plantation scheme. (PAR 1938-39, 
p. 28, fo r  the estimated tonnage).
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Chapter 12 Cr is is  at It ikinumu
On May 10th 1918 twenty-eight labourers from BNGD's I tikinumu 
estate who had l e f t  t h e i r  work and walked t h i r t y  miles to Port 
Moresby were prosecuted by the company fo r  desertion. The Native 
A f fa i rs  Department provided a defence fo r  the labourers on the 
grounds that they had had reasonable cause to refuse to 
work. Between the desertion and the hearing, Stanley Greenland, 
one of the three o f f ice rs  of the Department, made an inspection of 
the estate, the f i r s t  in nearly two years. His report set out a 
long l i s t  of breaches of the labour code he found had occurred in 
the interim. These included fa i lu re  to supply food from the 
plantat ion stores in the prescribed way, overworking labourers, 
and i l l i c i t l y  imposing Sunday work on rubber tappers. Two 
plantat ion assistants, Will iam Moysey and John Simpson-King, were 
interviewed and reported as saying that the manager, Richard 
Jensen, and another assistant,  Percy Nunn, had cont inua l ly  beaten 
labourers. Moysey said he had remonstrated with Jensen whose 
response had been that ' I  w i l l  not allow a bloody nigger to get 
the best of m e ' . ( l )  Jensen had barely escaped convict ion on a 
charge of grievous bodi ly harm a few months e a r l ie r  when he had 
thrown a lamp at a labourer causing the loss of an eye. What 
p a r t icu la r ly  disturbed Greenland now was the fa i lu re  of the 
management to provide proper eating utensi ls  as required under the 
NLO Regulations. Such neglect suggested not only disregard for the 
law but contempt for  the labourers on the part of the management.
1 CRS A1 18/12377. Greenland's report of 7 January 1918.
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At the hearing the company's complaint was dismissed on 
'reasonable cause' for  desertion being shown. Native A f fa i rs  
immediately made a counter claim fo r  cancel lat ion of the contracts 
of the twenty-eight. Jensen was obliged to give his consent to the 
terminations as the employer's agent. The Executive Council met 
and considering Greenland's report ordered that no labour was to 
be hired or transferred to Jensen or Nunn again. The company was 
cal led upon to show cause why the remaining 125 labourers on 
Itikinumu should not also have th e i r  contracts cancel l e d . (2)
G A Loudon protested to Murray that BNGD was being 'punished' 
fo r  what had been the 'unauthorised' behaviour of an employee 
whose misconduct should f i r s t  have been reported to the company so 
that an attempt to remedy the s i tua t ion  could have been made 
before the matter reached a court. No notice had been given BNGD, 
as the employer, of Native A f fa i r s '  in tention to apply fo r  
cancel lat ion of the contracts of the twenty-eight, as required 
under the NLO, and Jensen, Loudon maintained, had no authori ty  to 
consent. He quoted precedents where a notice of in tention to 
cancel contracts had been given and suggested that the company had 
a claim on the government for  the loss of labour i t  had 
su f fe red .(3)
Murray repl ied in the th i rd  person that i f  there was evidence 
that the 125 labourers would in fu ture be treated f a i r l y  then 
perhaps th e i r  contracts might not be cancel led. He added that the 
'Lieutenant Governor does not intend to in te r fe re  (with the Native
2 Ib id . "
3 NAPNG & CRS Series G/128, Item 6, Loudon to Murray, 28 May
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A f fa i rs  action) but the Company's bona f ides w i l l  be revealed i f  
Jensen and Nunn are retained in employ or i f  the 28 labourers 
whose contracts have already been cancelled are not paid th e i r  
wages without fu r the r  delay1. (4)
With the p o s s ib i l i t y  that I t ikinumu would be l e f t  en t i re ly  
bereft  of labour as well as of management, Loudon was forced to 
take control over the estate himself where an outbreak of 'Pink' 
disease had occured to complicate mat te rs . (5) He carr ied out his 
own enquiries in to  labourers'  complaints and concluded that 
Jensen's pr inc ipal  'e r ro r '  had been to require workers to dig 
sweet potatoes fo r  th e i r  evening meal a f te r  they had f inished work 
at 2 pm instead of issuing the food from the plantat ion stores. 
Loudon found the desertions had been inc i ted by Okari of Kokoda, a 
man who had been convicted of desertion previously. George 
Wiseman, the v i s i t i n g  expert from Malaya, accompanied the general 
manager to It ikinumu and observed that an offence s im i la r  to 
Jensen's in the FMS would have brought the manager a f ine  of $100, 
or between £11 and £12, whereas BNGD stood to lose over £1,000.(6)
The termination of the contracts of labourers essential to the 
continued running of a d is tant  estate because subordinate managers 
or assistants there had breached the labour code or assaulted 
labourers was a vexing problem fo r  a general manager located in 
Port Moresby. -And in asking fo r  advanced notice that grounds
4 NAPNG & CRS Series G/128, Item 6, Murray to Loudon, 29 May 
1918.
5 Corticium Salmonicolor - a fungal disease of rubber.
6 CRS Al, Item 18/12377. Submission Loudon to Hunt, 22 July 
1918.
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existed for prosecutions that might be avoided if action was 
quickly taken, Loudon was not asking for consideration that the 
government did not extend to others. Indeed, in defence of the 
necessity to proceed with serious charges from time to time,
Murray could show later that warnings were much more frequent than 
prosecutions.(7) In 1920 when an inspector reported unfavourably 
on the labourers' quarters on Kemp Welch River Plantation Murray 
sent a telegram to Arthur Bloomfield in Melbourne forewarning him 
and promising that his officers would not take action if 
Bloomfield would arrange to 'clean things up'. Bloomfield and 
Murray were on good terms, but was Loudon asking for more than an 
opportunity to 'clean things up' in 1918?
At a second hearing in June no complaints made on behalf of the 
125 remaining labourers on Itikinumu were sustained and Native 
Affairs'  application for the termination of their contracts was 
dropped. There is no evidence that Murray did interfere to prevent 
the matter getting out of hand but the failure to find that these 
workers had also been neglected threw doubt on the previous 
decision to cancel the contracts of the twenty-eight. And so the 
company's lawyer, R D Bertie, advanced in a claim for 
compensation.(8) In a let ter  to the Government Secretary he 
pointed out the inconsistency in the findings and claimed that the 
Lieutenant Governor's remark about the company/s bona tides 
constituted a threat. Bertie also claimed that officials had since 
placed obstacles in the path of BNGD as i t  sought to re-engage the 
twenty-eight for work on another of i ts plantations - despite an 
7
8
See below p. 419.
CRS A1 Item 18/12377. With Loudon's submission to Hunt 
22 July 1918.
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assurance given by Murray that ' i f  the 28 discharged labourers 
want to work at Waigani - every f a c i l i t y  w i l l  be given them to 
"sign on"1.(9)
In a le t t e r  to Murray, Loudon proposed that since the 
government l i ke  his company had inspectors of plantat ions, the 
administrat ion might share with pr ivate enterprise the 
respons ib i l i ty  fo r  working out the d i f f i c u l t i e s  that arose over 
labour from time to time. He did not, he said, object to the 
summary punishment of employees who fa i le d  to carry out th e i r  
duties under the NLO, but suggested that as the government also 
found d i f f i c u l t y  in f ind ing sui table white s ta f f ,  'some 
sympathetic considerat ion' might be extended to pr ivate  employers 
in such circumstances.(10)
Loudon was the complete businessman. His proposal was fo r  a
re la t ionship  between government and pr ivate employers based on
mutual in terests and pr ivate understandings l ike  that which
obtained between businesses. No suggestion could have been made
more calculated to receive a rebuff from th is  Lieutenant Governor,
trained in the law, who could only regard such a re la t ionsh ip ,
♦
were i t  to come about, as corrupt, and Loudon's proposal as an 
in v i ta t io n  to set the law aside. And the imputation that 
government o f f ice rs  might be of doubtful in te g r i t y ,  or less than 
competent, was one - whatever the t ru th  in i t  - Hubert Murray 
could hardly entertain as grounds for  co-operation.
9 Ib id .
10 NAPNG & CRS Series G128, Item 6, Loudon to Murray, 7 June
There is some evidence that BNGD, Loudon's company and the one 
with which the government had by fa r  the greatest d i f f i c u l t y ,  did 
d isc ip l ine  i t s  managers and assistants who were in breach of the 
NLO or who were known to have committed offences that risked 
prosecution under the criminal code - ju s t  as the company 
frequent ly  sacked employees fo r  other kinds of incompetence.
Michael Burgess, an assistant who would make al legations in 1921 
about mistreatment of labour on It ik inumu, Jawarere and 
Baubauguina, noted in his deposition that the Manager at 
Baubauguina, Meredith, had dismissed an assistant fo r  assaulting 
labourers. Meredith was himself subsequently sacked fo r  s im i lar  
behaviour on the basis of a complaint Burgess had wr i t ten 
to Loudon.(11) I t  is possible that these instances coming at the 
end of the 'development' period may prove l i t t l e  about the proper 
supervision of white employees in the previous decade and more 
about the extent to which the company was la te ly  becoming careful.  
I t  is equal ly possible that Loudon could have done l i t t l e  bet ter  
over the years than he claimed to have done in the supervision of 
his managers given the qua l i ty  of white employees avai lable.
Bertram Bramell, w r i t ing  in the 1915-16 Annual Report conceded 
that i t  was 'possibly the inexperience of p lantat ion managers and 
overseers with Papuans' that had 'a great deal to do with 
complaints and desert ions '. (12) In a l e t t e r  to the Papuan Courier 
in December 1918, Prosper Charpentier, the Woodlark planter, wrote 
that only the* larger companies had labour problems because they 
were forced to employ ' inexperienced and irresponsib le young
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11 Ib id .
12 PAR 1916-17, p .27.
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overseers and a ss i s t an t s '  who competed with each o t h e r . (13) But 
even single plantat ion enterprises employing ass i s tants  could have 
d i f f i cul t y .  The l e t t e r s  of Percy Robinson of Ogamobu in the period 
1918-1924 suggest that  competent and sober white ass i s tants  were 
very d i f f i c u l t  to obtain in Papua. The record of convictions of 
Europeans working on plantat ions is examined fur ther  in Chapter 
19.
Murray was l a t er  to r idicule  the suggestion that  BNGD should 
have a special immunity from accountabil i ty for the conduct of i t s  
employees.(14) If  Jensen and Nunn were held di rec t ly  responsible 
for t he i r  f a i lu r e  to observe the requirements of the NLO on the 
estate in t he i r  charge, and could as a consequence have the i r  
r ight  to control Papuan labour cur ta i led,  the company, l ike any 
other employer, had to accept the fur ther  consequences brought 
about because of i t s  f a i lu re  to adequately supervise i t s  
agents. Unless i t  was to be imputed that  the company everywhere 
t reated i t s  labourers badly and had attempted to 'economise* in 
the treatment of i t s  Papuan employees, then the law could take no 
other course. Conditions on other BNGD estates  in 1918 were not 
called into question and in September in a l e t t e r  to Loudon, 
almost cer tainly to make a point,  Murray complimented the company 
on labour rela t ions  at Waigani.(15) Loudon responded that  he had 
always found labour contented on his own v i s i t s  to the plantat ions 
in the ' e a s t ' . (16) Without attempting to defend the conduct of
13 Papuan Courier. 6 December 1918.
14 CRS A1 18/12377, Murray to Hunt. See also below p. 281.
15 NAPNG & CRS Series G128, Item 6, Murray to Loudon, 17 
September 1918.
16 Ibid. Loudon to Murray, 18 September 1918.
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Bernesconi in 1913 or Jensen and Nunn in 1918 i t  is quite possible 
to conceive that at least some of the labour discontent and 
desertions in the Central Division originated in restlessness 
among Papuan rec ru i ts  unhappy at having to work on a plantat ion 
away from the sea. On the Sogeri plateau where It ikinumu is 
si tuated, where nights could be cold and the work of rubber 
tapping exacting and boring, Papuans were also denied the 
excitement of ports and ships to which young men looked forward as 
a major a t t rac t ion  in indentured service. As a consequence 
' c o n t ro l1 might indeed have been more d i f f i c u l t .  Archie 
MacAlpine, BNGD plantat ion inspector in 1920, noted in a 
report submitted to Native A f fa i r s ,  dealing with yet another 
c r is is  at I t ik inumu, that the Sogeri d i s t r i c t  was unpopular with 
1abourers.(17) The same may have been true to some extent of 
Baubauguina and Rorona, plantat ions which, whi le much closer to 
the sea, were not on the beach. Bernesconi had pleaded as much in 
mit iga t ion of his conduct at Baubauguina in 1914. J T O'Malley, RM 
in the Central Div is ion in 1912, suggested that Raymond Dubois 
might well be having d i f f i c u l t y  in obtaining labour at Bomana 
because 'natives accustomed to the sea hate to work on a 
piantat ion in i  and'. (18)
Correspondence continued over the Jensen and Nunn a f f a i r  for
the remainder of 1918 with Murray gaining ammunition from a le t t e r
sent to him by Jensen in July asking that the ban denying him the
r igh t  to control Papuan employees be l i f t e d .  He had, Jensen wrote,
been working labour in Papua fo r  more than ten years without
17 CRS A1 18/12377 MacAlpine's report on conditions at I t i k i ­
numu, September 1920.
18 CRS A1 17593, 13/71.
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previous convict ions and at t r ibuted his d i f f i c u l t i e s  at It ikinumu 
to pressures from 'head o f f i c e '  in Port Moresby to 
' economise'. (19) In a l e t t e r  to Atlee Hunt, Murray made te l l i n g  
comparisons between the claims of Jensen and Loudon without 
conceding anything to e i ther .  Indeed that Jensen had not 
previously been convicted of assaults may have been ch ie f ly  due to 
want of witnesses as he was by th is  time suspected on good grounds 
of being a p a r t i c u la r ly  v io len t  man. His plea that he had been 
subject to pressure from Loudon might have had some substance but 
a h in t that he had attempted to blacken the name of the company 
having leaked out, Loudon wrote in October to the 
Government Secretary, Herbert Champion, l i s t i n g  items from his 
c i rcu la rs  directed to the managers of BNGD plantat ions since June 
1915 in which he had st ipu lated actions to be taken to ensure 
compliance with the food requirements under the NLO 
Regulat ions.(20) Also w r i t ing  to Atlee Hunt, Loudon set out the 
company's version of events from the beginning and in an intimate 
manner suggested that ' the Minister and yoursel f  are Chairman and 
Director of Papua Limited fo r  the Commonwealth and Murray is the 
general manager; don' t  you think i t  is time you had a board 
meeting?'(21)
To fu r the r  embitter re la t ions between the government and the 
largest company in Papua, hard on the heels of the c r i s i s  at 
It ikinumu came the destruct ion in January 1919 of the Merrie
19 CRS A1 18/12377, copy in Murray's report to Hunt. Jensen's 
l e t t e r  was dated 29 July but Murray does not appear to 
have repl ied un t i l  9 November.
20 Ib id. Loudon to Champion, 1 October 1918.
21 Ib id .  Loudon to Hunt, 2 October 1918.
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England, the Lieutenant Governor's steam yacht used for his tours 
of inspection. BNGD was held l iable  as an employee, ki l led in the
di sas ter ,  had caused an explosion while carrying out repairs.  On 
the principle of ' respondent superior '  the government proceeded to 
recover £11,000 from the company.(22)
By 1919 shareholder capital  in BNGD was exhausted with over 
£500,000 having been outlayed in developing 12,500 of i t s  holdings 
of 70,000 acres. The company was forced to make the f i r s t  of 
several debenture issues to meet the continuing drain on 
resources. Already known locally in j e s t  as the 'bung' company 
after  i t s  i n i t i a l s  and i t s  unfortunately named "Bung" twist  
tobacco, BNGD suffered from having at the outset  undertaken to 
develop in Papua too many propert ies too widely dis t r ibuted.  The 
company's large experiments with s i sa l ,  tobacco and cotton - 
considered in a l a t er  chapter - proved expensive f a i lu r es .  As the 
largest  private employer i t  is very l ikely that  i t  suffered most, 
despite G A Loudon's drive and resourcefulness,  from the 
d i f f i cu l t i e s  increased by the war in obtaining competent 
subordinate s t af f .
Murray and his off icers  would look back on the whole period 
unti l  1922 as the pioneering or development phase in Papua, one 
where they had worked to educate an asser t ive and insensi t ive 
s e t t l e r  community, ' ind i f fe rent  to native suf fer ing ' ,  in i t s  
responsibi l i t i es  towards the Papuans. Understandably perhaps, the 
managers of company estates  in those years,  most of whom had come
22 This was the second vessel of the same name. An ear l i e r  
Merrie England was wrecked in 1912.
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quite inexperienced to t rop ica l  agr icu l tu re ,  might indeed have 
been pre-occupied with the immense task of plantat ion development 
and incl ined to give labour less at tention than i t  required. 
Certa inly, as i t  was, organization of the labour force inev i tab ly  
demanded much time, but time often grudgingly given when so much 
else needed to be done. In the eight years before f u l l  production 
from perennial tree crops could commence shareholders' capital 
represented in most cases the whole of 'income' and the pressure 
upon and from d irectors and general managers to conserve funds 
was considerable, the costs of development of plantat ions in Papua 
general ly, i t  appears, greatly exceeding the est imates.(23)
23 Expenditure on development of BN6D estates in the f i r s t  
nine months of 1913 had amounted to £36,000 when the 
estimates had projected expenditure of £22,000.. In the 
fo l lowing year funds remitted to Port Moresby by the 
London o f f ice  were averaging £5,000 a month (or £60,000 a 
year). At the same time, while the proceeds of the 
company's trading and sale of i t s  produce had been 
estimated at £16,940 fo r  1913, only £7,946 was real ised. 
(BNGD Letterbooks, 14 May and 26 June 1914, S L Thompson 
to Lewis Cowley.) In 1918 with the plantat ions in 
production the sum of £14,000 had s t i l l  to be remitted to 
Papua fo r  the f i r s t  ha lf  year when £5,537 had been al l  
that had been estimated as needed fo r  the whole year. 
( Ib id ,  June 1918).
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Chapter 13 Bringing matters to a head
At a meeting of the revived Planters' Association in February
1919, held while Judge Murray was in Austra l ia ,  members considered
the Native Labour Ordinance and ways in which i t  might be modified
to better su i t  the needs of planters. An attempt was made to be
construct ive wi th in the ex is t ing p o l i t i c a l  and economic
boundaries, and Champion, in telegramming the recommendations of
the meeting on to Murray noted that they were 'couched in very
courteous te rm s ' . (1) Like the businessmen's group which had
included Loudon, Sefton and Jewell that Murray had asked to make
proposals fo r  improvements fo r  the 'welfare of the T e r r i to ry '  in
May 1916, so with th is  meeting of planters in 1919 - once they sat
down to work out and agree upon practical  action much the same
people who wanted Murray's removal could betray a moderation or,
at least a sense of p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y ,  hardly hinted at in the
rhetor ic  of the publ ic meetings and the Papuan Courier. They now
agreed that very l i t t l e  amendment in the law could, in fa c t ,  be
ju s t i f i e d .  The pr inc ipal  d i f f i c u l t i e s  planters faced were in the
administration of the ordinance. Large discre t ionary  powers had
been given to young and inexperienced o f f i c i a l s  who f e l t  bound to
carry out the le t t e r  rather than the s p i r i t  of the law. In cases
of i l le g a l  rec ru i t ing  involving a government o f f i c e r ,  the
respons ib i l i ty ,  the planters suggested, lay with the government to
recover fo r  an innocent employer any losses he might have
suffered. RMs should have the power only to recommend the
cancel lat ion of contracts where white employees were at f a u l t ;  the
decision in such matters, they proposed, should be reserved to the
1 NAPNG & CRS G128, Item 6, Champion to Murray, 10 February 
1919. Also CRS Al 19/10372.
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Executive Council. Or, i f  th is  was impractical,  employers should 
have the r igh t  of appeal against the ru l ing  of an RM. Women should 
be permitted to 'sign on' with th e i r  husbands, and though th is  was 
admittedly to the advantage of the employer, i t  was also, the 
planters thought, in the 'na t ive '  in te res t .  Wages should only be 
payable from the commencement of work, and labourers should be 
allowed to agree, i f  destined fo r  a rubber estate, to work by 
ro ta t ion on Sundays, as on any other day, with a compensatory 
payment offered in encouragement. Labourers should be allowed 
during the period of service advances of up to a s ix th  of the 
wages due.
Here was nothing very new. Planters were appealing fo r  leniency 
in the appl icat ion of the law, to have some re s t ra in t  placed on 
the summary ju r i s d ic t io n  of RMs and inspectors, and perhaps to be 
given opportun it ies from time to time ' to  clean things up'.  They 
wanted the indenture of women and unrestr ic ted Sunday tapping on 
the rubber estates. These were proposals, the Association to ld 
Champion, 'from the pract ical  point of v iew ' (2) but they suggest 
that whatever planters might say, i t  was not the NLO that was the 
chief cause of th e i r  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Five hours of tapping on 
Sundays - provided the tappers were not Christ ians - had already 
been conceded and the government was soon to allow the payment of 
advances on wages ju s t  as the Association recommended. The 
indenture of women was a los t  cause. Planters, i t  seems, were 
grasping at straws.
Ib id . The f i v e  hours of Sunday tapping had been permitted
since 1915 (Papua. Government Gazette, 4 Auqust 1915
CRS A1 19/10372). ’
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With the dearth of shipping by May 1919 there was scarcely any 
r ice l e f t  in e i ther of the towns fo r  the plantat ions dependent on 
imported food, and by August the Papuan Courier could declare that
there was a 'famine' in Port Moresby. No overseas vessels at a l l  
cal led between the end of August and 13 October. Percy Robinson of 
Ogamobu recorded that
The native s i tua t ion  is extremely serious on most Plant­
ations and Industr ies where native food is  not grown. I t  
does not worry us but i t  is no joke fo r  most of them with 
a large labour force depending on them fo r  food and no 
food obtainable. Of course the stores are "out" of every­
thing you want & altogether the ar r iva l  of the "Suva" is 
considered with more in te res t  as to what she is carrying 
than ( is )  the v i s i t  of Lord J e l l i c o e . (3)
Staying at Koitaki fo r  a few days he noted that the Seftons 
could eat ' real bu t ter ,  bread, fresh beef and other things we 
haven't seen in Port fo r  many weary weeks '.(4) By Christmas the 
stores were emptied and the apparent fa i l u re  of the government to 
do anything about the s i tua t ion  stood out in bold r e l i e f .  In July 
when i t  had seemed possible that the Commonwealth income tax might 
be applied in Papua the question of the franchise was once more 
raised and the newspaper began a campaign under the slogan of 'no 
representation: no ta x a t io n ' .(5) Ed i to r ia ls  and leaders appearing
3 Robinson Letters, 28 July 1919.
4 Ib id . 11 August 1919.
5 Papuan Courier, e d i to r ia ls  11 Apr i l  and 22 August 1919. 
the paper adopted the motto 18 July. In his le t t e r  of 30 
January 1920, Percy Robinson wrote to say that he had 
wr i t ten a ' leader '  fo r  the paper, his second contr ibution.
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in the remainder of the year - some at l eas t ,  i t  is l ikely,  
writ ten by G A Loudon, possibly others by R D Bertie,  a recently 
arrived 1awyer in Port ,  and at leas t  one by Percy Robinson of 
Ogamobu - were increasingly host i le  to the government.
The shipping shortage brought another actor onto the Papuan 
stage in 1919. Algernon Sydney Fi tch,  a master mariner who had 
spent eight years with the Hooghly Pi lot  Service at Calcutta and 
time since as a s e t t l e r  in Tasmania, now brought a tramp steamer, 
the Queenscl iffe, to the Papuan coastal t rade.  Captain Fitch 
became a successful merchant in Port and his Steamships Trading 
Company by the late  t h i r t i e s  would be second only to BNGD as an 
owner of plantat ions.  In 1919 he had quickly decided that  the 
government of Papua was in the hands of a recluse unsympathetic to 
business . (6)
In the new year the Papuan Courier called for a mass public 
meeting to press for electoral  representat ion and on 13th January 
1920 a new Cit izens '  Association was formed with Captain Fitch in 
the c h a i r . (7) In February with a continuing s t r ike  of marine 
engineers in Austral ia food remained very scarce in Port and the 
new Association used the recently established radio telegraph link 
with Melbourne to ask Murray, then on leave, to secure a r e l i e f  
steamer. A second public meeting held on March 15th demanded 
Murray's remov.al and the appointment of Staniforth Smith in his
6 In a l e t t e r  published in the Sydney Morning Herald of 
14 April 1920 Captain Fitch accused Murray of according 
Customs concessions to the Catholic Mission at Yule 
Island. He claimed that  the Lieutenant Governor was 
' inaccessible to those outside the of f ic ia l  c i r c l e ' .
7 Papuan Courier, 16 January 1920.
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place as a man who could command the confidence of the white 
se t t le rs .  The occasion of the meeting was the publ icat ion of a 
report wr i t ten by Judge Murray in response to an a r t i c le  in a 
Japanese newspaper c r i t i c a l  of 'B r i t i s h '  rule in Papua. Rinzo 
Gond, a jo u rn a l i s t ,  had suggested that Papua had fa l le n  behind 
German New Guinea because of the fa i l u re  of the administrat ions of 
B r i t ish  New Guinea and Papua to give s u f f ic ie n t  encouragement to 
white settlement and th e i r  p roh ib i t ion  on the importation of 
coloured labour . (8) In his report the Lieutenant Governor admitted 
that Europeans were less e f f i c ie n t  in the tropics than they were 
in temperate countries and that Papua could indeed be developed 
more rap id ly  with cheap labour from Asia 'but that from motives of 
patr iot ism and se l f -p ro tec t ion  we preferred to do without such 
labour ' .  (9) At the meeting the tw is t  his remarks had taken about 
the capacit ies of the white se t t le rs  was easi ly  exploited to 
attack the author - though Murray, probably cor rec t ly ,  was to 
suggest in a le t t e r  to the min ister that few attending could have 
read either his report or Gond's a r t i c le .  He attempted to persuade 
the Samarai Chamber of Commerce not to endorse the Port Moresby 
resolut ions but fa i le d .  The ag i ta t ion he at t r ibuted d i re c t ly  to 
the old antipathy of the former government o f f ice rs ,  Bruce and 
Jewell, and to the 'packing' of the meeting by BNGD. The o f f ice rs  
of the company, he suggested in a l e t t e r  sent to the Papuan Agent 
in Sydney, J T Bensted, were ' p a r t i c u la r ly  b i t t e r  against the 
government now fo r  they appear to be losing the i r  case <over the 
destruct ion of the Merrie England> and w i l l  probably have to pay
8 CPP 1917-1918-1919. Vol 6, p. 1623. Report by . . . the  Lieut .
-Governor of Papua...on an a r t i c le  "Three Power Rule
In New Guinea", by Mr Rinzo Gond.
9 NAPNG & CRS G128, Item 8, Murray to the Public Service
Association, 17 March 1920.
243
heavy damages1.(10) He thought that  ' in addition to employees they 
probably induced t he i r  customers to vote for the resolution 
especial ly those who were in t he i r  debt ' .  He asked Bensted to see 
that  a correct  report  containing these charges appeared in the 
Australian press with the comment that  ' the proper view to take is 
that  the division is a triumph for the Government for our native 
policy natural ly makes us many enemies and i t  is a matter of 
surprise that  the majority was not very much l a r g e r ' . (11)
There was some casuis t ry here and the mark of the lawyer. The 
whole s e t t l e r  community was experiencing the consequences of the 
decline in trade and shipping, and BNGD, i f  i t s  employees might 
have been obliged to take part  in the protes t ,  had no need to 
apply di rect  pressure on i t s  customers to join them. Stung by 
Murray's quick resort  to pr int ,  Loudon retorted that  i t  had not 
been BNGD but the government that  had attempted to 'pack'  the 
meeting, that  those who had opposed the resolutions had comprised 
only the o f f ic i a l s  present,  and that  they had fai led to avert 
de f ea t . (12) Murray was accused in the Papuan Courier of dragging 
in the 'native labour bogey' to mask his unpopularity and Loudon 
telegrammed the Prime Minister,  W M Hughes, to deny that  Murray's 
d i f f i cu l t i e s  with the s e t t l e r s  had anything to do with native 
1abour. (13)
10 NAPNG & CRS G128, Item 8. Murray to Bensted for d i s t r i b ­
ution, 16 March 1920. The reserved judgement of the court 
in the Merrie England case was handed down on 24 March 
with t he ’government being awarded £11,016 damages. An 
appeal in the High' Court was dismissed in August with 
damages reduced with the government's consent by £400.
11 Ibid.
12 Papuan Courier, 30 April 1920; 7 May 1920.
13 NAPNG & CRS G126, Item 8. Bensted reports to Murray,
12 May 1920.
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While the Lieutenant Governor sought and obtained expressions 
of confidence in his administrat ion from missionary and 
humanitarian groups in Austra l ia ,  Bensted reported that BNGD had 
sent one of i t s  employees 'south' to s t i r  up oppos i t ion . (14) This 
was Charles Jackson, the company's labour inspector and the 
secretary of the Planters'  Association. Murray wrote to the 
Minister,  a le r t ing  him to a previous despatch that showed Jackson 
had once been employed as a patrol o f f i c e r  and permitted to resign 
under a c loud . (15) There is l i t t l e  doubt that Murray now f e l t  that 
to d is t inguish between the Association and the company that 
employed Jackson was quite unnecessary. The man was c lea r ly  
G A Loudon's agent. Reflect ing la te r  on what had been 'a rotten 
t im e ' (16), Murray wrote to Atlee Hunt that since the Papuan 
Courier had fomented much of the discontent and the handbil ls 
advert ising the protest meeting had emanated from i t s  press and 
o f f ices ,  then Loudon and Bert ie, BNGD's s o l i c i t o r ,  who between 
them owned more than ha l f  of the shares in the newspaper, were 
d i re c t ly  responsible fo r  a l l  the ag i ta t ion that led to the meeting 
and which fol lowed i t . (17)
14 Ib id .
15 CRS A1 20/13556. Murray to Minister,  7 June 1920.
16 Francis West. Hubert Murray: The Austral ian Pro-Consul 
(Melbourne, 1968). p. 193. Murray to G i lber t  Murray, 14 
December 1920.
17 NAPNG & CRS G69, Item 23/1. Murray to Poynton, 17 June 
1921. This correspondence is also in CRS A1 20/13556.
Three days before the meeting of March 15th the paper had 
also come out in support of the suggestion of an anonymous 
correspondent that W C Bruce be nominated as a candidate 
fo r  the Senate in a seat with l imi ted voting r igh ts  that 
the Federal Government was apparently considering fo r  
Papua. He possessed 'a charming pe rsona l i ty ' ,  was 'an 
educated man' and had 'an abiding fa i t h  in the T e r r i t o r y ' .  
(Papuan Courier. 12 March 1920) In A p r i l ,  Arthur
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Samuel Thompson, the secretary of BNGD, v is i ted  Papua fo r  the 
f i r s t  time in May. While in Port Moresby he was interviewed by 
Murray who received him co rd ia l ly .  Before leaving in June,
Thompson wrote to the Lieutenant Governor expressing anxiety about 
the decl ine in the numbers of Papuans w i l l i n g  to enter agreements 
and the apparent f a i l u r e  of the government to encourage 'signing 
on1. In reply Murray affirmed that there had been a dropping o f f  
in recruitment but could not agree that the re spon s ib i l i t y  was the 
government's, and in a telegram sent to Thompson in Sydney he 
invi ted the secretary 's  attention to an a r t i c le  by Charles Jackson 
in the Sydney Morning Herald attacking the administrat ion over the 
Itikinumu a f f a i r  'be l iev ing as he does the s ince r i ty  of the desire 
you expressed to him recently of avoiding a l l  causes of dif ference 
with (the) Government (the Lieutenant Governor) cannot think that 
(you) w i l l  allow these attacks to con t inue'. (18)
Thompson repl ied that BNGD would comply, that the attacks would 
cease and that the general manager would sever his connections 
with the Papuan Courier. (19) Perhaps he had become alarmed at the 
degree to which Loudon had become engaged in a personal contest 
with Murray. Perhaps he saw how point less i t  was to expect to 
d iscred i t  the Lieutenant Governor when, i f  a choice between 
p ro f i ts  and native welfare in Papua became a publ ic issue in
Bloomfield - a candidate more l i k e l y  to be supported by 
Murray i f  Senate representation fo r  the Te r r i to ry  was 
indeed be-ing discussed in Melbourne - also offered himself 
as a candidate with the argument that as he was now again 
a resident of Melbourne his e lect ion could save money.
18 NAPNG & CRS G128, Item 8. Also CRS Al 20/13556. Murray 
to Thompson, 16 June 1920.
19 NAPNG & CRS G126, Item 8; CRS Al 20/13556. Thompson to 
Murray, 25 June 1920. The disposal of G A Loudon's shares 
was announced in the paper of 18 June.
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Austral ia,  those cast  as ' exploi ters '  could not hope to prevai l .
If  the BNGD management in Port Moresby had worked to topple 
Murray, there is no doubt that  outside the fellowship of o f f i c i a l s  
the feel ing against him was running high at the time and i t  was to 
his advantage to place responsibi l i ty  for the agi tat ion on those 
he could represent  as having manipulated the community into 
protest  out of a desire for gain. Bensted had kept Murray well 
informed of events in Austral ia and support had been r a l l i ed  to 
the administration through sympathetic j ourna l i s t s ,  in par t icular  
H S Nicholas of the Sydney Daily Telegraph. In a telegram to 
Nicholas over Jackson's a r t ic l es  appearing in the Sydney Morning 
Herald, Murray could both cast  blame and contain damage - ' i t  is 
true (there has been) more trouble with this  company than all 
others but (I allege) no systematic i 11- t rea tment ' . (20) Bensted 
reported that  the confidence of the 'Federal Ministry'  in the 
Papuan administration remained unshaken and that  the Prime 
Minister had issued 'a press telegram' to say that  no inquiry 
would be held to invest igate the causes of the dispute with the 
'Bri t ish New Guinea Development Company'.
What had Loudon, or indeed Bertie,  Jewell and Captain Fitch 
hoped to gain? Had they expected that  the s e t t l e r s  of Papua would 
be able to 'make free with the nat ives '  with Murray.gone? This was 
the impression that  Murray always sought to give of t he i r  motives 
- though he did not impute to them malice towards the Papuans, 
only ' indi fference to native suf fer ing ' .  Certainly when
20 NAPNG & CRS G128, Item 8. Murray to Nicholas, 8 May 1920.
Art icles by Jackson appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald 
on 24, 26, 29, and 30 April and 4 June 1920. Bensted had 
urged Murray to respond.
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considering the NLO in 1919 the planters could propose few 
changes. Neither Loudon nor Bert ie themselves managed labour 
d i re c t ly  nor does i t  seem that Loudon p a r t i c u la r ly  wanted to 
protect brutal managers any more than he would indulge incompetent 
ones - though undoubtedly he found i t  inconvenient to deal with 
the consequences of th e i r  exposure and convict ion. Jewell 's record 
in managing labour at Lolorua was unblemished. Tom Sefton, i f  a 
hard man with his Papuan workers, ran the most successful of the 
plantat ions without much trouble. Fitch was a newcomer.
Or did the basis of opposition l i e ,  ju s t  as Loudon and the 
others said, in th e i r  perception that Murray did not have a 
s u f f ic ie n t  commitment to the success of th e i r  enterprise in Papua, 
that i t  was not any threat  se t t le rs  posed fo r  the well-being of 
the Papuans at a l l  but the Lieutenant Governor's ind if ference to 
the s e t t le r  struggle that that was in question? His obsession with 
the Papuan in te res t ,  and the costs of his native pol icy - borne 
they believed disproport ionate ly by the white community - were 
merely proof of th is  ind if ference. Without elected representation 
planters could feel both powerless to promote change and no share 
in the respon s ib i l i t ies  and f ru s t ra t io ns  of o f f ice .  Where but upon 
Murray's lack of e f f o r t ,  or the Commonwealth's neglect, could they 
lay the blame fo r  hard times? Above a l l ,  they wanted p ro f i t s  and 
these eluded them. Stan iforth Smith, p rac t ica l ,  bold and 
uncomplicated, could indeed seem a man l i k e l y  to speak up fo r  
them, and Murray a man ju s t  too c lever ly  bent on achieving a 
perverse personal apotheosis.
But was Murray wrong? I t  seemed to him, as i t  seems now in
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ret rospect ,  that  his c r i t i c s  had mistakenly placed the blame for 
the disappointing outcomes of the i r  great expectations in the 
wrong quarter - in an apparent f a i lu r e  of this  Lieutenant 
Governor's administration to work for them - when in fact  they 
were all the while victims of circumstances over which he, l ike 
they, had l i t t l e  control .  And was not an ' indi fference to native 
suf fer ing1 implici t  in the planter demands? I t  would be the 
Papuans who would pay for any relaxat ion in e i ther  the law or i t s  
application or any reduction in the meagre conditions guaranteed 
them under the NLO. Clearly white men se t t l ing  on the land in 
Papua, unrestrained by government and beyond the scrut iny of 
humanitarians and the press,  might indeed have gone far ther  in 
reducing the Papuans to ' s lavery'  i f  they had had the power - as 
by t e l l ing  contrast  they had succeeded in doing with the 
Aborigines in the Northern Terr i tory - and all  the while 
protesting thei r  concern for the welfare of both the natives and 
the country.
A third though much smaller 'committee' meeting of the 
Citizens'  Association held in September and chaired by Captain 
Fitch adhered to the March resolutions urging Murray's 
replacement. The chairman afterwards thought himself j u s t i f i ed  in 
sending a telegram to the King claiming that  Murray's despotism 
was ' leading to (a) serious and dangerous uprising of (the) white 
people in Papua'. The 'honour of the Empire' demanded 
intervention.  (21) Fitch had c lear ly 'over-stepped the mark' , and 
his action was repudiated at a fur ther  public meeting. I t  had been 
a gesture - most could immediately see - that  impugned the
21 Papuan Courier, 8 October 1920.
249
competence of the Commonwealth and one hardly calculated to 
advance the c r e d ib i l i t y  in Austra l ia  of the f i v e  or six hundred 
'c i t i z e n s '  of Papua clamouring fo r  electoral  representation.
A lengthy review appeared in the local paper on the 5th of 
November. I t  was wr i t ten  by R D Bert ie , one of two s o l i c i to r s  
pract is ing in P o r t . (22) Robert Dugald Bert ie had arrived in Papua 
two years before. He became the planters'  lawyer, jo in ing  th e i r  
Association and, as noted e a r l ie r ,  buying shares in the 'new' 
newspaper. He quickly acquired a reputat ion as a p rocras t ina to r , 
i r r i t a t i n g l y  slow to answer le t te rs  or carry out instruct ions - 
El izabeth Mahony once sat on his doorstep refusing to move u n t i l  
he attended promptly to her concern - but he was ce r ta in ly  a 
shrewd and a r t icu la te  representat ive fo r  the 'oppos i t ion ' .  His 
review was a perceptive analysis of another review, the Review of 
Austral ian Administration in Papua from 1907 to 1920. a small book 
of s ix ty  pages wr i t ten  by the Lieutenant Governor, a copy of which 
the author had sent to the paper.(23) In the hos t i le  cl imate then 
at i ts  worst Murray had been very anxious to have th is  document 
published 'with the concurrence of the Commonwealth Government', 
for  i t  was essent ia l ly  a careful defence of his own po l ic ies and 
administrat ion disguised as a more general account of 'B r i t i s h '  
colonial pract ice as i t  had been applied by Austra l ia  in Papua.
The time was overdue fo r  Murray to explain himself at length, 
seriously, and without the careful understatement with which he 
sprinkled his Annual Reports. These, 'southern' readers could f ind 
masterpieces of o f f i c i a l  prose, free of grandiloquence, at times
22 Ib id . 5 November 1920.
23 J H P Murray. Review of Austral ian Administrat ion in Papua 
from 1907 to 1920 (Port Moresby: Government Pr in te r  1920).
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almost intimate, always fresh and in te res t ing ;  his readers among 
the Papuan planters could think them exercises in self-promotion 
and evasion and f ind them in fu r ia t in g .
Murray1s Review is indeed an impressive essay in j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,
not only of the po l ic ies he had come to adopt and which he now
could defend with complete confidence, but also of the whole
enterprise of colonial administrat ion in Papua as the work of
reasonable and humane men, who, at a given point in time, were
faced with circumstances of great inequa l i t ies  in power and with
cultures in c o l l i s io n .  Certa in ly  the Lieutenant Governor, i f  in
many ways isolated and alone, was in te l le c tu a l l y  well equipped and
possessed of an independent mind. Through an experience that fo r
any colonial administrator was already exceptional ly long in one
t e r r i t o r y ,  through his correspondence and the reading that his
so l i ta ry  personal l i f e  had probably f a c i l i t a t e d ,  he had acquired a
very wide knowledge of colonial po l icy and practice, one such as
no other Austral ian could possibly match.(24) Simply, he now set
down the basic choices open to governments of dependencies once
the decision to annexe them was made - the options in
pac i f ica t ion ,  white sett lement, development and ' c i v i l i z i n g '
po l icy;  the problems of land, labour and the ra is ing of a revenue;
and the reasons why the pa r t icu la r  choices made in Papua were
made. A government's duties towards Europeans encouraged to se t t le
and invest in a t e r r i t o r y  are set down. These obl igations were
c lear ly  not unl imited. A 'B r i t i s h '  colonial administrat ion 's
over-r id ing duty, as i t  had come to be seen since the
mid-nineteenth century, was towards the surv iva l ,  welfare and
24 Murray's wife Sybi l had been unable to to le ra te  Papua. She 
died in 1929. His second marriage ended in separation.
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development of the native people. Moreover, ' the unpopularity of a 
Governor <with se t t lers> may be in di rect  proportion to his 
performance of his duty1 in this  r e s pec t . (25) This suggestion 
appearing so natural ly in the argument was, in the circumstances 
in which the Review was wri t ten,  at i t s  heart .  Overall the Review 
placed Murray in a morally unassailable posit ion.
Bertie readi ly admitted that
No one can read the paper without being impressed by i t s  
power and force,  and our only regret  is that  i t  was not 
produced years ago. If  such a document had been avai lable,  
many misconceptions concerning the Government policy 
would perhaps have been avoided. . .  We commend i t . . . a s  the 
most able and interes t ing statement of native policy which 
i t  has been our pr ivi lege to r e ad . (26)
Nonetheless he saw through Murray's disguise and recognised the 
Review as an 'apologia'  that  'camouflaged' much that  was 
contentious in the administration of Papua.
With the large knowledge which we in the Terr i tory 
possess of his subject matter we cannot suf f ic ient ly  
admire the del icate  choice of words in a great many 
cases (where) in the present s t a te  of public opinion he 
is often treading on dangerous ground.(27)
25 Ibid. p. xi.
26 Papuan Courier, 5 November 1920, p. 6.
27 Ibid.
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To the heart of the matter Bert ie was qu ickly drawn. I f  'A 
Governor can.. .on ly  gain populari ty  by neglecting his duty towards
the natives' then many popular colonial governors were being 
maligned fo r  'We cannot bel ieve that they have a l l  neglected th e i r  
duties towards the na t ives '. (28) Murray's unpopularity, Bertie 
suggested, was not due to his native pol icy at a l l  but to his 
h o s t i l i t y  towards those engaged in the development of the country. 
He concluded with a rhetor ica l  protest that
The Europeans in Papua may be a band of explo iters "wring­
ing dividends out of the blood and sweat of the natives"
(Vide Commonwealth Hansard). We may be something lower 
than the Europeans discovered by the la te  lamented Sir  
Roger Casement in the Congo and Putamayo (Vide Southern 
papers of March and Apri l  l a s t ) .  Yet i t  is hardly possible 
that the wave of true fee l ing  fo r  the natives which has 
swept over a l l  the English-speaking countries has passed 
us by. We think that we are capable of appreciating a 
sound native p o l i c y . (29)
Planters could feel besieged by the c r i t i c i s m  directed at them 
by opportunist p o l i t i c ia n s ,  armchair humanitarians and, in the i r  
view, i resp on s ib le  jou rna l is ts  in Austra l ia  who knew l i t t l e  of 
the i r  problems or 'na t ive '  peoples but presumed to know a l l .  In 
the aftermath of world war the in te l le c tua l  and moral cl imate in
the West was rap id ly  changing, the la te  Vic torian cer ta in t ies
28 Ibid.
29 Ib id . The Putamayo a t roc i t ies  committed by the employees 
of rubber companies among the Indians of the upper Amazon 
were exposed by Sir  Roger Casement in 1912. See below
p. 272.
253
under challenge. Perhaps Bertie's parting thrust conveys some of 
the bitterness sett lers could muster at their neglect by a society 
that had so recently and confidently called upon them to commit 
their fortunes to the Territory. Nor can a claim that planters had 
a genuine concern for native welfare and an appreciation of what 
'a sound native policy' might be, as they saw these things, be 
entirely dismissed without imputing a degree of callousness or 
blindness to them that few actually possessed. If in much of their 
routine conversation white men found comfort in polarising racial 
differences - to be bothered with the subtleties of the situation 
could be threatening - and some of them were indeed prepared to 
bully and cheat Papuans, most had learned the value of their 
employees. Above all,  they saw themselves as men as deserving as 
sett lers in Australia i t sel f  of the assistance of governments - 
governments they supposed should represent their interests f i r s t  
and Papuans second. Murray, on the other hand, could hardly have 
been wrong in believing that the social costs Papuan communities 
would be forced to bear would be vastly increased if policies that 
fully met these set t ler  expectations were adopted.
To whom did the future of Papua belong? Both Murray and his 
opponents could have agreed that the Papuans might be dependent 
indefinitely. For Murray this implied that the country must be 
administered in trust for them. In this scheme white sett lers had 
a limited if necessary place. For the set t lers before 1914 there 
was l i t t l e  doubt that they were pioneering a 'new' country and 
that the future was theirs - theirs,  that is, failing a loss of 
will by the governing power. White minorities elsewhere in the 
British Empire had been conceded responsible government, they
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knew. I f  Murray was afra id that granting the white community 
elected representation would open the door to fu ture  demands fo r  a 
s im i la r  degree of self-determinat ion - the outcome of which could 
only resu l t  in Papuan interests  being permanently relegated to 
second place - se t t le rs  believed that without a franchise to elect 
representatives in e i ther  the Legis la t ive Assembly or the 
Austral ian Senate th e i r  in terests  would receive no hearing at 
a l l .  Murray, i t  seemed to them, was by v i r tue  of his posit ion as a 
publ ic o f f i c i a l  hamstrung, and by personal d isposi t ion ind i f fe re n t  
to th e i r  struggle, and a poor advocate fo r  the T e r r i t o ry 's  real 
in te rests . And yet i t  is quite possible that by 1921 when the 
agita t ion fo r  the franchise reached a new peak, elected 
representation might have been read i ly  foregone as an aspirat ion 
and the se t t le rs  easi ly 'bought o f f '  i f  the Commonwealth had only 
extended real t a r i f f  concessions to i t s  t e r r i t o r y  and underwritten 
Papua's development, or i f  the prosper ity a l l  had thought assured 
in 1914 had come to pass.
In November 1920 also came the blow that the government 
intended to levy an export duty on copra of twenty-f ive sh i l l in g s  
a ton. This drew a strong protest from the Planters'  Association, 
and Arthur Jewell, as vice-president,  wrote to Murray to remind 
him how much the administrat ion already depended fo r  i t s  revenue 
on an unprofi tab le planting industry. He claimed that in i t s  
ef fect  even the ten s h i l l in g s  head tax paid on behalf of 
indentured labourers by the RMs out of wages deposited with them, 
was a tax re a l ly  met by employers as the expectations held by 
Papuans about the moneys to which they were en t i t led  at the end of 
the i r  contracts had not diminished. The recent increases in the 
salary scale of o f f i c i a l s  made as a resu l t  of a review of service
255
conditions had compounded planters'  d i f f i c u l t i e s  as salaries fo r  
private employees were also forced to r ise .  The plantat ion sector 
could not bear the burden of the copra tax which would be 'a 
d i rec t  tax on Cap i ta l . . . not upon the p ro f i ts  of an i n d u s t r y (30)
The revenue had fa l le n  considerably in the previous twelve 
months and the Lieutenant Governor f e l t  no need to deny Jewell 's 
contentions or to j u s t i f y  his adminis trat ion 's  actions. While 
Murray would la te r  defend an export tax as a contr ibution to 
t e r r i t o r i a l  se l f - su f f ic ien cy ,  i t  is very probable from i t s  t iming 
that the copra levy was p r in c ip a l ly  introduced to cover the 
d e f i c i t  that would otherwise have resulted from the publ ic service 
salary increases. I t  was a tax, he wrote to Jewell , that was 
simply a necessary measure and s im i la r  to one recent ly introduced 
in Late German New Guinea. I t  was not l i k e l y ,  he said, to be 
waived.
Yet Murray well knew and pr iva te ly  acknowledged that he 
depended fo r  about a th i rd  of revenue on ind i rec t  taxes and fees 
levied on the ' shareholders' . (31) With the annual subsidy to the 
revenue from the Commonwealth of £30,000 in these years accounting 
for  another th i rd ,  and the heavy import duties levied on trade 
goods purchased by the Papuans fo r  the remainder, the government 
was expected to maintain balanced budgets with any d e f i c i t  met by 
borrowings from a small reserve or the pension fund, or by 
increased stringency in the fo l lowing year.
30 NAPNG & CRS G126, Item 9. Jewell to Murray, 30 November
1920.
31 Francis West. op. c i t .  Letter No. 52. To Gi lbert  Murray.
19 January 1913.
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For the plantat ion companies, with th e i r  leases only par t ly  
developed and having waited eight years un t i l  the perennial tree 
crops came into production, more money had to be found. The small 
' p r o f i t s '  that BNGD alone could show on i t s  large local trading 
account or on the modest proceeds of the sale of 'catch' crops, 
and declared to buoy up the confidence of shareholders, could not 
be d is t r ibuted - they were s t i l l  being greatly  exceeded by 
outgoings on the plantat ion development account - and were 
appropriated annually to expenditure in the succeeding year. While 
small planters depended heavily on th e i r  trade stores to survive, 
the other larger planting enterprises engaged in l i t t l e  trading 
and remained overwhelmingly dependent on shareholder funds or the 
f i r s t  returns on production to complete th e i r  development. In 
order to carry on as they reached the end of th e i r  issued cap i ta l ,  
or, as in many cases, ordinary shareholders fa i led  to respond to 
fu r ther  ca l ls  on th e i r  shares, most of the companies were forced 
to take out bank loans or to issue debentures on the securi ty of 
the i r  properties. The repayment of these borrowings represented a 
f i r s t  claim on earnings and had the e f fec t  of delaying even 
fu r the r  the time when the industr ies would reach the dividend 
paying stage. Very large sums of money had been expended, and the 
savings of many investors, not a l l  of them wealthy, had now been 
exhausted. Much depended on the maturing plantat ions proving 
pro f i tab le .
Capital entering the country during the 'development' years 
when plantat ions were being cleared and planted and before trees 
came into production could be expected to support a considerable 
trade d e f i c i t .  This represented investment in expectation of
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p ro f i t s .  But the extent to which the value of imports continued to 
exceed the combined value of the exports and the annual 
Commonwealth subsidy to the revenue a f te r  1916-17 - when 
production began on a large scale - represents one measure of the 
extent to which the new Papuan economy remained dependent on 
pr ivate capital inf low to pay i t s  way. Indeed as production and 
exports increased, the unfavourable balance of trade actual ly  
worsened with low prices, the shipping shortage, and greatly 
increased costs bringing expectations down. The value of exports 
would exceed that of imports a f te r  1905 only in 1925-26 before the 
great depression forced the Te r r i to ry  to l i ve  w i th in i t s  means 
between 1930-31 and 1936-37. And the experience of the t e r r i t o r i a l  
economy as a whole corresponded closely with that of plantat ion 
enterprise. BNGD would pay a f i r s t  dividend in 1926 and not 
another before 1936 - a year in which i t s  capital  was reduced by 
60% par t ly  in order to do so. The lesser companies would fare even 
1 ess wel1.
The to ta l  trade d e f i c i t  fo r  the early years of 'production' 
between 1916-17 and 1924-25 inc lus ive, amounted to £1,152,870. I f  
the tota l  of the Commonwealth grants over the period, £360,000, 
together with a large investment in the Lai oki copper f i e l d ,  and 
perhaps £100,000 in funds directed to the Christ ian missions by 
the i r  supporting societ ies, are subtracted, the remaining d e f i c i t  
might have been £500,000.(32) How was th is  met? Mostly s t i l l ,  i t
seems, from the capital of Austral ian and English shareholders -
32 These calculat ions are based on Annual Reports c i ted in 
text .  Unt i l  1916 planters were driven to l im i t in g  
costs through the 'development' stage. From 1916 onwards 
planters had expected p ro f i t s  from the 'production' 
stage. Murray estimated missionary contr ibutions to be 
£10,000 In 1921. (CRS Al, Item 21/15815)
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principally those interested in plantations - whose resources 
continued to be called upon and increasingly used just to sustain 
their properties well into the period when a large return had once 
been confidently predicted. The BNGD Debenture Issue of 1919 
sought £100,000 from subscribers all of which was applied to 
meeting expenses in bringing already planted areas into 
production. Lit t le or none was used in further development of the 
company's leases the unused areas of which s t i l l  amounted to 
nearly 60,000 acres. The sum of the cultivated areas on BNGD 
estates actually declined in the period 1917-1923 from nearly 
12,000 acres to under 10,000 acres as lands planted with tobacco, 
cotton and sisal were abandoned. In 1923 the debenture holders 
agreed to increase their risk with a guarantee of a further 
£50,000 held as collateral security on bank loans negotiated to 
keep the company afloat.
In these circumstances to those engaged in the development of 
agricultural industries government levies and charges could seem 
an insupportable burden and the size of the public service a large 
extravagance. Until 1916-17 the customs duties the government 
levied on most imported items whether for trade or issue to 
Papuans in indentured service were seen as adding materially to 
the heavy costs of plantation development. Beyond 1916-17 planters 
could only regard these ' taxes' as placing a severe brake on the 
profitabil i ty .of industries scarcely able to pay. The government 
had to raise a revenue, no doubt, and planters enjoyed the 
security and services i t  provided. They did not have their 
personal incomes taxed directly. Unless Australia was to bear the 
full cost of providing the Papuan administration, the burden of
259
contr ibuting to the costs of government, l i ke  the burden of 
developing and maintaining th e i r  propert ies, i t  seemed, had to be 
carr ied by the investors whether they were drawing p ro f i ts  or not.
The customs duties were the pr inc ipal item in the government's 
internal revenue, never amounting to less than ha l f  - the balance 
consist ing mainly of rents, f ines,  and fees fo r  services, l icences 
and u t i l i t i e s  - and Murray could reasonably claim that through 
them the Papuans also made th e i r  contr ibution to the costs of 
administrat ion of th e i r  country. Certa inly white people in the i r  
capacity as pr ivate residents rather than as employers were not 
heavi ly ' taxed' in th is  way. Much that Europeans imported fo r  
the i r  own consumption, except fo r  alcohol and tobacco, was not 
dutiable. Staniforth Smith calculated in 1910 that the white 
population of under 900 at the time contr ibuted 28% of the customs 
receipts, or £7,032 in the year 1909-10, and the Papuans 72%, or 
£17,868 in the same year. In terms of th e i r  personal consumption 
se t t le rs  thus contributed to the revenue no more than about £8 a 
head.(33)
But as employers planters could feel excessively and 
prematurely taxed. Much la te r ,  in the 1933-34 Annual Report when 
considering the consequences fo r  the revenue of a decl ine in the 
labour force, Murray estimated that 'a native labourer employed at 
10/- a month is worth 46s. (per annum) in customs duties alone so 
that a decrease of £28,124 ( in wages paid since 1927-28) means a 
loss to the customs of over £10,000'.(34) The f igu re  represents a
33 NLA Deposit 1709, Stan ifor th  Smith Papers, Item 690.
34 PAR 1933-34, p. 15. The calcu la t ion was actua l ly  the
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contr ibution to revenue that would have been shared between Papuan 
workers and the i r  employers as the calcu la t ion included not only 
the duty paid by time-expired labourers in the purchase of 
dutiable goods but also the duty paid by the employers on the 
tobacco, blankets, cotton cloth and r ice issued to indentured 
labour under the NLO Regulations. Thus fo r  employers f a i l i n g  to 
make p ro f i t s  the duties on these items could seem a large 
imposition and a clear target  fo r  attack on government po l ic ies.  
Even so, Papuans, whether receiving wages or producing copra on 
the i r  own account fo r  cash, were in d i re c t l y  ' taxed' through the 
import duties at the rate of 10% on most items they bought and at 
200% on tobacco, the major purchase i tem .(35)
Treasurer 's in Circu lar  No. 290, 31 March 1932. NAPNG, 
G91, Outstation records, Series 485, Box 806 (Cape 
Nelson). Of course any reduction by the government 
in i t s  own labour force would have represented a net 
saving to the revenue.
35 The Customs Duty of three s h i l l in g s  a pound on tobacco 
was reduced to one s h i l l i n g  and nine-pence a pound in 
October 1921.
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Part IV Coming to terms, 1920-26 
Chapter 14 The turning point
G A Loudon was in England at the time of the September meeting 
in Port Moresby and the f iasco of Captain F i tch 's  telegram. At the 
annual general meeting of BNGD he attacked the government's 'ban' 
on the employment of Papuan women on plantat ions and allowed the 
chairman of the company, W A Horn, to suggest that the Merrie 
Engl and at the time of i t s  destruct ion had been a 'd i lap idated '  
vessel whereas in fac t  i t  had been barely two years old. Murray's 
attent ion was drawn to the published account of the meeting. He 
wrote chal lenging Loudon's facts .  Women could work on plantat ions 
i f  they accompanied th e i r  husbands at the employer's r isk .  They 
could not, i t  was true, be indentured except fo r  domestic service. 
With regard to the Merrie England, Loudon had obviously allowed a 
plain untruth to pass - presumably so that the government's claim 
on BNGD would seem to the shareholders a l l  the more u n f a i r . (1)
In his report del ivered at the London meeting held in October 
at Winchester House, Old Broad Street, Loudon gave the planters'  
view of the benign transformation undergone by Papuans as a resu l t  
of a period of indentured service. He also suggested that i t  was 
the company alone who ensured the s t r i c t  observance by i t s
1 ANUABL Deposit 95, M37. BNGD Annual General Meeting,
October 1920. Murray's comments on the report of the 
meeting are in NAPNG & CRS G69, Item 23/1. Atlee Hunt 
wrote to Horn to question the statements made. The 
chairman apologised fo r  errors in his speech but defended 
what Loudon had said as 'candid c r i t i c is m  of le g is la t ive  
enactments' .
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managers of the i r  responsib l i t i es under the NLO and 
Regulations. In language reminiscent of S tan ifor th  Smith - or even 
an e a r l ie r  Murray - he assured the shareholders that
The Papuan, in his native state is a wi ld , rather d i r t y ,  
scraggy, cann iba l is t ic  gentleman, sometimes rather t ru c ­
ulent and not easy to deal with. A f te r  one, two or three 
years' service on one of our plantat ions we return him to 
his v i l lage  a new man, well nourished, with glossy skin, 
and good physique. We have the s t r i c te s t  regulat ions 
regarding the housing, care and attention of our natives, 
and any white employee disregarding such regulat ions is 
dealt  with promptly.(2)
This was, no doubt, what his audience wished to hear. But 
Loudon was undoubtedly sincere. Such a perspective was possible 
even i f  i t  is obvious that i t  understated the regulatory hand of 
government in Papua. And the standard fo r  comparison his 
descript ion would have suggested to those present was that of 
Indian Tamils who, u n t i l  recent ly , had been readi ly  avai lable in 
large numbers to undertake indentured service in Malaya and F i j i .  
Surely a s im i la r ly  well regulated system of indenture offered the 
Papuans, and th e i r  womenfolk, a valuable opportunity to ascend the 
ladder of c i v i l i z a t i o n  a rung or two!
On his way back to Papua Loudon cal led on J T Bensted a f te r  the 
Papuan Government Agent had complained to BNGD's Sydney agent, F C 
Tracy, about Loudon's speech in London. In an account of th e i r
2 Ibid.
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conversation sent to Leonard Murray, Bensted reported that  Loudon 
had claimed that  government of f i cers ,  unlike employees of private 
enterpr ise,  were not being brought to account for i l l - t rea tment  of 
Papuans, and that  he had evidence, 'supported by photographs' ,  
which could be produced to support the al legat ion.  When on his 
return Murray wrote asking him to explain,  Loudon disputed 
Bensted's account. All he had said was that  both government and 
employers were bound to acquire some unsat isfactory employees and 
that  the misdemeanours of o f f i c ia l s  were not made public. He 
reasserted his company's desire not to offend the 
administration.  (3)
In Brisbane Loudon had given an interview for the Courier Mai 1, 
l a ter  reprinted in the Melbourne Age, in which he had again used 
facts  rather  loosely - this  time to explain the f a i lu r e  of the 
cotton industry in 1916. The industry had collapsed,  he said, 
because women and children had not been permitted to ass i s t  with 
the harvest as they were in other cotton producing countries.  
Women, he again claimed, were not allowed to work on plantat ions 
though they would benefi t  from doing s o . (4) Though i t  is doubtful 
that  Australian readers understood the implications of his 
remarks, Loudon was making here another appeal for the indenture 
of women in agricul ture,  for the consequent development of a 
'plantat ion vi l lage '  system and ul t imately,  we can be sure, for a 
radical rest ructur ing of Papuan society to ass i s t  plantat ion 
agricul ture.  I t  was char ac ter i s t i c  of the man that  he would 
continue to press hard despite adversi ty even as he would
3 NAPNG & CRS G69, Item 23/1. Bensted to Leonard Murray,
7 January 1921; Loudon to Murray, 10 January 1921.
4 The Age (Melbourne), 29 January 1921.
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undoubtedly have taken advantage of successes to struggle for  
fu r the r  concessions. I t  must indeed have been wearying fo r  Murray 
to have had so energetic, persistent  and devious an opponent as 
Loudon was in these years. For Loudon also the long contest with 
Murray was undoubtedly a deeply serious matter. Working away at 
another obstacle he took the opportunity of the Brisbane interview 
also to attack the Commonwealth's t a r i f f  ind if fe rence to the 
products of Papua.
While G A Loudon was on his way home to Papua, though probably 
with his knowledge, the acting general manager of BNGD, Samuel 
Wi l ls , lodged a formal complaint in February 1921 1aga ins t . . . harsh 
and v ind ic t ive  treatment recently meted out to the Company by the 
Department of Native A f fa i r s  and C o n t r o l ' . (5) In many ways, th is  
complaint, though i t  did not re fe r  to events occurring before 
1920, marked the climax of the contest of p r inc ip le  and w i l l  that 
had developed since 1914 between BNGD and the government and 
between G A Loudon and the Lieutenant Governor personally. Again, 
the immediate issues were al legat ions of i l l - t re a tm e n t  of Papuans 
working on Itikinumu plantat ion.
Following the desertion of more than f i f t y  labourers from the 
estate, the acting CNA, Lindsay Bel l ,  a f te r  carrying out a 
prel iminary invest iga t ion ,  ins t i tu ted  proceedings against BNGD fo r  
f a i l i n g  to provide s ix ty - fo u r  labourers with 'good and s u f f ic ie n t  
food'.  The hearing, in what the Papuan Courier referred to as the
5 NAPNG & CRS G69, Item 23/1. 1 February 1921. The f u l l  
correspondence over the BNGD complaints against the 
administrat ion is also in A1 21/20615 'B r i t i s h  N. G. 
Development Company Ltd. Complaints against Admin'.
1921.
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'famous "bean" case', occupied fourteen f u l l  s i t t i n g  days in the 
Port Moresby RM's Court spread over t h i r t y -e ig h t  days from 
December 11th un t i l  January 27th, and though the charges were 
dismissed i t  was not before the company had incurred very 
considerable expenses.(6) Wi l ls  suggested that th is  a f f a i r  
together with another recent case involving desertions from BNGD's 
plantat ion at Aroa were two more instances of i l l -cons idered 
actions being brought in a discriminatory manner against his 
company by Native A f fa i r s ,  and that BNGD had a large claim fo r  
costs. These were l i k e l y  to exceed £700 in transport ,  the salaries 
of European witnesses, the maintenance of the deserters and other 
Papuan witnesses, and in legal costs of which the company had been 
allowed £54. The ind irec t  losses in suspended production caused by 
the absence of s ta f f  and labour from the estates could not be 
calculated.
In the Aroa case, W i l ls  claimed that contrast ing treatment had 
been administered to Arthur Bloomfield's Galley Reach company and 
BNGD over desertions of labourers recrui ted at the same time and 
place, and who, af ter  only a few hours on the estates, had run 
away complaining of a food shortage. Native A f fa i r s ,  Wi l l s 
alleged, had assisted the Galley Reach management to secure 
convictions against the deserters without i t  even being necessary 
for  the manager to leave his plantat ion.  Convictions were la te r  
obtained against the Aroa deserters also, but as the Itikinumu 
case intervened before the Aroa case could be heard, BNGD had been 
compelled under protest to maintain the Aroa labourers in town fo r
6 The 'famous bean case' was reported in the Papuan Courier,
21 January 1921.
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the whole period of the Itikinumu hearing.
W i l l s 's  charges were serious and were treated so. In a report 
to the acting Admin is t rato r , Bell set out the basis fo r  the prima 
fac ie case against the company over the Itikinumu deser t ions . (7) 
BNGD had not proceeded immediately against the deserters as was 
customary, but had asked fo r  time in which Archie MacAlpine, the 
company's plantat ion inspector, could make an investigation. 
Suspicious, Bell set aside the report MacAlpine then submitted as 
i t  gave him the impression that i t  had been especia l ly wr i t ten fo r  
him to read. An examination since made of the deserting labourers 
by the GMO, Dr Harse, had indicated they were u n f i t  to work and i t  
had been p r in c ip a l l y  upon th is  evidence that the decision was made 
to press charges. Bell rejected the planters'  argument advanced by 
Wil ls that where some labouring gangs on an estate were contented 
and well fed that others on the same estate with a d i f fe re n t  
overseer were s im i la r ly  so, or that an expression of contentment 
on a v i s i t  by an inspector necessar i l ly  implied that a l l  had been 
well e a r l ie r .  He denied that the Aroa and Galley Reach cases 
corresponded and cal led the suggestion that there had been a 
conspiracy to obtain the convict ions against the Galley Reach 
deserters ' preposterous'.  The Aroa deserters, unl ike those from 
Galley Reach, had alleged that they had been beaten. Bell had 
acted, he said, on the p r inc ip le  that when
batches of na t ives . . .walk about 30 miles to Port
Moresby...to complain of in s u f f i c ie n t  food, and the
Government Medical O f f icer  supports them in th is  evidence
7 NAPNG & CRS G69, op. C i t .  8 February 1921.
before the court,  something must be ra d ica l ly  wrong... I f  
these pa r t icu la r  natives had been treated properly they 
would not have become discontented and l e f t  t h e i r  work to 
complain.. .with the r isk  of being sent to gaol fo r  
deser t ion . (8)
Bell went on to r id ic u le  W i l l s 's  own knowledge of labour 
management. There was, he concluded, no foundation fo r  the claim 
that Native A f fa i rs  held any 'animus' against BNGD - as the 
dismissal of the Department's case would seem to prove. Yet, i f  
not animus, then prejudice was at least l i k e l y  - so acrimonious 
had re la t ions become between the government and th is  company. Bell 
gave no hin t that the previous contests had added any weight to 
the decision to prosecute BNGD but he was to imply la te r  that th is  
was indeed the case, and among i t s  o f f ice rs  the company's pyrrhic 
v ic tory  in the court did l i t t l e  to reduce the old suspicion that 
BNGD was being harassed.
The Department's charges in 'bean' case had been dismissed 
because BNGD had been wi th in the NLO Regulations in issuing 
har icot beans to plantat ion labourers instead of the customary 
r ice  that was unavai lable on account of the shortage of shipping. 
Haricot beans needed to be repeatedly soaked before cooking with 
the water changed regu la r ly  to prevent fermentation. They were 
very unpopular as the plantat ion staple with the Papuans who, 
refusing to eat them, might well have become hungry, rebel l ious,  
and u n f i t  fo r  work. These circumstances must have been well known 
to Native A f fa i rs  o f f ic e rs ,  and Murray would a t t r ibu te  the general
267
8 Ibid. 1 March 1921.
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fa l l i n g  o f f  in recruitment in la te  1920 at least pa r t ly  to the 
unwil lingness of labourers to eat the substi tutes offered for  
r i c e . (9) While Bell denied one of Wi l l s ' s  assertions that Port 
Moresby had been ' f looded' with deserters from the nearer 
plantat ions,  the d ie t  of beans appears also to have prompted the 
desertions at Galley Reach and Aroa.
The Executive Council met and considered that Wi l l s ' s  statement 
disclosed no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of his company's complaint of 
v ind ic t ive  treatment and that a claim fo r  compensation couched in 
the terms the acting general manager had employed could not be 
entertained. I t  was at th is  point that Michael Burgess, a 
disaffected former employee of BNGD on It ik inumu, Jawarere and 
Baubauguina plantat ions, cal led on Bensted in Sydney al leging that 
charges made by him to an RM, Edwin Bastard, about the treatment 
of labour on the three plantat ions had not been acted upon. Murray 
attempted unsuccessful ly to persuade Burgess to return to Port 
Moresby for  an inquiry . When Loudon in a l e t t e r  to Atlee Hunt 
accused the government of try ing  to bring Burgess back to fu r the r  
damage the company, Murray was to deny that he had done so . (10)
In June 1921 the incumbent Minister fo r  Home and T e r r i to r ie s ,  
Alexander Poynton, v is i ted  Papua and the new Mandated Te r r i to ry  of 
New Guinea. I t  was the f i r s t  m in is te r ia l  v i s i t  to Papua in ten 
years. G A Loudon sought a pr ivate  interview - hardly a request,
coming as i t  did from the most prominent businessman in the 
<T PAR 1919-20. P 6.
10 NAPNG & CRS G69, Item 23/1. Loudon to Hunt, 5 May 1921;
Item 23/3 contains Murray's correspondence with Bensted 
over Burgess. Murray could, of course, readi ly  deny 
Loudon's charge taken l i t e r a l l y .
Terri tory,  that  could easi ly be refused. Yet i t  was, ostensibly 
because Poynton's stay in Port Moresby was to be for only three 
days.
Loudon had attempted to prepare the ground for a meeting with a 
l e t t e r  giving a resume of BNGD grievances. He referred to the old 
hos t i l i t y  directed towards the company. He could 'never find the 
reason for this  antagonism. Sometimes I am told that  i t  is a 
personal matter, but i t  existed a long time before I came into the 
country1. If  anything he had done was considered to be the cause 
he offered to have his conduct 'made the subject of the closest  
inquiry' .  Of BNGD, he continued
The Company is directed by a body of gentlemen in London 
who have a very real feel ing that  the Company is doing 
good work for the Empire in assis t ing in the development 
of this  out-lying part ,
but that  there appeared to be in the Papuan service,
a feel ing that  anything can be done against us with 
impunity, and our complaints will be disregarded, that  any 
report  to our detriment will receive credence and that  any 
attempt at assistance to us will not be conducive to 
promotion in the s e rv i ce . . . (11)
He added,
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11 Ibid. 23/1, Loudon to Poynton, 25 June 1921.
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I am prepared to do anything to sa t is fy  the requirements 
of the government. I have long since given orders that so 
fa r  as possible the Company's o f f ice rs  are to comply 
s t r i c t l y  with the d i rect ions of any o f f i c i a l ,  however 
unreasonable.. . fo r  the sake of peace.(12)
Whether unable or unwil l ing to see Loudon alone, Poynton wrote 
asking him to put the Company's complaints in w r i t ing .  Loudon 
responded with a long statement repeating much of what Wil ls  had 
claimed about recent events but in even greater d e ta i l .  He also 
ventured that the Lieutenant Governor had greatly misrepresented 
the nature and extent of the opposition to his administrat ion in 
his published statements about the meeting in March of the year 
before, and re fering to the Prime M in is te r 's  remark that the 
quarrel in Papua was no business of the Commonwealth, Loudon 
suggested that 'a public o f f i c i a l  was not allowed the luxury of 
personal feel ings in his o f f i c i a l  capaci ty ' . (13) He continued,
You can quite understand that i t  is a matter of d i f f i c u l t y  
to carry on business in d i f f i c u l t  times with a fee l ing 
that any moment the company may be l ia b le  to a heavy and 
serious attack from errors (s ic) of one of our s ta f f  and 
even in cases where no mistake at a l l  is made. I t  may be 
that some of the government o f f i c i a l s  d is l i k e  our company 
or some of our s ta f f  but th e i r  personal disagreements have 
nothing to do with th e i r  duties as o f f ice rs  and we are 
en t i t led  to ask fo r  the same treatment as any other
12 Ibid.
13 Ib id . Loudon to Poynton, 8 July 1921.
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company. We contribute largely to the cost of the govern­
ment. We have spent an enormous amount in attempting to 
develop the country and we are ent i t led  to the assistance 
of the government.. . (14)
In the exchanges which followed, as in all  those hi ther to,  
Murray had the advantage of knowing exactly what Loudon had 
writ ten to Poynton or Hunt, as by customary procedure copies of 
l e t t e r s  were forwarded to him and conversations reported. Poynton 
invited him to comment on Loudon's l e t t e r  and subsequent 
statement.
With regard to the general manager's f i r s t  resume, Murray 
admitted he could have no regard for  Loudon personally but denied 
that  he had ever allowed his personal feel ings to influence him 
against BNGD. He had had no personal differences with Loudon's 
predecessor, Lewis Cowley, who he had nominated to the Legislat ive 
Council. Of Loudon's reference to the good intent ions of the 
company's di rec tors ,  Murray commented,
What is said of the Directors may be quite t rue - I hardly 
know them. I t  is t rue that  one of them is an ex-Governor; 
but I ought to add that  another ex-Governor warned me 
against this  Company, manifested great surprise that  i t  
was ever encouraged to come to Papua, and expressed the 
most glcromy views of the treatment which natives were 
l ikely to receive at i t s  hands.(15)
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid. Murray to Poynton, 25 June 1921.
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Murray here implied some pr io r  existence of BNGD, as i f  the 
company or i t s  pr inc ipals  had an e a r l ie r  record in another 
dependency of oppressing native workers. This was c lea r ly  untrue. 
Perhaps Murray had been warned in general of the threat posed to 
government and native welfare in any colony by the presence of a 
dominant commercial in te res t .  Certain ly he had previously 
expressed fear of such a threat  himself. In a subsequent l e t t e r  to 
Poynton he would draw the M in is te r 's  attention to the Putamayo 
a t roc i t ies  committed in Peru and exposed in 1912 by Roger Casement 
to show what the employees of B r i t i s h  companies could perpetrate 
fa r  from the eyes of th e i r  d i rectors.  (16)” He went on now to 
suggest that the BNGD directors knew very l i t t l e  about conditions 
in Papua. Indeed, at the time when Murray entertained him in Port 
Moresby, the company's secretary, Samuel Thompson, had been 
'e n t i r e ly  ignorant of the facts of so outstanding a case as the 
starving and i l l - t re a tm e n t  of 'boys' at It ikinumu in 1918'. He 
continued,
I was struck by one thing in pa r t icu la r  in my interview
with Mr Thompson, and that was his insistence upon the
wealth of his company and i t s  importance in the world of
a f fa i r s ,  and his apparent i n a b i l i t y  to understand the
ordinary Austral ian view that the r ichest  Comp.any could
have no more r igh t  to disobey the law than the poorest
s e t t le r - in  the t e r r i t o r y .  I think that th is  sort of idea,
that a r ich company is in some way above the law, may
have a good deal to do with the trouble th is  Company has
16 CRS Al 21/20615 'B r i t i s h  N. G. Development Company Ltd. 
Complaints against Admin.' 1921. Letter Murray to Poynton 
17 August 1921.
273
g iven .(17)
Murray appended reports on the Itikinumu and Aroa cases, on 
proceedings taken against BNGD by the Treasury over customs 
clearances, and on a dispute over a claim by the company fo r  
exclusive r igh ts  over a water supply point fo r  i t s  coastal 
steamer, the Tambar. Lindsay Be l l ' s  report of the December and 
January hearings was re -wr i t ten  fo r  Poynton's eye. Bell thought 
that the absence of complaints from other employers of v ind ic t ive  
treatment by Native A f fa i rs  was in i t s e l f  evidence of the 
absurdity of Wi l l s ' s  assertions. But he now allowed that
There is no company in th is  Te r r i to ry  that has given th is  
Department so much cause fo r  anxiety in connection with 
the treatment of i t s  native labourers .. .  O f f i c e rs . . . have 
made very earnest e f fo r ts  to bring the Company to a better 
understanding of i t s  responsibi 1i t i e s . . . by means of moral 
suasion, but we were most re luc tan t ly  forced to the conc­
lusion long ago that such methods were quite ine f fec t ive  
. . .  Surely no reasonable man can honestly bel ieve that we 
should appeal to the law, with a l l  i t s  attendant anxiety 
and extra labour that such en ta i ls ,  i f  we could carry out 
what we bel ieve to be our duty by any other e f fec t ive  
means... The Company wish to govern, not to be 
governed.(18)
This suggests that BNGD was to be dist inguished from other 
companies in Papua only by the degree of i r responsibi 1i t y  of i t s
17 Ib id . Murray to Poynton, 25 June 1921.
18 Ib id . Bell to Murray, 22 July 1921.
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European employees and by th e i r  unwil l ingness to submit to 
contro l.  But th is  company was the largest enterprise in the 
country and by fa r  the largest employer of Papuans. And the 
detect ion of breaches of the labour code and the prosecution of 
offenders was, a f te r  a l l ,  the raison d 'e t re  of Native A f fa i rs .  The 
confrontat ion between a government and such a company was indeed a 
major c r i s i s  fo r  both, and both parties could believe the other 
prejudiced. I t  is at least possible that there was a determination 
on the part of Murray and his o f f ice rs  to bring BNGD in pa r t icu la r  
' to  a better understanding of i t s  re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s '  fo r  fear of 
the threat any concessions to i t  could pose to the independence of 
the government. Such an enterprise had to be held at arm's length.
In commenting on Loudon's larger statement of grievances, 
Murray drew Poynton's at tention to the 'atmosphere' wr i t ten in to  
i t  that gave the impression that ' the Papuan Government is 
impossible and that i t s  members spend most of th e i r  time in t ry ing  
to entrap his Company in to  technical breaches of the l a w ' . (19) 
Murray repeated fo r  emphasis that the or ig ins  of a l l  the c o n f l i c t  
with BNGD lay in the company's pretensions - and not in any malign 
in tent on the part of his o f f ice rs :
This notion that the BNGD Co. Ltd. should be above the law 
is perhaps fostered by reco l lect ions of Chartered 
Companies in A fr ica  and elsewhere, and is I think re a l ly  
at the bottom of a l l  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  we have had with 
th is  Company.(20)
19 Ib id .  Murray to Poynton, 26 July 1921.
20 Ib id .
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Was Murray being fa i r ?  I f  there was 'atmosphere' in Loudon's 
submissions, there was exaggeration here also. Here was the 
trained advocate defending his administrat ion and the conduct of 
his o f f ice rs  with an unanswerable s t r ike  at the competence of his 
pr inc ipal  opponents: they could do wrong unconsciously. And as 
with his evidence before the Royal Commission in 1906 when he 
thought he could see a foundation fo r  Captain Barton's fa i l u re  as 
an administrator in his h o s t i l i t y  to Austral ian in te rests  - so now 
he had iden t i f ied  an underlying cause fo r  the government's 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  with BN6D in the company's pretensions. Certain ly the 
d irectors of the company were not as 'e n t i r e l y '  ignorant of 
conditions in Papua or Austra l ia  as Murray suggested. T.he 
chairman, W A Horn, was born in New South Wales and had spent much 
of his l i f e  in South Austra l ia  where he had been a member of 
parliament. His son, Major Kelham Horn, also a d i rec to r ,  had 
v is i ted  Papua with Evelyn Metcalfe and would v i s i t  again. Samuel 
Thompson's le t te rs  as secretary of the company suggest a 
conscientious and not inhumane man, and betray no h in t  of a claim 
fo r  BNGD to 'chartered company' status. Thompson was 
simultaneously secretary of the Kuala Selangor Rubber Company, 
also chaired by Horn, and the owners of Robinson River, and he and 
several directors knew Malaya wel l .  The comparisons they could 
make between conditions there and in Papua were not uninformed. 
Perhaps Murray could not f o r e te l l  the outcome of Poynton's v i s i t  
i f  his opponents caught the M in is te r 's  ear and succeeded in 
persuading him that th e i r  complaints had substance. He had to make 
sure that the groundwork fo r  any fu r the r  defence was so l id ly  la id .  
He did not impute in s in ce r i ty  to BNGD, nor need in s in ce r i ty  be 
imputed to him. At bottom, Murray had come to bel ieve, the
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problems between a colonial administrat ion and private s e t t l e r s  
were inherent in the colonial s i tuat ion i t s e l f  where the interes ts  
of the native people and those of the s e t t l e r s  were bound to be 
opposed.
If the v i s i t ing  Minister would not meet Loudon privately,  he 
could scarcely avoid meeting him as a member of a deputation of 
the Planters '  Association and Mining i n t e r e s t s . (21) The others 
present were Arthur Jewell as spokesman, R D Bertie,  Seymour 
Williams of Bloomfield's Moresby Trading and Agency Company, and 
P R Osborne of the Laloki Copper Mine. Jewell began with a request 
for consideration of a development loan for the Terr i tory of 
£500,000, the expenditure from which would be determined by a 
committee in which the Lieutenant Governor would have only a 
cast ing vote. Poynton said he thought that  th i s  'committee would 
abolish Government control a l together ' ,  an unlikely concession.
The remaining submissions were not new: the indenture of women, 
the admission of Asiat ics for specified tasks,  the reduction of 
government s taf f  and sa l ar i es ,  jury r ights ,  electoral  
representat ion,  the aboli t ion of the Native Affairs Department, 
the Sapphire Creek road. The encounter was amiable - if the 
Minister gave l i t t l e  hint  of his a t t i tude .  Poynton had l istened 
pat ient ly.  He responded to Jewell ' s  thanks contrast ing the welcome 
he had received in Papua with that  he had received in Darwin. He 
was struck,  he said, by the absence of signs in the places he had 
seen of the enormous waste of money that  had occurred in the 
Northern T e r r i t o ry . (22) This his hearers might well have found
21 Papuan Courier, 1 July 1921.
22 CRS A1 21/15821 'Cit izens of Port Moresby No. 1 Deputation 
to Minister,  1921'. pp. 7.
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ominous.
Poynton also met a deputation of the Cit izens '  Association 
comprising Captain Fi tch,  E C Skelly,  and J R Ross. Skelly, 
formerly the manager of a Samarai hotel was now an employee of 
Fi tch ' s  company, and Ross a small planter  at Kerema and possibly a 
trader connected with Fitch.  This exchange was less pleasant than 
the meeting with the planters.  Their principal  'demand', this 
deputation said,  was for enfranchisement of the white community.
But so heated did Fitch become in pressing his views about this  
and a wide range of other grievances that  the interview could only 
have confirmed any opinion Poynton may have had about the dangers 
of allowing such people a greater say in the Te r r i to ry’s a f fa i r s .  
Fitch was reminded that  he 'was making some very rash statements ' ,  
and the deputation informed that  there was no poss ib i l i ty  that  the 
Commonwealth would enter tain a proposal to give s e t t l e r s  ' ful l  
control while the country was in s ta te  of t rans i t ion*.  Murray, the 
Minister told them, 'had done remarkably we l l ' . (23)
Poynton's v i s i t  marked a turning point.  I t  did much to give 
se t t l e r s  a feel ing that  they had been given an opportunity at las t  
to state  thei r  case before an a rb i t r a t or .  He had conceded them 
nothing but his personal goodwill, yet a large crowd gathered at 
the Port Moresby wharf to cheer, sing 'For he ' s  a j o l l y  good 
fel low' ,  and waive him goodbye.(24) The Minister had demonstrated, 
without the least  ambiguity, the Commonwealth's confidence in the
23 Ibid. p. 12.
24 Papuan Courier. 15 July 1921. I t  is possible those giving 
the Minister a rowsing farewell were chiefly from ' the 
Government crowd' though given the general success of his 
v i s i t  this  is not cer tain.
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Lieutenant Governor. I t  could only take a l i t t l e  re f lec t ion  on the 
part of the planters and th e i r  a l l i e s  to see that they could 
expect no change in the structure of the government or in the 
administration of current po l ic ies and that no agi ta t ion could 
succeed. And they would have to l i v e  with Judge Murray.
Indeed that the government had won a ' v i c to r y '  was widely 
perceived. Having los t  control of the Papuan Courier in the 
previous year G A Loudon now had to contend with both e d i to r ia l  
c r i t i c is m  and attacks from correspondents in the paper that for  
the f i r s t  time placed the leading planters on the defensive. A 
le t t e r  on 1st July cal led them 'Advocates of As ia t ics '  and the new 
ed i to r ,  C E Wilkins, defended the independence of the local press 
against planter 'innuendoes'.
Before the Min ister l e f t  the Te r r i to ry  G A Loudon wrote to say 
that BNGD's plantat ion inspector, Archie MacAlpine, would also be 
t ra v e l l in g  south aboard the Marsina, and suggested that Poynton 
meet with MacAlpine to discuss matters .(25) The resu l t ing 
unintended and unavoidable interview at sea was t imely and proved 
Alexander Poynton a most astute c o n c i l ia to r .  Affect ing some 
perp lex ity  at the co n f l i c t in g  claims of the government and the 
opposit ion, he urged the plantat ion inspector,
that in the in te rest  of a l l  concerned I thought i t  would 
be much better to bury the past and work amicably together 
in the fu ture. Mr MacAlpine assured me that th is  was the 
sincere wish of his Company and that everything possible
25 CRS A1 21/20615, Loudon to Poynton, 8 July 1921.
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would be done by Mr Loudon and himself to create a better 
fee l ing  in a l l  matters between the Company and the 
government.(26)
On 4 August the Minister wrote a quasi-personal le t t e r  to 
Loudon report ing that he and MacAlpine had been 'unanimous' about 
the need fo r  the parties in Papua to work together. He assured the 
general manager
that as fa r  as you yourself  are concerned, I have always 
formed the highest opinion of your in te g r i t y  and a b i l i t y  
and never fo r  one moment did I think that you were person­
a l l y  antagonist ic to the Government of Papua, but presume, 
l i ke  myself, you have people under you who are not at a l l  
times very discreet in the handling of important matters.
(27)
This was a clever approach and i t  disarmed Loudon at a 
stroke. He was offered the opportunity to def lect  onto un-named 
subordinates any blame that might be his fo r  the ag i ta t ion and 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  between his company and the government. He was 
permitted to bel ieve that Murray himself might have been among 
Poynton's 'own' people who could be ind iscreet . He responded in 
September with fulsome thanks. He f e l t
that the resu l t  of your v i s i t  to Papua is f u l l y  appreciat­
ed by a l l  residents, especia l ly myself and Directors of
B.N.G.D. Co. Ltd. inasmuch as more harmonious re la t ions 
*26 Ib id . Poynton to Murray, 5 August 1921.
27 Ib id . Poynton to Loudon, 4 August 1921.
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have now been estab l ished.(28)
He could not re s is t  the implied o f fe r  of an intimacy in the 
M in is te r 's  l e t t e r ,  and added - i t  was e n t i re ly  in character - an 
in v i ta t io n  that Poynton 'w r i te  to me d i re c t '  i f  he considered 'a t  
any t im e . . . improvements can be made...and I w i l l  endeavour to f a l l  
in with your suggestions'. (29) Though he would remain general 
manager of BNGD fo r  another f i v e  years and go on to be a large 
private planter , and would be the las t  of the old 'opposit ion'  
ever to be reconci led to Murray personal ly, the 'uncrowned king of 
Papua' had come f i n a l l y  to accept the constra ints. He remained 
outspoken and a hard man in business but no longer the central 
f igure  in a cabal. In his la te r  years he chose to remember Murray 
only in a favourable l i g h t  and to forget the rancour that once 
stood between them.(30)
Long and ca re fu l ly  prepared submissions presented by a 
delegation of the Samarai Chamber of Commerce were also considered 
by Poynton on his return to Austra l ia .  They contained many 
proposals fo r  addit ional expenditure by the Commonwealth which 
they suggested should ' look on Papua as a business enterpr ise' 
and 'bear the burden of i t s  development t i l l  i t  reaches a 
sel f-support ing stage' - the whole predicated on the assumption 
that a much larger planter settlement in the country was 
necessary.(31) The Chamber e x p l i c i t l y  dissociated i t s e l f  from
28 Ib id . Loudon to Poynton, 19 September 1921.
29 Ibid.
30 In 1959 Loudon wrote a b r ie f  h is tory  of the Papuan p lant­
ation industr ies. Murray is mentioned only as the 
planters '  a l ly .
31 CRS Al 21/15921 'Planters of Papua. Deputations to
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those who had condemned the administrat ion but many of i t s  
' representat ions' were the same as those of the Port Moresby 
deputation of the planters.
Again the Lieutenant Governor was given an opportunity to 
provide his opinion on the submissions. He preferred a development 
loan from the Commonwealth to an increased subsidy. He 
defended the ' in iq u i to u s '  copra tax as essential to the revenue.
He could 'not imagine what advantage there would be' in reversing 
the roles of the Government Secretary and the Native A f fa i rs  
Department. He did not object to electoral  representation as long 
as the Papuans could be represented and the government retained a 
majori ty - the d i f f i c u l t i e s  were pract ical  as Papuans were not yet 
ready to par t ic ipa te  in th e i r  government. The demand fo r  ju r ies  
must be opposed where ' rac ia l  prejudice prevents the return of an 
impart ial  v e rd ic t ' .  And in the matter of an employer's 
respons ib i l i ty  fo r  i l l e g a l i t i e s  committed by his employees as 
employees,
i t  is believed that the employer is l ia b le  in every part 
of the world. The only person to whom the Government can 
look is the employer, and i t  is fo r  the employer to see 
that the provisions of the Ordinance are complied with 
both by himself and by his servants.. .  A company can only 
act through i t s  agents, and i f  only the agent is to be 
l ia b le  the company must always go f r e e . (32)
M in is te r ' .  1921. Deputation from Samarai Chamber of 
Commerce, 28 June 1921.
32 CRS A1 21/15921 'Planters of Papua, Deputation to
M in is te r ' ,  1921. Murray's Notes on deputation of repre­
sentatives of planting and mining. CRS A518 Item C918/2
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The publ icat ion of his Review in the previous year now gave 
Murray a convenient reference to which he could re la te his 
response to grievances and queries. On one point the views of the 
Samarai delegation had his complete support - i f  the coastal 
provisions of the Commonwealth Navigation Act were applied to 
Papua, as seemed l i k e l y ,  the e f fec t  would be disastrous. He noted 
that
Questions of female labour, admission of As ia t ics ,  and a l l  
the hundred and one points which are raised by way of 
c r i t i c i s i n g  the administrat ion are not worth a moment of 
consideration in comparison with the question of overseas 
trade with the rest of the world. I f  our trade is confined 
to Sydney owned boats trading to Sydney the prospects of 
agr icu l tu ra l  development are hopeless.(33)
And indeed i t  would be over th is  fundamental issue that planters 
and a l l  other se t t le rs ,  and the administrat ion were to unite in a 
struggle that would bind them as a community as never before.
The volume of the T e r r i t o ry 's  trade had increased 300% in the
f iv e  years to 1920 and with the f a l l i n g  o f f  in recruitment at the
end of th is  period there seemed that a serious labour shortage
would develop. But in 1921 the markets in both copra and rubber
collapsed in an in ternational  slump. Planters previously hampered
by the dearth of shipping from rea l is ing  on the post-war boom were
now forced to rapid ly  reduce th e i r  work force to maintenance
contains c r i t i c a l  comments by Atlee Hunt of the Lieutenant 
Governor's defence of the nominee system.
33 Ib id. Item 16.
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levels. Production ceased on most plantat ions.
The appl icat ion of the Navigation Act to both Papua and the 
Mandated Te r r i to ry  of New Guinea coincided with Poynton's v i s i t  
and appeared the crowning blow a f te r  a decade of struggle. In the 
interests  of both the Austral ian Seamen's Union and Austral ian 
shipping companies the Act e f fe c t iv e ly  denied the two island 
t e r r i t o r ie s  d i rec t  access to th i rd  countries by requir ing ships 
ca l l ing  in turn at any Austral ian and t e r r i t o r y  ports to conform 
to specif ied standards of accommodation fo r  the i r  crews - 
standards un l ike ly  to be met in vessels employing Asian seamen. 
Since the volume of th e i r  exports was too small to a t t rac t  d i rec t  
shipping to Europe or America, the ent i re  trade of the t e r r i t o r ie s  
was now forced to pass through Austral ian ports and to proceed 
there aboard Austral ian f lag  shipping whatever the destinat ion of 
the cargoes. Almost as soon as he had returned from his tour 
Poynton wrote personal ly to the Minister fo r  Trade and Customs, 
Walter Massy-Greene, urging the exemption of Papua and New Guinea 
from the Act. He had, he said, 'received numerous deputations' 
whi le in the te r r i t o r ie s  and
upon one subject I found a complete consensus of opinion, 
namely, the e f fec t  of the appl icat ion to the te r r i t o r ie s  
of th e . . .A c t ,  the view being quite general that unless 
some r e l i e f  therefrom can be afforded the progress and 
development of the te r r i t o r ie s  would be ser iously retarded 
and the interests of planters and other se t t le rs  
seriously pre jud iced.(34)
34 Ib id . Poynton to Massy-Greene, 3 August 1921.
284
He warned that
Any fac to r  in the trade between Papua and Austra l ia  which 
operates to the detriment of Papuan interests must, more­
over, inev i tab ly  react with equal force upon Austral ian 
i n te r e s ts . (35)
And so Poynton is l i k e l y  also to have argued in the Cabinet 
room, but apparently without success. In his 1920-21 Annual 
Report, Murray noted ru e fu l ly ,
Agr icu ltura l  development has, temporari ly at least,  come 
to an end. The low pr ice of rubber and copra is 
responsible fo r  th is  but even should prices r ise  i t  is 
improbable that there w i l l  be any fu r the r  development so 
long as the law confines our trade re la t ions with 
A u s t ra l ia . (36)
The prospects were 'gloomy' and 'the price we may pay fo r  
Aus tra l ia 's  pol icy may be the economic ruin of Papua1. This was a 
Lieutenant Governor, conspicuously 'going in to  bat'  on the i r  
behalf» of whom planters could approve. He received th e i r  le t te rs  
of support including one from G A Loudon.(37)
The imposition of the Navigation Act served to s h i f t  the locus 
of 'blame' from Murray's administration to the Commonwealth and to
35 Ib id .
36 PAR 1920-21. p. 1.
37 NAPNG & CRS Series G69, Item 1210/7, Loudon to Murray,
10 March 1922.
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the chief benef ic iaries of the Act 's  provisions, the Sydney based 
island traders and ship-owners, Burns Phi lp and Company. In his 
l e t t e r  to Massy-Greene, Poynton himself attacked the 'one l in e '  
that 'a t  present enjoys p ra c t ic a l l y  a monopoly of the Austral ian 
trade, and the service which i t  renders',  which was ' f a r  from 
sa t is fa c to ry ' . (38) That the presence of ' fo re ign '  shipping - given 
the state of the markets - would have availed them l i t t l e  at the 
time seemed not to inf luence the s e t t le r  reaction. A new v i l l a i n  
had been found.
In October 1921 the Planters Association published i t s  response 
to Murray's Review, en t i t led  Conditions in Papua, sett ing out the 
' t rue  posit ion of a f f a i r s . . . with pa r t icu la r  reference to the
4
Planting Industry, and with a view to securing more sympathetic 
treatment fo r  the pioneers of Papua, and i t s  ind us t r ie s ' . (39) I t  
was wr i t ten anonymously by R D Bert ie . I t  is essent ia l ly  an appeal 
to Austral ians to 'pay the premium on the insurance pol icy* taken 
out when Papua was f i r s t  placed under B r i t i s h  protect ion fo r  
reasons of Austral ian securi ty. Murray's Review is repeatedly and 
d e f t ly  quoted in c r i t i c i s m  of his own and Commonwealth po l ic ies 
while anything l i ke  a personal attack on the Lieutenant Governor 
is now avoided. Indeed i t  was the Commonwealth's 's tarvation 
p o l ic y ' ,  the fa i lu re  to provide a s u f f ic ie n t  subsidy through the 
development period that 'has condemned him (that  is ,  Murray) to 
personal hardships and penurious parsimony in his o f f i c i a l  
admin is t ra t ion '(40) and forced the Papuan Government to survive by
38 CRS Al 21/15921, Poynton to Massy-Greene, 3 August 1921.
39 Planters'  Association of Papua. Conditions in Papua 
(Sydney, 1921). 26 pp.
40 Ib id , p. 15.
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taxing the capital  of as yet unpro fi tab le industr ies. For though
I t  is an excel lent ideal,  to make the country 
se l f -suppor t ing . . . i t  must be real ised that th is  can, in 
fu ture ,  only be done out of p ro f i t s  made from the 
development of the country. The sooner th is  p ro f i tab le  
stage is reached by the industr ies,  the sooner the 
Te r r i to ry  w i l l  support i t s e l f . (41)
Yet there seemed to be a
fundamental sophistry, which in fects  l i k e  a canker the 
whole system of Papuan Administrat ion by the 
Commonwealth.. . ( in) the apparent assumption that the 
possible accumulation of wealth by pr ivate  ind iv iduals  or 
corporations resu l t ing  from the work of development of 
the country is e v i l ,  and must be prevented at a l l  
cos ts . (42)
What Ber t ie, together with Loudon, Sefton and Jewell - the 
executive of the Association - now proposed were: F i r s t l y ,  that
the annual subsidy to the revenue should be doubled to allow fo r  
the influence of i n f la t io n  since 1914 and so maintained un t i l  
industr ies could in fac t  contr ibute a larger share to the expenses 
of government out of p ro f i t s .  The 'savings' the Commonwealth had 
e f fe c t ive ly  made since 1914 by not maintaining the real value of 
the subsidy, or £180,000, should be set aside in a fund to assist
41 Ib id . p. 12.
42 Ib id .  p. 6.
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industrial development. Secondly, the export duty on copra should 
be removed and the tax on imported tobacco reduced. Thirdly, 
either a bonus should be allowed Papuan rubber when the price fell 
below the costs of production, or a preferential duty applied in 
favour of Papuan rubber entering Australia. Fourthly, the 
restrictions recently imposed by the application of the Navigation 
Act should be removed. Finally, there should be non-official 
representation on the Executive Council and elected representation 
on the Legislative Council.
The fulfilment of these requests was 'vital to the success of 
Papua1. In the only allusion to Judge Murray that might have drawn 
blood, Bertie
hoped that no one will take the complacent attitude so 
often adopted to camouflage the real conditions, that 
these conditions are only the aftermath of the war, and 
that, therefore, no one is to blame... The general 
stagnation of trade only makes our need the greater, and 
we have taken this means to publish the facts . . .also to 
prove that the general opinion of those engaged...in 
developing the country, of the attitude of the 
Administration towards them, is unfounded.(43)
This was an adroitly prepared document. If Murray's position 
was morally unassailable, the Commonwealth's was not. But did 
anyone read it? (44) The facts were that the Papuan sett lers were
43 Ibid. p. 21.
44 There is no copy on CRS Al 21/15921 or on the f i l e 
'Planters'  Association of Papua' Al 20/9009. There is
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far too few to be credible and that only in united action with a 
sympathetic administration could their distress - in conjunction 
with the threat of a collapse of the local revenue - move an 
Australian ministry.
a copy with the Staniforth Smith Papers (NLA Deposit 1709) 
Item 1472.
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Chapter 15 Burying the past
The s i tua t ion  fo r  a l l  planters had indeed become desperate. In 
the twelve months commencing in October 1921 the publ ic companies, 
without exception, underwent e i ther reconstruct ion with th e i r  
capital wr i t ten down, or were offered fo r  sale. Only the absence 
of purchasers of any kind served to keep most of them going in the 
unwil l ing hands of th e i r  long-suffering shareholders. 
Trader-planters subsisted, even continuing to export, th e i r  losses 
concealed by poor or neg l ig ib le  accounting and covered by the 
p r o f i t  on trade with even poorer Papuans. Angabunga River 
Plantat ions Ltd was wound up in October 1921 i t s  propert ies 
passing to a new venture of Walter Gors, Burns ‘Phi Ip manager in 
Port Moresby un t i l  1902 who now returned to Papua to grow sisal 
and cotton. In November the col lapse of Angabunga was fol lowed by 
reconstruct ion of Papuan Products, the New Zealand based company 
that had developed Mamai at Port Glasgow. Mullens Harbour 
Plantat ions (Sagarai) found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to obtain subscribers fo r  
an issue of debentures in May. Sogeri Para Rubber Ltd, the only 
company to have once paid a dividend and survived, offered Koitaki 
fo r  sale in August. I t  could not be sold. The company went in to  
l iqu ida t ion  and was re-formed as Koitaki Limited in 1925. Domara 
River Plantations Ltd was saved from col lapse by obtaining £9,588 
from an issue of £12,000 of f i v e  year debentures carrying the 
punishing in terest  rate of 15% a year. By 1924 the company was 
s tra in ing under the incubus of the debt. (1)
1 Papuan Courier, 5 May 1922 (Mull ins Hbr.) ;  4 August 1922 
(Ko i tak i ) ;  9 May 1924 (Domara).
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With the largest p lanter , BNGD, the debentures that had kept 
the enterprise af loat  since 1919 and now due fo r  redemption could 
only exacerbate the d i f f i c u l t i e s .  The choice fo r  the d irectors was 
between reconstruct ion in the shareholders1 in te rest  or having the 
debenture holders appoint a receiver. Though the company's 
plantat ions had been 'planted according to f i r s t  class pract ice ' 
and were in excel lent order, enquiries had shown that they would 
together fetch less than enough to pay the debenture debt, or 
£120,000 - perhaps a f i f t h  of the cost of the i r  development. There 
was no a l te rna t ive  fo r  e i ther  shareholder or debenture holder but 
to keep the enterprise going. A reconstruct ion through the set t ing 
up of a 'new' company of the same name was approved by the 
Chancery Division of the High Court in London in June 1922. The 
assets of the 'o ld '  company were purchased with three ten s h i l l i n g  
shares fo r  each of the old £1 shares with seven sh i l l in g s  and 
sixpence regarded as paid. The ca l l  of two s h i l l in g s  and sixpence 
now avai lable provided the company with the capital  to 
continue. The transfe r of t i t l e s  to the new company required a 
le g is la t ive  enactment in Papua and a f a c i l i t a t i n g  Ordinance was 
passed by the Legis la t ive Council in May 1923. S tan ifor th  Smith, 
Administrator in Murray's absence, wrote to the Min ister point ing 
to the f igures showing the company's f inanc ia l  p l ig h t .  He 
commented that ' they presented a very good picture of the 
t r ib u la t io ns  and d i f f i c u l t i e s  that have been the lo t  of a l l  
plantat ion owrTers in the T e r r i t o r y ' .  (2)
Of the Clarke and Whiting connection, the Fa ir fax Harbour and
North Fa ir fax Harbour sisal plantat ion enterprises, f loated by
2 NAPNG & CRS G69, Item 23/5. Stan iforth Smith to Senator 
George Pearce, 14 May 1923.
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Arthur Bloomfield as public companies in 1909 with Clarke and 
Whiting backing, were now offered to the government for £75,000 as 
soldier settlement b locks . (3) When the offer  was declined the 
propert ies were abandoned. The price Bloomfield had asked for them 
probably represented the loss sustained by the shareholders in 
thei r  development.
Arthur Bloomfield suffered major losses.  His 'agency house' 
venture, the Moresby Trading and Agency Company, went into 
l iquidat ion,  at least  one of the s taf f  suspected of criminal 
negligence or embezzlement. The agency's business passed to 
G A Loudon and Company, a new subsidiary of BNGD. Bloomfield's 
Galley Reach Plantat ion was incorporated into Kanosia in a 
settlement with Clarke and Whiting marked by some bi t t e rness  and 
reproach. Two of his companies were given special assistance.  Late 
in 1921 with 65,000 pounds of unsold rubber on his hands, 
Bloomfield requested a Commonwealth guarantee for a bank loan in 
return for a l ien on the debentures of Kemp Welch River Rubber
Estates and New Guinea Rubber Estates.  Judge Murray discreet ly 
supported this  application and the guarantee was obtained and with 
extensions continued unt i l  1925.(4) Arthur Bloomfield had by then
3 CRS A1 21/16061 'Fairfax Harbour Plantat ions Ltd. Papua 
Settlement of Sold iers ' ,  1921. The Commonwealth Repatr iat ­
ion Act did not apply to Papua but special arrangements 
and loans of up to £625 were provided to returned soldiers 
who had been Papuan ' r es i den ts ' .  Among the beneficiar ies 
were G Harden, Leo Gors, John MacDonald, Frank Mahony, 
Reginald Chancellor and M M Fi tzgerald.  The Papuan Govern­
ment was responsible for the col lect ion of repayments on 
the loans including in te res t ,  £2,500 having been advanced. 
None of this  was recovered and the loss was borne by the 
local revenue. (CRS A1 20/9467, and G69, Item 2/8/50).
4 CRS A1 25/16087, Loans to Kemp Welch & N G Rubber Estates 
Ltd. Papua. 1921-1925.
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withdrawn from all his Papuan interests. In 1926 he ventured again 
into tropical agriculture with the purchase of a plantation,
Maihua, in F i j i .
In Melbourne in March 1922, and with support from R S Whiting 
and Bloomfield and the 'Association of Planters' lobby, Judge 
Murray tr ied to persuade the Commonwealth to undertake to buy the 
whole of Papua's copra production at cost unt i l  prices rose above 
£18 a ton. He had earl ier proposed that the Commonwealth 
compensate the Territory for the l ike ly  effects of the 
Navigation Act by imposing a preferential t a r i f f  on copra from 
elsewhere in the Empire of £1 a ton and on 'foreign' copra of £2 a 
ton.(5) But locked into an intr icate set of t a r i f f  provisions and 
having many interests to balance, Australian federal ministries 
and their advisors were unprepared, i t  seems, to act quickly to 
make changes unless the pol i t ica l  price to be paid for inaction 
had become too high. I t  was expected that partisan producers would 
cry for assistance as they began to be pressed, but experience 
suggested that the suppliants could always endure more than they 
admitted. Later in the year the Assistant Director of Navigation 
was sent to Port Moresby and Rabaul to investigate the effects of 
the Act on the two island te rr i to r ies .  He attempted to weigh the 
interests of Australian manufactures, shipping and trade in the 
Pacific generally against those of the settlers to whom he spoke, 
who, apart from those 'd i rect ly  or indirect ly  dependent on Burns 
Phi Ip ' ,  he found everywhere ' in favour of the total exemption of 
their trade from the restr ict ions of the Act'. He recommended that
5 Papuan Courier. 10 February, 1922; the earl ier proposal is 
in CRS A518 A.M. 812/1/1, Part 2. Murray to Minister,
11 February 1920.
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vessels on Burns Ph i lp 's  Singapore run be permitted to ca l l  at 
t e r r i t o r y  ports and upgraded to take white crews.(6) The 
Commonwealth continued to wait.
The Papuan Government was forced to reduce the copra export 
duty to f i f t e e n  sh i l l in g s  a ton. Burns Phi lp in turn was induced 
to lower f re ig h t  rates fo r  Papuan produce shipped to Sydney from 
f o r t y - f i v e  to t h i r t y - f i v e  sh i l l in g s  a ton with through b i l l s  of 
lading to London at ninety sh i l l in g s  a ton on consignments above 
twenty-f ive tons. The proceeds of copra f . o .b .  at Port Moresby 
rose from £14 a ton on a c . i . f .  London price of £27 in 1922 to £16 
a ton on a London price in 1923 of £25. S tan ifor th  Smith estimated 
production costs at the time at £12 a ton on a f u l l y  bearing 
plantat ion y ie ld ing  eight hundredweight an acre though few 
plantat ions could match t h i s . (7) I t  seemed, nonetheless, that 
planters might jus t  survive without immediate assistance af te r  
a l l .
But the sense of grievance over the Navigation Act would not 
abate. In 1923 in a move to open up a d i rec t  l ink  with Europe and 
so escape the Act 's re s t r i c t io n s ,  BNGD chartered a steamer to 
de l iver  petroleum supplies to Port Moresby and ship copra to 
London. The vessel, the Pruth, was wrecked at the very entrance to 
Basi l isk Passage with in sight of the town on Sunday December 30th.
6 CRS A518 Item A. M.812/1/1 T a r i f f  Board Memo. 12 August 
1924.
7 NLA Deposit 1709, Stan ifor th  Smith Papers, Item 565.
'Valuation of Coconut P lanta t ions. '  - an exhaustive 
analysis apparently prepared fo r  the Expropriation 
Board in the Mandated Te r r i to ry .
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Assisted by jo u rn a l is ts  in the Austral ian papers who found 
Burns Philp an easy target ,  opposition to the Act f i n a l l y  led to
the appointment of a Royal Commission in August 1924.(8) In 
evidence the Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce t e l l i n g l y  charged 
that 'Rice, copra sacks, and other things which we must import 
from Asia are taken past our very doors to Sydney and transhipped 
back to Papua, involving extra handling and double f r e i g h t 1 while 
Papua had ' to  compete in the markets of the world with other 
countries employing coloured labour and whose produce is del ivered 
to the markets d i rec t  by ships carrying coloured c rew s ' . (9) The 
Majori ty  Report of the Commission accepted that damage had been 
done to the trade of the t e r r i t o r ie s  and recommended that the 
carrying of passengers and cargoes between Austral ian and 
t e r r i t o r y  ports no longer be deemed 'coasta l '  trade. The 
Commissioners pointed to the anomaly of having treated Papua as 
part of Austra l ia  under the Navigation Act while continuing to 
regard i t  as a foreign country under the T a r i f f  Act. One 
Commissioner, Senator G E Yates, in a Minori ty  Report, took the 
view that Papua had never been prosperous, that i t s  industr ies 
would continue to be uncompetitive, that Austral ian in terests  
required the maintenance of the Navigation Act and that the 
consequences fo r  the t e r r i t o r ie s  should indeed be borne by the 
Commonwealth.(10) In August 1925, the Majori ty  Report having been 
accepted, the re s t r i c t io n s  on Papua and New Guinea imposed by the 
Act were removed.
8 CPP 1925, pp. 1323-1343. Second Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Navigation Act.
9 Ib id. p. 11 (p. 1335).
10 Ib id. Yates's Minor i ty  Report is on p. 15 (p. 1339).
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In the meantime both planter representatives and the Lieutenant 
Governor sought to persuade the Commonwealth to concede t a r i f f  
protect ion to Papuan produce. I t  was an issue raised with Poynton 
and one he had agreed to consider fu r the r .  And fo r  the copra 
producers, whatever the outcome of the struggle over the 
Navigation Act, there remained the burden of the Papuan export 
levy. Sir Robert McCheyne Anderson, an Austral ian elected to the 
board of BNGD in 1922 as i t s  ' l o c a l '  representat ive, wrote in July 
1923 to Senator Pearce, Poynton's successor as Minister fo r  Home 
and T e r r i to r ie s ,  urging abo l i t ion  of the remaining duty of f i f te e n  
sh i l l in g s  a ton, and proposing a l i s t  of preferences. He was 
inv ited to make his submissions to a hearing of the T a r i f f  Board 
in September attended by Judge Murray and a delegation of the Port 
Moresby Chamber of Commerce led by Arthur Jew e l l . (11)
The T a r i f f  Board agreed that the copra levy was an excessive 
imposition upon an unprofi tab le industry and were prepared to 
recommend i t s  replacement with a bounty of f i f t e e n  sh i l l in g s  a ton 
to be paid by the Commonwealth to the Papuan government. Murray 
objected that an export tax u l t ima te ly  promised the only means 
whereby the Papuan administrat ion could hope to become 
self -support ing whenever prosperous times f i n a l l y  came. An 
increase by way of a bounty in the Commonwealth's s.ubsidy was 'a 
step in the wrong d i re c t io n ' .  A precedent would be set and a 
p r inc ip le  conceded. Export duties were levied in most Paci f ic  
t e r r i t o r ie s  including the Mandated T e r r i to ry ,  and Papua should not
11 CRS A518 Item A.M. 812/1/1 Part 1. Acting Chairman T a r i f f  
Board to Senator Pearce, 4 September 1923.
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abandon a jus t  claim on th is  form of revenue.(12) To head o f f  a 
c o l l i s io n  he acted quickly to persuade planters to accept a 
revised arrangement whereby duty would be levied at the rate of 
10% of the amount that the price quoted in London exceeded £20 a 
ton - i .e .  Ten Sh i l l ings  on a quoted price of £25. He was able to 
present th is  to the Board as a f a i t  accompli.
In commending the Lieutenant Governor's scheme to the Port 
Moresby Chamber of Commerce, the Government Secretary, Herbert 
Champion, pointed out that the greater part of the export duty was 
in fac t  being met by English and Austral ian shareholders in the 
larger companies and that th is ,  at least,  was to be preferred by 
residents to any increase in import duties which he posed as the 
a l te rnat ive revenue measure.(13) This was an argument used by 
Murray himself on several occasions though i t  would have found 
l i t t l e  support among small planters who had no shareholders onto 
whom to pass th e i r  losses. Indeed, when a copy of Champion's 
l e t t e r  was forwarded to Sir  Robert Anderson he commented to the 
Minister that ' f o r  cynical frankness i t  leaves nothing to be 
desired. In plain English the p r inc ip le  is la id  down that the 
Government has to be maintained by outlanders who had fo o l i s h ly  
found capital and consistent ly  los t  i t ' . (14) I t  was an a t t i tude ,  
Anderson thought, that would ' k i l l  the goose that lays the golden 
egg'. Bel ieving that the Chamber of Commerce had been led too 
easi ly to accede to the government's scheme he suggested that the
12 Ib id . Murray to Min is ter ,  17 July 1924; Memorandum, 24 
February 1925.
13 Ib id . Government Secretary (Papua) to Chamber of Commerce 
Port Moresby, 29 January 1924.
14 CRS A518 Item A. M. 812/1/1. Part 1. S ir  Robert Anderson 
to Senator Pearce, 5 December 1924.
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duty should not be levied unless the f .o .b .  price at Port Moresby 
was above £18 a ton, the cost of production on at least some 
plantat ions. In any case, he pointed out, the c . i . f .  London prices 
quoted were usual ly fo r  S t ra i ts  Settlements copra that fetched an 
average of £1 a ton more than South Seas copra. Certainly fo r  
fu r the r  investment in copra plantat ions the goose was already 
quite dead in Papua as elswhere, as the energies of company 
directors and planters fo r  much of the fo l lowing decade and more 
were heavi ly committed to protect ing the exist ing investment from 
a t t r i t i o n .
In Apr i l  1925 the Commonwealth Analyst and Advisor to the 
Minister fo r  Customs, Percy Wilkinson, v is i ted  both Papua and New 
Guinea to prepare a report fo r  the T a r i f f  Board and Cabinet on how 
encouragement might be given to expand the planting of economic 
crops fo r  Austral ian consumption. On his return to Melbourne he 
met the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee then considering 
the question of Papuan development. And in Sydney he held 
discussions with Sir  Robert Anderson, G A Loudon, J R Clay - a 
shipping agent at Samarai, and the Rev C F Rich - of the London 
Missionary Society, to get th e i r  views.(15)
Both the Chambers of Commerce at Port Moresby and at Samarai 
had sought a bounty of f o r t y  sh i l l in g s  a ton on copra while the 
government had recommended an Austral ian duty on ' fo re ign '  copra. 
When the provisions of the Papua and New Guinea Bounties and 
Preference Acts were f i n a l l y  announced in Apr i l  1926 both 
government and planters were disappointed as no assistance was
15 CRS Al 26/86 'P Wilkinson (Cwth Analyst) V is i t  to Papua 
and New Guinea'. 1925-1926.
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offered ei ther  copra or rubber producers. 1925-26 was colonial 
Papua's one year of prosperi ty due principal ly to the t rebl ing of 
the price of rubber and a fourfold increase in the volume of 
copper exported from the Laloki mine. If  copra exports increased 
only modestly in volume and value there seemed no pressing need to 
provide ei ther  for protection or encouragement.
In 1925 Judge Murray was knighted in the New Year Honours l i s t .  
The stormiest years were well past and prosperi ty seemed, for a 
br ief  moment, to hand. As the rubber prices rose the value of 
exports exceeded imports for the f i r s t  time since 1906 when both 
had been by comparison negligible.  Koitaki paid i t s  second 
dividend in eighteen years and BNGD i t s  f i r s t  in sixteen years of 
operation in Papua - a modest 5%. By 1927 the br ief  euphoria had 
subsided and the surplus of imports over exports resumed. Here was 
the true indicator of the Ter r i tory ' s  chronic poverty. Only the 
continued inject ion into the plantat ion and mining companies of 
shareholders ' funds, much of i t  proffered most unwillingly after  
1914, together with the annual Commonwealth subsidy to the 
revenue, allowed the Papuan colonial economy to pay for the 
dispar i ty  between i t s  earnings and i t s  expenditure.
The Customs Tari ff  (Papua and New Guinea Preference) Act of 
1926 waived t a r i f f s  on coffee,  whole coconuts, prepared coconuts, 
kapok seeds, ginger and t ropical  f r u i t s  entering Austral ia from 
the two t e r r i t o r i e s .  I t  was a measure taken at a moment when 
Austral ia i t s e l f  and the world economy appeared to have ' turned 
the corner'  a f t er  the post war depression and when some gesture of 
generosity towards i t s  dependencies could be afforded. Briefly
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bouyant, copra and rubber - as noted above - received no 
b e n e f i t . (16) Though Papuan products were s t i l l  subject to the 
Primage Duty of 2.5%, the umbrella provided by the preference over 
both 'Foreign' and 'Empire' imports was enough in the fo l lowing 
years to encourage the development of a dessicated coconut 
industry with fac tor ies  at Ahioma in Milne Bay and at Hisiu, and 
renewed in te res t  in growing c o f fe e . (17)
A Papua and New Guinea Bounties Act passed in the same session 
of the Commonwealth Parliament allowed that up to £25,000 annually 
would be made avai lable fo r  ten years u n t i l  31st December 1936 to 
encourage the production with in the te r r i t o r ie s  of commodities 
currently  imported in to  the Commonwealth from elsewhere. The 
schedule included sisal hemp and kapok f i b r e ,  bamboos and rattans, 
cocoa, v a n i l la ,  and various spices, and a l l  in a 'raw' state that 
would reserve fo r  Austral ian workers any manufacturing to be done. 
The Act came too la te  fo r  sisal hemp and the industry spluttered 
to a halt  despite the bounty now offered of £6 a ton. A revival in 
1930 was s h o r t l i v e d . (18) Of the remainder of the products l i s ted ,  
only a l i t t l e  cocoa was exported and th is  came from trees already 
planted. The other products seemed more appropriate to 
small-holder development and £8,783 was a l l  that was paid out in 
bounties from the £250,000 avai lable in the ten years u n t i l  1937. 
Nearly a l l  of th is  was accounted fo r  in subsidies to cocoa 
production in the Mandated T e r r i t o r y . (19)
16 CRS A518 Item A M 812/1/1 Part 2; and Al 26/86.
17 See below p. 359.
18 See below p. 348.
19 CRS A518 Item A.M.812/1/1 Part 2. Memorandum, Halligan
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Arthur Jewell was appointed a Member of the Legislat ive Council 
in 1924. In view of his long associat ion with the opposition to 
Murray's administrat ion,  the honour attached to the appointment - 
and Murray's offer  implici t  in i t  to forget  the past - placed 
Jewell in the Lieutenant Governor's debt. Their re la t ions  remained 
formal, an arrangement that  suited both men, though the new MLC 
came to be on fi rst-name terms with Leonard Murray. I f  elected 
representat ion was never achieved, Jewell ' s  appointment in many 
ways effect ively enfranchised the planters ,  and t hereaf ter ,  while 
they might remain privately c r i t i c a l  of government pol icies and 
publicly oppose par t i cular  decisions,  s e t t l e r s  could not again 
believe that  thei r  in te res t s  went ent i re ly  unconsidered, at least  
by the Papuan Government.
Jewell was a good choice. His r espons ib i l i t i es  as general 
manager of Pacific and Papua Produce, with i t s  plantat ions at 
Lolorua in the Central Division and the Conflict  Islands in the 
Eastern Division - together with Millicent  Jewel l ' s  in te res t  in 
Sagarai plantat ion which she bought in 1931 from the l iquidators 
of Mullens Harbour Plantat ions - took the MLC frequently to 
Samara!. He possessed a courtly manner that  impressed others in 
negotiat ions,  and proved an a ler t  and ski l ful  defender with Sir 
Hubert Murray of the common Papuan in te res t  in the seventeen years 
from 1924 until  the cessation of civi l  government in 1942.(20)
to Minister,  3 May 1937. A Memorandum of 12 April 1932 
records that  £'20 had been paid out in 1927-1929 as a 
bounty on cocoa in Papua, and £40 on sisal  hemp.
20 In 1925 Jewell became also unofficial  member of the 
Executive Council elected by the Legislat ive Council 
under an Amendment to the Papua Act.
The value of the Ter r i t ory ' s  exports rose from £179,452 in 
1922-23 with a trading def i c i t  of £135,966 (21), to £685,896 in 
the annus mirabi1is of 1925-26 with a surplus of £215,122 when
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8,619 tons of copra real ised £204,125, and 642 tons of rubber 
£194,849.(22) 11,466 tons of copper ore had brought a fur ther
£204,125. In the following year increased production of copra and 
rubber brought lower returns and with the sudden collapse of the 
copper industry,  the Papuan economy was again trading at a loss.
By 1928-29 exports were valued at less than half of those of the 
peak year.  From 1930-31 onwards unti l  1937-38 the trade of the 
Terri tory showed a small surplus.  But the Commonwealth subsidy was 
reduced af ter  1930, and with no fur ther  investment, the money 
economy had to l ive within i t s  means. Commercial agricul ture was 
far  from f lourishing.  If  rubber exports rose s l ight l y  the returns 
were less than a third of those of 1926 and coconut products 
steadi ly declined both in volume and value. In 1938-39 gold 
production was valued at £150,000, more than twice the returns 
from copra, and exceeding those from rubber by over £30,000. 
Renewed in teres t  in investment in rubber planting from 1937 and 
the rapid increase in mil i tary expenditure jus t  prior to the 
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 allowed the country once more 
to afford a large de f ic i t .  The defence of the investments in 
rubber and coconut plantat ions that  over-whelmingly pre-occupied 
planters in the years af ter  1926, together with an account of the 
fai led attempts to establ ish other commercial agricul tural  
industr ies over the whole period 1907-1942, form the subject of 
the next Part.
21
22
PAR 1922-23 p. 9 
PAR 1925-26 p. 74
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The BNGD Company shed the Samarai branch of i t s  trading 
operations in 1926. The purchasers were Burns Philp and 
Company. While G A Loudon withdrew as general manager in that  
year,  G A Loudon and Company, the BNGD re t a i l  store and plantat ion 
agency subsidiary continued under this  name for two more years 
before revert ing to i t s  former t i t l e ,  the BNG Trading Company. The 
parent company appointed George William Guttridge to succeed 
Loudon - though as Attorney rather  than as general manager. 
Guttridge played golf,  was a f ine chess player and 'a great 
en te r t a i ne r1 in Port ,  and Murray appointed him to the Legislat ive 
Council in 1931. He is believed never to have vis i ted any of the 
company's estates  (23) and were i t  not for the good fortune that  
Tom Nevitt had succeeded Archie MacAlpine in 1927 as BNGD 
plantat ion inspector the company might have col 1apsed. (24) Nevitt ,  
a Queenslander, had come to Papua as an ass i s tant  on Clarke and 
Whiting's Rorona es tate  in 1913. When Guttridge returned to 
England in 1933, Nevitt became general manager of BNGD, a posit ion 
held until  his retirement in 1951. He became an MLC in 1935. The 
old antipathy between the 'bung' company and the government was 
well buried, the rules in Papua were established and infrequently 
challenged, and the relat ionship between the o f f i c i a l s ,  the 
planters,  and very probably too, most Papuan coastal communities, 
had become almost domestic.
23 Interview: B E Fairfax Ross, 11 June 1972.
24 Archie MacAlpine died in 1927. Tom Nevitt died in 1953.
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Part v The fortunes of the industries, 1921-1942
Chapter 16 Defending the Stake: Copra and Rubber
In 1921 rubber tapping in Papua became uneconomic, and copra 
prices also began to fa l l  rapidly as in an international recession 
the extent of periodic over-capacity in tropical plantation 
production throughout the world became apparent. The pattern of 
pre-war trade in the tropical commodities had resumed with some 
increase in volume as the economies of the European belligerents 
re-adjusted to the peace. Britain and France had been greatly 
weakened by the war but retained their advantage as possessors of 
immense overseas investments including those in tropical export 
produce. Germany too was soon importing rubber at the pre-war 
level,  and the growth of the motor car industry in all the major 
industrial states promised an expanding market at least for 
rubber. But the extent of the planting explosion before 1914, 
predicated as i t  had been upon very optimistic expectations of 
future levels of consumption, was bound even without the 
interruption of the war to lead to the lowering of prices. The 
pressure to secure tropical commodities at the lowest possible 
cost in combination with their domination over populations in the 
colonies to whom they were pol i t ica l ly  unaccountable had allowed 
the metropolitan powers to impose terms of trade on their 
dependencies .that - while seeming to represent an improvement in 
the conditions of l i f e  of the subject peoples - had encouraged 
immense expansion in plantation industries based upon very cheap 
labour. In the South Seas an abundance of land and subsistence 
food might secure a degree of protection for the island peoples
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but in many other countries dependence upon plantation industries 
would provide an immense barrier to further betterment in the 
lives of colonized communities. With the margins of profit reduced 
to the minimum, both investors in 'over-extended' industries and 
low paid workers who laboured on tropical estates had now to 
contend with the cycle of inflationary boom followed by 
deflationary bust seemingly inherent in the operation of market 
economies. Only expanding consumption in the metropolitan 
countries ulimately promised profitabi1ity for plantation 
enterprise - and, perhaps, the f i l ter ing down to plantation 
workers in the colonies of some small measure of increased 
purchasing power. A world economy in recession represented 
disaster,  and the investors and distant planters in coconut 
plantations, in particular,  could feel trapped. They had been led 
on by the guarantees of William Lever and others in the almost 
universal optimism of the pre-war generation, and since by the 
hope that prosperity would follow the peace. The hopes of 1918 now 
dashed, the optimism of 1914 seemed quite naive and certainly 
irreclaimable in 1921.
Copra
An average coconut palm bears around forty nuts a year and 
about 5,000 nuts are needed to produce a ton of copra, the kernels 
losing about 45% of their weight in drying. On coasts with 
volcanic soils in New Guinea palms may produce up to eighty nuts 
and i t  might take only around 4,000 to make a ton, while on some 
atolls 7,000 nuts might be required. Thus an acre of about 
f if ty-six mature palms will produce on average about four 
hundredweight of copra a year or about a ton every five acres but
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100 acres might produce as much as f i f t y  tons in favoured areas or 
as l i t t l e  as twelve tons on poor soi l s .  50,000 acres, the area of 
Papua's plantat ions in the 1930's produced scarcely 10,000 tons. 
Some of the larger ,  bet ter  si tuated and bet ter  managed propert ies 
- l ike the government's Baibara plantat ion on Orangerie Bay - came 
close to producing two tons of copra from five acres. Smaller 
plantat ions must have done much less well considering that  vi l lage 
groves and plantat ions set  up under the government's Native 
Plantat ions scheme accounted for some part  of the copra exported.
Throughout the period to 1942 prices quoted for copra in Papua 
and New Guinea were the c . i . f .  landed prices obtaining in London. 
Freight from plantat ion to port - in the case of Papua f reight  to 
Port Moresby or Samarai - and f reight  to Sydney or Europe together 
with handling charges and an allowance for fur ther  shrinkage of 
copra aboard ship (with resul t ing weight loss) meant that  the 
return to the grower was between half and three f i f t h s  of the 
quoted price.  The cost of production was variously estimated as 
between £10 and £18 a ton with f reight  to London seldom less than 
£7 a ton.
Palms begin to bear commercial quant i t ies of nuts af ter  eight 
years and those planted in Papua between 1907 and 1914 began to 
come into bearing during the war years.  The extent of the 
commercial coconut plantat ions increased from 1,000 acres in the 
former year to 34,000 acres in 1915-16. Tonnage and value of copra 
exported rose from 1,100 tons valued at £19,000 in 1915-16 to over 
2,000 tons valued at £40,000 in 1916-17 outstr ipping gold for the 
f i r s t  time as Papua's chief export. Tonnage doubled again and
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values t r ipled by 1919-20 with copra valued at £124,000 accounting 
for half the value of all  exports in that  year. These resul t s  were 
despite the diversion and loss of ships in the war and thei r  
dearth in the years immediately following.
Between 1921 and 1925, when the burden of the Navigation Act 
was l i f ted  from Papua and New Guinea, copra producers in the 
t e r r i t o r i e s  could s t i l l  believe that  thei r  d i f f i cu l t i e s  were 
almost wholely due to i t s  e ffect .  And the coincidence of finding 
the market br ief ly  favourable in 1925 could seem to confirm thei r  
view. But to confirm other predictions - those made by the 
representat ives of Burns Philp before the recent Royal Commission 
- the exemption of the t e r r i t o r i e s  from the Act brought no rush of 
new shipping to Papua.(1) In the late  twenties di rect  f reight ing 
of copra to San Francisco commenced through the agency of Houlder 
Brothers, a London based company with off ices in Sydney and Port 
Moresby which had traded in Papuan timber since 1914. I t  now 
became convenient for American ships discharging cargo at 
Australian ports to call  occasionally at Port Moresby and Samarai 
and f i l l  otherwise empty holds with copra on the return voyage. In 
the t h i r t i e s  Dutch ships on the Sydney to Java run resumed cal l ing 
but mainly to set  down or take on passengers, and Burns Phi lp' s  
hold on the overseas trade of Papua remained unchallenged. And i f  
the recovery of 1925 had provided an opportunity to pay modest 
dividends, i t  Jid not resul t  in any fur ther  investment in coconut 
cul t ivat ion.  The l i f e  of a coconut grower became one of constant 
struggle to make ends meet, one providing the barest  of 
' c i v i l i s ed '  l ivings,  and carried on for much of the period until
1 PAR 1920-21, p. 8.
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1942 only in the hope that  'we might turn the corner1.
Of the world production of copra in 1926 of 897,000 tons, about
250.000 tons was "South Seas" copra, including 24,000 tons from 
F i j i ,  50,000 tons from the Mandated Terr i tory of New Guinea, and
12.000 tons (or 1.3%) from Papua. There was some reluctance on the
part of crushers in Europe to pay as much for South Seas copra as
for Ceylon (43,500 tons),  Java (206,000 tons) or S t ra i t s  
Settlements (146,000 tons) copra, the reason being the very great
var i ab i l i ty  in the qual i ty of the South Seas production in the
absence of a standard system of grading. (2)
The Samoan Government in 1927 was the f i r s t  to introduce an 
ordinance to control the qual i ty of copra produced in the vi l lages 
where the worst copra presented for sale had tainted the 
reputation of the best produced on the plantat ions.  Fi j ian 
planters sought a similar ordinance the following year when af ter  
continental crushers had amalgamated to form a Margarine Union i t  
appeared that  South Seas copra might face complete exclusion from 
the European market.
After an Imperial Conference held in London in 1926 an Empire 
Marketing Board had been formed to col lect  and disseminate 
information and to f a c i l i t a t e ,  i f  possible,  the r a t ional i sa t ion  
and integrat ion of commodity production within the Empire. The 
Board agreed to contribute to the costs of establ ishing in 
conjunction with the Fi j ian Government a coconut research stat ion
2 CRS A518 D812/1/1 'Ter r i tor ies  Commerce - General Copra 
Industry.  Assistance by Empire Marketing Board'. 1919- 
1932. Memorandum to Prime Minister,  18 April 1929.
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in F i j i .  Papua and New Guinea planters made representat ions to 
the Board for similar assistance in the Australian t e r r i t o r i e s ,  an 
approach the United Kingdom Government was, understandably, 
unwilling to e n t e r t a i n . (3) The Australian Government in turn was 
also concerned that  that  there should be no direct  contact between 
the planters in Papua and New Guinea and London that  by-passed the 
co-ordinating body for research in Austral ia,  the C.S.I.R. 
Subsequent ef for t s  made by the planters through the C.S.I.R. to 
secure the services of s c i en t i f i c  advisers were gracefully 
declined by the Board.(4)
With mounting apprehension as prices began to sl ide again some 
producers in Papua looked to al ternat ive  uses for coconuts. As 
noted previously, the Commonwealth Customs Act (Papua and New 
Guinea Preference) of 1926 - had the effect  of establ ishing one 
new industry.  Among t ropical  products from the t e r r i t o r i e s  to be 
admitted into Austral ia duty free the Act l i s ted 1 prepared 
coconuts' .  In 1927 W H Wright, the manager of Levers'  one Papuan 
plantat ion,  G i l i g i l i ,  began producing dessicated coconut. In 1929 
a group of Samarai merchants and planters led by the Burns Philp 
manager, George Aumuller, and the Bunting brothers invested in a 
dessicating factory at Ahioma, midway along the northern coast of 
Milne Bay with a view to buying in nuts from the numerous Papuan 
groves around the bay as well as from the commercial plantat ions.  
"Gi l igi l i"  Wright undertook the management, and a dessicator 
instal led designed and bui l t  by the Samarai engineer, Norman Izod, 
who had ea r l ie r  patented a widely imitated copra dr ier .  In the
3 Ibid. Memorandum Halligan to Prime Minister,  3 May 1929.
4 Ibid. Letter (Board) to Prime Minister (of Austral ia)
21 January 1932.
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same year a second dessicating factory was established by a group 
of Central Division planters under the name Coconut Products 
Limited (though no connection with W R Carpenter Ltd's Rabaul 
subsidiary of the same name) on Hisiu beach. This was also 
installed with an Izod Dessicator. Together with the production of 
several factories established around the same time in New Guinea 
dessicated coconut exported from the terr i tor ies was given 
protected entry into Australia ini t ia l ly  through an embargo on all 
' foreign' imports and subsequently through a ta r i f f .  By 1934, when 
the Papuan exports had reached 1,200 tons valued at £59,000 or 
equivalent to more than half the value of the copra exported in 
that year, the market became saturated and production had to be 
res t r ic ted. (5) In 1938 the two terr i tor ies were exporting to 
Australia nearly seven million pounds weight of dessicated coconut 
or a pound for every man, woman and child in the Commonwealth.
The c . i . f .  London price for copra fell  to £15 a ton in 1929-30 
and to as low as £11 the following year. Only the remission to the 
producers of the greater part of the benefit of the exchange gain 
in converting the Pound Sterling to the Australian Pound made by 
the shippers to the producers in the interest of maintaining a 
service through what was hoped would be a temporary slump eased 
the situation in any way.(6) The Commonwealth had come belatedly 
to the rescue of the rubber industry with the imposition of a duty 
on rubber imported into Australia except that from Papua, but 
whereas rubber trees could rest if necessary without deterioration 
and with only l i t t l e  maintenance, coconuts continued to fall  from
5 PAR, 1931-32. pp. 3, 31..For dessicated coconut exports see 
below, p. 463.
6 Ibid. p. 4.
310
the palms in season and out, and copra production f e l l  only 
gradually.  In the year of peak production, 1928-29, 12,500 tons 
brought in over £214,000. In 1933-34, 8,000 tons were worth only 
£43,000. The larger companies made copra at a loss carried by the 
meagre return on the i r  rubber. Smaller planters subsisted on 
credi t  and the declining trade in matches and rami es with the even 
more impecunious Papuans. In 1934 with small plantat ions closing 
down and the larger estates  obviously about to follow, the Papuan 
Government, to avert the calamity that  only hope of r e l i e f  had 
delayed for so long, voted £8,000 out of i t s  insurance fund to be 
given as assistance in respect of each ton exported at a rate that  
varied according to the distance of the plantat ion from the port 
of shipment. S t ab i l i ty  in the rubber industry and a renewed 
in teres t  in gold on Misima staved off d isas ter  for the revenue in 
1934 when copra reached a low £8 a ton. The Treasurer ' s  report  
noted that
Coconut planters have so long contended with adversity 
that  one must fear ,  i f  prices do not reach a prof i table  
level and remain there,  the industry will j us t  fade out 
with the par t ic ipants  giving up the unequal struggle.  I t  
is this  industry we have always looked to to absorb the 
bulk of our native labour . (7)
Copra producers everywhere sought r e l i e f  from colonial 
governments and drew at tent ion to the anomaly of planters 
floundering while the Unilever 'Combine' formed by the merger of 
the Margarine Union with Lever Brothers in 1929 continued
7 PAR, 1934-35. p. 6.
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throughout the depression to pay ample dividends. In the largest  
South Seas producer, the Mandated Terr i tory,  the f a i lu r e  of the 
industry threatened the livelihood of the greater part  of the 
European community in one way or another. Plantat ion salar ies  and 
wages for European employees were reduced and an ordinance passed 
granting a moratorium on mortgage payments due to the Custodian of 
Expropriated (German) Property. The Rabaul Times thundered that
these huge mergers of the super -capi t a l i s t i c  combines 
are bleeding the world's producers to death and any 
government in any country is not only ent i t led  but should 
consider i t  i t s  immediate bounden duty to step in and 
protect  those who are unable to protect  themselves 
against the exploi tat ion of huge concerns whose huge 
capital  and immense prof i t s  make them an economic power 
in the 1 and' . (8)
Indeed the ac t iv i t i e s  of the 'combines' gave ‘the greates t  f i l l i p  
to present-day Communism'. The New Guinea Planters and Traders 
Association urged an approach to the United Kingdom Government to 
enquire into Unilever 's a f fa i r s .  A similar proposal was made by 
the BSIP Advisory Council meeting in October 1933.(9) This one 
internat ional  company now bought more than 70% of the world's 
copra and was undoubtedly able to manipulate the market in edible 
oi ls  to ensure that  the lowest possible prices were paid - even if  
i t s  own plantat ions produced at a loss.  Responding to inquir ies
8 Rabaul Times. 2 February 1934.
9 CRS A518 Item C812/1/1 'Ter r i tor ies  Commerce. General 
Copra Industry.  Act ivi t ies  of Uni Lever Company'. 1934- 
1937.
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Unilever's agents blamed the situation for the coconut planters on 
the very low prices prevailing for butter.
The Empire Marketing Board, i ts members perhaps having realised 
the hopelessness of reconciling the interests of producers and 
manufacturers, had ceased to exist in September 1933. There now 
remained no institutional mechanism either within the British 
Empire, or outside i t ,  similar to the Rubber Growers Associations 
of Malaya and Ceylon, by which copra producers could work together 
towards an international agreement to maintain prices by 
restricting output. In Papua the export duty was reduced to a 
nominal two shillings and sixpence a ton. In Fiji a Report on the 
Copra Industry suggested measures by which a bounty on copra might 
be funded, all wharfage charges and the export tax remitted, and 
Fiji copra compulsory graded and separately marketed. The 
Legislative Council meeting in Suva in March 1934 distinguished 
between the plight of the white planters and the relatively less 
serious position faced by the Fijian growers who could withdraw 
from the market and enjoy the continuing security offered by 
communal society and the subsistence economy.(10) This would be 
also true in Papua. Indeed Pacific islanders generally enjoyed few 
advantages in marketing copra as smal1-holders except the capacity 
to survive a market collapse.
Planters throughout the western Pacific railed at what they 
believed were continuing excessive freight charges and the low 
f.o.b. prices offered by Burns Philp to whom many had become
10 Ibid. Contains the record of the meeting of the Council,
23 March 1934. The comment is made in the Governor's 
speech.
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heavily in debt. In the Mandated Terr i tory both ‘Beeps' and 
W R Carpenters had obtained 'charging agreements' from planters as 
securi ty for credi t  which, as the depression of the industry 
became prolonged, made foreclosures d i f f i c u l t  to avoid. In Papua 
in 1933, BNGD, having sold i t s  Samarai trading business,
G A Loudon & Co, to Burns Philp in 1926, now also relinquished i t s  
Bri t ish New Guinea Trading Company subsidiary in Port Moresby for 
£29,896 Stg. Burns Philp retained the trading company's name for 
i t s  wholesale business and provided off ice space at the i r  main 
building for BNGD - an arrangement that  often led to confusion as 
to the relat ionship between the plantat ion company and the 
merchants.
In Papua there were few 'charging agreements' .  Burns Philp had 
avoided taking a di rect  in teres t  in plantat ions in the Terri tory 
since the f a i lu re  of the Hall Sound Company in 1900. But by 1935 
with propert ies becoming available at prices well below the costs 
of t he i r  development, the company, having continued to prosper 
mightily,  could now both afford and r isk ownership. As a centre 
for i t s  plantat ion operation,  in February 1936 the company bought 
Robinson River, the large and very productive coconut plantat ion 
of 3,400 acres near Abau developed and managed for the Horn family 
by BNGD. The cost was £68,000 Stg, calculated as no more than the 
cost of development - or £20 an acre - but a high figure in view 
of the current s ta te  of the market . (11) In the same year the new 
Burns Philp subsidiary Robinson River Plantat ions Ltd bought the 
old Milne Bay Rubber Company's Hagita coconut plantat ion adjacent 
to Gi l ig i l i  at the head of Milne Bay, and Dedele - the oldest
11 K Buckley and Kris Klugman. The Australian Presence in the 
Pacific:  Burns Philp 1914-1946 (Sydney, 1983). p. 2/1.
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plantat ion in Papua and once associated with Burns Philp as the 
private venture of the company's f i r s t  manager at Port Moresby, 
Walter Gors. In 1939 Thomas McCrann's Baia plantat ion and the 
neighbouring Domara River Plantat ions rubber es tate  at Keuru were 
added to the Robinson River holdings.
The collapse of copra had brought down all the old single 
estate companies that  had depended primaril ly on coconuts. Their 
new owners, pr incipal ly Burns Philp and Steamships Trading 
Company, would proceed with production when prices eventually rose 
again after  the war unencumbered by any heavy development debt. 
Captain Fi tch ' s  company, now Burns Phi 1ps ' principal trading rival 
in Papua, began i t s  acquisi t ions with Mamai, the plantat ion in the 
Elai Valley of the New Zealand owned Papuan Rubber and Copra 
Company, in a l iquidat ion sale in 1934. The property had absorbed 
over £75,000 in shareholders'  funds and had paid no dividend. 
Steamships acquired i t  for £875.(12) The company went on to buy 
the two coconut plantat ions on the Vailala River. Maira, developed 
by Lewis Lett and since 1928 the property of J F Puxley, was 
bought in 1935; and Vaiviri ,  Donald MacDonald's place downstream, 
was bought from his widow in 1937. Captain Fitch also bought the 
New Guinea Rubber Estates property on the Kemp Welch in 1935.
Other estates to change hands were Sagarai obtained by 
Millicent  Jewell in 1931 from Mullens Harbour Plantat ions,  and 
Veimauri, bought in 1936 by i t s  manager Ernest Ward from the heirs 
of R S Whiting. Ward continue to manage for Clarke and Whiting at
12 Neal Nicklason. 'History of Steamships Trading Company
Limited. '  in Second Waigani Seminar. The History of Mela­
nesia (Canberra and Port Moresby, 1969). p. 242.
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Rorona until  1941; Mrs Vera Ward managed Veimauri in conjunction 
with Veiya, a small adjacent property Ward had owned since about 
1912.
Clarke and Whiting offered Rorona for sale in 1940 but i t  could 
not be sold. Kanosia and Rorona remained the i r  property unti l  
af ter  the war when Steamships undertook the management. Only the 
recovery in rubber prices in 1934 saved BNGD. A second 
reconstruction of i t s  assets in 1935 enabled the 'bung' company to 
pay i t s  second dividend in twenty-five years.  I t s  capi tal  was now 
writ ten down 60% from £478,531 to £191,412, perhaps a thi rd of the 
development costs of i t s  plantat ions.  With a loan of £75,000 stg 
from Burns Philp to pay off i t s  maturing debentures, new shares 
were issued in 1937 with two valued at two shi l l ings  being offered 
for every one of the old ten shi l l ings  (1923) sha res . (13)
Yet, most independent planters managed to survive with the 
assistance of the Papuan Government's small copra bounty, payable 
since 1934. The market r a l l i ed  in 1936-37 when the c . i . f .  price 
quoted in London rose again above £17 a ton. Papuan vi l lage 
producers, long inact ive,  also began again to contribute 
s igni f icant ly  to exports.  But the recovery was br ief ,  with prices 
fa l l ing steeply to £9 in 1939-40. With 6,000 tons unsold on hand 
in August 1940, Loudon, Jewell,  Nevitt and Fitch requested the
13 ANUABL Deposit 95, M37. BNGD Notice to Shareholders,
8 November 1935. Directors'  Report, 5 June 1937.
BNGD dist r ibuted no dividend before 1926 (5%) and then not 
another until  1936 (3%). Subsequently, with the Company's 
capital  heavily reduced and internat ional  rubber prices 
maintained at prof i table  levels,  dividends were declared 
in 1937 (3% and 5%), 1938 (2% and 3%), 1939 (2% and 5%),
1940 (2.5% and 5%), 1941 (7.5%).
BNGD Annual Reports 1911-1941 (ANUABL Deposit 95)
Administrator to radio thei r  proposals to Canberra for temporary 
assistance to 'save the total  loss of the assets '  of the 
industry.  In January Leonard Murray attended a conference in 
Austral ia to consider the problems facing all the South Seas 
producers. (14) The conference recommended the establishment of a 
combined Copra Marketing Board with a local board in each 
t e r r i t ory ,  but in June under the National Security Regulations the 
Commonwealth undertook to buy exist ing copra stocks in Papua and 
New Guinea for a maximum of £ 4 . 10s a ton and cover the f reight  
from plantat ion to p o r t . (15) I t  was bare r e l i e f  at the las t  
possible moment as many plantat ions had by then paid off thei r  
labour and ceased production. Some were re-opened la te  in 1943 as 
the Japanese forces withdrew from Papua. Most did not resume 
production until  1945.
Rubber
It  was not until  1915-16 that  the f i r s t  plantings of the rubber 
boom years began to yield thei r  latex.  In 1914-15 exports were 
valued at only £1,500. In the following year they were valued at 
£14,800 and in 1916-17 eighty-five tons were sold for £26,000. 
Thereafter,  while tonnages increased, the price declined and by 
1920-21 220 tons real ized scarcely more than had the eighty-f ive 
tons of 1916-17. When the price f el l  to sevenpence a pound in 1922 
tapping ceased on most es tates ,  exports f a l l ing  to f i f ty-seven 
tons in 1922-23 but r i s ing to 304 tons in 1923-24 when the price 
again exceeded a shi l l ing a pound.
14 Papuan Courier, 2 May 1941; and CRS G69 Item 25/20.
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15 Ibid. 20 June 1941.
In the meantime the planted area under rubber in Malaya had 
increased to over 2.25 million acres. I t  had become obvious that
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Papuan rubber, l ike the other plantat ion products of the 
t e r r i to ry ,  could not be produced at as low a cost as in South-east 
Asia. If prices rose above a shi l l ing a pound then a modest prof i t  
could be shown but the margin was narrower than for any of the 
'Eastern'  producers. Planters blamed the poor roads, the absence 
of railways, the fees and duties imposed by the Papuan government, 
or the Commonwealth's parsimony, for the uncompetitiveness of 
thei r  industry.  They also at t r ibuted i t  to the scarci ty,  
inefficiency and higher costs of Papuan labour. There were grounds 
for other explanations. As mentioned in Chapters 11 and 12, in 
1918 the manager of Glenealy estate  in Perak (FMS), George 
Wiseman, was invited by several of the Papuan rubber producers to 
v is i t  thei r  propert ies and suggest improvements. Wiseman noted 
that  the labour force on Papuan estates was actual ly smaller by a 
third than that  required on an equivalent acreage on Malayan 
plantat ions.  He thought this  s ta te  of af fa i r s  might indeed be due 
to higher labour costs in Papua. Or so he told the 
Planters '  Association. For he confided to Judge Murray, with whom 
he happened to travel to Austral ia as a fellow passenger at the 
end of his tour,  that  he believed the European managers and 
overseers employed in Papua infer ior  to the managerial class in 
Malaya and that  this  was the chief impediment to eff iciency and 
prof i tabl i ty. (.16)
In 1922, a Ceylon planter ,  C F Hutchinson, also vis i ted Papua
16 CRS A1 19/9923 'G. Wiseman Report on Plantat ions,  Papua'. 
1918-19. Murray's comments on Wiseman's reports submitted 
to him by Atlee Hunt.
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furnishing the Lieutenant Governor with a confidential  report  in 
which he too questioned the capaci t ies of the 'digger '  type of 
Australian employed on the es tates ,  thei r  number, and thei r  
c o s t . (17) He suggested that  many could be replaced by employing 
assi s tants  drawn from the Ceylon burghers or the Singhalese who 
could quite competently do much of the work current ly carried out 
by white men in Papua but at great ly less expense. These 
overseers,  clerks and art isans of the ' intermediate race1 would 
then work under a great ly reduced s taf f  of professional managers 
assisted by a department of qualif ied agricul tural  off icers .  He 
went on to recommend, as the planters had also regularly sought,
the settlement of the families of labourers on the plantat ions and 
the employment of women - a s i tuat ion that ,  i f  allowed, would make 
the labour force more dependent and more permanent. I t  was a 
suggestion deeply opposed, as we have seen, to Murray's policy of 
maintaining a balance between the need to provide jus t  suff icient  
labour to meet the requirements of employers and the need to 
preserve the basis of Papuan society in the vi l lage by ensuring 
that  time-expired labourers returned to thei r  homes. Hutchinson 
came much closer to laying bare the causes of Papuan disadvantage. 
But there were others as well.
From the beginning the very wide dis t r ibut ion of the estates 
and the consequent f a i lu r e  to consolidate holdings - together with 
the cont inuing^smal1 volume of the Papuan rubber export - had 
contributed to the higher costs of t ransport  both within and from 
the country. Before 1914 the Dutch KPM boats had called regularly
17 CRS A518 Item Hi12/1 'Papua Agriculture and Labour 
Reports' .  1922.
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at Samarai and Port Moresby on the Sydney - Batavia - Singapore 
run and approval had been given to build a l ight  railway from Port 
Moresby through the then flourishing sisal  hemp, tobacco and 
cotton plantat ions of the lower Lai oki valley to Sapphire Creek at 
the foot of the Astrolabe Range where the ore of the Laloki Copper 
mine and the rubber of the Sogeri plateau could be gathered in.
The steel r a i l s  purchased in England by the successful tenderer,  
Elders, were already aboard ship when war was declared. They were 
diverted to Brisbane for more pressing use. After the war, with 
the continued shortage of shipping of any kind and the r es t r i c t i on  
to Australian ships and ports imposed under the Navigation Act in 
1921, there were only the Burns Philp vessels,  no more tobacco, 
sisal  or cotton plantat ions along the Laloki - they had proved 
unprofi table - and the copper mine had closed down.(18) Until 
1942 the rubber of the Sogeri d i s t r i c t  had to be carried down a 
zigzag track from Hombrom's Bluff on the back of mules to be met 
by trucks at Sapphire Creek.
The post-war slump of 1921-22 was not confined to Papua. In the 
immediate aftermath of the war prices for rubber had risen.  
American motor vehicle production had reached 2.25 million in 1920 
and speculative boom conditions had again developed. Rubber 
acreage in Malaya increased by 125,000 acres in 1919 alone.
Efforts to control inf la t ion through credi t  r es t r i c t ion  that  
resulted from a conference of the a l l i es  in Brussels led to a
18 The mine was closed in 1919, re-opened in 1921, closed in 
1922, Re-opened in 1924, and f ina l ly  closed down in 1926.
To la ter  requests for a motor road beyond Sapphire Creek 
Murray could respond that  the whole product of the Sogeri 
Dis t r ic t  amounted to 'no more than two lorryloads a 
day' .  In CRS A518, Item R918/3 'Planters '  Association of 
Papua', 1936-1950. Bulletin No. 5, 8 January 1937.
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rapid collapse into depression. Car production fe l l  by half a 
million in 1921 and a stockpile amounting to 110,000 tons, of 
unsold rubber quickly accumulated. A committee under the 
chairmanship of Sir James Stevenson was set  up to recommend some 
form of r es t r i c t i on  that  would reduce production. The Stevenson 
Committee proposed to raise the price through an export tax and to 
l imit  production to a percentage of productive capacity,  to be 
decided annually, on the basis of 500 pounds an acre for 
plantat ion rubber and 400 pounds an acre for smallholder rubber. 
The scheme was duly applied throughout the Bri t ish rubber 
producing areas,  72% of the whole, and voluntari ly accepted by 
Bri t ish in te res t s  that  controlled a third of production in the 
Netherlands Indies - the Dutch producers refusing to be party to 
the r es t r i c t i ons  taking the view that  competition should be 
allowed to run i t s  course to eliminate the inef f ic ient  producer. 
The Americans took a similar view and saw the Stevenson scheme as 
a Bri t ish ' imperial venture'  which, at the expense pr incipal ly of 
the United States,  was designed to deprive automobile producers 
and consumers of cheaper rubber . (19)
By April 1926 the Colonial Office permitted 100% production but 
warned that  the percentage would be reduced again i f  the price of 
rubber on the London exchange fe l l  below twenty-one pence a pound. 
In that  year, planter Papua's one year of prosperity before 1942, 
the price reached f i f t y - f i v e  pence a pound. The 642 tons exported 
in 1925-26 realized over £194,000, only a l i t t l e  short of the 
£204,097 earned on the 8,419 tons of copra produced.(20)
19 John Drabble. Rubber in Malaya 1876-1922 (Kuala Lumpur,
1973) p. 198.
20 PAR 1925-26. p. 74.
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As noted in Chapter 15, the v i s i t  to both Papua and the 
Mandated Terr i tory of New Guinea in 1926 by the Commonwealth 
Analyst, Percy Wilkinson, was followed by the passage through the 
Federal Parliament of a Papua and New Guinea Bounties Act whereby 
£250,000 was set  aside over ten years to encourage in the 
t e r r i t o r i e s  production of t ropical  commodities that  Austral ia 
currently imported from the Netherlands Indies and elsewhere.
Rubber, br ief ly  bouyant, was not included in the schedule attached 
to the Act.
Arthur Jewell MLC, representing the planters and 
temperamentally a cautious man, immediately proposed that  rubber 
be added to the l i s t ,  and that  a bounty become payable i f  the 
price fe l l  below a shi l l ing a pound. Wilkinson thought i t  unlikely 
that  the price would f a l l  below twenty-one pence a pound and that ,  
in any case, the industry would do well to establ ish i t s  own 
s t abi l i sa t ion  fund out of any return above this  amount.(21) By 
1928, under pressure from rubber manufacturers in the United 
Kingdom, the Bri t ish Government announced i t s  intention not to 
impose fur ther  res t r i c t ions  on production as from November of that  
year. Prices fe l l  suddenly to eight pence a pound and Sir Hubert 
Murray pressed to have Jewell ' s  proposal reconsidered. (22) An 
immediate threa t ,  i t  seemed, was posed to the continued existence 
of the rubber plantat ions,  the l ivelihood of thei r  t h i r t y - s i x  
European managers and assi s tants  and to the employment of 2,000 
Papuan labourers.  The effect  on the Papuan revenue in reduced
21 CRS A518 Item P812/1/5 'Commerce Papua - Rubber Industry'
Part 1. Percy Wilkinson to Secretary,  Home and Terr i tor ies  
14 July 1926 and 5 October 1926.
22 Ibid. Murray to Minister,  20 April 1928.
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import duties, fees and receipts was l i k e l y  to be very severe and 
the ramif icat ions of collapse among the commercial community 
incalculable. The Stevenson scheme had had the e f fec t  of sh i f t in g  
American support to the Dutch producers and smallholder production 
in the Indies had rap id ly  expanded. I t  was now expected that 
Malayan planters would export at the maximum rate to reduce costs 
and no one could t e l l  the depths to which the market might f a l l .
The Commonwealth Analyst now concurred that the Papuan planters 
had a f a i r  claim to support but Austra l ia  was becoming rapid ly  
absorbed in i t s  own economic c r i s i s . (23) Rubber production in 
Papua dropped from 811 tons in 1928 to 470 tons in 1929 as tapping 
was reduced. Over the next twelve months the price did not r ise
above ten pence a pound landed in London which yielded the Papuan
grower less than the cost of production. Hard times had shown that 
rubber might jus t  be produced at cost at th is  f igu re  f .o .b .  at 
Port Moresby.
In February 1930 Arthur Jewell went to Canberra in an attempt 
in person to persuade the Government to include rubber with in the 
scope of the Bounties Act out of the fund of which almost nothing 
at al l  had so fa r  been paid to Papua. In July the price f e l l  to
sixpence a pound and Jewell wrote to the Min ister fo r  Industry, J
A Beasley, suggesting that i f  the bounty proposal was unacceptable 
then the Government might consider placing an import duty of a 
penny a pound on a l l  rubber entering Austra l ia  other than that 
from i t s  t e r r i t o r ie s .  This would represent almost £10,000 fo r  
every 1,000 tons imported. He pointed out that despite the decl ine
23 Ib id . Memoranda of 12 and 23 May 1928.
in raw rubber prices manufacturers of rubber goods had not passed 
any saving on to Austral ian consumers.(24)
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Here was an idea fa r  better calculated to gain a receptive 
hearing from a Federal Government i t s e l f  desperate fo r  revenue 
than could an appeal fo r  a bounty. The Comptroller General 
conceded in a memorandum that the increased burden on the 
Commonwealth that would resu l t  i f  the Papuan local revenue fa i le d  
might not be inconsiderable.(25) Rubber f e l l  to fourpence a pound 
in November and the House of Representatives passed a T a r i f f  
Resolution imposing an import duty of fourpence a pound on crude 
rubber other than that produced in te r r i t o r ie s  of the 
Commonwealth. Considering how desperate the s i tua t ion  had become 
and the sheer weight of correspondence that had been required to 
wring th is  preference from Canberra, the fulsomeness of Jewell 's 
grat i tude was excessive: 'We were indeed fortunate in having a 
Mother Country in Austra l ia  to whom we could appeal fo r  he lp ' ,  he 
telegrammed.(26) The Comptroller General was rather i r r i t a t e d  by 
th is  reaction. He wrote to the Prime Min ister,  James Scu l l in ,  
acknowledging that the t a r i f f  had given incidental assistance to a 
Papuan industry, but he thought i t  should be made quite clear that 
i t  had been p r im a r i l l y  imposed as a revenue measure. Scu l l in 's  
secretary noted that true as th is  may have been, such a view might
24 Ib id . Sir* George Manners, Chairman of Pacif ic  and Papua 
Produce (Lolorua and the Confl ic ts)  wrote to the Prime 
Minister,  Scu l l in ,  to say that his company's resources 
were 'p ra c t ic a l l y  exhausted'. 24 July 1930.
25 Ib id .  Memoranda, Comptroller General to Secretary, Prime 
M in is te r 's  Department, 3 October, 6 November 1930.
26 Ib id .  Jewell to McLaren, 20 November 1930.
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best be withheld from the Lieutenant Governor.(27) Meanwhile the 
Legis la t ive Council in Port Moresby carried a fu r the r  vote of 
thanks.
Elsewhere prices dropped s t i l l  fu r the r  and below the fourpence 
a pound now regarded as the cost of production in Malaya. In Papua 
i t  was soon real ized that even with the fourpence preference that 
i t s  rubber s t i l l  laboured under the disadvantage of a higher 
Primage Duty - a f l a t  rate duty of 2.5% ad valorem imposed on al l  
goods imported in to  Austra l ia  including those from Papua and New 
Guinea. Primage was levied on Malayan rubber before the t a r i f f ,  
that is on threepence a pound in 1931, whi ls t  Papuan rubber had 
primage levied on sevenpence a pound making the Malayan product 
s t i l l  cheaper, i t  seemed, fo r  Austral ian manufacturers to buy 
t a r i f f  and a l l .  Within a year the T a r i f f  Board was of the opinion 
that the duty on an essential material l i ke  rubber was neither 
' s c i e n t i f i c '  nor ra t i o n a l .(28) Arthur Jewell , v ig i la n t  as ever,
4
pointed out to Murray in a le t t e r  forwarded to the Prime Minister 
that the London price had fa l len  to twopence ha'penny a pound and 
that the a l te rnat ive to continuing the preference was the 
immediate collapse of the Papuan industry. Austral ian 
manufacturers and consumers, he argued, were paying less than the 
cost of production even with the fourpence d u ty . (29) The 
Lieutenant Governor had eventual ly heard of the view of the 
Comptroller General that the t a r i f f  was no more than a revenue
27 Ib id . Memoranda, Comptroller General to Secretary, Prime 
Min is te r 's  Department, 16 July 1931; reply, 3 August 1931.
28 Papuan Courier, 22 January 1931; Minute Paper, Prime 
Minister, 23 January 1933 confirms.
29 CRS A518, Item P812/1/5. Jewell to Leonard Murray 
1 October 1931.
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measure, and dismayed, he sought assurances, that were not 
forthcoming, that the preference would be adopted as a permanent 
feature of Austral ian t e r r i t o r i a l  p o l i c y . (30)
With the f a l l  of the Scul l in  m in is t ry  in November 1931 
manufacturers renewed th e i r  pressure fo r  abol i t ion of the t a r i f f  
and i t  seemed that the planters and the Papuan Government had to 
go through the whole gamut of explanatory correspondence again to 
acquaint the new Prime Minister,  Joseph Lyons, of Papua's 
predicament. In te rna t iona l ly ,  attempts made again in 1932 to 
regulate production fa i le d  as 'nat ive production' in the 
Netherlands Indies could not be e f fe c t ive ly  control led.  On Mincing 
Lane, the London hub of the rubber trade, brokers were accepting 
1.875 pence a pound.(31)
The Commonwealth t a r i f f  system traded o f f  one in te res t  group 
and industry against another where governments had to bear the 
electoral consequences of a l te r ing the balances. There was no 
consti tuency in Papua; there was only the cost that would accrue 
to the Commonwealth of f a i lu re  to keep the t e r r i t o r i a l  economy 
afloat .  With the Papuan rubber industry regarded by the 
manufacturers as more of a nuisance than an asset, the balance was 
heavi ly weighted in th e i r  favour. I t  appeared that the new 
Government would succumb to pressure as trade unionists added 
the i r  voice to those of the manufacturers when they protested 
against the withdrawal of a subsidy to the shale o i l  industry that 
promised a domestic synthetic rubber industry and demanded the
30 Ib id . Murray to Prime Minister (Lyons), 5 November 1931.
31 Papuan Courier, 24 March 1932.
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ending of the natural rubber 'subsidy' to 'New Guinea 
farmers'. (32)
Only the rubber preference had saved Papuan commerce, and 
indeed the Papuan Government, from the worst effects  of the 
depression as the annual subsidy to the revenue made by the 
Commonwealth declined from £50,000 in 1928-29 to £34,000 in 
1932-33. While the Papuan industry had been able to survive with 
the preference, the manufacturers had also derived the benefi t  of 
a savings in exchange, since in purchasing Papuan rubber they were 
not required to remit funds to London. Nonetheless, as the enti re  
Papuan rubber production represented only about 8% of Austral ian 
rubber consumption, th e i r  desire to have the duty l i f t e d  was an 
overr iding considerat ion. To press i t s  case the leading importer, 
the Dunlop Perdriau Rubber Company, declined to buy any Papuan 
rubber as from 31st March 1932, ostensibly on account of the 
disadvantage in primage d u ty . (33) The Executive Council in Port
Moresby now asked fo r  exemption from the primage fo r  Papuan 
produce - though the Treasurer, E C Harris, was able to tender 
figures that demonstrated that when the exchange fac to r  was 
considered Papuan rubber was indeed s t i l l  cheaper than 'Eastern' 
rubber. (34) Murray wrote
I do not think that one can contest the argument of the
32 CRS A518, Item P812/1/5. Darl ing Harbour Branch of the 
ALP to the Prime Min is te r , 4 May 1932.
33 Ib id . Jewell to Min is te r , 30 November 1932. Also Radio 
Murray to Prime Minister,  13 December 1932.
34 Ib id . Memorandum E C Harris to Leonard Murray, 14 December 
1932.
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Papuan rubber growers that the collapse of th e i r  industry 
would ruin many persons in the t e r r i t o r y  and would cause 
a loss to Austra l ia  fa r  greater than anything that cheaper 
sales of rubber in Austra l ia  could possible replace. The 
primage amounts to something l i k e  a halfpenny a pound and 
th is  on 800 tons . . . doubtless amounts to a very large sum 
but I suggest that i t  would be worth while to give up th is  
sum i f  thereby the objections of the merchants could be 
removed.(35)
On agreement that the excess primage be debitted to the sel lers 
account the manufacturers agreed to extend th e i r  purchases of 
Papuan rubber fo r  another year u n t i l  31 March 1933. In January 
1933 Jewell and Harris went 'south' to be joined by Major Walker 
of Clarke and Whiting, and F C Tracy, BNGD's Sydney agent, to 
attend a conference with the Chairman of Dunlop, W A Watt, and the 
Min ister fo r  Customs, Colonel T W White.(36) At the conference 
W A Watt complained about the expense of Customs supervision on 
the factory f lo o r  where a drawback of duty could be claimed on 
Eastern rubber that was to be re-exported but not upon Papuan 
rubber. I t  was d i f f i c u l t  to maintain a d is t in c t ion  between batches 
of rubber at the manufacturing stage merely on account of th e i r  
place of o r ig in .  This the growers could acknowledge. But the main 
problem, as Watt saw i t ,  was, and would continue to be, the cost 
of rubber production in Papua. I f  the Papuan industry was not 
competi tive, did i t  deserve to survive? He pr iva te ly  to ld Tracy 
that Dunlop would be prepared to buy a l l  the Papuan production at
35 Ib id. Murray to Prime Min ister,  16 December 1932.
36 Ib id. Harris and Jewell to McLaren, 13 February 1933.
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an agreed price of,  say, ten pence a pound i f  the t a r i f f  were 
l i f t e d  from Eastern rubber. I t  was an o f fe r  that might have been 
very acceptable years e a r l ie r  though i t  would, no doubt, have been 
t ied to an agreement re s t r i c t in g  extensions to rubber acreage in 
Papua. But the Federal Government's declared in te res t  in the 
revenue remained and a pr ivate agreement was not now possible.
The outcome of the meeting was a decision by the Commonwealth 
to impose a t a r i f f  of fourpence a pound and therefore equal 
primage on al l  rubber entering Austra l ia  but remitt ing the 
proceeds of the duty on the Papuan rubber component to the Papuan 
Government fo r  disbursement to planters in the form of a Papuan 
rubber export bounty.(37) Jewell and Harris returned to Port 
triumphant; the manufacturers remained outraged. A year ea r l ie r  
W A Watt had drawn his shareholders' attention to the in iq u i t y  of 
t a r i f f  and primage duties that amounted to upwards of 200% of the 
landed cost of an essential material and which cost th e i r  company 
alone £180,000 in the year 1931-32.(38) He should perhaps also 
have mentioned that the Austral ian manufacturers were themselves 
very heavi ly protected from imports of cheap manufactured rubber 
a r t i c l  es.
The triumph of Papua soured a l i t t l e  when i t  was found that 
Papuan rubber, l i ke  Eastern rubber, might now remain in bond fo r  
long periods and that bounty payments could only be made on 
receipt by the Papuan Government of the re-imbursement of duty 
after clearance.
37 Ib id. Jewell to Min is te r , 27 February 1933.
38 Ib id .  Dunlop Perdriau Rubber Company, Chairman's address.
Annual Meeting, 30 September 1932.
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In October 1933 i t  was announced in the Federal Budget speech, 
without warning, that the t a r i f f  on crude rubber was to be reduced 
to twopence a pound. The Prime Min ister hoped that the reduction 
would be passed on to the publ ic in cheaper motor car tyres. 
Apparently the Federal Treasurer had had his attent ion drawn to 
the Annual Report of BNGD that indicated the average cost of 
production had dropped from fivepence ha'penny to fourpence 
ha'penny a pound. A closer examination would have revealed these 
to be a pared down f igures,  produced fo r  jaded B r i t ish  
shareholders, that included nothing beyond plantat ion cost - not 
local or overseas f re ig h t  nor the 25% exchange payable on 
remission of proceeds to London.(39)
By the beginning of 1934 i t  seemed l i k e l y  that the 
manufacturers would soon succeed in forc ing the abo l i t ion  of the 
t a r i f f  and that the question of assistance to the growers in Papua 
would be 'thrown in to  bold r e l i e f  as i t  would have to be (borne) 
by subsidy from the Austral ian Treasury'. Sir Hubert Murray was 
invi ted in Apr i l  to furnish confidentia l  proposals fo r  such a 
contingency.(40)
The Commonwealth also intended to set up a commission of enquiry 
into the industr ia l  conditions prevai l ing in Papua. Murray 
thought th is  unnecessary.(41) Within Papua there was peace 
between government and commercial agr icu l tu re. The old complaints
39 Commonwealth Pariiamentary Debates 1933. (Representatives)
4 October 1933, p. 3235. For Lyons's announcement;
CRS A518 Item P812/1/5 Part 2 fo r  protest by F C Tracy to 
Secretary, Prime M in is te r 's  Department, 11 November 1933.
40 Ib id .  Prime Minister to Murray (Conf idential)  6 Apri l  1934
41 Ib id . Prime Minister to Murray, No. 25/3/489. 20 Apr i l  
1934.
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against the provisions of the Labour Ordinance and their 
administration had died away over the years. There was agreement 
that limitations of geography, timing and scale had all 
disadvantaged Papuan industry and that the conditions offered 
Papuan workers could not be modified. Murray now recommended that 
a permanent bounty of twopence a pound be applied to all Papuan 
and New Guinea rubber - a proposal he submitted in conjunction 
with General Griffiths, Administrator of the Mandated Territory.
In return Australia was to be offered exemption from duties on 
rubber manufactures imported into the terr i tor ies - a quite 
nominal gesture in view of the insignificance of such t rade . (42)
The tar i f f  stayed in place.
In March 1934 the manager of Ogamobu Plantation for BNGD, 
William Jefferson returned from Malaya after a careful assessment 
of rubber production costs there. He was able to confirm that in 
production per acre, in the number of trees tapped per day by the 
average labourer, and in labour unit costs, the Papuan estates 
compared quite favourably with those he had v is i ted . (43) The 
advantages possessed by 'Eastern' estates, he found, were f i r s t ly  
in transport where a large industry had provided the revenue out 
of which excellent roads and railways had been built and where the 
volume of production had made for cheap shipping. Secondly, though 
the salaries of white staff were much higher than in Papua, the
42 Ibid. Murray to Prime Minister, No. 25/3/490. 20 April
1934.
43 Ibid. Part 2. Murray to Prime Minister, 6 June 1934. 
Jefferson's report was prepared for the planters but 
Murray was given permission to use it  as he saw f i t .
He defended the need to protect the Papuan as an indepen­
dent peasant proprietor but in every other respect agreed 
with Jefferson's analysis. W H Jefferson. 'Some Notes on a 
Visit to Malaya - February/March 1934' is appended. (Tanah 
Merah mention p.7).
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number of white managers in proportion to the acreage was 
comparatively very small. Tanah Merah, near Port Dickson,, for 
example, a single es tate  of 11,172 acres and an area greater in 
extent than all the Papuan rubber estates together,  was under the 
control of one manager and two ass i s tants .  Thirdly, Indians and 
Chinese were available to carry out many of the technical and 
cler ical  functions performed by whites in Papua. Final ly the 
growth of great agency houses that  managed large numbers of 
propert ies in Malaya on behalf of Bri t ish companies allowed for a 
high degree of r at ional i sa t ion in s taf f ing,  t ransport ,  storage and 
marketing. I t  appeared that  only the amalgamation of estates in 
Papua - impractical on the grounds that  proprietorship was shared
between England and Austral ia,  and the plantat ions too small and
too widely dis t r ibuted - might have promised reduced costs.  A S 
Bloomfield set  up the Moresby Trading and Agency Company in 1916 
to act as managing agents for the Clarke and Whiting i n te res t s ,  
the Kemp Welch estates  and his own Galley Reach property. The 
company was a casualty of the post-war collapse and an absconding
accountant. G A Loudon and Company and the BNG Trading Co,
subsidiaries of BNGD, succeeded as agents for Clarke and Whiting 
in 1922 and managed the BNGD estates until  1933. But neither of 
these companies could achieve great economies of scale when the 
scale of the whole was so small.
The year 1934 marked a turning point in the fortunes of Papuan 
rubber. I t  was to be a l as t  minute reprieve for the colonial 
economy, for the year also brought the collapse of the copra 
industry that  was not to recover before the Pacific war. There had 
been renewed effor t s  to regulate internat ional  rubber production,
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and in addit ion th is  time, to l im i t  the expansion of planted 
areas. An In ternat ional  Rubber Agreement signed by Great B r i ta in ,  
the Netherlands, France, the Government of India, and Siam was 
signed on 7th May. Austra l ia  was not party to the agreement and 
Papua too in s ig n i f ica n t  a producer to be considered. Nonetheless 
the maintenance of th is  agreement was to provide the securi ty of 
price so long hoped fo r  that allowed, as another war drew near, a 
second expansion of the Papuan rubber industry almost on the scale 
of 1908-12. In February 1936 the London price rose above sixpence 
a pound fo r  the f i r s t  time in f i v e  years.
I t  did not take long fo r  the Internat ional  Rubber Regulation 
Committee set up to administer the Agreement to have i t s  oversight 
in respect of Papua drawn to i t s  attention by Dutch in te r e s ts . (44) 
The Committee approached the Austral ian High Commissioner in 
London to complain that under the umbrella of re s t r i c t io n  the 
growers in Papua were free to extend th e i r  plantings, and to urge 
the abandonment of any bounty that might encourage expansion. With 
Papua s t i l l  supplying under 10% of Austral ian rubber requirements 
the Commonwealth began, fo r  the f i r s t  time, to look on the 
Te rr i to ry  - at least fo r  the purposes of i t s  rubber industry - as 
an integral part of Austra l ia . Murray and Jewell were inv i ted to
respond to the Committee's objections. ( 4 5 ) Papuan production was 
minuscule by comparison with that of the major producers with less 
than an eighth of 1% of world production, but with the col lapse of 
copra, the decl ine in gold exports, and the fa i l u r e  of most other
44 Ib id .  High Commission (London) to Prime Min is ter ,  15 July 
1936. The IRA Committee's l e t t e r  is appended.
45 Ib id .  Murray to Minister.  5 October 1936. Memoranda by 
Murray and Jewell appended.
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cultures,  i t  was doubtful i f  a rubber industry was as important to 
the economy of any other country as i t  was to that of Papua. ' I t  
is hardly re a l ized1, Murray wrote, ' tha t  Papua has been within a 
very short distance of bankruptcy1.(46)
Such was the recovery that Koitaki was to pay a dividend of 
7.5% in 1935, the f i r s t  since 1926, and in July 1936 BNGD paid out 
i t s  second dividend in twenty-f ive years of operations in Papua, a 
tenta t ive 3%. Since the Internat ional  Rubber Agreement was to las t  
i n i t i a l l y  only u n t i l  1938, the Planters'  Association, newly 
refurbished, continued to press fo r  a guaranteed bounty of 
twopence a pound that would be f ixed fo r  upwards of t h i r t y  years. 
The urgency fo r  such a provision had diminished rap id ly ,  and the 
Commonwealth toyed with a proposal fo r  a s ta b i l iza t io n  fund to be 
raised out of the t a r i f f  re-imbursement. Rebate of the duty in the 
form of a bounty ceased f i n a l l y  on 1 October 1936 with the to ta l  
assistance given to the rubber planters of Papua since 1930 
amounting to £145,743. The only advantage now retained by Papuan 
rubber was exemption from the primage. This had been conceded. 
Austral ian consumption in 1936-37 was 19,000 tons. The area under 
cu l t iva t ion  in Papua was 11,836 acres and production amounted to 
1,112 tons. By comparison, Sarawak exported 44,000 tons from 
228,000 acres; B r i t ish  North Borneo, 21,000 tons from 126,000 
acres; Malaya, 600,000 tons from 3.25 m i l l ion  acres; and the 
Netherlands Indies 500,000 tons also from 3.25 m i l l ion  acres.(47)
In 1937 two c le r ica l  o f f ice rs ,  J Fletcher from the Commonwealth
46 Ib id . Murray to Prime Min is te r , 8 January 1935.
47 Ib id . Memorandum. Prime M in is te r 's  Department, 2 August 
1938.
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Department of Trade and Customs, and 0 Wolfensburger from the 
Tari ff  Board, were sent to Papua to assess the current  costs of 
rubber production. They closely examined the es ta te  accounts of 
BNGD, Clarke and Whiting and Koitaki concluding that  the average 
plantat ion cost without provision for e i ther  depreciation or 
amortisation was 5.23 pence a pound, and that  with provision for 
these - according to a formula of the International  Rubber 
Regulation Committee of what was a f a i r  and equitable price level 
' . . .  reasonably remunerative to e f f i c ien t  producers'  - the cost 
was 6.7 pence a pound f . o . b .  Port Moresby.(48) These were 
calculated at current cost but did not include the in te res t  on 
mortgage or debenture loans under which most of the companies 
laboured and which i f  added would have taken the figure close to 
the eight pence a pound that  planters now claimed as the minimum 
price they needed to obtain to cover t he i r  real costs - a f igure 
double that  for Malayan rubber c . i . f .  London.
From 1936 onwards, nonetheless,  the idea that  Papuan rubber 
production should be expanded as a contingency against war became 
part  of every recommendation for protection and occurs in much 
other correspondence besides.  Colonel White, as Minister for 
Customs, spoke to the National Club in Canberra declaring that  ' i f  
we do not develop these t e r r i t o r i e s  fu l ly  we may lose them. They 
will be taken from our weak fingers by energetic hands ' . (49) This 
was rhetoric reminiscent of that  which had accompanied each
48 Ibid. Minute Paper (Trade and Customs Department) 28 June 
1937, Prepared by 0 Wolfensburger. The Appendices are 
detai led and clear ly show that  the higher costs of Papuan 
production were due to higher t ransport  and supervision 
costs.
49 Note untraced
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previous new s t a r t  in New Guinea, but now the urgency seemed more 
pressing than ever before. All his adult l i f e ,  and l ike many 
other Austral ians,  Sir Hubert Murray had seen Japan as the real 
threat  to Aus t ra l ia ' s  survival as a European society in the 
Pacif ic,  and in a personal l e t t e r  to Sir George Pearce, Minister 
for Ter r i to r ies ,  he gave his private view of the vi tal  importance 
the Papuan industry might acquire in the event of a Japanese 
blockade of the Eas t . (50) He was now asked what the l imits of 
sui table and available rubber lands were.
I t  had become clear in 1937 that  the International  Rubber 
Agreement would continue beyond 1938 and in Port Moresby 
applications for more than 40,000 acres of new lands for rubber 
cul t ivat ion were received. The expansion between 1936 and 1942 was 
considerable,  the areas under rubber cul t ivat ion almost doubling 
though the benefi t  was not to accrue unti l  af ter  1945.
In 1934, Tom Nevitt had taken out a lease at Sogeri of the area 
between the junction of the Kokoda track and Koitaki on behalf of 
a syndicate of 'old'  BNGD managers comprising himself,  Bill Voysey 
of Gadaisu, Jim Matley of Waigani, Doug Ross of Obu, Gordon 
Marshall of Ogamobu, Tom Miller of Pa i l i ,  Fred Godson of 
Itikinumu, Arthur Pollard of Aroa, and Cecil Day of 0tomata.(51) 
The plantat ion was a l i t t l e  confusingly named 'Soger i1. Since BNGD 
had never been in a posit ion to provide any ret irement scheme for 
these men they had agreed to develop this  property j o in t l y  and as 
an enterprise quite d i s t inc t  from the larger company to provide
50 Ibid. Murray to Sir  George Pearce (personal and confident­
i a l ) ,  6 October 1936.
51 Interview: B E Fairfax Ross, 11 June 1972.
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for  th e i r  securi ty.  Samuel Thompson, now a BNGD d irec tor  and 
secretary of the company since 1910, with his two daughters also 
held an in terest  in the venture.(52) Coming in to  f u l l  production 
la te r  at the time of the Korean War, Sogeri amply repaid th e i r  
fores ight .
Also in the Sogeri d i s t r i c t ,  Percy MacDonald, once a miner on 
Misima, and a bui ld ing contractor in Port in the t h i r t i e s ,  had 
examined land a few miles along the Kokoda track from the 
Hombrom's B lu f f  tu rno f f  with a view to planting rubber. By 1937 
his p lantat ion,  I l o l o ,  was being cleared and a nursery prepared.
'Gal ' Loudon, once ' the uncrowned king of Papua', had taken 
large r isks and paid dearly fo r  them in the years a f te r  1926. In 
1922, as previously noted, he had establ ished G A Loudon and 
Company as a subsidiary of BNGD to operate as an agency fo r  the 
parent company and other plantat ion in te rests ,  and to take over 
the BNGD re ta i l  trading business. He remained general manager of 
both companies u n t i l  in 1926 when he thought the moment propit ious 
to become a fu l l - t im e  planter in his own in te res t .  He was la te r  
sued by G A Loudon and Co fo r  re ta in ing the agency fo r  Clarke and 
Whiting contrary to an undertaking he had made at the time of his 
res igna t ion . (53) An action was also taken against him to recover 
money he had borrowed from Burns Phi lp as a loan to buy his and 
T D Ryan's one th i rd  shares in Ogamobu Plantat ions in 1924. His 
personal a f fa i rs  were at th e i r  nadir and he survived on his 
interests  in several Papuan companies, the plantat ions at Mogubo
52 Ibid.
53 Papuan Courier. 2, 8 July 1927.
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and Ou Ou Creek, and on credi t  from Burns Philp. In 1929 Mogubo 
was sold to the Bunting brothers and Ogamobu to BNGD. In the same 
year,  Loudon began the development of a coffee and rubber estate  
at Eilogo, on the southern boundaries of Itikinumu. The rubber did 
not come into ful l  production unti l  a f ter  1945 when Loudon 
established another rubber es ta te ,  Mororo, and a c a t t l e  property, 
Catalina,  adjacent to Eilogo.(54)
Captain A S Fi tch,  the Steamships Trading Company chairman, and 
Brian Molloy, a new so l i c i t o r  in Port ,  prospected for 
sui table rubber growing country in the Kasiabadina d i s t r i c t  
between the Vanapa River and Galley Reach in 1935. In February and 
April 1937 two companies, Mariboi Rubber Estates,  with a nominal 
capi tal  of £50,000, and Rubberlands Limited, with capital  of 
£20,000, were incorporated to develop leases in the area. 
Steamships were the managing agents for the companies and the 
nursery stock was raised from the seeds of improved budgrafted 
rubber obtained from Koitaki.  These inland estates were unpopular 
with Papuan and New Guinea Highland workers in the years ahead 
though proving to be highly prof i table  investments. To the west of 
Galley Reach along the Aroa River, between Lolorua and Aroa 
plantat ion,  another lease for planting rubber was taken out by Mrs 
Vera Ward and Mrs Winifred Loudon. On th is  es ta te ,  Aroana, an 
attempt was made unsuccessfully to interplant  with cocoa. (55) 
Vegetables for the Port Moresby market were also grown for a time 
as catch crops.
54 Other plantat ions in which G A Loudon held an in teres t  
for a time included Baia, Domara, Hisiu and Dedele.
55 G A Loudon 'Notes' ,  p. 4.
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In April 1938, the Kienzle family led by A T K Kingsley, manager 
of the Commonwealth Hemp Company at Tavai in 1930 and since a 
miner in New Guinea, registered Mamba Rubber Estates,  a private 
company to develop a plantat ion at Amada near Kokoda.(56) On the 
same day together with E J Frame, manager of Burns Phi Ip in Port,  
they registered a gold prospecting syndicate to build a dredge 
downstream on the Yodda. The supplies for the development of both 
enterprises were flown into Kokoda af ter  the New Guinea goldfields 
pattern.  In July, intending another Northern Division development, 
Sangara Rubber Plantat ions Limited, was registered by R D Bertie,  
the Port lawyer, and may have represented an attempt by the 
syndicators of the fai led Sangara Sugar Estates to develop thei r  
lease with rubber instead.  Rubber trees became a common sight in 
the vi l lages of this  division as Orokaiva labourers returning 
along the Kokoda track over the Owen Stanley Ranges at the expiry 
of thei r  contracts planted 11,000 trees of the i r  own.
Final ly,  with rubber prices r i s ing rapidly in 1940, Captain 
Fitch invested fur ther  in another new company, Kerema Rubber 
Plantat ions,  which under Steamships management developed Epo 
Estate at Kerema in the Gulf Division. One of two other directors 
was R W Robson, edi tor  of the Pacific Islands Monthly, of Sydney. 
The shares in this  venture were not all sold unti l  a f ter  1945, and 
l ike all the plantat ions where development had begun in the late  
pre-war boom,*tapping did not commence until  the la te  f o r t ie s .
56 Papuan Courier, 6 April 1938.
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Chapter 17 Tr ia l  and t ra v a i l  with other cultures
While copra and rubber became the major industr ies of Papua, 
e f fo r ts  were made to establ ish plantat ions of most of the other 
pr incipal  t rop ica l  commodities. These included tobacco, sisal 
hemp, cotton, tea, sugar, coffee and cocoa. Each fo r  a time 
received enthusiast ic attention and could seem to promise an 
answer to colonial Papua's chronic poverty. Al l  had fa i le d  by 
1942. An account of the t r i a l  of these other cultures and the 
t ra va i ls  that planters encountered as cl imate, so i ls ,  diseases, 
distance, labour and markets were tested now fo l lows. I f  in 
general these abandoned industr ies demonstrated that in no branch 
of trop ica l  agr icu l tu re could Papua f ind  a margin of competi tive 
advantage, the h is tory  of each is d is t in c t  - fa i l u r e  or col lapse 
due to a d i f fe re n t  combination of fac tors .  The planters of Papua 
blamed th e i r  predicament on those closest - the antagonism of the 
Papuan Government u n t i l  1922 and the Commonwealth's unwil lingness 
or incapacity to provide the degree of protect ion and support 
necessary fo r  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  They wanted preferent ia l  treatment 
l i ke  that enjoyed by 'o ther '  Austral ian producers in Austral ian 
markets. This, federal min is t r ies  were loathe to provide fo r  the 
Papuan industr ies, unless, as was the case in 1930, a government 
in Canberra was faced with the immanent col lapse of the 
T e r r i to ry 's  revenue and forced to accord a preference to Papuan 
rubber.
Successive governments in Melbourne and Canberra never 
resolved, indeed never a f te r  1906 and before 1942 did they again 
consider, the fundamental issue of Papua's future - whether, l i ke
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the Northern Terri tory of Austral ia,  i t  was an integral part of 
the Commonwealth though current ly a dependency of the Federal 
Government, whether i t  was an external dependency destined for 
eventual incorporation into the Commonwealth, or whether i t  would 
remain indef ini te ly  no more than a convenient s t ra tegic  barr ier ,  
se l f -sustaining i f  possible,  but otherwise maintained at the very 
lowest cost.  From the outset  the revenues of Papua, unlike those 
of the Northern Terr i tory were to be raised subs tant ia l ly  from the 
country's own resources.  Indeed Papua could seem a ' foreign'  
country when i t  drew an income from customs duties on imports into 
the Terri tory - including those from Austral ia i t s e l f  - and when 
i t s  products imported into the Commonwealth were subject to 
Australian t a r i f f s ,  conceded no more than the imperial preference. 
There could be l i t t l e  pol i t i ca l  or commercial support in Austral ia 
for any of the agricul tural  industr ies of Papua i f  they might 
compete with Australian domestic production or with cheaper 
tropical  commodities obtainable elsewhere. William L i t t l e  MLC, 
advocating the development of a Papuan sugar industry in 1917, 
at t r ibuted continuing Austral ian indifference towards the 
development of Papua ultimately to the lack of elected 
representation for i t s  s e t t l e r s  - ' there are no votes in Papua for 
Australian p o l i t i c i a n s ' . (1)
With the Tar i f f  Preference and Bounties Acts of 1926 i t  did 
seem for a time that  the Commonwealth might adopt a more generous 
policy of protection and encouragement of commercial agricul ture 
in Papua and the Mandated Terri tory.  But, as discussed in the las t  
chapter,  neither copra nor rubber, the established indust r ies ,
1 Papuan Courier. 3 August 1917.
341
were included on the schedule of e i ther  Act and both measures 
largely fa i le d  to st imulate production of the other commodities 
l i s ted .  The pro f fe r  of assistance had come too la te .  By the la te 
twenties and throughout the next decade the in te rnational  economy 
offered few opportunit ies fo r  the development of new plantat ion 
industr ies in any part of the world.
Tobacco
The B r i t ish  New Guinea Development Company was the only 
enterprise to plant nicot iana tabacum on a large scale and 
experiment with manufacture of tobacco products fo r  local 
consumption. Tobacco from the beginning had been a major item in 
trade with the Papuans and comprised between 5% and 10% of a l l  
imports annually. Local production, the management thought, would 
be highly p ro f i tab le  and provide an income as a 'catch crop1 in 
the years while the perennial tree crops were immature. Five tons 
were harvested from the f i r s t  areas planted at Katea on the Laloki 
in 1911 and sold as ' c ig a rs ' .  An item in the Papuan Times noted in 
February 1912 that a f i r s t  l o t  of these BNGD cigars had been 
received by the ed i to r.  Will iam Bruce, who knew something at least 
about the i r  smoking qua l i ty ,  thought the 'Colorado Madura' sty le 
samples ju s t  'a l i t t l e  green',  but nonetheless ventured in his 
fulsome manner that 'o f  the cu l t ivated products of Papua we place 
tobacco next to copra and rubber in importance and think the day 
is not fa r  d is tant when the brands Flor de Kanosia, La Sogeri, or 
Regalia del Cowley w i l l  be indented by merchants and smoked by 
conniseurs (s ic) in a l l  c i v i l i z e d  parts of the w o r l d ' . (2)
2 Papuan Times, 14 February 1912. In the same edi t ion Bruce
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In 1913 the company sent out two Dutch ' tw is te r s ' ,  Arie Otte 
and Willem Akkerman, to ins t ruc t  Papuans in the making of tobacco 
tw is t  and f in e r  cigars. Subsequently, in 1916, a ' technical 
exper t ' ,  Thomas Call igan, was hired in the United States to come 
and oversee the enterprise. Cal l igan, a heavy dr inker,  proved 
'hopeless'. He was once pul led out of a ditch by someone he 
described as 'a long s t r ing  of a miner' and la te r  ide n t i f ied  as 
the Lieutenant Governor.(3) Bad luck in the choice of i t s  s ta f f  
seemed to plague the 'bung' company fo r  years.
The area under tobacco on Katea reached 232 acres in
1917.(4) Production had increased to 31,195 pounds in the las t
quarter of 1916 alone and a large part of the tw is t  tobacco in the
stores and issued by employers and the government under the rat ion
provisions of the NLO was by then being produced by BNGD's
factory. About 100 men of Wanigela, Marshall Lagoon, with ' f in e
neat hands' were employed in making the "Bung" and "Lakatoi"
brands of tw is t  and "Namo", "I-Dau" and the cheaper "Papuan
Beauties" brands of c igare ttes, 'grown and manufactured in Papua
by Papuans'.(5) A duty on imports provided protect ion of one
s h i l l i n g  and nine pence a pound on the tw is t  and some small
protect ion also on cigars and c igarettes. But an enduring problem
anonymously drew at tention to a deter io rat ion he believed 
had taken place in the qua l i ty  of the Armed Constabulary 
since the abo l i t ion  of the o f f ic e  of Commandant - his own 
old posit ion. One of his chi ldren had died of dysentery in 
the week .before this, was published.
3 Interview: Mrs W Loudon, June 1973.
4 ANUABL Deposit 95, M37, BNGD Annual Report, 1917. p. 18.
5 G A Loudon, 'Agr icu lture - Papua 1913-1959', Notes 
prepared fo r  an address or a r t i c le ,  1 Apr i l  1959. p. 3.
This source is ci ted below as G A Loudon, 'Notes'.
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had been the moulding of the tobacco in store and in the 1917-18 
season almost the ent i re  crop was wiped out by disease.  There had 
been increasing d i f f icu l t y  in wartime in obtaining the l icor ice  
required for twist  manufacture and the industry was abruptly 
abandoned.(6) G A Loudon much l a t er  recal led that  BNGD had to 
write off £150,000 with the f a i l u r e  of the tobacco industry.(7) 
This is possibly an exaggeration but cer ta inly the company had 
invested heavily in i t s  tobacco operations.
In 1931 Tom Sefton planted tobacco experimentally at Koitaki 
and sent leaf off to London to t e s t  the market. 2,085 pounds were
exported and sold for £216.(8) Badly cured i t  had been badly 
received. (9) But to encourage fur ther  t es t s  the government made a 
grant of £100 to the company. An ass i s tant ,  Sholto Morton, was 
sent to Mareeba in North Queensland to study tobacco cul t ivat ion,  
and planting began in earnest  with the Warne and Hickory Pryor 
va r i e t i e s . (10) In 1933 L A Jenkinson, an expert from the Tobacco 
Experimental Station at Mareeba, was invited to v i s i t  Koitaki and 
oversee the harvesting and curing. His report  gave mixed grounds 
for optimism - the f i r s t  tobacco harvested and cured being 
sat i s factory,  the second harvest less so on account of the 
'excessive rain,  and hot and steamy condi t ions . . . making the curing
6 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol 1, 30 December 1915. S L Thompson 
(Secretary of the company in London) to G A Loudon 
(General manager in Port Moresby). Thompson suspected the 
'Tobacco T r us t 1 of withholding a supply of l icor ice .
7 G A Loudon, 'Notes' ,  p. 4.
8 PAR 1932-33, p. 37.
9 Ibid. p. 12.
10 Ibid. p. 13
more d i f f i cu l t1. As well, ' this leaf also shows signs of leaf 
spots' .  Of this crop 458 pounds were exported but the return was 
only £11. None was exported thereaf ter . (11)
Beatrice Grimshaw's brother, Ramsay, planted or acquired a 
t r ial  plot of tobacco on a block on the Laioki that Beatrice 
bought in 1933 from Errol Flynn - the future actor and briefly a 
Papuan planter. The Grimshaws left  Papua in the following year, 
the tobacco being probably that harvested 'at  the 15 Mile' in late 
1934 by a trader, Percy Hinds, who turned i t  into "Koiari 
Twist".(12) Compared with the old "Bung" tobacco which 'would ruin 
any pipe',  the new tobacco was, if anything, 'too light '  for 'the 
native trade' but apparently quite suitable for cigarettes - for 
which no market existed. The experiment did not continue.
Sisal Hemp
Sisal, agave sisalana, a spiky yucca native to Mexico and major 
source of rope fibre, may have been among plants sent to British 
New Guinea for experimental planting from Rockhampton through the 
agency of Ferdinand von Mueller, the Victorian Government Botanist 
from whom Sir William MacGregor sought advice. Well suited to 
stony dry soils i t  was successfully propagated by A C English at 
Kapakapa near Rigo and subsequently by John Exton at Boera. By 
1907 English had planted sisal in his own interest next to the 
Rigo Government Station, but none of the processed product, sisal
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11 Ibid.
12 Papuan Courier, 4 January 1935. p. 4.
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hemp, was exported before 1910 when £340 was re a l is e d . (13) The 
poor so i ls  and lower r a in fa l l  of the coastal d i s t r i c t s  surrounding 
Port Moresby between Lealea in the west and Hula to the south east 
seemed to provide perfect conditions fo r  the c u l t iva t io n  of the 
sisal plant.
In the plantat ion boom beginning in 1907 sisal was one of the 
f i r s t  cultures to be t r ie d  with a view to an early return on 
investment. With A S Bloomfield as promoter and subsequently 
secretary of the companies, Sir  Rupert Clarke and R S Whiting 
f loated Fa ir fax Harbour Plantat ions Ltd and North Fairfax Harbour 
Plantat ions Ltd in 1909 to produce the f ib r e  between the western 
end of the harbour and the sea. The contractor fo r  these 
properties in 1910 was Arthur Jewell who bought suckers from 
Exton's 50 acre block at Boera. Clarke and Whiting la te r  proceeded
to plant more than 1,000 acres of sisal on th e i r  Rorona property 
at Galley Reach alongside the coconuts.
At the '7 Mile'  on the Laioki road, Papuan Plantat ions Limited 
had planted 250 acres of the suckers on a lease of over 1,100 
acres by 1914. Further along the track at Bomana the company had 
another 210 acres planted on a lease of 5,500 acres next to a much 
larger plantat ion of the BNGD Company. By 1914 BNGD-were 
cu l t iva t ing  nearly 1,000 acres of sisal on th e i r  lease at Bomana 
of 10,228 acre’s. In that year the larger company took over the 
smaller company's holdings on the strength, the BNGD chairman 
said, of the government's f i rm  undertaking to bui ld a rai lway 
along the Laloki to the Astrolabe copper mining f i e l d .  Papuan
13 PAR 1911-12. p. 152. For sisal exports see below, p. 462
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Plantat ions Limited had paid a dividend i t  could not afford in 
1913, the f i r s t  paid by any of the plantat ion companies, and 
l iquidat ion soon followed. Both companies had instal led scutching 
machinery and l ight  ra i l  t racks,  and the immense f i e lds  of sisal  
and the acres of racks hung with drying f ibre  were a st r iking 
feature along the road to Sapphire Creek in 1921.(14) BNGD 
produced 101 tons of s isal  hemp in the year ending 31st January 
1917, the Terr i tory producing 343 tons in 1917-18.(15) This was 
the best year and earnings were £17,682, exceeded only by returns 
on Copra (£68,225), Rubber (£37,020), Gold (£28,594), and Pearls 
(£19,250). The shortage of shipping during the war enabled 
Australian buyers to pay only £28 a ton on sisal  hemp then 
fetching £37 in London and £43 in New York.(16) In August 1917 the 
London price reached £68.
When prices began to f a l l  in 1919, the t e r r i t o r y ' s  output 
rapidly declined, to 145 tons valued at £4,630 in 1921-22, and to 
nothing in the following y e a r . (17) Production of s isal  hemp 
ceased. As mentioned in Chapter 15 (18), capital  in the Fairfax 
Harbour companies was exhausted and they were placed in the hands 
of A S Bloomfield, the i r  promoter in 1909 and now the i r
14 Papuan Courier, 21 January 1921. pp. 6-7. Comment in a 
repr int  of an a r t i c l e  that  had appeared i n J h e  World's 
Work magazine written by Thomas McMahon, a ' sis-al expert '  
"who visi ted Papua in 1920. In the paper of June 10 McMahon 
c r i t i c i sed  Commonwealth meanness in Papua.
15 PAR 1918-19. p. 63; BNGD Directors '  Report to 31 January 
1917.
16 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol 2, 16 January 1916. Secretary to 
General manager.
17 PAR, 1921-22, and PAR 1922-23.
18 See above p. 290.
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l iquidator .  There were no buyers - Clarke and Whiting with other 
shareholders losing the whole of t he i r  investment in these 
plantat ions.  BNGD did not immediately rel inquish i t s  leases but 
the company did not again produce sisal  hemp.
Elsewhere sisal  had been planted on the Tavai Creek at Gaire in 
1909 by the former RM, Henry Griff in,  for a company he had floated 
and which included among i t s  di rectors  Arthur Jewell and Archie 
MacAlpine. The property, planted with stock from Kapakapa, had 500 
acres bearing in 1916. I t  was offered for sale in 1913 and appears 
to have passed into the hands of Clarke and Whiting. By 1918 Tavai 
was being managed by Tom Nevitt ,  then one of the Clarke and 
Whiting s t a f f .  Also l e f t  abandoned as prices f e l l  in 1920-21 i t  
was opened up again in 1922 by Anglo-Papuan Investments Ltd, a new 
undertaking of Walter Henry Gors, the onetime Burns Philp manager 
and early planter ,  who returned to join his brothers and s i s t e r  in 
Papua af ter  an absence of twenty years.  He acknowledged that  he 
was taking a 'gamble' but that  i t  was 'worth a t r y ' . (19) Alongside 
the sisal  at Tavai cotton was also grown. But by 1926 Walter Gors 
had fai led to make the place pay and this  time he l e f t  the country 
not to return.  When he came he had f e l t  ' ten years younger' ,  he 
wrote to the Lieutenant Governor begging permission to withdraw 
from the Legislat ive Council to which Murray had re-appointed him 
in 1922, but so much disappointment had attended the sisal  project  
that  he l e f t  ' feel ing ten years o l d e r ' . (20)
In 1930 with the arrival  of a representat ive of a newly formed
19 Papuan Courier, 4 August 1922, p. 4.
20 CRS A518 P800/1/5. 2 July 1923, W H Gors to Murray.
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Commonwealth Hemp Company, A T Kienzle, together with 'plant  and 
gear1, Tavai was again opened up, 200 acres of the old plantat ion 
being in s t i l l  ' splendid condi t ion ' .(21) But even with the promise 
of a Commonwealth bounty of £6 a ton the Papuan industry could not 
compete with countries paying the i r  labour sixpence a day in f u l l .  
£40 was paid out from the bounty fund in 1931 but none thereaf ter .  
Forced to sell  at or below cost ,  the company ceased production and 
sisal  disappeared from the h i l l s  near Gaire. A T Kienzle became a 
rubber planter on the Yodda in the late  t h i r t i e s .  In 1936 the 
Commonwealth Hemp Company became agents for the Bri t ish Australian 
Pulp and Paper Company that  intended to make paper in Austral ia 
from the kurukuru grass of Papua.(22)
Cotton
Like s i sa l ,  Sea Island and upland cotton had been cul t ivated by 
A C English at Rigo in the years before 1906, though none had been 
exported. Robert Hunter had also t r ied cotton at Obu in 1898. John 
Clunn sent samples from a t e s t  crop at Ramaga on Milne Bay to 
Brisbane for appraisal in 1904. They were reported to be of 'good 
commercial v a l u e ' . (23) With the plantat ion boom commencing in 
1907-08 the production of cotton was bound to be attempted and 
Alec Clunas and Morton Clark were the f i r s t  to do so, on the 
Giriwu River -near Buna in the Northern Division. Partners in a 
store supplying the miners on the Yodda and Gira gold f i e lds  they
21 Papuan Courier, 4 April 1930.
22 See below p. 362.
23 BNGAR, 1904-05, p. 29.
leased 940 acres on which to plant rubber and coconuts in 1908. 
Cotton was to be a 'catch'  crop. By 1912 Clunas was dead and the 
lease terminated.
In 1914-15 to t e s t  both the su i t ab i l i t y  of i t s  lands and the 
market, the BNGD Company began the cul t ivat ion of cotton on 102 
acres of Baubauguina es ta te ,  with smaller plots on Otomata, Pa i l i ,  
Obu, Aroa, and Gadaisu. The f i r s t  266 bales (forty tons) produced 
realized £2,639 in London. I t  was apparently of a high quali ty but 
unprofi table at the price obtained on account of the cost of 
Papuan labour . (24) Cotton was not again planted on any of the 
estates in 1917.
In 1919 the president of the Commonwealth Board of Trade wrote 
to the Lieutenant Governor enquiring about cotton growing in 
Papua. In reply Murray acknowledged that  the main d i f f icu l t y  was a 
suf f ic ient  supply of labour at the picking stage. He asked the 
general manager of BNGD to supply a report  of the company's 
experience which was forwarded on to the Board. G A Loudon began 
by saying that
The industry was abandoned by the company on account of 
labour d i f f i c u l t i e s . . .when our crops were due for harvest­
ing, we only had a certain number of indentured -labourers 
available.  Cotton is a rush crop, and harvesting has to be 
carried out promptly and a large number of casual 
labourers are requi red. . .when we called on local natives 
from surrounding vi l lages to ass i s t  in picking (for which
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24 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol 2. 13 January 1916, Secretary to 
General manager.
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we were wil l ing to pay <a half-penny> per lb. )  they 
refused . (25)
In addition he noted that  Papuan pickers averaged only nineteen 
pounds of boll cotton a day which compared badly with the 130 
pounds a day picked by Egyptian casual labour, with which, af ter  
a l l ,  they were competing. Only a large area, an abundant labour 
force and a level of production that  would allow the employment of 
the l a t es t  machinery, he thought, would have made the industry 
payable. In his l e t t e r  accompanying Loudon's report  Murray saw no 
reason to dispute the general manager's reasoning.
Yet with the collapse in 1921-22 of the market for Papuan 
rubber, copra, and sisal  hemp, there was a renewed i nte res t  in 
cotton production. A Papuan Cotton and Produce Association began 
planting cotton at Haga on Milne Bay in 1921. Anglo-Papuan 
Investments Ltd, the company that  re-commenced the production of 
sisal  hemp at Tavai in 1922, planted cotton as well,  both there 
and on the old Angabunga Company lands i t  had also leased in the 
Mekeo d i s t r i c t .  In November 1923 Walter Gors thought the Gaire 
pickers,  while they 'broke no records'  had 'shaped very well '  with 
the best worker gathering ninety-four pounds in a day . (26) BNGD 
too resumed cotton cul t ivat ion on a large scale on i t s  propert ies 
at Katea, Gadaisu and Baubauguina in 1923 and Clarke and Whiting 
began interplapt ing a crop under the coconuts at Rorona. At Huiva 
in the Gulf Division Robert Shaw-Moody had planted s ixty-f ive
25 NAPNG Series G128, Item 7, 7 July 1919. G A Loudon to 
President of the Board of Trade.
26 Papuan Courier, 23 November 1923, p. 5.
acres of cotton by October 1924 and in March 1925 brought a 
shipment of twenty-seven tons to Port Moresby.(27)
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G A Loudon and Company, formed in 1922 to take over the agency 
and commercial business of BNGD, established one of two cotton 
ginneries in Port.  Shaw-Moody put his f i r s t  four tons through 
Loudons1 Asa Lee gin in July 1924. The second ginnery was set  up 
by a Messrs Clayton and Bell.  Kurt Hacke, a mechanical engineer 
who had worked for Walter Gors at Tavai, became manager of the i r  
machinery in 1925. A Papuan Cotton Syndicate became Patakalana 
Cotton Estates Ltd in September 1923 taking over a timber lease on 
the Kemp Welch River from Timbers (Papua) Ltd, a company in 
l iquidat ion.  Patakalana continued the sale of timber and began 
planting cotton. By 1927, l ike all the producers, th i s  company was 
in trouble.  The Ter r i tory ' s  production had reached 103 tons valued 
at £4,866 in 1925-26, by far  the best year,  but prices rapidly 
fe l l  thereaf ter .  To these prices alone, and not to a shortage of 
cotton pickers at harvest time or to the low productivity of 
Papuan workers, was now at t r ibuted the decline in the industry. In 
1928-29, one ton was produced.(28) By 1932 there was none and the 
industry disappeared for a second time.
Liquidation and sale of the assets of a fai led enterpr ise to a
27 Papuan Courier, 27 March 1925.
28 PAR 1928-29, p. 21. For cotton exports see below, p. 462 
The physical su i t ab i l i t y  of Papua for cotton cul t ivat ion 
was again affirmed in September 1925 when a vis i t ing 
Bri t ish cotton expert ,  G Evans, and the Commonwealth 
Cotton Entomologist, E Ballard, a f ter  inspecting several 
parts of the country, recommended the 'dry '  belt  around 
Port Moresby and the D'Entrecasteaux for Sea Island cotton 
development. (PAP 1925-26, p. 9)
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new venture that in i t s  turn also collapsed made up a pattern 
repeated in colonial Papua before 1942 as speculators probed the 
p o s s ib i l i t i e s .  Despite the lessons that some learn t ,  others s t i l l  
could be readi ly  deluded, i t  seems. A Wataluma Cotton Syndicate 
was registered in 1927 with the in tention of developing an 
industry on Goodenough Island. In 1932, in the midst of the 
depression, the Syndicate was s t i l l  seeking money in the market 
bel ieving that a cotton industry could yet be establ ished in 
Papua.
Tea
Tea was grown successful ly from seed at Warirata in 1896-97 and 
was among the numerous 'economic' plants that grew in the 
government's nursery and garden begun in 1907 on Hombrom's B lu f f ,  
on the opposite spur of the Astrolabe Range overlooking the lower 
Laloki.  In the 1912-13 Annual Report, Charles Speedie, in charge 
of the s ta t ion,  recorded that he had 14,000 tea seedlings 
avai1ab le . (29) BNGD had considered tea culture and seeds were 
supplied to the company together with rubber seeds by the agents 
Cumberbatch & Co. of Malaya in 1910. An experimental p lo t  of 150 
bushes was planted on It ikinumu estate where, l i ke  those at the 
B lu f f ,  they did well in a cl imate and at an a l t i tude  considered 
ideal.  The secretary in London noted that ' there should be a 
splendid market fo r  tea in Austra l ia  i f  i t  could be found to 
t h r i v e ' . (30) A report on tea consumption and production prepared
29 PAR 1912-13, p. 31.
30 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol 1, 1 May 1914. Secretary 
to general manager (Lewis Cowley in 1914).
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in the Commonwealth Department of Trade and Customs in July 1917 
noted that  Austral ia imported tea valued at nearly £2 mill ion.  The 
wri ter  believed that  Papua 'possessed large upland jungle 
d i s t r i c t s . . .where the climatic and soil condi t ions . . . approach 
closely those of the tea d i s t r i c t s  of Java and Ceylon1. I t  seemed 
fol ly  to continue to import so much when 'our own vast t ropical  
possession (was) lying almost unexploited within a few hours sai l  
of the mainland' . (31)
Yet neither BNGD nor any other company proceeded beyond 
experiment with tea cul t ivat ion.  In every country where i t  was 
produced tea was picked pr incipal ly by women. I t  was l ikely that  
i f  an industry was developed in Papua pressure would have mounted 
for the government to reverse i t s  policy on the indenture of women 
in agricul ture.  This, the administration had already shown i t  
would strongly r es i s t .  In 1924 the idea that  tea might be 
cul t ivated was revived by the Commonwealth Analyst but with the 
world price already very low i t  was obvious that  no bounty or 
preference could be useful ly given in encouragement. I t  was not 
included in the schedule of e i ther  the Bounties or Preference Acts 
of 1926. In 1935 prompted by a suggestion from Sir Hubert Murray a 
preference of twopence a pound was f i na l ly  offered,  but while tea 
grew in Papua, tea planting was a r isk no one was prepared to 
t a k e . (32)
31 CRS A1 20/21573 Papuan Development - Report by
W P Wilkinson, 1920. Appendix from Trade & Customs f i l e  
17/5585.
32 Papuan Courier, 6 December 1935.
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Sugar
Among a l l  the t rop ica l  commodities that had entered world trade 
since the seventeenth century sugar was the f i r s t  to be 
1 over-produced' and i t s  planters the f i r s t  to suffer the downward 
pressure on price and income in a near perfect international 
market that producers of a l l  the commodities would eventual ly 
experience. Indeed the sugar colonies of the West Indies and the 
Mascarenes were the classic plantat ion economies where unbridled 
European power, unanswerable to an enslaved or indentured 
population of workers that could be moved about almost at w i l l ,  
had f i r s t  succeeded in creating the conditions whereby a commodity 
desired in Europe was produced in unprecedented abundance at the 
very lowest possible cost and at a great distance from the 
markets. The development of the Austral ian and F i j ia n  industr ies, 
though subject to much greater scrut iny in a more humane 
generation, began in much the same pattern. But Austral ian sugar 
was being produced largely  fo r  a growing domestic market that 
possessed an enfranchised working class wanting employment at 
' c i v i l i s e d '  rates of pay and rest less at competing with cheaper 
'coloured' labour. With the federation of the Austral ian colonies 
the Queensland industry had to respond to p o l i t i c a l  pressure and 
replace indentured South Sea Island labour with white labour, the 
producers compensated fo r  the increased costs with t a r i f f  
protect ion.
No one could be in any doubt that sugar could be grown in 
Papua. I t  was a natural home of saccharum off icinarum and stra ins
col lected in New Guinea were important in the development of sugar
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industr ies elsewhere. The Badi11 a variety that  became the most 
successful of those grown commercially in Queensland had been 
obtained in New Guinea in 1895.(33) The problem for anyone 
contemplating establ ishing sugar plantat ions in the Terr i tory was 
that  Austral ia together with Fi j i  had begun the development of 
sugar industr ies in the 1870's that  by the time Bri t i sh New Guinea 
was annexed already met the requirements of the Australasian 
colonies and to spare. No Australian government answerable to i t s  
domestic sugar producers and to white industr ial  unions and at the 
same time administering Papua could readi ly permit the development 
of a Papuan sugar industry that  might threaten the Australian.  The 
entrenched and establ ished Queensland sugar i nte res t s  could only 
view a Papuan sugar industry as a threat  to t he i r  current  markets 
and to thei r  future expansion.
In May 1916, on hearing a report  that  the Australian Prime 
Minister,  W M Hughes, had said that  increased sugar production was 
desirable in the Empire, Samuel Thompson, secretary of BNGD in 
London, telegrammed the general manager in Port Moresby asking him 
to secure leases of up to 10,000 acres adjacent to the company's 
Paili  es tate  for a sugar venture. I t  was ' important ' ,  he 
added.(34) The company had hoped in any case to obtain more land
33 Papua continued to be a source of new sugar var ie t i es .
The Chief of the Sugar Research Branch of the United 
States Department of Agriculture,  Dr E W Brandes, visi ted 
Papua in 1927 looking for disease r es i s t an t  stock. He was 
accompanied by the Chief Sugar Expert of the Dutch East 
Indies,  Dr J Jesweit and the Chief Entomologist of the 
Hawaiian Planters '  Association, C Pemberton. The expedit­
ion camped at Everi l l  Junction on the Fly and were flown 
in by sea-plane. Large quant i t ies of plant material were 
collected.  PAR 1927-28, p. 41.
34 BNGD Letterbooks, Vol 2, 18 May 1916, Secretary to general 
manager.
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at Cloudy Bay near Pail i  in exchange for other areas of i t s  leases 
that  were unproductive - perhaps to consolidate i t s  holdings. The 
government was unwilling to allow such exchanges. And, almost 
cer tainly,  Hughes's remark was made in the i n te res t  of Australian 
growers alone and when this  had become clear BNGD did not proceed 
fur ther .  In the following year William L i t t l e  MLC, noting that  
Austral ia was actual ly a net importer of sugar products, proposed 
in lengthy l e t t e r s  to the Papuan Times that  a sugar industry be 
developed af ter  the war by returned soldiers enabling Papua to 
become for Austral ia what Hawaii and the Caribbean islands were 
for the United S t a t e s . (35) In 1921 the Samarai Branch of the 
Returned Soldiers '  League submitted a similar proposal for the 
development of an industry at Buna to the v i s i t ing  Minister,  
Alexander Poynton.(36)
No attempt was made to t e s t  whether a Papuan sugar industry 
could be developed before 1929 when Sangara Sugar Estates Ltd was 
promoted by Arthur Bunting, the Samarai merchant and planter ,  and 
Tom Nevitt ,  then BNGD's plantat ion inspector,  to grow cane 
commercially in the Northern Division between Buna and 
Kokoda. Several residents of Cairns in North Queensland, including 
Tom Nevi t t ' s brother Bert, an accountant, were members of the 
syndicate backing the venture. In August, W F S Howe, manager of 
the Mulgrave Central Mill at Cairns, was persuaded by the Nevitts 
to v i s i t  Papua to examine and comment on the su i t ab i l i t y  of the 
area for sugar development. His report  was rumoured in the Papuan
35 Papuan Courier, 3 August and 31 August 1917.
36 CRS Al 21/15922 RS&SILA Samarai Sub-Branch to Minister.
The members understood that  the Buna Bay d i s t r i c t  would 
be opened up to soldier  s e t t l e r s .
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Courier to be 'g lowing',  the Buna lands thought to resemble 
Babinda near I n n i s fa i1.(37) B ad i l i a  cut t ings were brought. in from 
Cairns and by July 1930 a nursery and t r i a l  plots had been set out 
and tramlines reported to be completed. The Sangara experiment was 
begun with l im i ted  cap i ta l ,  Bunting and Nevi t t  hoping, no doubt, 
that a successful demonstration would a t t rac t  the remaining 
investment necessary fo r  a much 1 arger scale development. In the 
1928-29 Papuan Annual Report, Sir  Hubert Murray gave the idea of a 
sugar industry fo r  Papua his support and to a l lay the apprehension 
of a threat  to th e i r  in te rests  among Austral ian growers he assured 
them that Papuan sugar would never enter the Commonwealth. Instead 
i t  would 'be sold in the markets of the w o r l d ' . (38) This could 
hardly have comforted Queensland growers with a sugar surplus to 
sel l  in the in ternational  market. In the end they had no need to 
fear.
In 1932, Stan ifor th Smith's successor as Director of 
Agr icu lture, A P Lyons, reported that while the Sangara sugar 
experiment had been techn ica l ly  successful and a f lou r ish ing  crop 
grown, the in ternational  f inanc ia l  slump made fu r the r  development 
un l ike ly  fo r  a time. Seventy-six tons of 'p lant B ad i l i a '  cane an 
acre were produced on one plot of twenty-f ive acres and for ty- two 
tons of ' f i r s t  ratoon B ad i l i a  and 'P 0 J' mixed' on another.(39)
In an experimental nursery the company also planted fo r t y  
indigenous var ie t ies  col lected in the Buna and Tufi  d i s t r i c t s .  
None at al l  in the end was exported. The company had offered
37 Papuan Courier. 30 August 1929. The v i s i t  was f i r s t  
reported on 16 August.
38 PAR 1928-29. p. 4.
39 PAR 1931-32. p. 7.
358
450,000 £1 shares for subscription, a huge sum given the state of 
the share market, but expecting a slow response the promoters 
assured subscribers that the deposits made to reserve their shares 
would be held in a trust  account until sufficient were sold. The 
suggestion was that this might take several years. Five other 
enterprises were mooted or floated in the years 1931-35 to plant 
sugar in the Northern Division. One, Papuan Rural Products 
Limited, intending to grow sugar on Collingwood Bay, proposed 
having a nominal capital of £4 million. All of these ventures 
failed either to proceed or produce, the loss on the Sangara 
venture being £30,000.(40)
Coffee
Coffee from its mixed plantation at Warirata had been the f i r s t  
tropical culture tested commercially by Burns Philp in 1897 and 
the f i r s t  choice for plantation cultivation on the pioneer Sogeri 
plateau properties of David Ballantine, also in 1897, and of 
Garrioch and Greene in 1902. In 1905-06 the value of the beans 
exported reached £915.(41) Thereafter production rapidly declined 
with none being exported in 1910-11. Without privileged entry to 
the Australian market there seemed no likelihood of -a revival. 
Staniforth Smith in June 1915 and Judge Murray in December 1917 
each wrote to*argue that since coffee could not be produced in 
Queensland with white labour the Commonwealth might exempt any
40 G A Loudon, 'Notes', p. 6.
41 PAR 1908-09. p. 152. For coffee exports see below, p. 463
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coffee produced in the T e r r i to ry  from the t a r i f f . (42) No response 
came before 1926, when to encourage new industr ies at las t ,  coffee 
from the Commonwealth t e r r i t o r ie s  was to be permitted entry in to  
Austra l ia  free of duty under the new Customs T a r i f f  (Papua and New 
Guinea Preference) Act. Coffee imported from elsewhere remained 
subject to duty of threepence a pound. With th is  assistance 
s ign i f ica n t  exports from Papua resumed in 1928-29 when four tons 
valued at £313 were shipped south. By 1934-35 exports had 
increased to seventy-nine tons and sold fo r  £7,083. The greater 
part of the production came from Eilogo estate on the Sogeri 
p ia teau.(43)
In 1929 G A Loudon had begun cu l t iva t in g  coffee at Eilogo when 
with the depression his fortunes were at th e i r  lowest. Planting 
rubber as a long term investment he interplanted with both robusta 
and Blue Mountain coffee to spread his r isks .  These f lourished and 
he was gradually able to regain the personal pre-eminence among 
the planters of Papua that fo r  four or f i v e  years he seemed to 
lose. His "'A'LOGO" coffee at f i r s t  found a ready Austral ian 
market through the agency of F C Tracy, a shareholder in Eilogo 
and Sydney agent fo r  BNGD since 1915. The early shipments were 
sold to the Mutual Store in Melbourne with Bushel Is in Sydney 
la te r  taking the b u lk . (44) In 1935 coffee from the Netherlands
42 CRS A518 Item A.M.812/1/1. Murray to Minister of Trade and 
Customs, 21 December 1917.
43 A th i rd  of production came from Papuan owned plantat ions 
set up under a scheme whereby the government provided the 
capital out of the Native Taxation Fund to establ ish small 
plantat ions in the Northern Division with a to ta l  area in 
1935 Of 242 acres. The proceeds of sales as elsewhere 
under the Native Plantat ions scheme were divided 
between the Fund and the growers.
44 G A Loudon, 'Notes',  p. 4.
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East Indies was being sold in Sydney below the costs of production 
and Loudon was able to show that  the Australian Primage (the f l a t  
duty of 2.5% on all imports) together with the costs of f reight  by 
mule and truck between Eilogo and Port Moresby and by sea between 
Papua and Sydney amounted to a sum hardly less than ' the Dutchman 
is prepared to accept C.I.F. Sydney'.(45)
Always an entrepreneur and enjoying being ahead of others in 
everything he did, Loudon bui l t  an 'aerodrome' on the property in 
1938 and flew out his produce to Port,  probably the f i r s t  planter 
in ei ther  Papua or New Guinea to use a i r c r af t  in th is  way.(46)
Just prior to the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939 
overproduction in Brazil and Java had again caused the market to 
slump with prices f a l l ing  to threepence a pound. Loudon appealed 
for additional Austral ian protection without resul t  and production 
at Eilogo was shut down, the t rees grubbed out. 'At th is  time the 
Blue Mountain type was commencing to f lower ' ,  Loudon wrote, 'and 
the destroying was a heartbreaking j o b ' . (47)
Cocoa
Elias Solomon planted cocoa at Loani on the China S t ra i t  in the 
early twenties on a small scale.  In 1928-29 he exported 784 pounds 
valued at £17 and drew £20 from the bounty fund but none was
45 NAPNG Series G 69. Item 25/21. G A Loudon to H L Murray,
17 April 1935.
46 Loudon is also believed to have brought the f i r s t  
motor-car to Papua in 1914.
47 G A Loudon, 'Notes ' ,  p. 5.
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exported t h e r e a f t e r . (48) A fur ther  attempt to grow cocoa 
commercially was made on Aroana, a rubber estate  between .Lolorua 
and Aroa opened up towards the end of the 1930's by Mrs Vera Ward 
and Mrs Loudon but Aroana proved seasonally too dry for success 
with th i s  c u l t u r e . (49) Apart from Solomon no one exported cocoa 
from Papua until  well a f t er  1945 when production began in the old 
Northern Division.
Miscellaneous ventures.
'Peanut'  Char l ie ' s  attempt in 1899 to establ ish peanuts on 
Gebaro Island in the Western Division has been mentioned.(50) 
Elias Solomon experimented with vanil la  beans at Loani but these 
fa i l ed ,  i t  was concluded, because bees were absent. BNGD tr ied 
planting castor oil seeds at Katea in 1918 af ter  the f a i lu r e  of 
tobacco, but the new crop was attacked by ca t e rp i11a r s . (51)
The Angabunga River Plantat ions company in the Mekeo grew 
bananas during the war years 1914-1918 in the hope of finding an 
Australian market. 1,200 bunches valued at £120 were exported in 
the year 1915-16.(52) The company went into l iquidat ion in 1921, 
i t s  propert ies passing to Walter Gors' Anglo-Papuan Investments.
48 Ibid p. 4; PAR 1928-29, p. 21; CRS A518, Item A M 812/1/1, 
Part 2. Prime Minister ' s  Minute regarding payments under 
Bounties Act, 1926-1931, 12 April 1932.
49 Loudon ' Notes' ,  p. 4.
50 See above p. 53. Judge Murray believed that  Gillingham 
was later  'eaten'  in the Solomon Islands (CRS Al 20/21573, 
Murray to Minister,  29 September 1920).
51 G A Loudon, 'Notes' ,  p. 7.
52 CRS Al 20/5481. 'Angabunga Plantat ions Ltd. Reduction of 
Lease' .  F S Bryce to Sir  Joseph Cook, 21 November 1919;
PAR 1915-16, p. 23.
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The new owners planted cotton. When cotton fa i le d ,  a new Angabunga 
Plantat ions enterpr ise again t r ie d  bananas. An Austral ian 
preference was sought and denied, and th is  company too was wound 
up in 1938.
Some industr ies did not require the development of plantat ions 
i n i t i a l l y  but might have done so la te r .  There had been a 
prel iminary invest igat ion in to sett ing up an industry to make a 
fuel alcohol, Nata l i te ,  from sago palms in the Delta Divis ion in 
1922. And then there was in te rest  in kurukuru ( 1alanq or kunai) 
grass.(53) In June 1936 a report in the Papuan Courier noted that 
a consortium of New South Wales graziers led by P R Higgins, 
chairman of Standard Portland Cement, had lodged an appl icat ion to 
reg is ter  a B r i t ish  Austral ian Pulp and Paper Company Ltd with a 
nominal capital  of £3 M i l l io n .  I t  was intended to enter into an 
arrangement with B r i t i s h  f irms to use the long f ibrous grass from 
Papua and New Guinea to produce pulp at a fac tory  in Papua, and 
manufacture paper at a m i l l  to be b u i l t  at Port Stephens, north of 
Sydney, or in Tasmania. The promoters expected that the new 
company would produce 60,000 tons of bleached paper annually.
45.000 acres of grassland on Collingwood Bay - possibly the old 
Mombiri lands - were obtained from the Papuan Government. In 
August the projected output was reduced to between 15,000 and
20.000 tons and the capita l required now estimated at £1 m i l l ion .  
An engineer from Bertrams Ltd of Edinburgh was brought out to 
design the machinery. Not s t r i c t l y  a p lantat ion venture, th is  was 
to be the ' f i r s t  big industr ia l  enterprise in Papua'. Neither of
53 Papuan Courier, 5 June 1936. Further de ta i ls  were 
published on 21 August and 25 September.
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these projects proceeded. Five di rectors  of the Commonwealth Hemp 
Company, agents for Bri t i sh Australian Pulp and Paper, were 
arrested in Martin Place Sydney in 1940 for attempting to defraud 
shareholders . (54)
In 1936 there seemed no industry where Papua could find an 
advantage; the country had proved a profound disappointment. In 
the Papuan Courier an anonymous wri ter  about to leave af ter  
twenty-one years poured out the sentiments of many of ' the legion 
of the damned 1.(55)
I t  was not the hardships or the discomforts or the sense 
of loneliness that  makes me so joyful at the prospect of 
being able to leave i t  all behind. All these have been 
and s t i l l  could be cheerful ly borne, i f  there were any 
sense of achievement.. .  But there is no such feel ing and 
my s p i r i t  is oppressed with a sense of f u t i l i t y ;  a 
conviction that  all the s t r iving and s t ress  of all  these 
years is j us t  a generation of endeavour wasted.(56)
'Adsum' in his regular column 1Papuanalysis1 wrote a few months 
la ter  that  'not a word of (that) a r t i c l e  was unt rue1’ and asked
How many are there here today, we wonder, - or are buried 
here - who feel or have f e l t  exactly the same... What a
54 Papuan Courier, 6 September 1940.
55 Papuan Courier, 22 November 1935.
56 Ibid.
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waste of youth, energy, f a i t h ,  hopes and money, have gone 
in to  p lan ta t ions  of Coconuts, Hemp, Rubber, Coffee etc. 
Why is  i t  tha t hopes have never been re a l i ze d ? (57)
57 Papuan Cour ie r , 19 June 1936.
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Part VI Planter Papua 
Chapter 18 The planters'  world
What expectations did inexperienced set t lers coming to Papua 
hold about the kind of l ife they would live? If they came, as most 
did, after 1909, they would have seen Staniforth Smith's Handbook 
of the Territory of Papua in the f i r s t  or subsequent editions and 
found i t  full of reassuring detail .  Some would have read one of 
Beatrice Grimshaw's articles or The New New Guinea. Many middle 
class sett lers would have been familiar with the south seas 
stories of Robert Louis Stevenson, Louis Becke or Jack McLaren.
All had some idea of plantation l i fe as i t  had been recently seen 
in Queensland or as i t  could s t i l l  be seen in Fi j i .  Plantation 
societies had existed in the Americas for three centuries and in 
parts of the East for nearly as long - plantations could seem a 
permanent part of the periphery of the world Europeans had 
created. To some the actuality they faced in Papua would always 
fall short of the expectations that these images aroused and 
planters could think that they had chosen the wrong country or had 
arrived too late. Nonetheless, the nature of the common plantation 
enterprise - the experience of clearing the land, the management 
of alien labour, the conscious adjustment to a new climate and 
country - these created a sense of identity and shared destiny 
among planters which, like the group loyalties among sett lers 
elsewhere, could be given at f i r s t  an exaggerated significance, 
but acquire in time great sentimental power.
Beatrice Grimshaw in her autobiographical account of her South
Seas wanderings as a jo u rn a l i s t  and author of popular romances, 
Isles of Adventure, wrote that
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I f  I were asked what I have most enjoyed in my l i f e ,  I 
think I think I should say the clearing of that fo res t .
No one who has not done clearing can imagine the del ights 
of i t .  You have obtained from the Government so many 
acres of fo res t ,  paying nothing but a few s h i l l in g s  fo r  
your ninety-nine year lease; you know that you w i l l  have 
no rent to pay fo r  ten years, and a f te r  that only a few 
pence an acre. The place is yours to dispose of fo r  a 
century. . .
Your team of "boys".. .has been col lected and signed on; 
they are your servants fo r  three years, provided you 
t rea t  them wel l ,  and th e i r  wages w i l l  be no more than 
ten s h i l l in g s  a month each man. Just before dayl ight  
. . .you w i l l  wake...and go out on the verandah fo r  r o l l  
c a l l .  The sun is r is ing  now, and your native labourers 
dressed in cotton lo in  c loths,  or in the native next- 
to-nothing of dried leaves, stand in l i n e . . . a l l  but one 
boy who has been to ld  to go ahead with the cooking.
After  r o l l - c a l l  comes medical parade; cuts and sores 
are dressed, medicines, i f  necessary, are given out.
Then you .go to b reakfast . . .  One by one the big trees 
f a l l  to the accompaniment of wild screams and singing, 
and by the middle of the day your boys...have transformed 
a good s l ice  of the landscape.
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Power? Authori ty? You can revel in both to the top of 
your bent . . .  You have been down to the sea, taken your 
whaleboat across to Samarai. You return, a f te r  a day of 
absence, walk up the long dark fo res t  track and see, 
ahead of you, a break of l i g h t  that was not there yeste r­
day. For the f i r s t  time in centuries, the sun has touched 
the earth of those dusk acres. For the f i r s t  time, since 
those h i l l s  beyond were made, man may look upon them from 
the val ley below. And you have done i t . . .  Power!(1)
Beatrice had recol lected these emotions in t r a n q u i l i t y  years 
afterwards but s im i la r  thoughts occured to Percy Robinson clearing 
land at Ogamobu in December 1919. Writ ing to his wife in the heat 
of the moment he found that
Achievements on a large scale have th e i r  compensations 
fo r  the hard work and se l f  denial that go th e i r  making 
- i f  they are successful. I have ju s t  been watching the 
inpenetrable jungle that I used to struggle in to ,  and 
get los t  in,  less than four months ago, r is ing  to the 
high heavens iri flame and smoke. I t  is good to see, and 
good to contemplate good work well done. And the scale 
is large enough fo r  anyone. Imagine an area equal to a 
l ine  from the Hackney Hotel to the Parliament House 
corner then down King Will iam Street to City Bridge 
along Queen's Drive to Hackney Bridge and back along 
Hackney Road to the corner you started from - that is 
the size of the block you have to imagine th ic k ly
1 Beatrice Grimshaw. Isles of Adventure (London, 1930), 
p. 210.
strewn with great trees, branches, and dry scrub six 
feet or more deep & closely packed - some f i re eh!(2)
Robinson's deep satisfaction was almost certainly shared by his 
'boys' as they feasted, danced and rested for three days after 
completion of the work. He wrote
I killed 'Scotty Currie' (a Berkshire pig) for the 
feas t . . .  They decorated themselves and their houses 
with variegated leaves and flowers & created really 
a most effective scene of festivity.  I bought (sic) 
up seven dozen discarded flags.. .and presented them 
to the boys & you would have laughed to see the use 
they made of them... The whole affair was...a good 
s tunt . (3)
In his let ter  of 20 March 1920 he described his 'regular 
routine' .  It  varied l i t t l e  from Beatrice Grimshaw's.
A bell rings at 5.30 and we have coffee and a pipe while 
the boys eat breakfast (which consists of sweet potatoes 
cooked over night and left  in the boss boys' charge) then 
at 6 there is a violent uproar of conch shells.and the 
gangs "fall in". We have 150 now so it  is quite a gather­
ing. Then the various tasks are allotted, food ’for lunch
2 Percy Robinson. Robinson Letters, 12 December 1919. In the 
possession of Mrs Penelope Hope of Canberra. They are 
cited below as the Robinson Letters. Her parents' letters 
are extensively used in Mrs Hope's Long ago is far away 
(Canberra, 1979).
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3 Ibid.
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served out, sores and sickness treated and we depart fo r  
work. At e ight, having seen the various gangs well started 
on the i r  respective jobs we come in to breakfast and a 
smoke. Then back on the job t i l l  noon when everyone knocks 
o f f  fo r  lunch t i l l  one P.M. Then back again t i l l  5.30 
which makes the even twelve hours round. Then I bath and 
shave, get into my pyjamas and eat some food and a f te r  a 
pipe on the veranda turn in with a book u n t i l  the nine 
o'clock gun by which time I am good and ready fo r  
s leep.(4)
I f  fo r  the planter - his routines dictated by meaningful work - 
such a l i f e  was deeply f u l f i l l i n g ,  to some close observers his 
world could appear drab and conventional despite the exotic 
sett ing, the s e t t le r  trapped by his own narrow perspective as much 
as by physical iso la t ion .  Often with the sardonic outlook of 
Austral ians and eschewing any pretence to in te l le c tu a l  or cu l tu ra l  
interests beyond a taste fo r  farce, drink and sport,  the typica l 
s e t t le r  disclosed l i t t l e  of a sense of wonder or appreciation of 
any beauty in his surroundings. In 1917, the anthropologist 
Bronislaw Malinowski wrote 'How shal l I describe Samarai... The 
contradict ion between the picturesque landscape, the poetic 
qua l i ty  of the island set on the ocean, and the wretchedness of 
l i f e  h e r e ' . (5) Per iod ica l ly  depressed by T rob r iander culture on 
Losuya he sought company in the l i t t l e  town. But the white 
residents ' f i l l e d  (him) with d i s l i k e . . . I  shudder at the thought of
4 Ib id .  20 March 1920.
5 Bronislaw Malinowski. A Dairy in the s t r i c t  sense of the 
term (London. 1971), p. 112, 12 November 1917.
how l i f e  looks from th e i r  point of v ie w ' . (6) He found them 
'ordinary people who are incapable of f ind ing a glimmer of poetry 
in cer tain things that f i l l  me with exal tat ion* - even as he 
g u i l t i l y  f l i r t e d  with with one or two of the p r e t t i e r  women among 
them.(7) Unpleasant jokes made about his Austrian c i t izensh ip  by 
Austral ian o f f i c i a l s  he found 'Loathsome, and the 
e f f e c t . . . depressing. These fel lows have such fabulous 
opportunit ies - the sea, ships, the jungle, power over the natives 
- and don' t  do a t h i n g ' !(8)
Evelyn Cheesman, an entomologist co l lec t ing  in Papua and the 
New Hebrides, recal led much la te r  that in her experience ' i t  was 
the planters that l ived the most lonely l i v e s ' . (9) Unl ike even the 
missionaries who were joined in a community in frequent contact 
with each other, planters were often isolated and alone, chained 
to th e i r  plantat ion fo r  many months at a time, th e i r  only company 
the i r  Papuan 'boys' with whom no real dialogue was e i ther  wise or 
easy, or a dog. Or,
There might be a wi fe, or young chi ldren before they were 
old enough to send to school. Sometimes i t  was a man 
without re sp o n s ib i l i t ie s ,  and on the whole these were the 
happiest.. . i t  was no l i f e  fo r  an ordinary woman unused to 
pr ivat ions. (This point of view should be remembered when
6 Ib id ,  p. 167. 27 December 1917.
7 Ib id . p. 21. 5 October 1914.
8 Ib id .  p. 21. 27 December 1917.
9 Evelyn Cheesman. Who stand alone (London, 1965). p. 8.
371
men are despised for taking a native wife.)(10)
No ordinary woman herself and possessing the freedom and the 
means to visi t  remote places and leave them again as she finished 
her work after a month or two, Evelyn Cheesman could attest  to 
the 'stark greyness of these lonely lives'  that 'can scarcely be 
imagined except by those who have experienced i t '  even as she 
enjoyed the spare amenities of a planter 's house after weeks in 
the bush.(11) The people she remembered most vividly were clearly 
not the planters of popular imagination among people down 'south' 
in Australia or at 'home' in England, sipping gin on a verandah in 
some south seas tropical idyll,  but
Li t t l e  cel ls  of humanity tucked away in the vast untamed 
wi lds . . .  Their own known world out of reach below the 
horizon, and t he i r  present l i f e  co lour less . . .  Hundreds 
of men and women endured t h i s ,  in the days before radio 
and air  communications...  Mail was l e f t  at anchorages 
and small ports,  thence to make hazardous journeys to 
i t s  dest inat ion - precious packages in waterproof 
covering.(12)
Isolated planters expected passing coastal boats and patrols to 
visit  and accept hospitality and the failure of a white skipper to 
pause without explanation was deeply fel t .  In a let ter  of 1921 
Percy Robinson noted that the Freshwaters at Madiri had been 'a
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. p. 9.
12 Ibid. p. 9, 11
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b i t  cold at f i r s t '  when he cal led. They had thought that he had 
'gone South fo r  good' and were upset because Percy's 
bro ther- in- law, Arthur Will iams, rec ru i t ing  on the Fly , had sai led 
past three times, and with his new wife aboard, without stopping 
b y . (13) Evelyn Cheesman recal led the greeting and 'querulous and 
impatient'  voice of a lone p lanter 's  wife trapped by the choices 
she had made and desperate fo r  white company: 'Yours is the f i r s t  
c i v i l i s e d  voice I have heard fo r  th i r teen months since the las t  
ship anchored here, except my Hubby's - and he only ta lks  about 
the copra market ! ' (14)
Other women could summon up the strength to manage e n t i re ly  
alone. Two Americans, John and Margaret Vandercook, t ra v e l l in g  the 
world in the i r  yacht, cal led into Papuan ports in 1931.(15) In 
Dark Is lands, John Vandercook recounted a v i s i t  they made to 
Ogamobu where they stayed with B i l l  Jefferson and his wife fo r  
several weeks.(16) During th e i r  stay the Jeffersons were also 
v is i ted  by a woman, a 'Mrs Evans', who together with her eleven 
year old daughter, unexpectedly t ied up her schooner at the wharf. 
'Mrs Evans', as Vandercook understood, had decided to open up a 
rubber plantat ion up the Fly River and had come to Jefferson fo r  
pract ical  advice about cu l t iva t ion .  The woman described can only 
have been Mrs Janet Cowling, the widow by th is  time .of John 
Cowling of Mibu. In 1931 Janet Cowling took out a lease over the
13 Robinson'Letters, Apr i l  1921.
14 Cheesman, op. C i t .  p. 13.
15 John W Vandercook. Dark Islands (London, 1938).
16 Jefferson was manager of Ogamobu fo r  BNGD af te r  the 
col lapse of a partnership (1924-29) of Percy Robinson,
G A Loudon and Thomas Ryan. He obtained a posit ion on 
a Malayan estate in 1934.
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old Papuan Industries plantat ion at Madiri from the Unevangelised 
Field Mission, and might indeed have gone to learn a few deta i l s  
about rubber from Jefferson j us t  as Percy Robinson, a decade 
before, had gone from Ogamobu to Madiri to learn from James 
Freshwater. A domestic servant in Yorkshire, Janet Wallis had 
gone out to Papua to be housekeeper for a ' r ich p l an t e r 1. John 
Cowling was apparently well read but hardly wealthy. They were 
married in Port Moresby in 1920. After his death she had remained 
on Mibu, where, as Vandercook had most probably been told by the 
Jeffersons,  'barefoot ,  ponderous, with a heavy r i f l e  always in her 
hands, she had marshalled her Fly River boys. . .digging drainage 
di tches,  set t ing out new groves'  in that  unpromising p l ace . (17)
Accepting the minimum of hospi ta l i ty  and sleeping aboard her 
boat 'Mrs Evans' departed as soon as she could, a s t r iking but 
quite credible f igure and representat ive of a group of pioneer 
women of great strength and courage. Mrs Mahony, the 'Queen of 
Sudest ' ,  was another and so also had been Mrs Joan Mickle McCrann 
of Baia plantat ion at Domara. Controlling her labour 'exceedingly 
well '  and adopting ' exactly the same methods she knew a man would 
have done' ,  she seldom saw visi t o r s . (18) In 1910 Mrs McCrann 
tended Mrs Lett dying in chi ldbi r th on nearby Keuru. She died 
hersel f ,  ' fevered and alone ' ,  in 1912 aged f i f t y - fou r  having spent 
two years developing the property she shared with the publican of 
the 'lower pub' in ' P o r t ' ,  Thomas McCrann. Mrs Elizabeth Whitten 
of Samarai and Mrs Vera Ruby Ward of Veimauri were planters in 
thei r  own r ight  alongside thei r  husbands, and Mrs Millicent
17 Vandercook, op. Cit .  pp. 234-239.
18 Papuan Courier, 31 January 1912.
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Jewell, wife of Arthur Jewell and a 'handsome woman' in the 
reco l lec t ion  of several old planters, continued to d i re c t l y  manage 
the i r  Papuan in te rests  a f te r  her husband's death in 1943.
The war of 1914-18 took i t s  t i t h e  of young men from among the 
planters and th e i r  fam i l ies  as from among the o f f i c i a l s .  Harry and 
Margaret Catt of the government plantat ion at Baibara los t  th e i r  
only son in August 1916 at Pozieres. Staniforth Smith made sure he 
v is i ted  the boy's grave before leaving Europe in 1919 a f te r  act ive 
se rv ice . (19) A son of James Osborne of Hagita, Milne Bay, was 
k i l l e d  in July 1918. Harry 'Hardy' Gofton a plantat ion assistant 
in the Eastern Div is ion and b r ie f l y  the 'Port '  butcher in 1914 was 
k i l l e d  in March 1918. His pret ty  wife l e f t  alone in Samarai was 
one of those who att racted Malinowski 's eye in 1917. She v is i ted  
Harry's grave in 1922, remarried and started a hotel at Bulolo in 
the Mandated T e r r i to ry .  Charles Evenett only son of 'Brassy'
Evenett of East Cape had joined the 9th Batta l ion. Badly wounded 
he died at Cairns in December 1919 on his way home to Papua.
Campbell Cowley of Mogubo also returned from France in 1919 and 
died wi thin a year possibly as a resu l t  of war in ju r ie s .  Judge 
Murray counted 120 Papuan white residents who had gone o f f  to war, 
some f o r t y - f i v e  from among the o f f i c i a l s ;  the remainder must have 
included many assistants from the es ta tes . (20) Will iam Bruce 
noted in 1915 that the Papuan Times had been received and read by
19 NLA Deposit 1709, Stan ifor th Smith Papers. A le t t e r  
dated 30 Apri l  1918 from Harry Catt to Stan ifor th  Smith 
asks fo r  a photograph of the younger Harry's grave.
20 Francis West. Selected Letters of Hubert Murray (Melb­
ourne, 1971). No. 65, 14 December 1915. Letter No 67,
6 August 1916 increased the estimate to 140.
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at least f i v e  'Papuans' with the AIF at Gal 1i p o l i .(21)
Two Germans return ing to work in Papua on the Marsina in 
January 1920 were not permitted to remain ashore by a host i le  
group of res iden ts . (22) One, Carl E t t l in g ,  had managed Dedele fo r  
Mrs El izabeth Whitten fo r  a time u n t i l  1915 when he was interned 
in Austra l ia .
As time went by the white community became increasingly 
integrated by marriage. Few women remained e i ther  single or widows 
fo r  long and many were recognised as having very strong 
characters. Archie MacAlpine's brother Alex was an RM and his 
sis ters married C R Baldwin, the 'Por t '  merchant and J G Fowler a 
plantat ion manager who became an ARM. Of the planter t r iumvira te  
of G A Loudon of BNGD and Eilogo, Tom Sefton of Ko i tak i ,  and 
Arthur Jewell of Lolorua, Loudon married the second school 
mistress at Port Moresby, Winifred Penny, Sefton married Ruth 
Prat t ,  daughter of Surveyor A E Prat t ,  and Jewell married 
M i l l i c e n t  Francis, a BNGD employee. Daisy English, wife of 
A C English of Rigo, was a s is te r  of E C Skel ly, a Samarai 
publican, and a s is te r - in - la w  of Bertram Bramell, Commissioner of 
Native A f fa i rs .  Of the two daughters of Mrs Ashton of Huiva in the 
Gulf Div is ion, and 'Port '  baker in 1914, Vera married Ernest 
Trevor Ward, Whit ing's manager of Veimauri, and V io le t ,  a former 
miner and planter at Mei in the Gulf Div is ion, Charles Priddle. 
Widowed in 1925, Vi Priddle in 1941 married Tom Nevi t t ,  the BNGD
21 Papuan Times. 15 September 1915. One of the f i v e  named was
W M Middleton onetime a partner of Hobart S p i l le r
of Menapi. (See note 1 above p. 137)
22 Papuan Courier. 9 and 16 January 1920.
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general manager. Vera and Violet ' s  brother married A H Bunting's 
daughter Meg. Kathleen, wife of Arthur Gors, was widowed in 1928 
and married the BNGD manager at Aroa, Arthur Pollard,  in 1930. In 
the same year Arthur Drummond, previously a brash young ass i s tant  
on Ogamobu, married the widow of Robert Shaw-Moody of Huiva and 
became a planter in his own r ight .  Celia,  widow of Donald 
MacDonald of Vaiviri ,  married Captain Fitch in 1937. There were 
many other such unions and interconnections between residents.
Sometimes 'Papuan' names were given to white children.  Frank 
'Snowy' Clarke of Domara and l a t e r  of Robinson River called his 
son Domara; Bill Voysey, a BNGD manager, gave the name Doa to a 
daughter born on the plantat ion of the name; Harry Gofton's son 
was named Moresby; and Ted Clay, a rec rui te r  in the western 
divisions,  called his daughter, Varoe, af ter  his boat, i t s e l f  
named af ter  a place on the Kikori r iver  by i t s  one-time owner 
Percy Robinson.
An increase in the r i sks  to health and especial ly to the health 
of children was a heavy price paid by Europeans who committed 
themselves to isolated l ives throughout the t ropics.  Malaria was 
endemic in coastal Papua and New Guinea and few se t t l e r s  escaped 
ent i rely from bouts of fever.  At least  f ive white children died in 
a 'dysentery epidemic' that  swept Port in 1912, including two of 
William and Ellen Bruce's babies, a child of Lewis Cowley, the 
second general manager of BNGD, and a child of Albert and Daisy 
English of Rigo. Lewis Let t ' s  f i r s t  wife had died in chi ldbi r th in 
the i solat ion of an es ta te ,  and his only son, a child of his 
second marriage, young Richard Let t ,  died in 1931 aged 11 years.
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Among other se t t le rs  the miners in pa r t icu la r ,  mostly single men 
or by the nature of th e i r  work l i v in g  apart from wives in Cooktown 
or Sydney, careless about th e i r  food, insect bites and shelter,  
were p a r t i c u la r ly  vulnerable - as were many of the Papuans who 
worked fo r  them and shared th e i r  camps. Many died in tes ta te  in 
Papua. Assistants on the estates, often l i k e  the miners heavy 
drinkers and s ingle, were l ikewise frequent ly  among the casualties 
of empire.
In 1929 Al ice Keelan, wife of an ARM badly shell-shocked in the 
war and given charge of Gobaregere, the government plantat ion on 
the Kemp Welch, published In the Land of Dohori. a reveal ing and 
often b i t t e r  account of f i v e  years l ived in Papua from 1920.(23) 
While confident about the moral and ra t ional super io r i ty  of 
'white '  c i v i l i z a t i o n ,  she reserved her harshest judgements fo r  the 
many malicious and ungenerous white people she encountered. She 
was ju s t  as confident that Papuans general ly were unre l iab le, 
lazy, mendacious, superst i t ious,  incompetent and d i r t y ,  whi le she 
remembered p a r t i c u la r ly  f ine  qua l i t ies  in many ind iv iduals .  She 
accepted her husband's code that responsible Europeans must 
maintain the i r  d ign i ty ,  honour th e i r  pledges and deal j u s t l y  with 
the native people. That some did not was deplorable and fo r  a 
'white man to go n a t ive ' ,  actual ly  l i v e  l i ke  one, she agreed with 
Jack, 'seems l i ke  a degradation of the whole white race and 
pierces one's'very sou l ' . (24)
23 Al ice Jeannetta Keelan. In the land of Dohori (Sydney,
1929).
24 Ib id . p. 225.
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The expression of such att i tudes may have been common currency 
among both o f f i c i a l s  and middle class se t t le rs  throughout the 
B r i t ish  colonial world but they were at t i tudes worked through and 
given assent to in the f i r e  of countless circumstances where to 
act other than according to the simple p r inc ip le  of maintaining 
white 'prest ige ' could only be seen as betrayal.  Keeping social 
distance between the races became an imperative that came easi ly  
to an already very class conscious white community whose own 
chi ldren were protected from adult r e a l i t i e s  u n t i l  well in to  
adolescence. Camaraderie, loya l ty ,  a f fec t ion and t ru s t  there could 
be between white 'Papuans' and Papuan 'natives ' but seldom - i t  is 
tempting to say never - as equals, never without an over-r id ing 
awareness of an unbridgeable dif ference in cosmic predicament.
In Papua there had been disturb ing signs of change as some
Papuans in the towns, who had become fa m i l ia r  with Europeans at
home and at play and had had opportunit ies to assess that the
taubadas and sinabadas were neither moral ly impeccable nor
omniscient, could feel that they might show some defiance, steal,
or make a sexual advance and perhaps escape unpunished. Anxiety
among residents of Port Moresby about a decl ine in respect fo r
Europeans reached a peak in 1926 when a White Women's Protection
Ordinance was passed and the death penalty made mandatory in cases
of rape of a white woman or chi I d . (25) The discriminatory
provisions of the measure seemed quite j u s t i f i e d  and necessary to
a community increasingly self-absorbed, suburban, and perhaps
hypocri t ica l  in i t s  prevai l ing outlook. The loosening of
25 The events leading to the passage of th is  ordinance are 
recounted in Amirah In g l i s '  Not a white woman safe 
(Canberra, 1974).
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r es t r a i n t s  among Europeans in the post-war world had not made them 
less race-conscious; indeed changes in sexual codes and dress had 
probably heightened t he i r  awareness of being vulnerable in alien 
eyes.
Yet on outstat ions and plantat ions white women and children 
continued to l ive as before - apparently exposed to great 
danger and far  from the aid of other Europeans - but very few 
convictions on charges of being 'within the curt i lage of a house 
without good cause1, or of assaul t ,  or of intent  to ' i n su l t '  a 
European woman or child appear to re l a te  to incidents that  took 
place outside Port Moresby or Samarai. An attack occured at Kerema 
in the Gulf Division in December 1925.(26) I t  was one of two cases 
reported by the Lieutenant Governor to the Minister at the height 
of the Port Moresby agi tat ion over the safety of white women. 
Another took place at Bwagaoia on Misima in 1930.(27) If there 
were very few assaults of any kind on isolated white women, 
incidents of common assault  on plantat ions between men, including 
violence involving white men, were hardly infrequent.
The fa i l ings  and vir tues of Papuan employees were as often the 
subject of conversation among s e t t l e r s  as t he i r  own health or the 
weather. In April 1921, Percy Robinson of Ogamobu described his 
cook, Hepea, as
a treasure that  I have jus t  signed on at 15/- a month
26 CRS A518 Item D840/1/5. Murray to Minister,  28 December 
1925.
27 NAPNG, Series 485, Box 806, Station Records, Baniara and 
Cape Nelson. Circular No. 263, 12 December 1930.
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& is equal and bet ter  that  the Pt Moresby house boys 
at £2. He can make splendid bread and cooks very we l l . . .
He has good manners. . .he goes for a swim each 
afternoon. (28)
A week l a t er  Hepea was 'a wonder1 who had presented him
with a pidgeon (sic)  p i e . . .  We thank each other most 
courteously on all necessary occasions and he always 
addresses me as "Sir" or "Taubada".(29)
Hepea's predecessor, Aumockel, had been 'qui te  to le rable '  
requiring only a whisper to know what to do. Vagi, one of the crew 
of Robinson's vessel was 'an expert cook, natural born mechanic, 
experienced seaman & can sew and mend l ike a t a i l o r ' . (30) Two 
years l a t er  Vagi was found to know how to milk cows and Robinson 
was unst inting in his praise - ' I  have yet to find anything he 
doesn' t  know ab o u t ' . (31) Such detai l  may suggest that  relat ions 
were unusually good at Ogamobu and that  Robinson was indeed a 
sensi t ive employer. Was he extraordinary or were these Papuans 
unusual? Or was i t  that ,  despite a level of confl ict  and 
misunderstanding that  was inevi table,  co-operative rela t ions  
prevailled much of the time in most work places? Nowhere in his 
frank and confidential  l e t t e r s  did Robinson admit to thrashing 
Papuans. He frequently deplored as quite unnecessary the use by
28 Robinson Let ters ,  29 April 1921.
29 Ibid. 8 May 1921.
30 Ibid. 28 December 1918.
31 Ibid. 11 September 1920.
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his brother-in-1aw and other Europeans of violence as a means of 
control l ing labour even as he was quite prepared to physically 
threaten several of his white employees himself. The question of 
assaul t  and of breaches of the labour code are fur ther  considered 
in the following chapter.
In Alice Keelan's In the Land of Dohori, both Jack Keelan on 
several occasions, and Alice at least  once, hi t  out physically at 
Papuans who were del iberately defying them and she wrote ' there 
were many times when my hands ached to give Toia (her 'house boy' 
at Gobaregere) the shaking he so r ichly deserves ' . (32) She was not 
unique. Indeed two white women in 1912, and another in 1918, were 
convicted and fined for assault ing t he i r  domestic servants in Port 
Moresby.(33) Alice could see the dangers in legal ly permitting 
employers the r ight  to punish t he i r  'boys' but could believe that  
some might be so placed as to need to use corporal punishment.
Yet she came increasingly to see how Papuans might view thei r  
si tuat ion and was often taxed by questions Toia asked. He had 
heard about the war in Europe and wanted to know why white people 
were not gaoled, as Papuans were, for f ight ing.  'For a moment I 
was non-plussed. The white race had evidently been arraigned 
before a native parliament at some time or other,  and the 
inconsistencies of the white man's theory and pract ice severely 
commented on' . (34) Later Toia asked how the white man found New 
Guinea and how he had thought about making guns - having clear ly
32 Keelan, op. Cit.  p. 133.
33 Papuan Times, 28 February and 6 March 1912. Papuan Courier 
18 December 1919.
34 Keelan, op. Cit.  p. 72.
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ident i f ied the two essent ia l s ,  ships and guns, that  in Papuan eyes 
had made the European supreme. Mrs Keelan learned ' t ha t  the native 
evidently thinks his own thoughts, even while he seeks information 
on them from a white person whom he t rus t s .  And I was forced to 
admire the wisdom that  seeks "the other fel low's" point of view 
while yielding no enlightenment on his own. Would that  we 
understood the Papuan as thoroughly as he understands us! '  She 
'was conscious of a feel ing of genuine regret  when the day of 
<Toia's> departure arrived.  As natives go, he was a wonderful boy, 
and surprisingly honest and l oya l ' . (35)
When, af ter  repeated attacks of shell-shock, Jack Keelan was 
f i na l ly  invalided out of the service,  he and his wife decided to 
se t t l e  as planters on a small holding at Sogeri hoping that  when 
the road then under way to the plateau was complete they could 
l ive comfortably off the land and his pension. After enduring many 
hardships and f rus t r a t i ons ,  and the lof ty h os t i l i t y  of Tom Sefton 
of Koitaki whose ident i ty is only barely disguised in Al ice ' s  
book, the Keelans gave up thei r  lease when work on the road was 
abruptly abandoned in 1926. Those bruised by t he i r  Papuan 
experience could imagine that  the country was 'cursed'  in some 
way, that  they had been enticed into compromising themselves with 
a painted harlot .  No one who had lived in the country, i t  seems, 
could leave unaffected by i t .  In In the Land of Dohori the pain is 
palpable.
Scarcely a year went by af ter  1910 without the publication of a 
book of anthropology, missionary annals, travel or f ic t ion  about
35 Ibid. pp. 164-5.
383
the Terr i tory.  These were widely read, and Papua, with i t s  t ree 
houses and houses bui l t  over the sea, i t s  dubus and ravis ,  
cannibals and sorcery, became a place imagined famil iar  by 
schoolboys, armchair t r ave l l e r s ,  ph i l a t e l i s t s  and scholars in many 
places. Bronislaw Malinowski's studies of Trobriand Island culture 
based on three years spent in Papua in 1915-18 placed the country 
at the centre of anthropological at tent ion.  His books beginning 
with Argonauts of the Western Pacific began appearing in 1922 
(36); his las t  major Trobriand work, Coral Gardens and thei r  
Magic, was published in 1935.(37) And s e t t l e r  Papua inspired a 
small industry in f i c t ion .  Living in Papua for much of the period 
between 1907 and 1934, Beatrice Grimshaw wrote over twenty novels 
and numerous s t or i es ,  many with a Papuan set t ing.  Generally 
peopled by larger than l i f e  characters and with implausible plots 
her novels served to develop and feed a market in south seas 
romances for adults.  In her f i r s t  and best 'Papuan' book, When the 
Red Gods Cal 1 (1911), the daughter of the 'Governor' of Papua 
marries a planter ,  Hugh Lynch, a man educated at Harrow and 
Sandhurst, but who she subsequently learns has been previously 
married to a Papuan g i r l .  The girl  is dead, but hurt and 
indignant, Stephanie Hammond leaves Lynch and goes back to 
England. Hugh, repenting his e ar l ie r  youthful f o l ly ,  has never 
compromised himself in any other way with the ' na t ive '  and years 
la ter  Stephanie returns to Papua and her husband real izing that  
she is bound to him by the bonds of marriage. Conventional 
morality is vindicated and a del icate  question of racial
36 Bronislaw Malinowski. Argonauts of the Western Pacific 
(London, 1922).
37 Bronislaw Malinowski. Coral Gardens and t he i r  Magic 
(London, 1935).
relat ionships resolved. (38) Papuan s e t t l e r s ,  no doubt, were among 
those who read Beatrice Grimshaw's books but they could hardly 
have regarded them as l i f e l i ke .
Rather bet ter  drawn images of t he i r  world were real ized in 
several novels writ ten by Gilbert  Munro Turnbull,  an archi tectural  
draftsman employed in the Department of Public Works (1914-1934).
In Munro Turnbull ' s  novel, Paradise Plumes (1934), Stephen Blake, 
an incorrupt ib l e RM returning to Papua aboard the 'Moratau1, f a l l s  
in love with a young woman on her way to marry a planter ,  Harry 
Merton, a man Blake knows to be a scoundrel. Merton has previously 
lived with a Papuan girl  - a fac t  that  in any man of honour would 
have prevented him contemplating ever marrying a white woman.
Again the husband conceals his past ,  his subsequent crude and 
bullying behaviour consistent  with that  of a weak man who has 
betrayed his caste.  The drama is resolved when Merton is ki l led by 
Loana, his Papuan mistress,  with Blake neatly shielding Lesley 
Merton from the facts of her husband's shame. To balance the 
figure of Harry Merton, Munro Turnbull places old Tod Lorimer, a 
rough but worthy pioneer and planter ,  the widower of a Papuan 
woman, who has honourably accepted the consequences of his union.
His daughter Moira is placed in an unenviable posi t ion.  Although 
educated by the nuns at Yule Island - as indeed were many children 
of mixed race in Papua - she cannot f i na l ly  escape her Papuan 
heri tage and her ' l apses '  into chewing betel nut 'bewilder'  and 
' f r ighten '  her father .  Turnbull allows Lesley Merton to find 
Moira's treatment by white men hypocri t ical  but when she taxes 
Blake about the girl  he has to shrug his shoulders. Lesley does
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not understand. Paradise Plumes says much about the outlook of a 
generation for whom an alternative ethos was l i teral ly 
unthinkable.(39)
Planters themselves, while they could be the subject of 
romantic fiction or writers of occasional let ters of complaint, 
were mostly 'doers' rather than observers. Lewis Lett and his 
second wife Mollie were both writers and planters for a time but 
wrote no planter reminiscences. Indeed few set t lers left  records 
of any kind at al l .  The books, therefore, of Beatrice Grimshaw, 
Alice Keelan, Munro Turnbull and others, and the material in the 
Papuan Times and the Papuan Courier provide information that must 
be relied upon heavily in reconstructing the set t ler  world in 
Papua. But in the extraordinary let ters of Percy Robinson of 
Ogamobu there is another order of material available - abundance 
of detail ,  immediacy, strain, fatigue, elation, humour, emotion. 
Comprising almost a weekly diary at times, they singularly allow 
an intimate acquaintance with one planter. It  is beyond the limits 
of this study to exploit all of their richness though their value 
must be apparent. Robinson was a sensitive, aggressive and highly 
strung man, his wife and correspondent an interested and informed 
reader. Irene Robinson had been to Kikori on a visi t  with Percy in 
1916 and part of the value of the let ters lies in th-is - that 
Robinson could assume her understanding of much that he 
subsequently Wrote about. And for Percy Robinson, Ogamobu was from 
the outset to be his 'greatest and last adventure', one in which 
he had invested everything.(40)
39 G Munro Turnbull. Paradise Plumes (Sydney, 1934).
40 Robinson Letters. 1 January 1920.
386
A dissatisfied public servant on his way to look at farming 
land being offered for settlement on the Daly River in the 
Northern Territory, Robinson was attracted to Papua at a chance 
meeting with H C Cardew, the ARM from Kikori, when calling at 
Thursday Island in 1914. He decided to interrupt his voyage to see 
the Papuan Gulf, and like Theodore Bevan before him, was 
captivated by the meretricious charms of what he saw, 'the whole 
t r ip '  being ' l ike the most br i l l iant  of my anticipations. . . calm 
smooth water, perfect weather and an intensely fascinating 
tropical jungle within a stone's throw of the boat practically all 
the way. I t  realized my wildest imaginings & seemed almost too 
good to be t rue1. (41) At the Kikori station, he found the view 
from Cardew's house 'enough to bring tears to your eyes'. If 
Robinson was interested in taking up land on the Kikori rather 
than on the Daly, the ARM suggested, he_ would be prepared to be a 
silent - and preferably unidentified - partner in the 
enterprise.(42)
At Daru Robinson decided to accompany Percy Beach, a recruiter,  
on a short t r ip to Parama Island where he 'couldn't think of 
anything better to do with myself but stand around & look as much 
like the dominant white race as possible' .(43) But this experience 
was also inspirational. At home in Broken Hill and Adelaide he 
laid before several investors proposals to develop a coconut 
plantation at  the Kikori River which he thought could be partly 
financed out of the proceeds of recruiting labour in the western
41 Ibid. 15 April 1914.
42 Ibid. Easter Sunday 1914.
43 Ibid.
div is ions. He returned to Papua placing his two brothers-in-1aw, 
Arthur and Claud Will iams, in charge of a lease he had taken out 
on the r i ve r  at Ogamobu above the Kikori  government s ta t ion.
In May 1918, having persuaded several Melbourne investors to 
jo in  him in a company, Kikori  Plantat ions, to take over the lease, 
Percy Robinson went to Papua to d i r e c t l y  manage Ogamobu. By August 
he had been again to Port,  had argued with Arthur Bloomfield over 
a rec ru i t ing  agreement, and had been asked to jo in  the Papua Club 
by 6 A Loudon. He was elected to the council of the recent ly 
revived Planters' Association. While yet again in Port on the 11th 
November Percy noted in his l e t t e r  that the Club's rooms had 
become his temporary o f f ice .  Three days la te r  he was to bring news 
of the armist ice to K iko r i .
At the time of his a r r iva l  at Ogamobu most of the lease s t i l l  
remained to be cleared and planted with rubber, coconuts having 
proved unsat isfactory on the f i r s t  blocks planted by Arthur 
Will iams in that extremely wet place. In his le t te rs  to 
Irene Robinson Percy t r ie d  to convey the atmosphere and excitement 
of the estate at the clearing stage:
My f i r s t  day in charge here was celebrated by quite a 
chapter of accidents. I hardly arrived on the clearing 
to inspect the work before one of the scrub cutters 
presented fo r  my inspection a ho r r ib ly  gashed foot  that 
he had cut with his axe. I f ixed him up & sent him o f f  
ju s t  in time to receive another with a cracked head - 
don't  know how he did i t .  Then as a f in a l  catastrophe,
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a tree f e l l  on Dimabi and k i l l e d  him ins tan t ly .  As you 
have probably never heard a hundred savages doing th e i r  
death wail you can have no idea of the uproar. I knocked 
them o f f  and started fo r  the house with the body & then 
a l l  the women joined the chorus...  We buried him th is  
morning and the incident is apparently forgotten 
a lready.(44)
He could not re s is t  condemning Arthur Wil l iams's frequently 
v io len t  treatment of labourers when i t  seemed that careful thought 
could almost invar iab ly  prevent trouble. He continued,
You remember Dimabi? He was boat boy on the launch.
Arthur beat him up & got f ined f i v e  pounds. So I took 
him from the launch & put him to work at Ogamobu to keep 
him out of Arthur 's  way. This continual trouble with the 
Authori t ies has got to be stopped somehow...it is only 
a matter of time before Woodward, the new magistrate, 
w i l l  be a 'cow' also unless I can devise some means to 
check (Arthur's) unruly conduct. He was f u l l  of good 
resolut ions a f te r  Woodward arrived but...was (soon) 
again ta lk ing  about 'black swine' & 'be l t ing  th e i r  
blocks o f f '  & general ly performing in his old Pleasant 
manner.(45)
By December he could wr i te  of a clever scheme he had conceived 
to keep up the morale of the labour force:
44 Ib id .  18 October 1918.
45 Ib id .
389
After the end of next week we will have a block of 100 
acres r ight  in the middle s t i l l  to do. This may s t r ike  
you as a queer way to attack the job but i t  is s t i l l  
part of the 'kidding'  process. I t  is part ly th i s  scheme 
that  has kept the labour from losing heart  in the face 
of the magnitude of the t a s k . . . ( f o r )  in the isolated patch 
is now collected all  the wallabies,  cassowaries etc.  that  
may have been about and so j us t  at the time when the 
labour is hear t i ly  sick of the whole thing they will bog 
in l ike seven devils to get at the game... Three hundred 
acres of virgin jungle looked a fearful  task. I confess 
that  when I scrambled through to the back l ine the f i r s t  
day my heart fa i led me - i t  seemed such a cheek for us 
human insects to undertake to remove all that  mill ions 
of tons off the face of the ear th. . .you can imagine 
what i t  feels  l ike to struggle into i t  for a mile & then 
s i t  down & real ize that  you have undertaken to remove i t  
a l l .  The way I s tar ted was to work out a week's task on 
my programme. Then I divided i t  into s t r i ps  from west 
to east  of such width that  i f  the boys did thei r  work 
they came out at the home end on Saturday morning. They 
were gett ing nearer home every day & i f  they fa i l ed  to 
reach there on Saturday morning they worked Saturday 
afternoon. So i t  became a sort  of game & kept the i r  
minds off the res t  of the j o b . (46)
Recruiting labour in the west for plantat ions in the Central 
Division was to pay the day to day development costs at Ogamobu
46 Ibid. 4 October 1919.
and i t  was essent ial  to have competent and experienced crew on the 
company's vessel,  the Varoe. Percy was quite candid in admitting 
his complete dependence on good men among the Papuans, and 
resorted to careful strategems to retain them. Sometimes these 
came unstuck.
I t  was rather amusing to notice the effect  of his (Igua's) 
dismissal on the crew. They are picked boys and know the i r  
value too well.  Consequently they were inclined to hold 
out as a great favour the prospect of the i r  signing on 
again. But since I sacked Igua i t  has thrown a scare into 
them and each one has come to me in great anxiety to 
know if I will sign them on again. Rather a change from 
thei r  previous a t t i tude .  I was awfully rel ieved when 
Heagi came to me on the same errand t ho '! I was afraid 
he might leave me and I do not know how I could manage 
without him.. .he is quite the best on the coas t . . .  They 
are a f ine crew.. .  I can see that  they approve of me too, 
as a boss although I don' t  think they respect me very 
much - i t  is more a sort  of pi ty for a harmless individual 
that  gives as l i t t l e  trouble as poss ib l e . (47)
In December 1918 Heagi and the crew 'get on with me and each 
other in a most sa t i s fac tory way.. .I  am most awfully relieved as I 
simply couldn' t  carry on i f  i t  was rea l ly  necessary for  discipl ine 
to behave in the blackguardly manner that  Arthur claims is the 
only way' to deal with Papuans. (48) A month l a t e r ,  however, Heagi
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walked out af ter  demanding £1 more a month in wages. Refusing at 
f i r s t ,  Percy was f ina l ly  forced to go into Hanuabada and beg his 
skipper to return.  By 1920 Percy Robinson's earnings from 
recrui t ing with the Varoe had reached £6,000 and had substant ia l ly 
paid for the costs of development at Ogamobu in the preceding two 
ye a r s . (49)
With the agricul tural  labourers the same care needed to be 
taken in the select ion of boss-boys and in weeding out those 
elements among the labourers that  spread d i ssa t i s fac t ion  or 
shirked on the job. Labour contentment, i t  seems, was not only a 
resul t  of careful management and consideration shown by an 
employer. Labourers could bring with them, or learn from other 
workers, a t t i tudes  that  could threaten good rela t ions  on the 
plantat ion.  Percy was pleased if  his judgement was confirmed:
Bydalu - the warder in the Kikori Hospital who humbugged 
along Evoi's wife - we l l . . .  I put him on for a month on
t r i a l  much against Arthur 's advice. . .and he turned out 
an absolute prize winner. . .  So I shot out Evuga & the
res t  of his crew of loafers and am now well sa t i s f ied  
with the s taf f  at Ogamobu. Nearly all the old guard 
have been paid off and I have 60 brand new boys (signed 
on for 3 years) who have no bad t radi t ions  to overcome.
I finished up the 100 acres on the other side of the 
Tewo creek . (50)
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. 2 November 1918.
392
In November he reported that
there is orderly discipl ine  & plenty of hard work going 
on. At the same time there is much more contentment. We 
have twenty-four women on the place and numerous children 
and babies. They have gardens of t he i r  own and are 
allowed to entertain thei r  re la t ions  at weekends. The 
mile or so of sago swamp has proved a great success. . .  
and the 'sago boys' go out every day. . .  I have cut out 
r ice a l t oge the r . (51)
He now found that  Woodward, ' the new RM...is a real good sor t '  
who 'shows every intent ion of avoiding f r i c t i on  with us'  and 
Greenland 'who is acting CNA put me wise to a lot  I d idn ' t  know 
before ' -  presumably about compliance with the NLO Regulat ions. (52)
Percy Robinson was welcomed by G A Loudon, Arthur Jewell and 
Tom Sefton into the inner c i rc le  of the commercial community. 
Ogamobu was a business-l ike operation,  Percy tough and determined. 
His recrui t ing venture had quickly outstripped i t s  r ivals  in the 
'west ' .  He appeared a r i s ing man. His membership of the Papua 
Club and the Planters '  Association pleased him and his 
enthusiast ic descript ions of membership mores provide one of only 
two contemporary glimpses that  survive.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
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The Papua Club
The Papua Club was founded in 1913 by Tom Sefton, G A Loudon - 
then BNGD's new Commercial Manager, Arthur Jewell and others as an 
exclusive r e t re a t  for selected members of the commercial and 
planting community, the ' s i l v e r t a i I s 1, who could thus avoid the 
' r i f f  r a f f 1 who gathered in the pubs - and at the same time 
balance the exclusivism of the o f f i c i a l s .  Sefton had come to Papua 
as an accountant with the Bank of New South Wales in 1911 but was 
soon working as ass i s tant  manager for his uncle, F A Lord, the 
manager at Koitaki. He succeeded Lord in 1913. I f  'Gal'  Loudon was 
a rough and bold player in various contests with the government, 
Tom Sefton was careful to mind his own business and mind i t  well,  
while Arthur Jewell,  once Captain Barton's private secretary and 
since an opponent of Judge Murray, would become the planters '  
chief negotiator.  Already in 1914, Loudon, Sefton and Jewell were 
considered leaders of 'Port '  society,  Sefton and Jewell acquiring 
houses on Ela Beach in which they stayed on t he i r  frequent v i s i t s  
to town. Much l a t e r ,  when a planter at Eilogo, Loudon also 
maintained a town house. An American doctor sent to Papua by the 
Rockefeller Foundation to t rea t  hookworm in 1920, S M Lambert, 
found friendship in the Club and some indifference at Government 
House. He thought Loudon, Sefton, Jewell,  R D Bertie and Tom 
Nevitt
and a dozen more. . . the ablest  colonials in the South 
Pac i f i c . . .  I couldn' t  have moved a f inger without the help 
of these men and t he i r  fr iends.  These were the 
forward-1ooking ones who wanted native labour restored to
health,  to r ev i t a l i ze  races for whom, at that  time, there 
seemed no future but extinet ion 1.(53)
Lambert betrayed here a perfect  summing up of a view of thei r  role 
vis-a-vis  the Papuans held by many planters - that  i t  was they and 
not the o f f ic i a l s  who did most to ' improve' and even preserve the 
'nat ive '  as they sent t he i r  'boys' back to the i r  vi l lages free of 
skin diseases - with a caddy of tobacco, a hurricane lamp, and a 
bolt  of red cloth under the i r  arm. Yet to c r i t i c s  i t  could as 
easi ly seem that  despite the fr iendly relat ionships the more 
lordly among the s e t t l e r s  might undoubtedly have with individual 
servants and employees, they appeared to regard the Papuans 
col lect ively as l i t t l e  more than par t i cular ly  troublesome beasts 
of burden. Within the confines of the Papua Club and among 
likeminded men with common interes t s  the country's problems could 
seem capable of simple remedies i f  only the members could have 
thei r  way.
Membership became a reward that  admitted the more successful 
members of the white community to an e l i t e  group. Staniforth Smith 
was one of the f i r s t  ' o f f i c i a l s '  offered membership. Judge Gore 
would la ter  join him. The Club became a registered company with 
nominal capital  of £5,000 in 1927 but i t  is doubtful whether there 
were ever more than for ty  members at one time before 1942, and i t  
acquired permanent premises of i t s  own only in 1940.
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Percy Robinson, the new member in 1918, recorded some of the 
atmosphere of both the Club and the 'Port '  community. The rougher
53 S M Lambert. A Doctor in Paradise (Melbourne, 1942). p.19.
society a l l  se t t le rs  shared to some extent before 1914 had given 
way to one of sharp class d is t in c t ions .  In Port Percy found that
the men here rather go in fo r  a t t i r e  - much more so than 
I expected considering that the society is almost en t i re ­
ly  masculine. There seems a very sharp l ine  between the 
beachcombers and such and the crowd that frequent the 
Club. I think they are careful about a t t i r e  to emphasise 
the d i f fe ren ce . . .you see half  the men ( in town) going 
about with bare toes s t ick ing out of th e i r  shoes & noth­
ing on but ragged pants & a f i l t h y  s ing le t  & the other 
half  looking as i f  they had jus t  come out of Col l ins St. 
Melbourne. There is nothing much in between.(54)
Club members were 'a p a r t i c u la r ly  nice crowd of men and I have 
some very good fr iends among them'. His wife 'would f a l l  fo r  
Louden ( s i c ) . . . '  and ' there is an ent i re  absence of any e f f o r t  to 
assert s u p e r io r i t y ' .(55) Yet conformity to a standard of dress and 
a code of behaviour was c lea r ly  expected with 'Gal ' Loudon, Tom 
Sefton, Arthur Jewell , and Ernest Ward, R S Whit ing's rather 
elegant manager at Veimauri, sett ing the acceptable pattern. Percy 
continued in de ta i l ,
In dul l  or cool weather and in the evening they wear 
trousers of e i ther gabardine or mohair of a karki (sic)  
color, socks to match and brown shoes, a s h i r t  of a 
color to go with the rest & t i e  l ikewise. Shirts  are
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always plain & never with anything in the shape of 
stripes or spots or patterns of any sort. If really 
cold they have a coat to go with the pants. Unlined 
patch pockets (pleated) & cut in a severe military 
s tyle . . . in  the hot weather, duck pants, white shirt 
of heavy twill with two breast pockets.. . gauntlet 
cuffs are anathema. Louden has his made with wide 
sleeves only to above the elbow <i e short sleeves> 
but that is his speciality & no one likes to copy 
him although they approve of the idea. Black silk 
t ie as narrow as possible. Anything in the nature of 
"handkerchief" ties would cause the wearer to be 
tarred and feathered.(56)
Percy Robinson visited Sefton at Koitaki, enjoyed dining at 
Loudon's and at Surveyor Prat t ' s  and imbibed the opinions of his 
fellow Club members about particular officials.  Stanley Greenland, 
the CNA Inspector whose advice he had earl ier thought worth 
taking, now i t  seemed was 'a dud', a 'narrow of f i c ia l . . . the sort 
that drives me frantic.  I expect I have to 'out'  him' .(57)
A E Pratt, Tom Sefton's father-in-law, on the other hand, was a 
useful friend who would survey Ogamobu and include a block across 
the Tewu Creek that Percy had il legally cleared before the Land 
Board had granted him its lease. Smarting from a £10 fine for 
over-carrying on the Varoe 'in spite of my ingenious efforts to
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid. 9 March 1919.
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dodge i t 1(58), he now thought,
Govt o f f i c i a l s  here are simply poisonous - they are al l  
a l ike, i t  is the system & not so much the ind iv iduals .  No 
one seems to be able to escape fo r  the simple reason that 
the Governor does not care a hang about the s p i r i t  of the 
law - i f  they can "catch" you on any technical breach 
they rub i t  i n . (59)
But i t  was not only v is -a -v is  the government that he had to 
watch his step. Most of the leading planters had taken large r isks 
with th e i r  fortunes and l ived on the edge where ruin was an 
ever-present p o s s ib i l i t y .  There was frequent l i t i g a t i o n  to recover 
debts even from fr iends. Some of the f r a g i l i t y  of his own 
s i tua t ion  Robinson revealed as he real ised that
Just at present I am strong here & am treated by every­
one with dist inguished considerat ion as a successful man 
and one of the "Heads" but i t  would take about three 
months of hard luck & a few whispers of f inanc ia l  
embarassment to throw me down among the supp l ian ts . . .  No, 
i t  is not a condit ion fo r  a weak or nervous man.(60)
By 1924 he knew G A Loudon to be 'as clever as Satan1 even as he 
entered into partnership with the general manager of BNGD to buy 
out the 'southern' shareholders in Ogamobu. The partnership would
58 Ib id . 2 A p r i1 1919.
59 Ib id .
60 Ib id . 22 May 1919.
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indeed prove a fa ta l  mistake for Robinson. In the collapse of 1929 
while Loudon managed to survive the loss of many of his business 
in teres t s  including his share in Ogamobu, for Percy Robinson 
the Papuan 'adventure'  had come to an end.
The Planters '  Association
Unlike the Club which was to have a continuous l i f e ,  the 
Planters '  Association of Papua was a body that  was formed and 
reformed several times af ter  periods of inact ivi ty .  As with the 
Citizens'  Association in 1915 and 1919-21 j oin t  action by planters 
as a group was only possible in such a small and dispersed 
community for short periods. The f i r s t  Association was formed in 
1911 with an executive comprising Lewis Cowley, general manager of 
BNGD 1911-14, Arthur Bloomfield, Raymond Dubois and Archie 
MacAlpine. Representing the larger plantat ion companies rather 
than the individual planter ,  this  was the group worried at the 
time that  the l imits of avai lable Papuan labour had already been 
reached, and pressing for three year contracts and the admission 
of Asians.
Following several years without meeting the Association was 
re-formed late  in 1917 when new grievances had brought in teres ts  
together.  With the purposes of commercial agricul ture and Murray's 
government now seeming to be in i r reconci1able opposition, the 
d i f f i cu l t i e s  planters were experiencing seemed remediable at f i r s t  
only i f  the Judge was replaced as Lieutenant Governor. Names put 
forward in case Murray should r e t i r e  on turning sixty were those
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of Stan iforth Smith and Major General Charles Rosenthal, a 
prominent Austral ian conservative.(61) With a membership of t h i r t y  
seven, the Association now represented i t s e l f  as a responsible 
'opposit ion'  which in the absence of electora l  representat ion had 
taken upon i t s e l f  to speak on behalf of the planting 
community. Several well prepared 'B u l le t in s '  were printed and 
c i rcu la ted. But most smaller planters chose not to jo in .  
Essent ia l ly  the Planters'  Association had been revived to give the 
leading planters, Loudon, Sefton and Jewell - with the lawyer R D 
Ber t ie 's  help - a base respectably large enough to allow them to 
apply pressure on the local and Commonwealth governments. As noted 
in Chapter 14, when the Min is ter fo r  External T e r r i to r ie s ,  
Alexander Poynton, v is i ted  Papua in June 1921 the Association led 
by Jewell , Seymour Will iams - Bloomfield's agent at the 
time, Bert ie and G A Loudon confronted him with a formidable l i s t  
of proposals fo r  Commonwealth expenditure and changes in 
p o l i c y . (62)
In the economic crises that fol lowed in 1921-22 and again in 
the la te  twenties, Judge Murray's e f fo r ts  to have Papua exempted 
from the provisions of the Navigation Act and other measures taken 
on behalf of the distressed planters changed th e i r  view of his 
administration. With the Lieutenant Governor ac t ive ly  engaged in 
defending the T e r r i t o ry 's  industr ies and in te res ts ,  a Planters 
Association operating as an opposition to the government had 
l i t t l e  to do. Af ter  years of suspended a c t i v i t y  when the Chambers
61 Papuan Courier, 18 February 1921.
62 See above p. 276. Bul le t ins (3) issued by the 
Association are in CRS Al 20/9009. Membership rules were 
changed in 1920 to admit plantat ion assistants as 
'Associate Members'. (Papuan Courier, 19 November 1920)
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of Commerce in Port Moresby and Samarai provided representat ion 
for the in teres t s  of the combined commercial and planting 
communities, a new Planters Association of Papua was formed in 
1935 on a broader basis of membership than the previous bodies and 
when economic issues alone now assured i t  of support. The 
president was G A Loudon. Tom Sefton was vice-president  and the 
secretary- t reasurer  was Richard 'Dickie'  Walshe of Domara. The 
Council of the Planters Association of Papua included Loudon, 
Sefton, Walshe, Tom Nevitt MLC, and Captain F i t c h . (63)
In the ' eas t '  of Papua, where there were few large planters or 
company es ta tes ,  where the t ropical  environment was more 
d i s t inc t ive ,  standards of dress and behaviour might have been more 
relaxed than in ' Po r t ' .  Several ' eas terners '  were members of the 
Planters '  Association and v i s i t ing  members of the Papua Club. Yet 
Samarai had only a few government off icers  and l i t t l e  of the 
hos t i l i t y  between the 'commercials'  and ' o f f i c i a l s '  that  
characterised the capi tal  during the war years.  While there were 
cliques - Alice Keelan found three in 1920 between which newcomers 
had to chose - the Samarai Chamber of Commerce provided a 
suff icient  local forum for all those with an in te res t  to advance 
or defend and well represented the col lect ive  voice of the 
r e s iden t s . (64) The white population of the town might r i se  to two 
hundred or more at Christmas - with the two hotels providing an 
egal i tar ian place to meet, stay and enter tain that  drew t raders ,  
miners, pearlers and planters from a vast area. The grander
63 Membership in 1936, i t  seems, comprised every planter.  A 
l i s t  of the members circulated on a bal lot  paper for three 
delegates from each of five ' d i s t r i c t s '  contains 
seventy-eight names out of eighty-seven. CRS A518 Item 
R918/3 'Planters '  Association of Papua' 1936-1950.
64 Keelan, op. Cit.  p. 49.
planters of the Central Division might have found the place 
cloying and confined.
Another group had been formed in Melbourne in 1914 to lobby the 
Commonwealth Government on behalf of Australian investors 
interested in Papuan plantat ions.  This was an Association of 
Planters under the leadership of A S Bloomfield and including 
F W Kitchen the Soap manufacturer and principal  of the 
Commonwealth Copra Company (G i l i g i l i ) ,  and H Y Russell of Sydney, 
director  and secretary of Sogeri Para Rubber Company (Koitaki).  In 
1919 the two Associations disagreed over recommendations each were 
making about Sunday tapping on rubber estates .  Murray consulted 
with the Melbourne group in 1922 to obtain support in opposing the 
Navigation Ac t . (65)
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While s e t t l e r s  in the years before 1914 had expected that  Papua 
would one day resemble Java or Malaya,no such expectation could be 
sustained by 1930. Henry Dexter, a marine engineer who had worked 
his passage out to Papua on the BNGD supply ship SS Bentinck in 
1910 and then served as an ass i s tant  on Otomata and Kemp Welch 
River Plantat ion,  l e f t  the Terr i tory in 1918 to take up a posit ion 
on a rubber es tate  in Negri Sembilan in Malaya. He returned to 
Papua after  eight years and remained a t rader  in Milne Bay until  
1937. Dexter was well placed to make comparisons between quite 
di fferent  planter communities.
65 CRS A1 19/10372 contains correspondence between the Melb­
ourne group and the Minister.  CRS G69 contains disagree­
ment over Sunday tapping.
At Otomata he had worked under B i l l  Jefferson who knew Malaya 
and had t r ie d  to prepare Dexter fo r  what he would see, but 'Only 
those who have spent years in a p r im i t ive  country l i k e  Papua can
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f u l l y  real ise the con tras t ' .  In 1918 everyone in Malaya seemed 
prosperous. While d i f f i c u l t  times were to come, there were
comfortable hotels, cars, t ra ins  in which one could travel 
in comfort, instead of the long journeys - per boot - that 
had been the usual method of travel  in Papua.. .every 
d i s t r i c t  had i t s  l i t t l e  club, with i t s  b i l l i a r d  tab le, 
tennis courts, reading room, e t c . . .  How d i f fe re n t  the lo t  
of the Papuan planter ! Not his the blocks of ice, the 
da i ly  paper, mails and cold storage goods del ivered each 
morning; nor when his day's work was done could he get 
into his car, and spend his evening with others of his 
kind. (66)
The Papuan planter might personal ly re c ru i t  his own labour, 
personal ly supervise his rubber nursery or bud-graft his rubber 
stumps, bui ld his house, and personal ly oversee the clearing of 
the land, a l l  tasks le t  out to Chinese contractors in Malaya. 
There, cleaning and weeding, and rubber tapping i t s e l f  were 
contracted out, a Chinese tapper being replaced by the contractor 
i f  trees were wounded on two successive occasions. ' I t  was great ly 
to the cred i t  of the Papuan p lan te rs ' ,  Dexter thought, ' that 
tapping is as good as i t  i s ' . (67)
66 Henry Dexter. 'Reminiscences of a Gin-soaked Trader' , 
unpublished manuscript (ANU Paci f ic  Manuscripts Bureau,
PMB 624) p. 110-112. Dexter was an acting ARM at Abau in 
1915.
67 Ibid. p. 114.
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A recent historian has described ' the world of Papua's 
expatr iate s e t t l e r s '  before 1942 as 'a dusty, lower middle class,  
Australian version of the Bri t i sh R a j ' . (68) Se t t l e rs  would not 
have presumed even so much. In the t h i r t i e s  Br i t i sh India seemed 
very far  away and vast ly more glamorous than prosaic Papua.
Samarai might resemble other south seas port towns but Port 
Moresby from the beginning had the unmistakeable stamp of a 
northern Australian f ron t ie r  sett lement - timber framed and iron 
roofed houses with verandahs, raised above the ground on ' stumps' ,  
with corrugated iron water tanks to col lect  the run-off of rain 
water from the roofs. The town, except in the br ief  wet season 
from December to March, invariably disappointed v i s i to r s  who had 
expected something more t ropical .  As a place to l ive Lewis Lett 
thought Port Moresby by 1939 had become a town as 'dul ly and 
regret tably respectable as any other.  For with the coming of women 
and the flood of commercialism.. . the pioneer element has 
disappeared' . (69) Sir Hubert Murray could write in the 1938-39 
Annual Report of 'our l i f e ' s  dull-round proceeding as usual '  as 
the news of a fresh European war arrived and he 'found i t  
d i f f i cu l t  even to feign an i n te res t  in the local a c t iv i t i e s  which 
had hi therto absorbed so much of my l i f e ' . (70) If  for government 
o f f i c i a l s  the heroic age of paci f icat ion had been succeeded by an 
age of bureaucratic rout ine,  so for planters the exciting stages 
of development, the clearing of the bush and the laying down of 
the plantat ions,  had been followed by years of waiting and of
68 Edward P Wolfers. Race rela t ions and colonial rule in
Papua New Guinea (Sydney, 1975). p. 45.
69 Lewis Lett .  Papua, i t s  People and i t s  Promise (Melbourne.
1944).
70 PAR 1938-39, p. 1.
bondage to the needs of trees, labourers, and markets.
Yet both o f f i c i a l s  and planters, once so opposed, now shared a 
very strong sense of 'ownership' of the country. Frequently, i f  
mainly perhaps to d is t inguish themselves from the white community 
in New Guinea, they had cal led themselves 'Papuans'. Less 
frequent ly  and more formal ly  they described themselves as 
1Anglo-Papuans1 - those who had, in th e i r  sense, 'made' the 
country ju s t  as i t  had been white people l i k e  themselves who had 
named and created 'Papua'. The other Papuans were Papuan 'natives 
the best of whom might be more able than whites of an ' i n f e r i o r  
class' perhaps but who general ly were s t i l l  destined fo r  a very 
long apprenticeship in c i v i l i z a t i o n .  In the t h i r t i e s  with most of 
the world s t i l l  apparently safe wi th in the ambit of 
unchallengeable European power i t  was quite easy fo r  'ord inary '  
white people to hold such a view. Gandhi seemed to the average 
white man a joke, the Indian na t iona l is ts  pushy and ungrateful,  
and only the Japanese, the Germans, and the Bolsheviks real 
enemies of world order.(71)
71 Atlee Hunt had wr i t ten p r iva te ly  to Murray in October 1916 
when as a resu l t  of C F Andrews' report on the indenture 
of Indians overseas the Government of India ended the 
system. Hunt had been told that Andrews was 'qu i te  a crank 
on the subject of Indian labour' who had 'ser ious ly  
lowered his own status with the whites by an extraordi nary 
action he committed in Natal ' where he had ' l i t e r a l l y  
kissed' the feet of an Indian leader named ' Gandi' ( s i c ) .
In CRS A1 20/11706.
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Chapter 19 Transgression and ret r ibut ion
The individual s e t t l e r  was vulnerable and his safety f i na l ly  
depended on the perception by Papuans that ,  i f  the provocation was 
suf f ic ient ,  the reach of the gavamani was very considerable,  and 
that  re t r ibut ion was both certain and i r r e s i s t i b l e .  The capacity 
of the new author i t ies  in the forceful suppression of warfare and 
unflagging pursui t  of 'wrong-doers'  had been demonstrated quite 
overwhelmingly and within l iving memory by MacGregor, LeHunte, and 
Christopher Robinson. But there was a gap between open opposition 
to the government, i t s  laws and i t s  of f icers ,  and the small thef t s  
and evasions,
the loafing,  the scheming, the waste and destruct iveness 
of the native on his job - things which only prohibit ive 
expenditure on white supervisors could hope to cope with 
and then not too successfully - the thousand and o> • 
insolences and i r r i t a b i l i t i e s . . . tha t  confront the grower 
at every turn against which he has no pract ical  remedy at 
all save a very risky and i l legal  one.(l )
Acts of 'disobedience'  and 'di srespect '  directed towards the 
isolated and f a l l i b l e  employer - his power obviously limited - 
were hardly uncommon as Papuans were prompted to assert  thei r  
dignity as men. Such an isolated European might be outnumbered a 
hundred to one, and the constant concern to maintain thei r  
individual authori ty and a general ' respect  for the white man' was
1 Papuan Courier. 14 August 1936. Let ter  writ ten by Richard 
Wal she.
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kept alive in the minds of most set t lers as much by these smaller 
shows of defiance met with frequently, as by the much less 
frequent reports of actual attacks. They were signs, sett lers 
could think, of a savagery s t i l l  barely repressed in a people so 
recently subjugated. It  might now seem more remarkable that 
Papuans threatened the sett ler  so seldom and accepted the isolated 
white man at his own valuation as much as they did.
Yet, for the European both his fears and his overcoming of them 
might have provided zest in a l i fe in other respects dull. He was 
also strongly prompted not to lose his standing with other whites 
by failing to 'control'  his labour. The trick, many found, was to 
forestall a display of provocative behaviour from assertive 
labourers with a show of bravado, personal power and 
self-confidence that left Papuans impressed. The penal sanctions 
of the labour code were a blunt weapon and for an employer to be 
forced to rely on them too heavily could be considered by his 
peers an admission of defeat.
A planter's capacity to command respect depended partly on 
mystery - the novel and unpredictable quality that much of the 
behaviour of Europeans possessed at least for 'raw recruits '  from 
the bush, and which kept them intimidated, intrigued, and 
frequently, i t  can be assumed, just amused. Europeans themselves 
were very aware of their effect generally, often planning to 
surprise, impress, and even occasionally delight their employees 
with exotic wonders - and being disappointed if Papuans failed to 
respond as expected. J F Horn, the visiting director of Robinson 
River, was present at Giligili in Milne Bay in January 1933 to
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observe a f ireworks display provided by the manager, Don I rv ine ,  
to entertain the 'b o y s ' . (2) Percy Robinson could k i l l  a pig or 
issue f lags at Ogamobu as a reward to the men completing the task 
of clearing the bush. Others might k i l l  a bul lock or take th e i r  
workers hunting or f ish ing .  But planter authori ty  also depended on 
demonstrable s k i l l s  - the da i ly  l i f e  of the plantat ion presenting 
many opportunit ies fo r  displays of special ised knowledge in the 
construct ion and repair of bu i ld ings, boats, wharves and 
machinery. Plantat ion development overal l  and the processes of 
production to the export stage had requirements set by the remote 
world outside the purposes of which Papuans could only guess at 
and which gave the planter the i n i t i a t i v e  as employer, ins truc tor  
and technical spec ia l is t .
Labourers were also dependent on the degree of respon s ib i l i t y  
and care provided by the employer - the more so the more isolated 
the plantat ion. Planters were expected by th e i r  workers - as well 
as required as employers under the NLO - to attend and t reat  
personal ly any seriously i l l  and injured labourers - a task 
carried out immediately af ter  r o l l  cal l  each morning on most 
plantat ions. There was a cost in negligence as cases referred to 
the Government Medical Off icers fo r  treatment - except where 
venereal disease was the cause - were a charge against the 
employer. Though also constrained by the law to provide adequately 
for  his workers, every planter could seem to hold power as the 
suppl ier of food, tobacco, she l ter,  wages and the passage
2 J F Horn. 'Diary of a v i s i t  to Robinson River P lanta t ion ' ,  
unpublished. In the possession of the w r i te r .  The Papuan 
Courier of 22 November 1939 reported the large Christmas 
feast provided fo r  his Teste Island plantat ion workers by 
Bob Bunting the younger.
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home. When, a f te r  1920, RM's were empowered to advance up to a 
s ix th of the wages deposited with them and due to Papuan 
labourers, the money was general ly spent in the plantat ion trade 
store the planter control l e d . (3) Generally he needed to show some 
inte rest in labourers' problems, acting as a local ' c o u r t1 
punishing misdemeanours with tobacco f ines and a 'dressing down', 
and s e t t l in g  by force of personal i ty  disputes ar is ing between 
labourers. Generally also the employer had too much to lose i f  
plantat ion routines were disrupted, and strong reasons to maintain 
a sat is fac tory  working atmosphere. But f ig h ts  on plantat ions were 
not unusual, sometimes involving a confrontat ion between Papuan 
worker and European manager, more often between workers, 
especial ly where batches of labourers from d i f fe re n t  div is ions 
were employed fo r  d i f fe ren t  types of work - where, say, Goaribaris 
or Orokaivas were employed fo r  heavy work and Aromas or Ia s i - Ia s is  
fo r cleaning and tapping - but they could also occur between 
labourers from r iva l  ' t r i b e s '  from the same d iv is ion ,  and 
sometimes on larger estates between work gangs p i t ted  against each 
other by the i r  overseers. Island labourers clearing land in 1911 
on G i l i g i l i  and fear fu l  when they heard the sound of axes f e l l i n g  
trees on the neighbouring property, Hagita, rushed to James 
Osborne with the 'breathless information' that ' the Orokivas (sic) 
are coming' . (4 )
The universal pract ice of s ing l ing out experienced labourers as 
'boss-boys' to act as in te rmediaries between the planter and the
3 As noted above p. 73, the prices charged fo r  common trade 
store goods by plantat ion stores were regular ly  monitored 
by both Native A f fa i rs  inspectors and v is i t i n g  RMs.
4 NAPNG Series G91, Patrol Reports, Eastern Div is ion,
C B Higginson, 4 September 1911.
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labouring gangs not only provided a convenient s tructure of 
command l ike  that in an army company or a publ ic school but placed 
social distance between author i ty  and the ordinary labourer that 
was essential in the confined society they shared. On larger 
estates, a manager might never, in fac t ,  d i re c t l y  communicate with 
an ordinary labourer at a l l .  On smaller plantat ions the boss-boy 
system was indispensible i f  a planter was ever to be able to leave 
his property fo r  b r ie f  periods, essential in the t ra in ing  and 
supervision of new re c ru i ts ,  essential i f  he f e l l  i l l .  The 
‘ understanding1 that every planter attempted to develop with these 
employees could be very close and a 'good' boss-boy was much 
sought a f ter .
The mood on a p lantat ion could change and i f  an employer's grip 
was lost in a lapse of judgement, or a pa r t icu la r  batch of 
labourers could not be b lu ffed, impressed or int imidated, and 
openly refused to work, the enterprise was faced with a major 
c r i s i s .  For an indentured labourer to refuse a lawful order or 
desert his work - or to inc i te  others under contract to do so - 
were offences under the NLO and the planter was e n t i t le d  to seek 
assistance from the nearest RM to punish offenders. As well as the 
time lost in work and attendance at a local court hearing the 
planter could face the r is k  that the accused might bring a counter 
claim of unjust treatment or abuse against himself, which, i f  
proved, could resu l t  in f ines and costs being imposed that were 
severe. I f  labourers were gaoled th e i r  services were los t .  Often 
the employer would prefer to have the contracts of ' loa fe rs '  and
'deserters'  cancelled, accepting the losses involved in wages for  
which he was s t i l l  l i a b le  and the costs of having new labourers
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recrui ted.  He could hope for more t rac table  replacements or an 
opportunity to mend his own approach. Other planters seemed to 
enjoy teaching a ' sur ly '  or ' lazy batch'  of workers a lesson, 
believing that  to begin with a harsh regime or to bring back 
deserters to a severe routine ' taught the boys who was boss' .  
Subsequently such a calculat ing planter could allow himself to be 
generous knowing that  he could 'crack the whip' whenever he chose. 
He might even acquire a reputation as a 'good' taubada.
If in many lesser  circumstances i t  was j us t  not worth the
employers' while to bring actions against the i r  employees and a
‘dressing down' or the withholding of tobacco rat ions were the
most common 'punishments' ,  physical violence remained temptingly
available as an immediate recourse in dealing with 'disobedience' .
I t  was one especial ly resorted to by the more incompetent or
insecure among the Europeans, but one nonetheless that  all
employers needed to hold in readiness,  one that  they believed
Papuans understood, and one the threat  of which was far  more
signif icant  in the plantat ion set t ing than the the records of
assault  cases brought against employers can possibly show. White
men acknowledged that  in these 'quinine l a t i t u d e s ' ,  tempers - l ike
lives - were shortened. They spoke of being 'nervy'  or
' 1 i ver i sh ' . (5)  A planter suffering from frequent bouts of malaria
or the consequences of heavy drinking might as frequently have
been short tempered in his management of Papuan labour. I t  would
often be l e f t  to a boss-boy to interpret  the taubada's mood to
other workers. The employee might even feel an indulgent or
5 Papuan Times, 4 October 1911. Under the headline 'Are we 
Mad?' A wri ter  suggested that  residents suffered from 
' furore t r op ica l i s '  and that  ' I t  cannot be denied that  the 
white inhabitants of Papua are hot of temper and 
rancourous of disposi t ion taken all round' .
protective concern for such a white man. Certainly many sett lers  
had good reason over the years to be grateful for the 'loyalty' of 
Papuan servants, boss-boys and crews in such circumstances.
Papuans were also testing the constraints. They saw that the 
Europeans were divided by roles into different groups, that aid 
could be sought from government off icers against employers and 
that the law in Papua did indeed provide a predictable, i f  
inexplicable, degree of protection. In October 1919 Percy Robinson 
of Ogamobu noted that
If (the labour force on a plantation) take i t  into their 
heads to sulk, you can't do a thing. I know that was 
Arthur's trouble - he treated the labour l ike dogs and 
they simply wouldn't work for him. You may 'belt their 
blocks off' and punish them but i f  they don't want to 
work you can't make them. They have nothing to learn 
from the I.W.W., I can assure you. Simpson treats them 
like children. He pulls their legs and kids them on. He 
rarely punishes a boy.. .  We had a government inspection 
on Saturday and there was not a complaint. Incidentally 
we exercise a l i t t l e  diplomacy with the Govt o f f i c i al s  
to the same end. Of course, quarrelling with the of f ic ia ls  
and brutally i l l - treat ing the natives at the same time may 
be personally gratifying but i t  is poor policy from share­
holders' point of view.(6)
The argument that shareholders ultimately paid for the abuse of
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6 Robinson Letters, 4 October 1919.
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labourers was one pressed by the government on many occasions.
Robinson's l e t t e r s  contain quite detai led accounts of several 
white plantat ion ass i s tants  at Ogamobu and thei r  dealings with 
Papuan workers. William Arthur Simpson, employed there between 
1919 and 1921, was typical .  The high opinion held of him in the 
note above in the comparison with Arthur Williams, Percy's 
brother-in-1aw, did not l as t .  The ass i s tant  worked well in sober 
periods but began to be 'rude and offensive'  about the house 
having forgotten how 'half  starved'  he had been when Percy took 
him on. Simpson had ea r l i e r  been 'shaken to the soul with fear as 
he had had a close look at his next step - the beachcomber - and 
this job came jus t  in time to save him.. .His memory lasted about 
three months ' . (7) Simpson's drinking and indulgence with Papuan 
women in the end proved too much for Percy's puritan t as te .  One 
morning he thrashed the ass i s tant  so severely he was taken to 
hospital .  Drinking whisky with Baidam, the boss-boy, in Percy's 
absence, Simpson had touched ' the lowest level for a white man in 
this country - to s i t  drinking with a native.  Besides carrying a 
penalty of six months imprisonment'! By this  time Percy Robinson 
was 'fed up absolutely with cheap white labour . . . I  don' t  think any 
men of that  class are worth employing at any pr i ce ' .  Simpson had 
been a pharmacist in Marrickvi11e, New South Wales, before going 
to Papua - perhaps with a drinking problem - in 1918. In the 
t h i r t i e s  'Simmo' managed Whitten's Bubuleta plantat ion on Milne 
Bay and he died at Samarai in 1939, aged sixty f o u r . (8)
7 Ibid. Christmas Day 1919.
8 Papuan Courier, 17 March 1939.
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Three separate instances of conf l ict  on plantat ions might be 
considered:
The f i r s t  comes from the reminiscences of Henry Dexter, acting 
for a time as a manager for BNGD at Otomata. Writing much l a t er ,  
Dexter recorded with revealing candour a potent ial ly  explosive 
confrontation with labourers in 1913. He had 150 Goaribari 
labourers he had previously recrui ted for Baubauguina t ransferred 
to him. On one occasion these 'old f r iends '  refused to work.
Dexter knew that  the RM was absent from the government s tat ion at 
Abau, and that  to communicate with the general manager in Port 
would be an admission of weakness. 'Rightly or wrongly' ,  he issued 
a gun to his servant,  loaded his Winchester, and confronted the 
' s t r i k e r s ' .  They had acted as beaters for Dexter on Saturday 
afternoons and well knew the power of the r i f l e .  The ' s t r i ke '  
collapsed. Dexter's conduct was completely i l legal  and the 
consequences could have been far  more serious.  I t  is quite 
possible that  such a scene was more representat ive than we have 
evidence for - even i f ,  as a recol lect ion of himself as a newcomer 
perhaps out of his depth, Dexter's account is unique. (9)
Yet another picture appears in a 1929 case which jus t  might 
suggest that  physical punishment was more routine on at least  some 
plantat ions than there is other evidence for.  In October three 
labourers from the Gulf Division employed on Kanosia estate  were 
committed for t r i a l  on a charge of causing grievous bodily harm to 
a boss-boy, Mohi-miri, who had reported the i r  refusal to work to 
the manager, J B 'Joe'  McKenna. In thei r  defence, they t e s t i f i ed
9 ' D e x t e r  ‘Reminiscences' ,  p. 49-50.
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that  they had taken revenge on Mohi-miri because McKenna had caned 
them. Caning was a punishment quite inadmissible under the law in 
Papua, but i t  is at least  possible that  the manager had taken such 
a 'very risky and i l l e g a l 1 step, might have done so on other 
occasions, and was not alone among planters who did so. While the 
workers in this  case were convicted of an admitted assaul t ,  no 
charge was laid against the manager.(10)
The third perspective comes from a Papuan source. Ausa Songoro 
of Mabadauan in the Western Division worked for Tom Sefton of 
Koitaki as a boss-boy before 1942 and as a recrui ter  af ter  1945.
He remembered Sefton as a ' s t rong'  or hard man, and violent to a 
degree. Labourers were indeed frightened of his anger. Ausa could 
remember being called on one occasion to hold Sefton's horse while 
a Kiwai worker was horse-whipped to tears.  The former boss-boy 
could s t i l l  feel the indignation he had then f e l t  at the 
humiliation of a countryman. Yet af ter  ten years working at 
Koitaki he could not recal l  a single instance where a labourer 
brought an action against Sefton for assaul t .  Papuans, i t  is 
possible,  were prepared to accept the i r  employer's r ight  to use 
force to punish them i f  they had 'done wrong'. 'Mr' Sefton valued 
good workers and rewarded them. He was harsh with those who were 
' lazy'  or rough with the rubber t rees .  He ensured that  Koitaki 
labourers were well fed and when they were sick he visi ted them 
each afternoon. He kept two shooting boys constantly out in the 
bush af ter  game to provide variety and in te res t  in the plantat ion 
diet .  These things also seemed important to Ausa. (11)
10 Papuan Courier, 18 October 1929.
11 Interview: Ausa Songoro, Hohola, May 1975.
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Like most others in the development years Tom Sefton had been 
fined for breaches of the NLO and in 1917 was warned of the 
consequences of i l l ega l ly  confining a 1abourer . (12) All this  would 
be forgotten,  his firm handling of his labour probably regarded as 
fal l ing within permissible bounds by the 1920's and 1930's, as 
Koitaki became the showplace plantat ion to which vice-regal and 
other of f i c ia l  v i s i tors  were invariably taken to be entertained by 
the manager.
Indeed Sefton came to epitomise the more successful Papuan 
planter.  In 1935 he had a cr icket  ground with a concrete pitch 
made at Koitaki where ' a l l  hands, European and Papuan, pract ice 
t ogether . . . on Saturday and Sunday, and play matches against 
neighbouring p lanta t ions ' .  J T O'Malley, CNA by this  time, hoped 
other planters would follow Sefton's l ead . (13)
Official  policy was the prohibit ion of all assaul ts whether by 
European or Papuan, employer, labourer or vi l lager .  If  assaul ts 
could no more be prevented in Papua than in most societ ies  - and 
perhaps less than in some, Murray and his off icers  policed the law 
with an eff iciency and degree of equity where two races interacted 
that  might have been exceptional.  And i f  Papuans were more l ikely 
to be convicted on the testimony of Europeans than the contrary, 
and routinely given prison sentences that  appear more severe,
12 CRS A1 18/4271
13 PAR 1936-37, p. 12.
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cer tainly gross or pers is tent  offenders among white men could 
expect prosecution. In 1924, Charles Jackson, once a Patrol 
Officer and then the BNGD company labour inspector and secretary 
of the Planters '  Association during the period of greatest  
hos t i l i t y  towards Murray's government, published his Native Labour 
Law and Practice in Papua.(14) By the time of publication an 
admirer of the Lieutenant Governor he noted that
the newcomer is astonished to find that  many natives are 
only too ready to take the fu l l e s t  advantage of thei r  
privilege to 'make court '  on every opportunity offering,  
and that  convictions and f ines against the employer are 
inevitable if the assaul t ,  whatever i t s  nature,  is proved 
. . .  I t  is frequently very gall ing to find one's only l e g i t ­
imate remedy is the 'ponderous machinery of the law' (often 
enough a d i f f i c u l t ,  tedious and expensive remedy) for all 
the many petty delinquencies of native employees, when a 
' cuff ing'  or even a 'sound thrashing'  at times seems so 
much more suited to t h e . . . of fence . (15)
If a Papuan knew that  'a sympathetic. . .or apparently 
sympathetic. . . o f f i c i a l ' would preside ' to hear pat ient ly and 
solemnly anything and everything he has to say ' ,  then employers 
had to be careful .  In pract ice,  Jackson advised, i t  was 'Time 
alone' that  ' serves to establ ish the mean of a reasonable 'give 
and take'  tolerance and mutual understanding between employers of
14 Charles F Jackson. Native Labour law and pract ice in 
Papua (Sydney 1924).
15 Ibid. p. 37.
417
labour and o f f i c i als 1.(16)
In Chapter 9 i t  was noted that  the posit ion of Commissioner for 
Native Affairs and Control (CNA) was created in 1908 and held 
conjointly unti l  1910 with that  of Government Secretary by 
Alexander Campbell. As Government Secretary Campbell was head of 
the administration through the Resident Magistrates of the eight 
(in some years nine) Divisions into which Papua was divided. As 
CNA his r espons ib i l i t i es  were to supervise the indentured labour 
system.
The roles were essent ia l ly  incompatible, and from 1910 they 
were separated. Bertram Bramell became CNA. He had been an off icer  
in the Bri t ish New Guinea and Papuan services since 1897. 
Thereafter with a small s t a f f  of Native Affairs Inspectors the 
ful l  time of the Commissioner could be given to policing the 
Native Labour Ordinance (NLO) independently of the regular 
magistracy responsible to the Government Secretary.  Bramell was 
regarded by s e t t l e r s  as far  too credulous in admitting 'nat ive '  
evidence and 'a bi t  of a crank' .  He bore the brunt of planter 
antagonism during the most trying period of confl ict  between the 
administration and the s e t t l e r s .  In 1920 in an account that  
demonstrates what was probably a typical planter  response to a 
surprise v i s i t  by the Commissioner - though in this  instance he 
did not appear - Percy Robinson wrote that  he had been 'scared out 
of seven years'  growth' when he saw the Government Yacht Elevala 
heading unexpected towards his wharf for
16 Ibid. p. 38.
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I was sure i t  was that white whiskered old Devil Brammell 
(s ic) . . .coming to inspect the labor and plantation. His 
rare visi ts are invariably followed by complete disorgan­
isation of your labor and the Lord knows what expense 
for all sorts of faddish alternatives of the houses, 
latrines etc. So I was much relieved to see only the 
Governor... Our labor is contented, well fed, well housed 
and the general conditions.. . are absolutely O.K. but i t  
only needs old Brammell to put in an appearance and the 
labor will be upset and full of complaints and our work­
ing programme jiggered up for the next six months.(17)
Percy Robinson, like most planters, had l i t t l e  to hide most of 
the time. Ultimately this was because he and they knew that 
Papuans could not be compelled to 'make paper1 and enter a 
contract of indentured service if they believed they would be 
cheated or mistreated. After al l ,  plantations and planters came to 
acquire reputations among the Papuans too. But for some planters, 
or more commonly managers and overseers, hard pressed, 
irresponsible or just temperamentally unsuitable, and not awake to 
the dangers of alienating workers or believing that they might 
evade the law for a period without serious consequences, the fear 
of the inspectors must have acted as a restraint .  Yet throughout 
the 'pioneering' years and until 1922 even those planters who were 
scrupulous in'observing the requirements of the NLO could s t i l l  be 
indignant at the disruption of their routines by the visi ts of 
'impractical'  CNA officers prying into their businesses and 
questionning the labour force. While acquittals were frequent in
17 Robinson Letters, 29 February 1920.
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cases brought by the Native Affairs Department officers against 
planters, usually for want of conclusive evidence - a fact which 
seemed to confirm the prevai l ing view among the lat ter  that many 
charges were ill-founded or frivolous - there was some effort 
indeed needed not to be caught evading the law in Papua for any 
length of time.
In 1918 Arthur Bloomfield had shown Atlee Hunt the reports on 
the Kanosia and Galley Reach estates prepared by George Wiseman, 
the visiting Malayan planter. Well primed with the planters'  view 
of things Wiseman had suggested that in Papua ' the Labour 
Ordinance is interpreted too l i teral ly by Government labour 
officers ' .(18) Hunt forwarded copies on to Murray for comment. To 
show that forbearance rather than an eagerness to prosecute was by 
far the more frequent response of his officers, the Lieutenant 
Governor reviewed the twelve most recent plantation inspection 
reports of the Native Affairs inspectors, Bell and Greenland, 
which had exposed sixteen clear breaches of the Ordinance and 
three cases of assault. Action was taken in only one case of 
assault - that against an overseer at Mamai on six charges of 
assaulting his workers, and in the case of two breaches of the NLO 
- against Fairfax Harbour for allowing the latrine to become 'a 
serious menace to health' and against Itikinumu for failure to 
provide accommodation for sick labourers. With these cases action 
could not be avoided. In f i f ty  other cases in the year ending 30th 
June 1918, where a total of 320 labourers had laid complaints, 
action had not in the end been taken by the Department. Here 
surely was evidence of restraint ,  hardly of 'too l i t e ra l '  an
18 CRS A1 19/9923. 'G. Wiseman, Report on Plantations, 
Papua'. Murray's comments.
interpreting of the law. Murray could argue persuasively that 
while
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I do not of course claim that the Department makes no 
mistakes...I do claim that the figures I have given 
prove that the Department exercised a very free discretion 
in distinguishing between the complaints which are genuine 
and those which are not . (19)
He concluded,
I think the opposition of the ordinary sett le r to the 
Government, in such countries as Papua, is really quite 
independent of evidence, and arises from the very nature 
of things...he is naturally inclined to view with 
impatience any desire on the part of the Government to 
protect and assist the native...as a piece of sickly and 
unpractical sentimentality.. . he is not a fa i r  c r i t i c  of 
the Government's native po l icy . (20)
A planter, quite understandably, would rather deal in labour 
matters with the Resident Magistrate in his own Division - a 
neighbour with whom he could often build up a rapport. They might 
mix socially. Their wives might become friends. I f  an RM was also 
a qualified Native Labour Inspector whose reports were forwarded 
on to the CNA by the Government Secretary, plantation inspections 
occupied only a small part of his time. On several occasions
19 Ibid. p. 8.
20 Ibid.
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planters would suggest that  the roles of the CNA and the RMs be 
reversed - that  the CNA be responsible only for ' unc ivi l i sed '  
natives and unemployed vi l lagers  and the RMs responsible for all 
aspects of the indentured labour system.(21) In a l e t t e r  to Atlee 
Hunt in July 1918, G A Loudon described Bertram Bramell as 'more 
or less a joke with the natives themselves'  and went on to point 
out the excellent  rela t ions  that  existed between Milne Bay 
planters and the RM at Samarai, C B Higginson.(22) An edi tor ia l  in 
the Papuan Courier of 6 September 1918 - cer tainly appearing with 
Loudon's knowledge - accused the Department of Native Affairs in 
par t icular  of the harassment of planters.  Murray saw clear ly the 
des i rab i l i ty  of maintaining an independent labour inspectorate 
precisely because i t  was disl iked by planters ,  and one reason for 
the very frequent movement of RMs from Division to Division may 
indeed have been to prevent them developing too close a 
relat ionship with the s e t t l e r s  in any one place. In a l e t t e r  
reporting the departure from Kikori of Louis Brown, an RM he 
liked, and his replacement by the shell-shocked young Jack Keelan 
- 'mad as a ha t t er ,  but, thank heaven a type I can manage' - Percy 
Robinson thought the 'Govt, sickening the way they t r ea t  the i r  
o f f i c ia l s !  The Browns toi led day and night to make the Station 
habi table ' .  He added, 'You have no idea to what extent the 
eff i c ient  management of our job depends on a t act ful  handling of 
the Government o f f i c i a l s .  They can j us t  about double our costs of 
development by a wave of the hand' .(23)
21 In Papuan Times. 4 April 1915 and in ' representa t ions ' of 
the Samarai Chamber of Commerce to Poynton, 1921 (in A1 
21/15921).
22 CRS A1 18/12377, Loudon to Hunt, 22 July 1918.
23 Robinson Let ters ,  May 1920. In Penelope Hope. Long ago is 
far  away (Canberra, 1979). p. 175.
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In 1922, fo l lowing the c l imactic  events of the preceding two 
years, Lindsay Bel l ,  previously Chief Inspector, succeeded Bramell 
and faced a then much tamed s e t t le r  community. Bell had been sent 
to Malaya in 1912 to bring back a report on the labour system and 
conditions there. A former senior RM, J T O'Malley, yet another 
o f f i c e r  with an intense personal loya l ty  to Murray and in complete 
sympathy with his determination to maintain the law without fear 
or favour, succeeded Bell in 1926.(24)
By 1924 C F Jackson could explain to the newcomer, without a 
hint of the r id ic u le  that Will iam Bruce would have brought to bear 
a decade e a r l i er, that
The guiding p r inc ip le  behind the administrat ive po l icy is 
the necessity to render impossible.. .where Europeans of 
mixed temperaments and antecedents are working and l i v in g  
under health conditions that tend to exaggerate 'nerves' 
and ' l i v e r ' ,  the adoption of a general s p i r i t  of domineer­
ing and careless b r u ta l i t y  in re la t ions with the native 
populat ion.(25)
Most employer infringements of the NLO - neglecting or f a i l i n g
to provide good and s u f f ic ie n t  food, adequate housing or medical
treatment - were classed as minor and cases could be heard by the
RMs at a Court of Petty Sessions consti tuted on an inspection
v i s i t  to a plantat ion or at the nearest government sta t ion. I t  was
on the high incidence of charges over these offences - together
24 Bell became an optic ian in Sydney. In the early 1930's he 
advertised in the Papuan Courier.
25 Jackson, op. Cit .  p. 39.
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with actions brought against managers fo r  f a i lu re  to maintain 
proper records - that the perception of some in the years before 
1922 that the government was engaged in a frenzy of unnecessary 
prosecutions was based. In cases brought by the Native A f fa i rs  
Department on behalf of Papuan workers, the DNA Inspectors 
themselves would act as prosecutors before an RM, the Department 
also providing a s o l i c i t o r  in the defence of labourers charged by 
employers where i t s  o f f ice rs  believed a defence could be made. 
While convict ions recorded against planters were frequent - hardly 
an overseer or manager was not at some time convicted of an 
offence - so also were dismissals and acqui t ta ls .
Cases of common assault, l i ke  breaches of the NLO, could be 
t r ied  summarily by an RM. RMs general ly would only convict a 
European i f  a complaint was repeated, where witnesses were c lea r ly  
agreed or where some in ju ry  appeared to have resulted. The slaps 
and hair pu l l ings,  the type of humil iat ing treatment employed to 
coerce labourers by some assistants and overseers, general ly went 
unpunished. Most managers and owner-planters using boss-boys as 
intermediaries could avoid such methods altogether. More serious 
cases considered to warrant criminal prosecution were referred to 
the Central Court, e i ther in Port Moresby or Samarai or on 
c i r c u i t ,  and heard before the CJO - Murray himself throughout 
almost the whole period of th is  study, or from 1910 u n t i l  1928 
before the DCJO, Charles Herbert, or subsequently before Justice 
Ralph Gore.
The number of Europeans convicted of criminal offences against 
Papuans was actual ly  small. In June 1921, with the v i s i t  of
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Alexander Poynton, Murray had a l i s t  prepared of a l l  cases of 
Europeans charged under the Criminal Code heard before the Central 
Court in the eleven years since 1910.(26) There had been 
fo r ty- two.  Offences ranged from steal ing and forgery to murder.
The majori ty of those t r ie d  appear not to have been planters or 
plantat ion employees though these were well represented. Of the 
cases where planters, assistants or overseers were convicted of 
offences against Papuans the t r i a l  in October 1911 of the Osborne 
brothers of Rossel Island fo r  arson, the Bernesconi a f f a i r  of 1914 
previously considered, and the case of A M S inc la i r  of Hisiu 
arraigned on a charge of murder, stand out.
The Osborne t r i a l  was the outcome of the f i r s t  v i s i t  by a 
government patrol in three years to Rossel or Yela Island at the 
extreme east of the Te r r i to ry  in July 1911. The v is i t o r s  were 
unexpected. I t  became apparent that the brothers Frank and Eric 
Osborne, fo r  much of the time the only white men on the island and 
planters and traders there since 1903, had taken advantage of 
the i r  posit ion to in t imidate the islanders and engage in a wide 
range of i l l e g a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  They had fe l le d  timber, operated 
beche-de-mer boats without l icence, had placed bui ld ings on native 
land, and supplied islanders with shot-guns. The most serious of 
the i r  offences were the burning down of the houses of men who had 
refused to work fo r  them and a possible case of incitement to 
murder. The lesser cases were t r ie d  summarilly by the RM and the 
criminal charges referred to Port Moresby. At a s i t t i n g  of the 
Central Court on 27 October Frank Osborne threw himself upon the
26 NAPNG & CRS G179, Item 7/2. 'Return Shewing Europeans
Charged with Criminal Offences in the T e r r i to ry  of Papua 
since the 1st January, 1910' 1921.
mercy of the Lieutenant Governor denying the incitement charge but 
admitting arson and w i l fu l  destruct ion of property. Both brothers 
were convicted of the offences against property, f ined and made to 
enter a £50 bond to keep the peace.(27)
A M S inc la i r  was t r ie d  in January 1920 fo r  the murder in 1919 
of Kaima, an employee blown up while S inc la i r  was using dynamite 
to stun f ish .  He was found g u i l t y  of manslaughter and given a 
suspended sentence.(28) Charges of the manslaughter of a 
plantat ion labourer were made against Charles Adolphe Smith, an 
assistant on Jawarere, in 1915, and against the manager of 
Robinson River in 1920, Helge Holm. Smith was found g u i l t y  and 
imprisoned fo r  three months. Holm had kicked a labourer who had 
taken more than his share of a catch of f i s h .  The man subsequently 
died, probably of a ruptured spleen. Because there had been no 
post mortem the exact cause of death could not be ve r i f ie d  and the 
case against the manager was dismissed. He had been previously 
convicted on several occasions since 1914 of assault on labourers.
Over the whole period 1910-21 seven out of nine Europeans 
charged with i n f l i c t i n g  bodi ly  harm and four out of f i v e  charged 
with unlawful wounding were convicted. Two at least were 
plantat ion overseers, one a rec ru i te r .  Richard Jensen, whose 
treatment and neglect of his workers led to the c r i s i s  at 
It ikinumu in 1918, as previously noted, had barely escaped 
convict ion the previous year fo r  having caused the loss of an eye
27 Ibid. And Margriet Roe. 'The History of South East Papua 
to 1930' (ANU, PhD thesis, 1962). p. 475-6.
28 NAPNG & CRS G179, Item 7/2. op. c i t .  p. 2; Papuan Courier,
16 January 1920.
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when he threw a lamp at an indentured labourer. The vict ims in 
other cases recorded on the 1921 l i s t  may not a l l  have been 
Papuans. There were v io len t  crimes committed by Europeans against 
other Europeans. A G S  Frese, the contractor who cleared Jawarere 
in 1910, serving subsequently as manager on several estates, was 
charged with the murder and convicted of the manslaughter of 
'Handsome Harry' Baker in 1915. They had quarrel led over a Papuan 
woman.(29)
Between 1918 and 1932 ten managers and assistants were debarred 
from having charge of labour . (30) A banning order made by the 
Executive Council as a resu l t  of a convict ion before e i ther  an RM 
or the Central Court was usual ly fo r  twelve months in the f i r s t  
instance and perpetual on a second convict ion. The most prominent 
cases were at the beginning and end of th is  period. The f i r s t  was 
that of G E Harris, the assistant on Mamai found g u i l t y  in 1917 of 
six charges of assault and as a resu l t  permanently banned.(31) The 
second was the case of Richard Jensen and Percy Nunn convicted of 
breaches of the NLO on It ikinumu in 1918. The last was the case of 
Edward Dit ton, a stockman on G i l i g i l i  in Milne Bay who was fined 
fo r  assault in 1930, and who in 1932 served two months 
imprisonment on another assault charge and was committed fo r  t r i a l  
in the Central Court fo r  the attempted murder of a v i l la g e r .
Though acquitted he was never to be allowed to have charge of 
labour again. Dit ton smashed the windows of the RM's o f f ice  in
29 NAPNG & CRS Series G179, Item 7/2.
30 NAPNG G91 Series 485, Box 806, Stat ion Records, Abau,
Jackets 18, 19, 1913-1936.
31 CRS A1 18/4271, 'Papua: Reports re Native A f f a i r s ' ,  1916- 
1918. B W Bramell to Lieutenant Governor, 10 February 
1918, reports Harris case.
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Douglas Street in protest , was imprisoned fo r  a fu r the r  three 
months during which he refused to eat. He was deported in October 
1933.(32) Among the others debarred at least fo r  a year were Harry 
Garstang - a onetime manager of a government p lantat ion, and 
W J Connolly - a former Patrol O f f ice r  and Government Land Buyer.
Recruiters could lose th e i r  l icence as a resu l t  of a summary 
convict ion by an RM, and between 1917 and 1921, fourteen, 
including the planters A G S  Frese, Arturo P i l o t t i ,  Charles Owen 
Turner and Hobart S p i l le r ,  had th e i r  r igh t  to rec ru i t  
suspended.(33) A Recru i ter 's  Licence was issued annually, subject 
to a guarantee being secured or a surety of £50 being lodged. As 
with the planters, a second convict ion fo r  any serious offence 
could resu l t  in a re c ru i te r  being permanently denied the r ig h t  to 
employ Papuans and refused a l icence.
In the 1923-24 Annual Report a f te r  noting that there had been 
no serious breaches of the law in the previous twelve months, 
Lindsay Bel l ,  then CNA, wrote that
The conditions under which native labourers are working 
at present are as good, I th ink, as we can expect under 
an indenture system. The natives seem to have no serious 
grievances i f  we may judge by the large numbers in a l l  
parts of the T e r r i to ry  who regular ly  seek fu r the r  service
32 CRS A518, X840/1/5. Prohibi t ions Employment of Native 
Labour, 1932-34. Reports Ditton case.
33 NAPNG G91 Series 485, Box 806, Stat ion Records, Baniara 
and Cape Nelson, 1914-1934. From 1926 private planters 
were permitted to re c ru i t  labourers lo ca l ly  without a 
l icence. Other businesses had been so free since 1918.
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with Europeans when th e i r  contracts exp i re . (34)
And in 1926 B e l l 's  successor, J T O'Malley, found that 
general ly 'amicable re la t ions '  had been maintained between 
employers and labourers in the preceding twelve months. He 
att r ibuted th is  to the 'steady improvement year by year in the 
conditions under which the natives work' and to employers having 
absorbed the lesson taught by the Department ' in  and out of 
season' that to reduce costs at the expense of labour was re a l ly  a 
pol icy of extra c o s t ' . (35) Above a l l ,  the improvements in the 
working atmosphere on plantat ions was a t t r ibuted to the select ion 
of 'a better class' of plantat ion assistant on the company owned 
estates. Papuans in the North Eastern Divis ion were now 
approaching recru i te rs  fo r  work and planters in the Rigo d i s t r i c t  
were almost da i ly  turning appl icants away.
Of 138 inspections carr ied out during the year f i f t y  were 
carr ied out by the Commissioner himself or one of his three Native 
A f fa i rs  Department Inspectors and the remainder by the twenty RMs 
in the i r  capacity as Inspectors of Native Labour. Employers now 
seemed less perturbed by inspections and on many estates labourers 
were being encouraged to raise any grievance d i re c t l y  with the 
manager over the head of subordinate supervisors, a system, 
O'Malley thought, that 'places the responsibi 1i t y  fo r  contentment 
and e f f ic iency  on the r ig h t  shoulders' . (36) He proceeded in the 
same report to describe unsat is factory types of overseer that
34 PAR 1923-24, p. 52.
35 PAR 1925-26, p. 82.
36 Ib id. p. 84.
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could s t i l l  occasionally be found: the one who has nothing to 
learn and believes that sympathetic treatment of labour w i l l  be 
construed as weakness, the man with the ' l i v e  mouth1 who nags his 
workers, and the man who has no in te rest  in the labourers and 
believes he must make every small saving while extract ing the 
maximum of labour. There was 'always the inev itab le  bias of the 
white man against the coloured man, which can only be r i g h t l y  
interpreted as race p re jud ice . . .  Opposed to th is  is  the native 
convict ion that the European does not scruple, when opportunity 
o ffers , to take advantage of h im ' . (37) Since 'our pioneering 
stage of development', the Commissioner bel ieved, employers had 
learnt that the 'watchful eye' of the Department could not be 
evaded.
Ten convictions fo r  common assault were recorded against 
Europeans during the year and eight other such charges dismissed. 
There were twenty-four convict ions fo r  assault by Papuans on 
Europeans with three cases dismissed. Not a l l  of these cases would 
have been connected with events that took place on plantat ions. 
Some 600 cases were heard against labourers in breach of the NLO 
with 116 being dismissed. Fourteen Europeans were convicted of 
breaches. The inspections over twelve months had covered 13,669 
'u n i ts '  of labour. There had been 6,716 new engagements and 6,317 
labourers paid o f f .  Total wages amounted to £68,082 with £572 
being withheld fo r  worker infringements of the Ordinance.(38)
In proportion to the numbers of white men and brown men, 'o f
37 Ibid.
38 Ib id . pp. 85, 88.
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mixed temperament and antecedents'  both, who faced each other on 
plantat ions at rol l  call  each morning, the number of convictions 
for 1926, despite O'Malley's reassurances, may s t i l l  seem 
excessive. About 150 Europeans owned, managed or were employed on 
plantat ions.  Perhaps another f i f t y  were t raders and recrui ters  who 
did some 'p lant ing ' .  And plantat ions employed more than half the 
Papuans in service.  While an exact record of the numbers of 
Papuans engaging and completing contracts was readi ly maintained, 
the actual number current ly under indenture could only be 
estimated. Allowing for those labourers with the three year 
contracts preferred by planters ,  and who would not appear in the 
records as entering or ending a period of employment, the total  
labour force under indenture at any one time in 1926 must have 
been between 9,000 and 10,000, the majority,  or about 6,000, as 
general agricul tural  labourers.  If  a corresponding two thirds of 
infingements of the NL0 were committed by plantat ion workers these 
would account for about 320 of the convictions recorded. Thus 
perhaps 7% of indentured labourers on plantat ions might have been 
charged with such infringements in 1926 and under 6% convicted. If  
planters were indeed the employers most l ikely to commit assaul ts 
on Papuans or offend against the NL0 - then perhaps as many as one 
planter in twenty was convicted of assaul t  and one in fourteen of 
a breach of the NL0. Fewer than one in 200 indentured labourers
all told were convicted of assaulting a European.
By 1930-31 Sir Hubert Murray could record in the Annual Report 
that  the Central Court heard few civi l  cases adding - perhaps a 
l i t t l e  forget ful ly  - that  ' the t r i a l  of Europeans on (criminal) 
indictment is prac t ica l ly  unknown. The law abiding nature of the
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white population of Papua has been a noticeable feature ever since 
the days of Sir William MacGregor1.(39) In May 1936, George 
Roberts, another stockman employed at G i l i g i l i ,  was t r ied  for the 
rather brutal murder of a plantat ion labourer and convicted of 
manslaughter. While Roberts admitted to st r iking Kelemesina with 
his open hand a post-mortem revealed a ruptured spleen and other 
internal in jur ies .  Judge Gore sentenced the stockman to eighteen 
months imprisonment. Roberts had been well defended by his 
counsel, Gore conceded.(40) This was the nearest a European came 
to conviction for a capital  offence committed against a Papuan 
before 1942.
By 1930 a cumulative l i s t  of Papuans convicted of serious 
offences in the Central Court and debarred from entering fur ther  
contracts of service - or to be permitted to sign on only under 
conditions - contained thi r ty-nine  names.(41) About half of these 
men had been convicted e i ther  of indecent assault  involving a 
European woman or child or of being on premises with intent  to 
'annoy' a European woman or child,  all but two of the instances 
being in Port Moresby, one in Samarai, and one on Misima. A Native 
Offenders Exclusion Ordinance was passed in that  year to deny 
access to the towns to Papuans so convicted. Gulf and Delta 
Division Papuans in par t icular  were regarded as untrustworthy near 
European women and an order was made that  no men from these 
divisions were to be signed on to work as domestic servants
39 PAR 1930-31, p. 7.
40 Papuan Courier, 15 May 1936.
41 NAPNG Series 485, Box 806, Station Records, Baniara and 
Cape Nelson. Appendix to DNA Circular No. 254, 22 July 
1930.
432
outside th e i r  own d i v i s i o n . (42) Of the remainder, most of whom 
might have been piantat ion 1abourers, at least one and probably 
several others were debarred because of sodomy, perhaps several as 
'notorious troublemakers1 who had been convicted of f ig h t in g  or of 
incitement, and the others fo r  serious assault on a European. 
Eighteen names were added to the l i s t  in 1933 as a resu l t  of 
convictions fo r  the group rape of a Papuan woman of Hisiu. Yet, 
considering the size of the indentured labour force - and 
remembering that many thousands of other Papuans had at some time 
been 'signed on' - the l i s t  of debarred labourers, l ike  that of 
Europeans convicted of criminal offences against Papuans, was 
short.
Whether provoked or not Papuans as men and as Melanesians could 
be v io lent.  Robert Bunting was attacked in August 1913 at 
G i l i g i l i ,  Milne Bay, by Orokaiva labourers armed with knives a f te r  
he had struck one who had threatened him. The labourers when 
questioned by Alexander MacAlpine ARM said that they would surely 
have k i l l e d  Bunting had he been a Papuan but had desisted because 
he was 'another k i n d ' . (43) Much la te r  in 1934, Bunting was 
attacked by Fergusson Island labourers at Ahioma, Milne Bay, where 
he had taken over the management of the dessicated coconut 
plant. Nine of his attackers were given sentences of ten years' 
imprisonment.(44) Bunting died a few months la te r ,  possibly from 
the ef fects of  the assault, aged f i f t y - tw o .  In 1926 Andrew Doyle
42 Ibid. Circular No. 246, 14 February 1930.
43 NAPNG & CRS G91 Government Secretary, Patrol Reports 
Eastern Div is ion,  15 August 1913.
44 Papuan Courier, 4 May 1934.
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a small planter  or market gardener on the Laloki was murdered by 
an employee, Nohoro of Orokolo. The motive apparently had been no 
more than robbery. In 1936, Laidley Cay, an ass i s tant  on Itikinumu 
was very badly beaten by labourers af ter  he had punched one for 
refusing to put out a c i g a r e t t e . (45) Eight months l a t e r  Cay was 
again attacked by workers who were charged with attempted murder. 
Four of the assai lants  were sentenced to seven years and two to 
six years imprisonment. Station Patrol Reports and Journals record 
numerous acts of violence carried out by Papuans both on and off 
plantat ions.  And by comparison with l i f e  in many vi l lages,  
plantat ions might in fact  have been comparatively quiet  and 
peaceful places.
Papuan communities in the vic ini ty  of plantat ions were neither 
free of confl ict  or en t i re ly  subdued by fear  of the gavamani and 
from time to time could probe the l imits of i t s  power. Harry 
Ballot,  a 'Russian'  managing Jawarere for BNGD, was murdered there 
in 1915 by Papuans from nearby vi l lages for ki l l ing a pig. I t  was 
an incident William Bruce in the Papuan Times used to 'show' that  
Papuans held the government in contempt.(46) In the same year at 
Abau in the East Central Division vi l lagers  at Oio ki l led three 
members of the Armed Constabulary sent to arrest  a man wanted for 
the murder of Mageri people. The dozen Europeans on plantat ions 
throughout the area offered to ass i s t  L P B Armit RM in a patrol 
to catch the k i l l e r s .  J R Clay, a coastal mariner staying at
Robinson River at the time and found wounded, may have been
45 Papuan Courier. 7, 14 August 1936; 2 April 1937.
46 Papuan Times, 10 March 1915.
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attacked by the 0io .(47)
The same d i s t r i c t  was disturbed again eighteen years la ter .  In 
June 1933, Frank Clarke, former manager of Domara and now at 
Robinson River, wrote a note to the RM at Abau requesting a police 
patrol .  He had been warned 'by the elders not to l e t  my boys go 
into the bush' .  In January 1934 the RM reported that  several 
murders had been committed by Waramabo in a raid on Wanigela. I t  
seemed that  the Waramabo thought that  i f  they ki l led someone they 
could be sent to gaol ' to  see what i t  was l i k e ' . (48) In May 
C R Corke, managing at Dedele, reported that  some of his copra 
sp l i t t e r s  had been frightened by 'bush na t ives ' ,  armed and 
decorated with f e a t h e r s . (49) In August raids were made on Dedele, 
where an attempt had been made to ki l l  two Goaribaris,  and on 
Robinson River, where the house of an absent assis tant  was 
ransacked. In October there were ki l l ings  and rumours of ki l l ings  
by 'Keveri'  men from the vi l lages behind Domara, the range of the 
unrest st retching over the mountains into the North Eastern 
Division. In December Richard Walshe of Domara reported that  his 
Aroma tappers worked ' in fear and trembling of being knocked on 
the head by "bushmen"' who were 'hanging around the outski r ts  of 
our p ianta t ion ' . (50) One worker from Aroma had been ki l led there 
in 1931. Walshe had been forced to place a ' s ta lwart  gang of 
Goaribaris'  on guard while rubber was being tapped. In July 1935,
47 NAPNG & CRS G91, op. c i t .  Station Journal,  East Central 
Division, April 1915.
48 NAPNG Series 485, Box 809. Station Records Abau, 1913- 
1936. Grist  ARM to Government Secretary,  25 January 1934.
49 Ibid. Corke to ARM Abau, 8 May 1934.
50 Ibid. Walshe to ARM Abau, 17 December 1934.
Awara of Ganai, a labourer on BNGD's Baubauguina estate nearby, 
was murdered. The Lieutenant Governor directed that the RM at 
Abau see that the people of the d i s t r i c t  understood that murderers 
of plantat ion labourers would in future be punished with 
death.(51) The disturbances ceased.
Small societ ies previously hos t i le  to each other could readi ly  
be dominated by comparatively few Europeans supported by the 
organization and technology of the larger world outside. Clearly 
these Europeans were powerful men possessed of desirable objects 
and formidable weapons. But Papuans could continue to entertain a 
level of violence as an expression of personal and group power 
among themselves and would d i rec t  violence against Europeans too 
i f  the strangers were perceived as vulnerable or provocative 
enough. The re s t ra in t  that Papuans and Europeans each exercised in 
the in terest  of sa t is fy ing  complementary needs enabled economic 
and social re la t ions to develop and endure. Plantat ions were the 
major arena in which Papuans and Europeans interacted and one 
which quite qu ickly acquired character is t ics  that were 'customary' 
and predictable. Papuans came to know what to expect, and could, 
fo r  a time, accept the terms offered them in return fo r  the i r  
1abour.
435
51 Ib id . Government Secretary Minute Paper to ARM Abau, 
23 October 1935.
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Part VII Set t l ing  accounts
Chapter 20 Conclusions and reconc i l ia t ions
The white 'pioneer'  episode in Papua was b r ie f  and much of the 
evidence that there was once a small community of ' Anglo-Papuans' 
who believed that they had a permanent fu ture in the country w i l l  
soon have disappeared completely. Hardly a structure w i l l  be l e f t  
standing or an or ig inal  p lan ter 's  name remembered and many of the 
older plantat ions have completed th e i r  cycle. While international 
companies control some of the larger estates and these may retain 
overseas s ta f f ,  most plantat ions in an independent Papua New 
Guinea - i f  they survive - w i l l  acquire a h is tory  increasingly 
associated with Papua New Guinean ownership and management and 
with the economic experience of the new nation state. Their 
'white '  h is tory  w i l l  recede in memory and in proportion. And among 
l iv in g  Australians too the 'Papuan' experience w i l l  be soon 
extinguished. For in i t s  colonial period Papua did not a t t rac t  
substantial  settlement or become the economic 'asset'  to the 
Commonwealth that Austral ians in 1888 or 1905 or 1945 imagined i t  
would become. They could not have known th is  in advance, of 
course, however inevitable the outcome seems now in retrospect. Of 
the period from 1888 u n t i l  1942 we might conclude in general:
F i r s t l y ,  that despite the bold words of the Royal Commissioners 
and others in 1905-06 and once i t s  s tra teg ic  needs were met, 
Austra l ia attempted»neither to create a genuine mercanti le empire
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in Papua (or later in New Guinea) with protected industries that 
complemented her own, nor to develop a thoroughgoing plantation 
economy based on imported labour with which she could challenge 
other producers of tropical commodities in the international 
markets. The Australian domestic market remained too small ever to 
absorb more than a small part of the copra produced in i ts 
surrounding island region, a region where the Papuan growers were 
in competition with many other Australian and British producers. 
And most other tropical commodities imported into the Commonwealth 
would continue to be obtained more cheaply from nearby South-East 
Asi a.
Secondly, that as a field for commercial plantation agriculture 
Papua proved in any case an ungenerous country, less fer t i le  than 
its verdure suggested, with no advantage in i ts resources or in 
the cost and efficiency of its labour force over 'competitors' 
elsewhere in the tropical world. This, the white set t lers 
discovered to their cost and sorrow. Nothing except much larger 
discoveries of gold or of oil might have compensated for this and 
changed Papua's fortunes as a colonial economy. Comparatively few 
white men made a living out of the country.
Thirdly, that while the administration of Sir Hubert Murray was 
indeed one determined to defend the Papuans, so too, i t  seems, 
were successive ministries in Melbourne and Canberra. Their 
concern for the country primarilly strategic and prepared to take 
few risks they would make a virtue of a policy of protection. As 
i t  became manifest that Papua was in fact poor in resources and 
prospects, this was also the cheapest policy.
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If the plantation cycle elsewhere consisted of four phases - a 
'pioneer' phase in which the individual planter predominated, a 
' capi tal is t '  phase in which companies superseded the private 
planter, a 'consolidation' phase in which great agency houses 
provided integrated management services or plantations came under 
the direct control of the manufacturers downstream, and a 
' repatriation' phase as ownership and some degree of control of 
plantation industries were claimed and acquired by the successor 
states, then in Papua the third phase had been passed by.(l) On 
the margins of the plantation world, its small industries 
uncompetitive, the Papuan economy could not proceed to the 
consolidation of plantation interests,  infrastructure or property 
management that characterised the plantation economies of 
South-East Asia after 1920. If these developments signified 
'maturity' in those economies then Papua's economy remained 
'immature' even as the last phase approached. Nor, without 
imported labour, could the Territory have taken the Fijian path 
whereby Indian tenant farmers replaced white planters as the 
foundation of an integrated commodity export industry.
Papua had not stood the commercial test .  Its copra industry 
stagnated and i ts rubber never became competitive. Attempts to 
develop other industries failed. It  became apparent- that the 
Territory could not be another Java or Malaya or Ceylon because 
Java, Malaya’and Ceylon already existed. The reality was that 
Australians had neither the numbers, nor the wealth, nor indeed
1 This model of the course of plantation development is 
discussed in G C Goldthorpe: 'Plantation Agriculture in 
Papua New Guinea'. Institute of National Affairs Occasional 
Paper No. 19 (Port Moresby, 1985) p. 52 et seq.
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s u f f ic ie n t  good reason to invest more heavi ly in th e i r  dependency 
- in e i ther i t s  industr ies or i t s  administrat ion; only the 
st ra teg ic  arguments fo r  the annexation of B r i t ish  New Guinea were 
in the end, fo r  them, unquestionably vindicated. Papua's 
industr ies contributed towards i t s  upkeep but otherwise they were 
without importance.
And as demonstration models of industry among the Papuans 
plantat ions can hardly be said to have succeeded. Throughout the 
period covered by th is  study small-holder development remained 
small - rewarded with meagre returns and tainted by the pressure 
applied on unwil l ing v i l lage rs  by government o f f ice rs  carrying out 
a pol icy of 'encouragement1. Despite an ancient t ra d i t io n  of 
barter trade between Papuan communities the in trus ion of European 
commerce led to no growth of a class of 'na t ive '  traders, small 
businessmen or sk i l led  managers; perhaps the advantage Europeans 
possessed in the new trading was such that Papuans were excluded 
from the beginning; perhaps Papuans were content that the new 
economic functions carried out by Europeans should remain in the 
hands of these strangers outside the c i r c le  of customary 
ob l igation. Small-holder cash-cropping would expand in the 
f i f t i e s  as commodity prices rose and a much more resolute 
programme of agr icu l tura l  extension was begun but i t  is doubtful 
that the presence of commercial plantat ions was essential in 
st imulat ing th is  development.
Modern Papua New Guineans might have reason to be glad of the 
' f a i l u r e '  of colonial Papua as they might be rel ieved by the 
determination of the Austral ian and Papuan governments not to
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admit an alien labour force into the country when i t  was within 
their  power to do so. European intervention may have been 
rela t ively less destruct ive of Papuan societ ies than of small 
societ ies in other parts of the world precisely in proportion to 
the fa i lure  of the development the intruders had hoped for.  
Certainly a much larger white community, i f  i t  had become 
established - and l ike those elsewhere - might have stubbornly 
resisted the eventual t ransfer  of power to Papua New Guineans. 
Papuans might believe that  they gained l i t t l e  from thei r  
experience of European colonization but they were also spared 
much.
Of planters and s e t t l e r s
To colonize an apparent Eden, to s e t t l e  and cul t ivate  'new' 
lands, are profoundly formative experiences. To create and to 
defend a permanent stake in a country that  may be passed on to 
others of the s e t t l e r  group may const i tute  an almost biological 
imperative. To expect to be j us t i f i ed  by time in the possession of 
t e r r i to ry  might seem something well worth the sacr i f i ce  and effor t  
of a l i fe- t ime.  And so i t  seemed for a time to the white pioneers 
in Papua. The tenaci ty of the i r  commitment to the.country they 
claimed is s t r iking.  Like the i r  contemporaries in Kenya or 
Rhodesia, they had come confidently,  believing themselves the 
f i r s t  ful ly conscious and adult people to tread that  earth,  the 
f i r s t  to real ly  see i t  for what i t  was, and to t ruly possess i t .  
They believed that had come to stay and they had high hopes. And 
most of those who put down roots in the boom years remained to
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take what came. They were g re a t ly  disappointed.
For by 1935 Papua's ' f a i l u r e '  was a l l  too c lear .  Papua, i t s  
s e t t l e r s  now recognised, would never be a ‘ white man's count ry ' .  
And those who had f o o l i s h l y  se t t led  there , i t  seemed, would never 
f ind  p rosper i ty .  Richard Walshe, managing at Domara, and admitt ing 
to pessimism, wrote to the Papuan Courier in June to question the 
assumption made in the leader of 17th May tha t  p rosper i ty  might 
' r e t u r n ' .  'Has "p ro sp e r i t y "  been here then? ',  he asked. 'Has 
somebody seen i t  at las t? '  The only p rosper i ty  Papua had known, he 
was ce r ta in ,  was the 'mirage' created by ' ca p i ta l  and yet more 
pr iva te  cap i ta l  FLOWING IN ' .  (2) In June, 'Adsum' re f le c te d  that
At some d is ta n t  date a "H is to ry  of Papua" w i l l  be w r i t te n .  
. . .The f i r s t  t h i r t y  years w i l l  no doubt be sty led the 
Early or Pioneer Period. The next t h i r t y  years might be 
styled The Grasscutters Period. What w i l l  the t h i r t y  year 
period commencing now be styled? Let us hope i t  w i l l  be a 
period of true development. I f  not why not l e t  the 
Germans, Japs, or the real nat ives have i t ?  There is any 
amount of room in A u s t ra l ia ,  and no need to come to  Papua 
to - w e l l ,  d e t e r i o r a t e . (3)
Why indeed did s e t t l e r s  now stay? Because of the residual
a l lu re  of the is lands?(4) Because of an attachment to cl imate? To
2 Papuan Cour ie r , 14 June 1935.
3 Papuan C our ie r , 3 July  1936.
4 Dexter, 'Reminiscences' , p. 287. For Henry Dexter i t  was 
the 'Call  of the i s la n d s ' .  Years before he had been 
advised "You take my t i p  and get out of th is  country as 
soon as you can or every time you go away y o u ' l l  be hearing 
the Call and be always coming back. I t ' s  damned u n s e t t l i n ' ,
I can t e l l  you",  p. 297.
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fr iends? To properties? To a shared way of l i f e ?  Or because of a 
'sense of th e i r  s in g u la r i t y 1 among al iens, a deep unadmitted 
pleasure in being lords over lesser men? Certa in ly  an 
unwil lingness to admit f a i lu re  and leave Papua, and a strong 
desire to return a f te r  an absence, were repeatedly shown by a 
whole generation of both se t t le rs  and o f f i c i a l s  between the wars.
I f  o f f i c i a l s  could r e t i r e  on th e i r  pensions to Austra l ia ,  and few 
private se t t le rs  could afford to do so, the Commonwealth yet 
offered immense opportunit ies to any European wanting to begin a 
new l i f e .  Elizabeth Mahony of Sudest re t i red  south, but there 
were few others l i k e  her before 1942. More typica l of those who 
l e f t  were Walter Gors, Percy Robinson and the Keelans, who had 
been driven out in b i t terness and defeat. And G A Loudon was a man 
who might have succeeded anywhere. Only his stubborn refusal to be 
beaten can explain 'his determination to stay. Despite worsening 
times and greatly  dampened hopes, Papua, i t s  seems, remained an 
adopted homeland, a fa m i l ia r  place, a focus of s e t t le r  
ide n t i ty .  In an emotional and most t e l l i n g  conclusion to his 
response to suggestions in 1939 that there should be an 
amalgamation of Papua with the Mandated Te r r i to ry ,  S ir  Hubert 
Murray probably spoke as he claimed to speak fo r  the great 
majori ty of the Papuan white community when he declared, in 
opposing the idea, that ' in  spite of a l l  sorts of woeful 
prognosticat ions we have made a success of our t e r r i t o r y . . . and we 
have come to love Papua not only as our home, but as our own 
crea t ion ' . (5 )
5 Sir Hubert Murray. Notes on the Suggested Combination of 
the Administrat ions of Papua and New Guinea (Port Moresby, 
1939). p. 17.
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In May 1935, a poem by 'R.H.'  - probably Richard Humphries RM - 
was published in the paper. In i t  the wri ter  undoubtedly spoke to,  
and for ,  many of his contemporaries among the white Papuans - 
whether o f f i c i a l s  or private s e t t l e r s  i t  did not now matter. 'This 
Land1 presents a profound contrast  in mood and substance to 
J G Fowler's s t r ident  s e t t l e r  verse of 1911.
Whatever call I f e l t  to leave this  land 
In days done by, a prey to thoughts that  seemed 
To promise more than what I had in hand 
Of calm and ease and pleasures real or dreamed;
Whatever call  I f e l t  I must obey
To find r e l i e f  from longing's p l a in t i f f  cry,
I t  is to this  wild land that  now today 
My sp i r i t  cl ings,  my calmer soul gives way.
I feel and know that here where I have fought 
And sinned and suffered, laughed at passion's heat,
Drunk all  the draughts of pleasure l i f e  has brought,
And b i t t e r  cups of misery and defeat ,
Here in th i s  land whose discords sui t  my ear,
Whose features once were sullen in my eyes,
This very land, which has to me grown dear,
Now holds me close in mild but sweet surprise.
Whatever call  I feel to wander now 
To dis tant  lands with wider ways that  hold 
For other men a heavy laden bough 
Of care,  success, or crop of gleaming gold;
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This land, mother of all I know unkind,
Whose wayward steps I never could explain,
This very land the only place I find
Where I can l ive at peace with heart and mind.(6)
But with the pioneer planters who had shared the old optimism 
of the development years or had cleared with t he i r  'boys'  a square 
mile of virgin scrub, a par t icular  relat ionship between some white
men and women and the land of Papua was already passing away. From
1930 onwards no year went by, i t  seemed, without the deaths of 
several of the central f igures of the pre-1914 generation of 
s e t t l e r s  whose presence had given continui ty and s t ructure to the 
community. Among these 'old f r i ends ' ,  Leo Gors of ' Iki - ikina '  at 
Hisiu, and Horace Harbord, a miner in the 1880's rush and f i r s t  
manager of Angabunga, died in 1931. Bob Bunting of Sanaroa and
Ahioma died in August 1934, Allan B Sinclai r  of Orokolo in May
1936, Elias Solomon of Loani in August 1936, Robert Hunter - the 
rough sandalwood get ter  who had planted Daugo for Sir William 
MacGregor - in September 1936, and Charlie Talbot of 'Taupota' ,  
Punipuni, in January 1937. Robert Whitten, the surviving brother 
of the Whitten Bros partnership died on 16 April 1937. Allan 
MacGregor Sinclai r  of Hisiu died in December 1937, Mrs 
Anna 'Granny' Clunn of Ramaga in December 1938. Arthur Bunting - 
the eldest  of the Bunting brothers and with the Whittens and
Mahonys a major planter of small propert ies in the Eastern 
Division, Jim Matley of Waigani - a BNGD manager since 1910, Mrs 
Daisy English of Rigo, ' Gus' Nelsson MLC of Doini and Woodlark,
6 Papuan Courier, 17 May 1935.
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and Don Irv ine of G i l i g i l i ,  died in 1939. 'Scot ty'  Currie of Oiapu 
died in 1940, Fred Kruger of Gamododo and Fred 'Brassy' Evenett of 
Moununa in 1941. Brassy had blown himself up in a boat 
accident. News had been received of other deaths - in 1934 of 
Stan iforth Smith in ret irement in Western Austra l ia ,  and in 1936 
of Walter Gors, Papua's f i r s t  planter , dead in Sydney aged 
seventy-one. Others tempted by the planter dream came to buy or 
manage the smaller plantat ions but the newcomers seemed to d i lu te  
rather than strengthen the old community.
Reconci1iat ions
By 1940 the c i r c le  was closing. Hubert Murray was in his 
seventy-ninth year and had been Lieutenant Governor fo r  th i r ty - tw o  
years having acted in the posit ion fo r  two years preceding his 
appointment. He had also been Chief Judicia l O f f ice r  in Papua 
since 1904. Now f r a i l  i f  s t i l l  unbending, the 'Old Man' had become 
a source of some pride even fo r  those who had once sought to bring 
him down. The social committee of Steamships Trading Company 
arranged a bal l  in September 1938. Unexpectedly Murray accepted an 
in v i ta t io n  to attend. Captain F i tch, so long al ienated from the 
Lieutenant Governor by the telegram of 1920, to ld his general 
manager E V Crisp that Murray's presence there had made the moment 
the proudest of his l i f e .  The two had seldom met, and then only 
o f f i c i a l l y ,  ir> the nineteen years Fitch had been in the country.
On January 28th 1940, 'Gal '  Loudon's elder daughter was married to 
an American geologist in Port and Murray inv i ted to propose a 
toast at the reception. I t  was another moment of reconc i l ia t ion .  
His 'b i t t e re s t  enemy fo r  many years' with whom Murray could not
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contemplate fu r the r  contact in 1918, and the Governor that Loudon, 
alone among the business community, could not bring himself to 
congratulate on his t h i r t y  years of service only a few months 
before, could at las t  see no purpose in continuing to keep th e i r  
distance. ' I  took i t  as an expression of a wish to bury the 
hatchet, and read i ly  accepted1, Murray wro te . (7) A month la te r  
while on routine ju d ic ia l  c i r c u i t  in the Eastern Divis ion he died 
of pernicious anaemia at Samarai.
Some that had become reconci led to his methods and long 
prepared to accept the contra ints he had consistent ly  maintained 
were once again able to see the p o s s ib i l i t y  of another ' fresh 
s ta r t '  in Papua with a fu ture pol icy favouring development through 
government assisted pr ivate  enterprise. Once more the Papuans were 
'too protected' .  Once more, the v i s i t i n g  popular w r i te r  Frank 
Clune wrote, could Austra l ia  ' look to Papua fo r  many t rop ica l  
products imported from foreign countries - rubber, tea, coffee, 
cocoa, quinine, kapok, copra, could a l l  be more extensively 
cu l t ivated. Rice could be grown in the swamplands fo r  native food, 
and industr ia l  uses could be found in paper-making from the 
quick-growing grasses and nipa palms of the mighty r i v e r  val leys 
and the muddy de l tas. . .Our northern f r o n t ie r ,  the Land of the 
Fuzzy-tops, should become an asset instead of a l i a b i l i t y ' . (8)
When asked-his recommendations fo r  a successor fo r  Sir Hubert 
Murray, Tom Nevi t t ,  BNGD general manager since 1934, now declined
7 Francis West, Selected Letters of Hubert Murray (Melbourne, 
1971). Letter No 166, 29 January 1940.
8 Frank Clune. Prowling through Papua (Sydney, 1942) pp. 236- 
237.
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to confide in H W Champion or Leonard Murray. F C Tracy, agent 
for BNGD in Sydney since 1915, submitted proposals on a successor 
for consideration by the Prime Minister,  R G Menzies, on 5th May 
1940. Tracy thought that  'however excellent  the qua l i t ies  of the 
late Sir Hubert Murray, he was not a financial  genius, neither had 
he any liking or regard for agricul ture or commerce and this  is 
clearly shown in the present condition of finance,  agricul ture and 
public works in the Ter r i to ry1.(9) Considering the public support 
planters had given Murray since 1922, and the debt they owed him 
for assistance in the two depressions - as much as he could give 
within the l imits of his resources - this  was unjust .  Tracy saw 
the opportunity presented by Murray's death to make him once more 
the scapegoat for the disappointing progress of Papua with a view, 
no doubt, that  by avoiding any mention of the Commonwealth's 
f a i lu r e  to provide adequate support for i t s  dependency, a change 
could be prompted in i t s  policy. But in July, a f ter  a meeting of 
planters,  Captain Fitch,  as chairman, wrote favourably of Murray's 
effor ts  on behalf of the growers.(lO) The appointment of Leonard 
Murray to succeed his uncle, i f  only as an ' Administrator ' ,  while 
i t  surprised no one, was a disappointment to those, l ike 
G A Loudon, who wanted a change in di rect ion.  The younger Murray 
was not personally unpopular with planters - they had lived 
together with him for a generation - but he promised only 
continuity.  One change might have pleased some, at leas t  in 
principle.  In 1941 i t  was decided that  no harm would now follow
9 NAPNG & CRS G69 1/31 f 1-10. 'Correspondence in which 
Crit icism is levelled against the la te  Sir Hubert Murray's 
a t t i tude to Agriculture and Commerce'. Nevitt to Champion, 
n.d. f 1/31/8; Tracy to Menzies, 1 May 1940.
10 NAPNG & CRS G69 4/39/20. Fitch to Minister,  31 July 1940.
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for Papuan workers i f  the old Department of Native Affairs and 
Control - the la te  Lieutenant Governor's independent 'watch dog' 
over employed labour - were to be amalgamated with the Government 
Secretary's  Department as part of the general adminis t rat ion. (11)
With the outbreak of the war in the Pacific in December 1941 
white women and children in Papua and New Guinea were evacuated to
Austral ia to be followed in January and February by all of the men
who could not be placed in the armed forces.  The sudden departure 
of the greater part  of the European community l e f t  the plantat ions 
without direct ion and t he i r  indentured labourers stranded and
perplexed. No one had known what to advise t he i r  employees to
do. On a few estates  workers continued to maintain the routines of 
production until  the plantat ion food stores were exhausted, 
waiting for a return to normalcy, unable to comprehend so abrupt a 
discontinui ty.  Others perhaps long expecting an apocalyptic 
outcome to European intrusion might not have been disappointed by 
the war. Many small plantat ions already reduced to a maintenance 
s tate  by the depression in the copra market were j us t  abandoned as 
labourers t r ied  to make t he i r  way home. The Australian army's need 
for carr iers  would soon exceed by far  the annual labour supply 
Papua had hi ther to afforded and for the f i r s t  time Papuan 
communities would be subjected to a very large demand for 
involuntary labour. Many plantat ion workers were drafted di rec t ly  
into serving the mil i tary forces without being able to return to 
thei r  vi l lages and without regard to the period of t he i r  indenture 
served prior to the war.
11 Papuan Courier, 14 February 1941.
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A Pacific Territories Association was formed in Sydney in May 
1942 by planters and other set t lers,  mostly those in private 
business and from both Papua and New Guinea, to represent their 
interests in exile. The president from July was E A James, a 
customs agent in Port Moresby and proprietor of the Papuan Courier 
since 1924. The treasurer was Gerald Smith, G A Loudon's Port 
agent. The looting of town stores and residences by the Australian 
troops in the confusion of the evacuation, together with the 
destruction of other property, was a major concern of the members 
at f i r s t .  As the war progressed and time elapsed the probability 
of resuming the same l i fe in the terr i tor ies as before began to be 
threatened by the patriotic and humanitarian rhetoric in the press 
and the Federal Parliament about giving the native people who had 
assisted the allies a new deal after the war. The situation seemed 
to be growing dangerously out of hand and by not being in Papua 
and in possession of their properties the set t lers could feel 
their grip loosening.
The Pacific Islands Monthly, published in Sydney since 1930 and 
during the depression years a comforting buttress of the planter 
establishment throughout the western Pacific, now became the 
se t t le r ' s  only source of information, and the editor, R W Robson, 
enjoyed the opportunity to strut a l i t t l e .  He became intemperate 
in his advocacy of se t t ler  interests at one point proposing that 
the Pacific Territories Association appeal over the head of the 
Australian government to Britain and the United States for 
immediate independence for New Guinea, a motion overwhelmingly 
rejected by the Association. In July 1943 the Australian New 
Guinea Production Control Board was set up to allow production to
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resume in areas no longer threatened by the enemy and many of the 
Papuan planters were permitted to return to their properties 
without their families. Confronted with badly damaged or neglected 
plantations and the work at hand, their anxiety about the future 
lessened. If the Labor Party seemed determined to pursue a 
post-war policy that placed the Papuans above the sett lers ,  
practical men could see that the plantations could not easily be 
done away with nor the property rights of Australian citizens  
disregarded. By November 1944, the Commonwealth committed i t s e l f  
to compensation payments for war damage.
But following on as i t  did from the deaths in the late thirties  
of so many of their peers, in a profound sense the intervention of 
the war had provided a final release for the remaining pioneers 
from a kind of bondage to Papua - a deep severing of their 
psychological commitment to the country and a way of l i f e  they had 
been unwilling to acknowledge as leading to nothing. Forced to 
make many prolonged adjustments of their lives and minds to 
conditions in Australia they would never again regard Papua as a 
permanent home. For many Sydney would now remain their fixed point 
of reference and their plantations 'in the islands' essentially  
businesses - businesses conducted in surroundings that were 
familiar, even dear to them, but no longer truly theirs. In the 
post-war prosperity most could afford to go 'South' for a brief 
holiday or for long-delayed dental treatment, and nearly all would 
retire to Sydney or Brisbane, forming a small and dwindling circle  
of old 'Papuans' in friendly rivalry with their contemporaries 
from New Guinea. The rubber estates begun in the late thirties  
were developed and came into full  production, but otherwise l i t t l e
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advantage was taken of the new prof i t s  to replant  the older 
plantat ions - ' the writing was on the wal l1 and t he i r  proprietors 
content to work them out as they stood. While the new planters 
taking up soldier  settlement blocks in the old Northern Division 
to grow cocoa or those developing coffee estates  in the highlands 
of New Guinea in the 1950's would re l ive  the old i l lus ions  the 
world had shif ted.
Post-war production of rubber in Papua great ly exceeded the 
pre-war output. The area under hevea b r as i1iensis grew to 35,000 
acres and exports reached 6,000 tons in 1970. Copra, nearly a 
third the product of Papuan smal1-hoidings,  amounted to 16,519 
tons in 1964-65 - the plantat ion share scarcely more than that  of 
the best years before 1942.(12) In the early s ix t ies  some of the 
new generation of planters could ignore the signs and s t i l l  hope 
for a 'par tnership'  with Papuans and New Guineans or a continuing 
const i tut ional  relat ionship between Austral ia and the t e r r i t o r i e s  
- combined since 1949 - that  might preserve the economic role and 
privileges of the ' expa t r i a t es ' .  But by 1965 the pace of 
decolonisation elsewhere and Aus t ra l ia ' s  paramount in teres ts  
dictated a rapid progress towards disengagement. Their numbers 
never large enough to allow them to make demands that  might modify 
the Commonwealth's policy, t he i r  dependency on Australian markets 
now too great and Austral ia i t s e l f  far  too close for any seizure 
of power to be remotely contemplated, s e t t l e r s  would accept the 
inevitable outcome. In the end i f  some thought that  they could 
afford the r isks of carrying on, many were given no such option, 
made the best arrangements they could for the disposal of t he i r
12 PAR, 1965-66.
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assets, and went qu ie t ly .
In 1942 both 'Gal ' Loudon and Tom Sefton had turned s ix ty ,  and
Arthur Jewell was s ix ty - th ree .  Jewell died a year la te r  in wartime
exi le . M i l l i c e n t  Jewell , always the stronger partner, carr ied on
af ter  1945 managing th e i r  in te rests  u n t i l  her own death. Loudon
joined the ANGAU administrat ion as Assistant Quartermaster General
with the rank of major. He had been one of only a few
unsentimental Papuan residents in 1939 in favour - on conditions -
of amalgamation with New Guinea, in favour of the larger arena
that such a change would create as he was in favour of the
development po l ic ies  that gave greater securi ty  to the Papuan
industr ies a f te r  the war . (13) He was ever consistent. His Ei logo,
Mororo and Catal ina estates did well in the years fo l lowing the
outbreak of the Korean War and his son, Ian Loudon (born 1921),
with Colin Sefton of Koitaki (born 1920), seemed fo r  a time l i k e l y
to carry on leadership of the Papuan planters in to  the next
generation. Ian Loudon was drowned in a few inches of water when
his car swerved o f f  the low Laloki bridge at Sogeri in November
1957 a f te r  a party at Koi tak i .  I t  could seem the las t  act in a
planter tragedy. The manager of Sogeri Plantat ion remembered that
'something seemed to go out of the d i s t r i c t 1 with the younger
Loudon's death and that i t  tainted a l l  enjoyment o f ' the  better
13 On 17th February 1939 i t  was proposed in the Papuan 
Courier .that G A Loudon should be the 'u n o f f i c i a l '  
representat ive of Papuan commercial agr icu l tu re at the 
amalgamation discussions. The suggestion was not followed 
but Loudon would undoubtedly have proved d i f f i c u l t  in the 
defence of 'Papuan' in terests .  In the paper of 8th August 
1940 he dismissed as a ' joke ' the suggestion that the then 
Administrator of the Mandated Te r r i to ry  might preside over 
the combined te r r i t o r ie s  - 'We ourselves in Papua can 
produce at least half  a dozen more outstanding men', he 
thought.
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times of the s ix t ies .  G A Loudon died in Sydney in 1964. He had 
seen the most prosperous period experienced by the Papuan 
plantat ion industr ies in the las t  decade of his l i f e  at a time 
when i t  had become quite clear that the old order could not las t  
and that the fu ture  belonged to the Papuans. His wi fe , Winifred 
'Peg' Loudon, nee Penny, Port Moresby's second school-mistress in 
1913, spent f i f t y  years in Papua. Looking back in 1973, she 
re f lected that planter Papua, the Papua of s e t t le r  hopes, had been 
1 a washout1.
Postscript 1988
At Sogeri, in 1988, Koitaki Estate has been large ly  cleared of 
i t s  rubber and ca t t le  graze in open country. It ikinumu s t i l l  
stands but rubber tapping has ceased and th is  too w i l l  become a 
ca t t le  property supplying the expanding needs of the capital  fo r  
fresh meat. The co l lec t ing  bowls s t i l l  hang from the trees with 
the latex in them coagulated and d i r t y .  I l o l o ,  Percy MacDonald's 
estate on the Kokoda track planted with bud-grafted rubber in the 
late t h i r t i e s  is s t i l l  in production and is being added to with 
even better cloned stock. I t  is owned together with Sogeri 
plantat ion by a Koiari co-operative. Eilogo remained in the hands 
of the Loudon family u n t i l  1978, when with i t s  trees exhausted, i t  
was f i n a l l y  sold to the Papua New Guinea Government. The centre of 
the rubber production is  now c lea r ly  in the be l t  of lower country 
surrounding the old Kanosia, Lolorua and Veimauri estates and in
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the Rubberlands-Mariboi area. The new levels of rural  wages place 
the industry in d i f f i cu l t y  but with fur ther  planting or replanting 
using new high-yield material and with technical advances in 
tapping and processing i t  may survive. There has been a promising 
development in small-holder production of rubber in the Western 
Province and around Otomata at Cape Rodney. Copra production is 
almost at a s t ands t i l l  with elder ly coconut stands,  l i t t l e  new 
planting,  and overwhelming competition in internat ional  markets 
from palm o i1.
The Bri t ish New Guinea Development Company became a subsidiary 
of Eastern Produce Holdings, part  of the Jessel l  (UK) Group of 
companies in 1970. In 1984 i t  was acquired together with Kanosia 
and Veimauri by the Belgian conglomerate, S A Sipef N V of 
Antwerp. Sipef also holds an equal 50% share with the Government 
of Papua New Guinea in a large palm oil development in New 
Bri tain.  As agents for the remaining Sogeri es tates  and from i t s  
own propert ies,  BNGD - s t i l l  under the old name - exported 4,200 
tons of Papuan rubber in 1986 at around 80c(US)kg. Koitaki Limited 
remained a Sydney based company into the eight ies diversifying 
with ca t t l e  at Sogeri and at Mt Hagen in the New Guinea Highlands, 
and with coffee nearby at Banz, but became one of the enterprises 
purchased by the part ly s ta te  owned corporation,  ANGCO, which at 
the time of writ ing was also negotiat ing the acquisi t ion of 
Itikinumu from Sipef. Of other pre-war plantings held for a period 
by Steamships Trading Company, Lolorua, Mariboi and Rubberlands 
are now wholly state-owned. The old BNGD estates  Baubauguina and 
Waigani are owned by the London based Commonwealth Development 
Corporation, and Otomata, l ike many other smaller plantat ions,  was
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purchased fo r  or by the local communities. Others, l i k e  Ogamobu, 
are abandoned.
In the old Port Moresby cemetery at Badihagwa, behind Hanuabada 
v i l lage ,  l i e  many of the graves of the white pioneers of Papua 
together with that of S ir  Hubert Murray. They are neglected and 
many of the headstones and crosses are broken down with parts and 
inscr ip t ions missing. Many now are quite unmarked. There are the 
remains of the memorials to two of Will iam and El len Bruce's 
chi ldren, to Dr Harse's daughter Enid dead at 22, to Otto, Arthur, 
Leo, Adel a and Kathleen Gors, to Les Joubert's son, to W J L i t t l e ,  
and to L P B Armit, to Richard Edward Weaver murdered on the 
Laloki in 1906, to Dr Walter Strong, an o f f i c e r  from 1904 and CMO 
1915-1937, and to E J Frame of Burns Phi lp, 'a pioneer of Papua'. 
Ian Loudon's headstone was one of the las t  put up here before a 
new cemetery was begun at Bomana. Tom Sefton of Koitaki is buried 
nearby. He died in 1954 a f te r  a stroke had reduced him to a shadow 
of his old loud and masterful se l f .  His headstone has been knocked 
over. Papuan chi ldren play there.
Appendices
Table 1 PAPUA: Coconut P lanta t ions ,  1940
Owners 1940 Orig ina l  Planter Name and loca t ion  Tons
( i cncn
Central D iv is ion
BNGD BNGD Aroa, Redscar Bay 320
BNGD BNGD Obu, Redscar Bay 375
Dr C C Simson Simson; Anthony His iu ,  Redscar Bay 600
Mrs K Poll ard Gors brothers I k i - i k i n a Redscar Bay 130
Mrs M S in c la i r S in d  a i r The Palms, Redscar Bay
G A Loudon Cl unn Ou-Ou Creek, Delena 88
Mrs V R Ward Whiting Veimauri , Gal 1ey Reach 120
Clarke & Whiting Clarke & Whiting Rorona, Gal 1ey Reach
H Exton Angabunga R. Ptn Angabunga, Hall Sound 110
J M i l l e r M i l l e r Vi 1irupu , Marshall Lgn. 70
C E M i tche l l Vi 1irupu , Marshall Lgn.
BNGD Laka River Ptns Pai1i , Marshal 1 Lgn. 275
BNGD BNGD Baubauguina, Marsh. Lgn. 300
Nagel & Sol ien Sol ien Gal 1ey Reach 15
S & J Sol ien Sol ien Gal 1ey Reach 12
I T Jenkins Harden/Pi 1 o t t i Baramata, Cape Rodney 60
BNGD BNGD Otomata, Cape Rodney 200
P Charpentier Charpentier Nauru, Laloki  River 8
Cathol ic Mission Kairuku, Yule Island 133
Cathol ic Mission Obu, Redscar Bay 84
Cathol ic Mission Teina Materua Tou, Redscar Bay 20
Robinson R. Ptns Robinson R.Ltd Robinson R. Cloudy Bay 1,016
(Burns Phi lp) Gors; Whitten Dedele, Cloudy Bay 171
Robinson R. Ptns Domara; McCrann Domara/Baia, Domara R. 372
Eastern D iv is ion
Papuan Govt. Papuan Govt. Baibara, Orangerie Bay
BNGD BNGD Gadai su, Orangerie Bay 240
BNGD BNGD Wai gan i , Mi lne Bay 560
Robinson R. Ptns Milne B. Rubber Hagita, Mi 1ne Bay 87
C'wth Copra Co. Kitchen & Sons G i l i g i l i , Mi lne Bay
J Driver Leetch/Driver H ih i la ,  Mi lne Bay 102
W Grieg Mariawatte, Mullens Hbr. 16
Aumuller /B1t ing Cowley/Loudon Mogubo, Amazon Bay 150
Dr G H Vernon Vernon O n i -on i , Port Glasgow 18
L M Owen-Turner Owen-Turner Eabu l i , China Stra i  t
Mrs C M Johns Bal lantyne ? Matadona, China S t r a i t 8
J Gray Gray Annie I n l e t ,  East Cape 40
Anglo-Pap. Ptns Wickham/Mombiri Conf1i c t Is lands
? Bre t t ? 48
W. L & D Tanby ?
Steamships Trad Talbot brothers Punipuni East Cape 170
Steamships Trad Nelsson/Sheddon Doini I . near Samarai 120
Steamships Trad P.R.& C. Co N.Z. Mamai, Port G1asgow 290
A H Bunting Ltd Bunting brothers M i la g i1i
A H Bunting Ltd Bunting brothers Panamau ■ Dumoulin Is . 35
A H Bunting Ltd Bunting brothers Mei lai
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PAPUA: C o c o nu t  P l a n t a t i o n s ,  1940 ( c o n t i n u e d )
Owners O r i g i n a l  P l a n t e r Name and l o c a t i o n Tons
(1 9 3 9 )
E a s t e r n  D i v i s i o n ( c o n t i n u e d )
A H B u n t i n g  L t d B u n t i n g  b r o t h e r s S a n a r o a ,  D ' E n t r e c a s t e a u x 65
B u n t i n g  T r u s t e e s R B u n t i n g T e s t e / W a r i ,  D u m o u l i n  I s 45
E n g i n e e r  Group
P l a n t i n g  A s s o c . B u n t i n g  B r o t h e r s E n g i n e e r  Group 85
M C a d ig a n ? 40
G B u r f i t t ? 18
P O sb orne ?
S e w a t a i t a i  P tn s H e n d e r s o n / B u n t g S e w a t a i t a i ,  Normanby I . 240
D 1E n t r e c a s t e a u x
T r d n g  & P l t n g  Co 0 1 s e n / H a r r i s o n K e d i d i a ,  F e r g u s s o n  I . 40
V C E g l e s t a f f E g l e s t a f f W a ta lu m a ,  Goodenough I . 12
W h i t t e n  B ro s W h i t t e n B u b u l e t a ,  Mi 1ne Bay
W h i t t e n  B ro s W h i t t e n K u i a r o ,  C h in a  S t r a i t
Enes i  P tn s  L t d London M i s s i o n a r y  K i l l e r t o n ,  M i l n e  Bay
(K w a to  E x t  A s s n ) S o c i e t y
S o u t h - E a s t e r n  D i v i s i o n
I Ede Ede Guasopa ,  W o o d la r k 70
A L e B o u t i l i i e r B e r n i e r T a u h i k ,  K au b ag a ,  M i s i m a 6
C Coppa rd Coppa rd K aubaga ,  M is im a 25
S B ru do R & S B ru do K a v a t a r i a ,  T r o b r i a n d  I s .
R H Ede Ede L a u g h l i n  I s . 78
J G Munt Papuan G o v t / M u n t N i v a n i  I .  and M is im a 80
C Cameron Cameron K i t a v a ,  T r o b r i a n d  I s . 85
D H O sbo rn e O s bo rn e  b r o t h e r s A b u l e t i , R o s s e l 142
H W Hughes J o h 1se n /H u g h e s Madau, W o o d la r k
E A u e rb a c k A u e rb a c k Muwo, T r o b r i a n d  I s . 186
Kwa iapan  Bay P tn N e 1sson K w a ia p a n ,  W o o d la r k
? C h a r p e n t i e r L a u a n i , W o o d la r k
? Mahony B o n a g a i , W o o d la r k
A Daw kins Mahony Madaua, S u d e s t 60
? Mahony M o t o r i n a ,  C a lv a d o s  I s .
A H B u n t i n g  L t d A n d e rs o n P a n a w in a ,  C a l v a d o s  I s . 45
Mrs E D e la n e y ?
G u l f  D i v i s i o n
H T C o g h i l l Mawson K a v a u v a u ,  O r o k o l o 50
F W B u rk e C u r r i e O ia p u ,  O r o k o l o 65
A Drummond Shaw-Moody H u i v a ,  I e  I n l e t 186
Mrs V P r i d d l e Ä s h t o n / P r i d d l e A r i m i r i ,  Kerema 80
London M i s s i o n -
a r y  S o c i e t y C l a r k Koaru 40
G W Lup son Fowl e r? V a i 1a l a  R i v e r
S t e a m s h ip s  T ra d L e t t / P u x l e y M a i r a ,  V a i 1 a l a  R i v e r 125
S t e a m s h ip s  T ra d McDonald V a i v i r i , V a i 1a l a  R i v e r 70
PAPUA: Coconut Plantat ions.  1940 (continued)
Edwin Clay Robinson Varoe, Kikori River 15
Western Division
Luff & Gordon Papuan Industries Dirimu, Binaturi River 100
Source: CRS & NAPNG G69 25/20 C. 117/1/1825.1 Amended l i s t  of
Copra growers' .  21 November 1940. The l i s t  was compiled 
from responses to a government c i rcular  requesting 
information about assistance required in disposing of 
copra stocks under wartime conditions.  As some estates 
had already been closed down the resul t ing l i s t  is not 
complete and has been amended here to account for some 
of the planters who fai led to respond and for p l ant a t ­
ions known to have remained in existence.
Mrs J Cowling Cowling Mibu, Fly River mouth 150
Northern Division
BNGD Joubert & Oates? Jaropa, Buna
A H Bunting Ltd Oro Bay Ptns Ltd Wiresota, Oro Bay
70
120
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Table 2 PAPUA: Rubber plantat ions,  1940
Plantation & Dis t r i c t Owners § Area Area in
PI anted production
(Acres) (acres)
Central Division:
Itikinumu (Sogeri) BNGD 1,559 1,158
Koitaki (Sogeri) Koitaki Ltd 2,180 1,050
Eilogo (Sogeri) G A Loudon 600 117
Bisiatabu (Sogeri) SDA Church 20
Gobaregere (Kemp Welch) Papuan Government 217 179
Koke Bagu (old K.W.R.R.E)
(Kemp Welch) Koke Bagu Ltd (248) 111
N G Rubber Estates
(Kemp Welch) Steamships Trading 100 70
Veimauri (Galley Reach)* Mrs Vera Ruby Ward 430 110
Lolorua (Galley Reach) Anglo-Papuan Ptns 2,853 1,100
Kanosia (Gal 1ey Reach) Clarke & Whiting 1,638 1,398
Doa (Gal 1ey Reach) BNGD 809 581
Jawarere (Musgrave River) BNGD (288) ?
Northern Division:
Kokoda Papuan Government 125 90
Oro Bay* A H Bunting 7
Eastern Division:
Keuru (Domara River)* Robinson River Ptns
(includes Baia) (Burns Philp) 250
Mamai (Port Glasgow)* Steamships Trading 270 120
Loani (near Samarai) D & W Gill 170 45
Hagita (Mi 1ne Bay)* Robinson River Ptns
(Burns Philp) 58
Sagarai (Mullens Hbr.) Mrs Mi Hi  cent Jewell 450 420
Tomanau (Mullens Hbr.) (80) ?
Delta Division:
Kikori (Kikori River) Papuan Government 250 190
Ogamobu (Kikori River) BNGD 507 410
Western Division:
Madiri (Fly River) Mrs Janet Cowling 300
Total 7,784
§ The areas planted but not in production may represent  ei ther  
trees in decline or new plantings since 1935. The new 
estates being cleared and jus t  being planted - Sogeri ,
I lolo,  Mamba, Mariboi, Rubberlands, Aroana, Cupola and Epo - 
do not appear on this  l i s t .
* These estates were also copra producers.
Source: CRS A518, Item P812/1/5 Part 4. Papuan Rubber Planta t ­
ions as at 15 May 1940; and CRS G69, Item 25/19, 24 May 
1926, for additions in brackets.
Table 3: BRITISH NEW GUINEA and PAPUA: Overseas Trade 1888-1941
(Value of)Imports(£) Exports(£) Balance (+/-)
1888-89 11,109
1889-90 16,104
1890-91 15,530
1891-92 23,755
1892-93 25,261
1893-94 28,501
1894-95 28,367
1895-96 34,521
1896-97 51,392
1897-98 46,971
1898-99 52,170
1899-1900 72,286
1900-01 71,618
1901-02 70,817
1902-03 62,367
1903-04 77,631
1904-05 67,188
1905-06 79,761
1906-07 87,776
1907-08 94,061
1908-09 94,680
1909-10 120,177
1910-11 202,910
1911-12 235,369
1912-13 218,323
1913-14 212,134
1914-15 202,055
1915-16 223,040
1916-17 271,640
1917-18 283,793
1918-19 258,112
1919-20 422,741
1920-21 484,770
1921-22 305,705
1922-23 315,423
1923-24 354,965
1924-25 459,080
1925-26 470,774
1926-27 455,904
1927-28 403,561
1928-29 361,271
1929-30 373,918
1930-31 240,074
1931-32 221,843
1932-33 . 218,016
1933-34 220,605
1934-35 269,299
1935-36 317,815
1936-37 452,056
1937-38 631,497
1938-39 514,808
1939-40 826,412
1940-41 539,152
5,943 5,166 -
6,455 9,649 -
8,134 7,396 -
11,239 12,516 -
14,966 10,295 -
14,952 13,549 -
16,215 12,152 -
19,401 15,120 -
44,345 7,047 -
49,858 2,897 +
68,496 16,326 +
56,167 16,119 -
49,659 21,959 -
68,300 2,517 -
62,891 524 +
75,506 2,125 -
76,435 9,247 +
80,290 529 +
63,756 24,020 -
80,616 13,445 -
79,692 14,988 -
100,599 19,578 -
117,410 85,500 -
99,990 135,379 -
128,016 90,307 -
123,140 88,994 -
94,354 107,701 -
125,428 97,612 -
156,535 115,105 -
220,599 63,194 -
176,247 81,865 -
270,481 152,260 -
172,672 312,098 -
220,236 85,469 -
179,452 135,971 -
239,408 115,557 -
367,629 91,451 -
685,896 215,122 +
454,462 1,442 -
350,363 53,198 -
337,365 23,907 -
324,775 49,143 -
274,354 34,280 +
269,254 47,411 +
275,866 57,850 +
249,135 28,530 +
294,743 25,444 +
355,157 37,342 +
524,001 71,945 +
435,593 195,904 -
490,158 24,650 -
510,672 315,740 -
492,775 46,377 -
Source: T e rr i to ry  of Papua, Annual Report 1926-27 (p. 71) et seq.
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Table 4: PAPUA: Agricultural Commodity Exports 1905-1941:
Copra and Rubber
Copra Rubber
Quantity Value Quantity Value
(tons) £ (tons) £
1905-06 9,315 1,145
1906-07 7,467 1,385
1907-08 7,515 483
1908-09 13,376 113
1909-10 29,498 904
1910-11 17,837 2,054
1911-12 19,368 935
1912-13 16,912 517
1913-14 29,063 1,536
1914-15 12,693 1,501
1915-16 1,156 19,051 43.5 14,816
1916-17 2,096 40,882 85 26,682
1917-18 3,189.7 68,225 144.7 37,020
1918-19 2,598 53,264 207 33,010
1919-20 4,080 124,035 242 41,542
1920-21 2,984 68,579 220 28,966
1921-22 5,063 87,377 85 5,826
1922-23 5,870 112,481 57 5,907
1923-24 7,315 136,659 304 33,334
1924-25 7,765 172,905 511 68,507
1925-26 8,419 204,097 640 194,849
1926-27 9,542 186,837 761 156,274
1927-28 9,825 194,019 811 102,158
1928-29 12,480 214,051 470 46,816
1929-30 11,693 176,485 763.75 50,640
1930-31 9,436 93,710 785 47,036
1931-32 10,011 100,454 806.25 49,262
1932-33 9,686 89,512 953.25 56,929
1933-34 8,082 42,990 948.5 61,324
1934-35 8,570 57,597 1,069.25 79,031
1935-36 10,549 100,681 1,096.75 89,467
1936-37 13,600 191,808 1,112.5 124,174
1937-38 11,249 91,166 1,243 129,448
1938-39 9,357 57,999 1,290 114,949
1939-40 6,656 45,568 1,345.75 152,487
1940-41 8,936 1,273
Source: Territory of Papua, Annual Reports, 1905-06 - 1940-41. 
Note: Copra tonnages include copra exported out of trade with 
Papuan villagers. See note 26, p. 225.
Table 5: PAPUA: Agricultural Commodity Exports 1905-1941:
Sisal Hemp and Cotton
Sisal Hemp Cotton
Quantity Value Quantity Value
(tons) £ (tons) £
1905-06
■1906-07
1907- 08
1908- 09
1909- 10
1910- 11 340
1911-12 720
1912-13 3,039
1913-14 3,633
1914-15 1,269 (138.1) 3,400
1915-16 447 11,999 25.5 1,610
1916-17 326 11,463
1917-18 343.2 17,682
1918-19 287 12,532
1919-20 336 12,284
1920-21 188 7,723
1921- 22
1922- 23
145 4,630
1923-24 32 1,125 45 550
1924-25 396 13,141 31 3,761
1925-26 202 7,695 103 4,866
1926-27 1 33 5.8 824
1927-28 1 59
1928-29 3.7 415
1929-30 1.25 3 2 167
1930- 31
1931- 32
1932- 33
1933- 34
1934- 35
1935- 36
1936- 37
1937- 38
1938- 39
1939- 40
1940- 41
6.75 271 .5 28
Sources: Territory of Papua, Annual Reports, 1905'-06 -
British New Guinea Development Company Annual Report, 
,1915. for the tonnage of cotton produced in 1914-15.
Table 6: PAPUA: Agricultural Commodity Exports 1905-1941:
Coffee and Dessicated Coconut
Coffee *Dessicated CoconutQuantity Value Quantity Value
(tons) £ (tons) £
1905-06 9151906-07 700
1907-08 470
1908-09 325
1909- 10
1910- 11
654
1911-12 48
1912-13 4881913-14 488
1914- 15
1915- 161916- 17
1917- 18
1918- 19
1919- 20
1920- 21
1921- 22
1922- 231923- 24
1924- 25
1925- 261926- 27
425
40 2,494
1927-28 108 7,407
1928-29 4.15 313 260.75 16,0331929-30 5.75 519 747 39,923
1930-31 2.75 242 1,467 79,2641931-32 8.25 537 1,228 59,826
1932-33 36.25 2,404 1,117.75 49,5141933-34 60.25 4,993 1,274 48,0001934-35 79 7,083 1,452.75 37,8951935-36 54.5 5,217 1,415.25 42,4671936-37 88 7,536 1,498.75 47,1371937-38 83.25 6,606 1,541.25 52,6281938-39 111.75 6,911 1,580.5 48,1401939-40 77.25 5,289 1,875.5 58,0151940-41 1,749.5
Source: Territory of Papua . Annual Reports, 1905 -06 - 1940-41
* Coconuts used in the manufacture of dessicated coconut were
derived principally from plantations but included unknown 
quantities of nuts supplied by Papuan villagers.
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Table 7: PAPUA: Principal Mineral Exports 1905-1941:
Gold and Copper 
Gold Copper
Quantity Value Quantity Val ue
Ounces £ tons £
1905-06 24,227 87,869
1906-07 16,103 58,886 137 (ore) 4,098
1907-08 14,557 51,024 176 II 2,479
1908-09 14,710 51,108 67 II 1,340
1909-10 16,151 60,181 72 II 1,439
1910-11 18,497 68,803 403 II 12,386
1911-12 17,047 60,628 594 II 9,681
1912-13 18,247 64,115 1,285 II 18,997
1913-14 14,666 50,110 1,150 II 19,733
1914-15 15,290 51,221 695 II 5,606
1915-16 10,930 43,248 1,156 II 19,051
1916-17 9,678 37,988 2,096 l l 40,882
1917-18 12,168 33,512 1,112 II 11,572
1918-19 11,769 26,641 224 II 1,613
1919-20 11,751 21,757 10 II 107
1920-21 13,232 18,478 255 II 1,830
1921-22 52,704 58,615 2,700 II 13,514
1922-23 17,033 22,494 1 (smelted) 14
1923-24 2,166 6,702 8 II 120
1924-25 4,947 17,642 2,094 l l 41,674
1925-26 7,746 27,134 11,466 II 201,732
1926-27 8,806 29,115 582 II 35,799
1927-28 2,173 6,364 16 II 208
1928-29 2,287 6,767
1929-30 3,624 10,632 8 194
1930-31 6,923 22,440
1931-32 8,574 34,338 1.5 60
1932-33 15,268 45,383
1933-34 19,496 45,933 2.21 74
1934-35 21,732 68,922
1935-36 26,199 81,034 2 10
1936-37 33,580 87,003
1937-38 47,308 108,141
1938-39 64,622 150,198
1939-40 46,239 135,879
1940-41 *14,056 133,341
* 1940-41 gold weight in fine ounces
Source: Territory of Papua, Annual Reports, 1905-06 - 1940-41. 
Where figures are amended in later Reports, latest figures are 
given.
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Clearing at Koitaki , 1908.
(J H P Murray, Papua or Bri t i sh New Guinea. 1912)
Cattle at Sariba,  circa 1909.
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The labour force and European s t a f f ,  G i l i g i l i  P lan ta t i on ,  1912.
(CPP Vol 2 1914-1917)
The labour force at Fa i r fax  Harbour P lantat ion (Sisal  Hemp) 
c i r ca  1910.
(J H P Murray, Papua or B r i t i s h  New Guinea. 1912 p.46)
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' A P I a n t a t i o n  Hol id a y 1
(Beatr ice Grimshaw, The New New Guinea. 1910)
'The labourer 's  welcome home1.
(Beatr ice Grimshaw, The New New Guinea. 1910)

4 7 5
(Bustle Sabine (act ing Director of Agr icu l ture) ,  A S Bloomfield 
and o A Loudon and caddies, 1915.
(Mrs Winifred Loudon)
The Papuan Times press, ci rca 1912.
(Mrs Ellen Bruce)
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S S  u^l
New plantation house 
1910.
at taka River Plantation ( later  Pai l i ) ,
(Nixon-Westwood Papers, UPNG)
Wm
r; - u t '**
I
Young coconuts, No 3 Block, Kemp Welch River Rubber Estates,  
circa 1915.
(National Library of Australia)
Sisal growing at ßomana in 1920.
(CRP Vol 6 1917-1919. p. 77)
Sisal hemp drying at Bomana in 1920.
(CPP_ Vol 6 1917-1919. p. 77)
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Si r  Hubert Murray, Cape Nelson, 14 December 1938.
(Mrs El len Hal 1)
'Nat ive labourers s igning a con t rac t  before a M ag is t r a te 1.
(Beatr ice Grimshaw, Papua the Marvel lous, 1909)
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1908Sma^  ^ p lanter:  L,ohn Clunn and workers at Ramaga, ci rca
(Frank Burnett, Through Polynesia and Papua. 1911 p. 173)
'Government Nursery, La lok i ' .
(Beatrice Grimshaw, Papua the Marvellous. 1909)
480
Decor t icat ing M i l l ,  Bomana, 1920.
(CPP Vol 6 1917-1919, p. 78)
Three month old cotton at Tavai near Gaire, 1915.
( j  H P Murray, Papua of Today. 1925 p. 146)
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The Kia-ora (Whitten Bros.) at Samarai wharf, circa 1910.
Papuan workers returning home.
National Library of Australia)
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The Papuan rubber tapper.
(Mrs Winifred Loudon)
483
Itikinumu scenes, 1938.
(Mrs Ellen Hall)
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Samarai.
Port Moresby in the th i r t ies.
(G Dromgold, Two lugs on a lugger, c. 1938)
(Beatrice Grimshaw, The New New Guinea, 1910)
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Three of Wi l l iam Bruce's ch i ld re n  w i th  servants,  c i rca  1910.
(Mrs E l len  Bruce)
I n t e r i o r ,  Beat r ice Grimshaw's house at Migagi (Rouna).
(Beat r ice Grimshaw. Is les  of Adventurp .1
V
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The Sapphire Creek Gymkhana Committee, 18 May 1913. The group 
included Tom Nevi t t  ( th i rd  from l e f t  at rear ) ,  James Matley 
(with pipe, back row), Campbell Cowley ( f i f t h  from l e f t  in back 
row), A 0 Wallace (with glasses second from r igh t  in back row), 
Richard Jensen ( fa r  r igh t  in back row), Tom Sefton (centre) ,
Guy deMoleyns ( r igh t  centre).  The others were Messrs Thomas, 
Harmont, Ridal,  Fry, and Simmonds.
(Mr Colin Sefton)
On the steps at Koi tak i .  From l e f t ,  Winif red Penny, Tom Nevit t ,  
woman and boy unknown, Ruth Pra t t ,  Tom Sefton. c irca 1915.
(Colin Sefton)
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Vice-regal party at Koitaki,  1929. Centre,  Tom Sefton, centre 
r ight ,  Sir Hubert Murray, Lady Stonehaven, Lord Stonehaven 
(hidden by coat) ,  Leonard Murray.
* (Mr Colin Sefton)
A planter  occasion circa 1938. From l e f t ,  Gerald Smith, E J 
Frame, hidden unknown, R A Goodyear, unknown (possibly Richard 
Walshe), E A James, Arthur Jewell,  P J Macdonald, Tom Sefton, 
Tom Nevitt (with pipe),  J B McKenna, and Fred Godson.
(Mr Colin Sefton)
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D C Lewis Planter Papua 1884-1942
Additional Notes on Sources
These 'Additional Notes on Sources' are appended to provide in 
part fu r the r information required by the examiners.
I acknowledge that th is  thesis in i t s  o r ig in a l form had too few 
footnotes. I have reprinted the thesis with some additional notes 
and amendments. These are outlined below. I f  some sources of 
information remain unclear I believe I have accounted fo r  a l l  or 
nearly a l l  d ire c t  quotations throughout (g la ring  exceptions are 
noted - Note 9 on page 38 and Note 49 on page 334).
Additions and amendments:
The fo llow ing notes, mostly providing additional information, have 
been added or amended in re -p r in t in g :
Chapter 2, notes 1, 3,
Chapter 3, notes 9, 10
Chapter 7, notes 12 , 36
Chapter 8, notes 1, 24,
Chapter 9, notes 7, 61.
Chapter 10, notes 1, 8, 10, 20, 32
Chapter 11, notes 9, 26 - a substantial additional note on
the Native Plantations scheme.
Chapter 12, notes 22, 23 - a substantial additional note in 
support of the argument in the tex t.
Chapter 13, notes 17, 19, 24, 32, 34, 35
Chapter 14, notes 6, 10, 24.
Chapter 15, notes 20, 24.
Chapter 16, notes 13 - a substantial note in support of the 
argument, 54.
Chapter 17, notes 13, 28, 41,
Chapter 18, note 62
Chapter 19, notes 2, 31, 32
New material has been added on pages 196, 296, 376, and 451, and
seven tables have been added on pages 456-464. These tables are
now referred to in footnotes at appropriate points.
Tne fo l lowing material has been re-drafted in response to 
c r i t ic ism s I accepted: pages 256-260 and page 430.
As required I have added several paragraphs to the concluding 
chapter, Chapter 20, on pages 436-449 to make some general 
comparisons with p lantat ion systems elsewhere and to provide 
conclusions addit ional to those in the examined version.
In repr in t ing  the text  a large number of minor e d i to r ia l  changes 
have been made.
I needed perhaps to say more about oral sources. The thesis was 
very long meditated (indeed meditated upon fo r  an inexcusably long 
time) and I became very sure that I had in the end 'got i t  r i g h t '  
again and again - a delusion to which historians are prone? I was 
throughout careful to check out my hunches among my 
informants. Among these I was very fortunate in being able to 
consult several old planters and others whose memories stretched 
back well before 1942. Indeed Mrs Loudon's recol lect ions went back 
to 1913 and Mrs Bruce's to 1903, Captain Clay's to the 1920's. 
Above a l l  I was indebted to B E Fairfax Ross fo r  a cool-headed 
commentary on my BNGD study in 1973, a study that gave me the 
questions I believe to have been the r igh t  ones to ask in 
undertaking the larger thesis. 'Fax',  more than anyone I spoke to 
- he was an a r t icu la te  MLC in the years after the war and general 
manager of BNGD u n t i l  1971 - had a large view of the Papuan 
plantat ion experience. I have recently found J W Lukin of Palm 
Beach - a Sogeri planter and manager fo r  the Loudon family at 
Eilogo u n t i l  1978 - s im i la r ly  acute and courteous in answering 
questions of deta i l  in preparing the f in a l  d ra f t .  I was also, of 
course, fortunate in having access through Mrs Hope to Percy 
Robinson's astounding corpus of le t te rs  that amounted to oral 
testimony.
Other informants whose invaluable assistance is not perhaps 
commensurately ref lected by footnote references were Sir  John 
Bloomfield fo r  information about his father, A S Bloomfield, and 
the Clarke and Whiting connection, and more recent ly fo r  the 
Postscrip t 1988 on pages 453-454, Mr Yogi Srikhanta, Financial 
Control ler in Port Moresby of S A SIPEF N V of Antwerp, the 
current owners of the B r i t ish  New Guinea Development Company, 
Veimauri Plantations and Kanosia Estates. Mr Srikhanta's name 
should have been added in the acknowledgements.
I bel ieve that the 'minor correct ions or amendments' to the 
deposited copy required in Dr Reid's memorandum of 2 March are 
here s u f f i c ie n t l y  f u l f i l l e d .
D C Lewis 
31 July 1990
D C Lewis Planter Papua 1884-1942
C O R R I G E N D A  & A D D E N D A
p. 10, l ines 3-4. For ' l i t t o r a l  and the islands' read ' l i t t o r a l  
of New Guinea and the neighbouring is lands'.
p. 38, l ines 10-11. For ' of of ' read ' o f ' .
p. 49, l ines 14-15. For ' . . . p la n t in g  while l i v in g  o f f  those who 
did demonstrated' read 'p lanting - while l i v in g  o f f  
those who did - demonstrated'.
p. 127, note 30. For 'p. xxx' read 'p. 362'.
p. 195, note 1. Add 'An a r t i c le  report ing Sir  Rupert Clarke's 
opinions was published in the Sunday Times (Sydney),
22 March 1914.'
p. 217, note 9. For 'p. 340' read 'p. 330 and note 48, p. 334'.
p. 220, l ine  21. For '£1500' read '£1,500'.
p. 292, l ine  4. For ' the 'Associat ion of Planters'  lobby' read
'an 'Associat ion of Planters'  lobby', 
and note 5. Add 'See below p. 401 fo r  reference to the 
Melbourne 'Association of Planters ' .
p. 342, note 4. For 'p. xxx. '  read 'p. 18'.
p. 354, l ine  14. For 'Exton's 50 acre block' read 'Exton's 
f i f t y  acre block '.
p. 383, l ine  two. For 'dubus and rav is '  read ‘ dubus and r a v i s ' .
p. 418, l ine  27. For ' questionning' read 'question ing' .
p. 430, l ine  23. For 'Fewer than one in 200 indentured
labourers a l l  told were convicted of assaulting a 
European.' read 'Fewer than one in 300 indentured 
labourers a l l  told were convicted of assaulting a 
European, perhaps one in 250 plantat ion workers among 
them.'.
p. 437, l ine  1. For ' in  Papua (and la te r  in New Guinea)' read 
' i n  Papua (and la te r  in the Mandated Te r r i to ry  of New 
Guinea)'
